G.R. No. 110571. October 07, 1994

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions October 7, 1994 EN BANC MENDOZA, J.:
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MENDOZA, J.:


This is a motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the
Second Division[1]
sustaining the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals from the
decisions of the Board of Investments and, consequently, dismissing the
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner First
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. Because of the
importance of the question raised, the Court en banc agreed to accept the
matter for consideration.

Petitioner’s contention is that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be
deemed to have superseded art. 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O.
No. 226) because the Code, which President Aquino promulgated in the exercise
of legislative authority, is in the nature of a substantive act of Congress
defining the jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Art. VIII, § 2 of the
Constitution, while the circular is a rule of procedure which this Court
promulgated pursuant to its rule-making power under Art. VIII, § 5(5). Petitioner questions the holding of the Second
Division that although the right to appeal granted by art. 82 of the Code is a
substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule of procedure, nonetheless,
questions concerning where and in what manner the appeal can be
brought are only matters of procedure which this Court has the power to
regulate.

Even assuming that there is merit in petitioner’s contention,
however, the result reached in the main decision is nonetheless correct from
another point of view.

Judicial review of the decisions and final orders of the BOI was
originally provided for in the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 (P.D. No.
1789),[2]
art. 78 of which stated:

ART. 78. Judicial Relief. – All orders or
decisions of the Board in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall
immediately be executory. No appeal
from the order or decision of the Board by the party adversely affected shall
stay such order or decision: Provided,
That all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the order or decision.

Art. 78 was thereafter amended by B.P. Blg. 129,[3]
by granting in § 9 thereof exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of Appeals) over the decisions and
final orders of quasi-judicial agencies. When the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226) was promulgated
on July 17, 1987, the right to appeal from the decisions and final orders of
the BOI to the Supreme Court was again granted. Thus, the present Code provides:

ART. 82. Judicial Relief. – All orders or
decisions of the Board in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall
immediately be executory. No appeal
from the order or decision of the Board by the party adversely affected shall
stay such order or decision: Provided,
That all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the order or decision.

By then, however, the present Constitution had taken effect.[4]
The Constitution now provides in Art. VI, § 30 that “No law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided
in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.” This provision
is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed
under its appellate jurisdiction. For
the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its
essential function of expounding the law in its most profound national aspects.

Now, art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing
for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders of
the BOI, increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Since it was enacted without the advice and
concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective, with the
result that it can never be deemed to have amended BP Blg. 129, § 9. Consequently, the authority of the Court of
Appeals to decide cases appealed to it from the BOI must be deemed to have been
conferred by B.P. Blg. 129, § 9, to be exercised by it in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91.

Indeed, there is no reason why decisions and final orders of the
BOI must be directly appealed to this Court. As already noted in the main decision in this case, the purpose of § 9
of B.P. Blg. 129 is to provide uniform appeals to the Court of Appeals from the
decisions and final orders of all quasi-judicial agencies, with the exception
only of those issued under the Labor Code and those rendered by the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals. It is,
therefore, regrettable that in the adoption of the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987 the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, as required by the
Constitution, had not been obtained in providing for the appeal of the
decisions and final orders of the BOI directly to the Supreme Court.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.


[1]
Per Nocon, J. (now
retired) and concurred in by Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, and Puno,
JJ.

[2]
Effective Jan. 16, 1981.

[3]
Effective Aug. 14, 1981.

[4]
Effective Feb. 2, 1987.