COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORP., PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORP., TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP., UNITED ARTISTS CORP., UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., WALT DISNEY COMPAN…

On 07 April 1988, the National Bureau of Investigation
(“NBI”), through its Agent Lauro C. Reyes, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 159) three applications for search warrant against
private respondents Tube Video Enterprises and Edward C. Cham (ASW No. 95), the
Blooming Rose Tape Center and Ma. Jajorie T. Uy (ASW No. 96), and the Video
Channel and Lydia Nabong (ASW No. 97), charging said respondents with violation
of Section 56 of Presidential Decree (“P.D.”) No. 49, otherwise known
as the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property, as amended by P.D. No. 1988.

In the three applications for search warrant, NBI Agent Reyes
stated under oath that the respondents had in their possession and control –

“1. (p)irated video tapes of
the copyrighted motion pictures/films the titles of which are mentioned in the
attached list;

“2. (p)osters,
advertising leaflets, flyers, brochures, invoices, journals, ledgers, job order
slips, delivery slips, stickers and books of account bearing and/or mentioned
the pirated films with titles x x x, or otherwise used in the videogram
business or activities of the defendants; sold, leased, distributed or
possessed for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public
exhibition, journals, ledgers, job order slips, delivery slips, stickers and
books of accounts used in the unlawful videogram business or activities of the
defendants; (and)

“3.
(t)elevision sets, video cassette and/or laser disc recorders, dubbing
machines, rewinders, film projectors, U-matic machines, image enhancers,
dubbing machines, tape head cleaners, converters, accessories, equipment and
other machines and paraphernalia, materials or empty/erasable video tapes and master
copies used or intended to be used in the unlawful exhibition, showing,
reproduction, sale lease or disposition of videograms they are keeping and
concealing in the premises abovedescribed.”^[1]

Acting on the applications, then Regional Trial Court Judge Maria
Alicia M. Austria conducted a joint hearing during which she made a personal
examination of the applicant and his witnesses. Finding just and probable cause for granting the application at
the time, Judge Austria issued the corresponding Search Warrants
(“SW”) numbered 95, 96, and 97.

Private respondents filed their respective motions to quash the
three search warrants, citing as grounds therefor the following:

In SW No. 95 –

“1. There is no probable
cause nor the existence of a satisfactory fact upon which the search warrant is
based;

“2. The National Bureau of
Investigation has no authority nor the jurisdiction to initiate the filing of
suit against the defendants;

“3. The
confiscation of defendants’ seized articles based on the questioned search
warrant violated the latter’s constitutional right against deprivation of properties without due
process.

“4.
The films in question are not protected by Pres. Decree No. 1988 in that they
were never registered in the National Library as a condition precedent to the
availment of the protection secured by that decree. The complaint has acquired no right under the same.

“5. The mere
publication by complainant of its alleged ownership over the films in question
does not ipso facto vest in the right to proceed under P.D. No. 49 as that law
requires official registration. Moreover, the said publication took place only after the
application for the questioned search warrant.”^[2]

In SW No. 96

“1. The complainants, one Rico V. Domingo and
one Rene C. Baltazar, in representation of the Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc., have not proven nor established their ownership over the films
listed in Annex ‘A’ of the search warrant issued by this Honorable Court
against the defendants herein.

“2. The
information provided by the National Bureau of Investigation agents and the
representatives of the MPAA, Inc. are replete with generalities insofar as the
description of the items to be concerned in violation of the provisions of Sec.
3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Their allegations as to the offense are presumptuous and speculative in
violation of the same section of the Rules of Court.”^[3]

Private respondents in SW No. 97 adopted
the motions filed for the quashal of both SW No. 95 and SW No. 96.

Herein petitioners (the private
complainants in the three cases), namely, Columbia Pictures Entertainment,
Inc., Orion Pictures Corporation, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation,
MGM/UA Communications Company, Universal City Studios, Inc., Walt Disney Company
and Warner Bros., Inc., submitted their oppositions to the motions to
quash. The movants, herein private
respondents, filed their replies to the oppositions and sought, simultaneously,
the release of the items seized. After
a rejoinder was filed, the court a quo considered
all the incidents submitted for resolution.

In a Joint Order, issued on 09 December 1988, Judge Austria
defined the issues raised in the motions to quash thusly:

“1. Whether or not the NBI
had authority to file the application for search warrant; whether or not it is
the Videogram Regulatory Board under P.D. No. 1987 which has exclusive
jurisdiction to file suits against violators of said law.

“2. Whether or not this
Court observed due process of law before issuing the search warrants in
question.

“3. Whether or not search
warrants Nos. 95, 96 and 97 are general warrants and therefore void.

“4. Whether or not there
was probable cause in the issuance of the search warrants pursuant to Section
3, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

“5. Whether or not private
complainants who are members of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.
(MPAA for brevity) through their counsel, Atty. Rico Domingo, have sufficiently
proven their ownership over the alleged pirated video tapes of the copyrighted
motion pictures/films.

“6. Whether or not the
items seized by the NBI agents by virtue of SW Nos. 95, 96 and 97 may be
ordered released to defendants.”^[4]

Anent the first three issues, Judge Austria ruled that the NBI
had the authority to apply for the search warrants; that in the issuance of the
search warrants, due process of law was duly observed; and that the questioned
search warrants were not general in character since the provision of law
violated, i.e., Sec. 56 of P.D. No. 49, as amended by P.D. No. 1988, was
clearly specified. Judge Austria,
nonetheless, reversed her former stand initially finding probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrants and ordered the quashal of the search warrants
giving the following reasons:

“1. Private
complainants were uncertain of their ownership of the titles subject of the
seized video tapes;

“2. Complainants did not comply with the requirement that the
master tapes should be presented during the application for search warrants;
and

“3. Private complainants cannot seek the protection of
Philippine laws as they failed to comply with the deposit and registration
requirements of P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D. No. 1988.”^[5]

Judge Austria thus ordered the return of
all the items seized by virtue of the warrants.

Petitioners appealed the order of Judge Austria to the Court of
Appeals, docketed CA-G.R. CV No. 22133­-22135, assigning the following alleged
errors:

“1. The Court a quo erred
in ruling that private complainants were uncertain of their ownership of the
titles subject of the pirated video tapes.

“2. The Court a quo erred
in ordering the quashal of the search warrants on the ground that the requirement
of producing the “master tapes” during the application for a search
warrant, as enunciated in the 20th Century Fox case, promulgated on 19 August
1988, was applicable to the facts of the instant case which transpired on 07
April 1988, and that the same was not complied with.

“3. The Court a quo erred in ruling that appellants do
not have a protectable copyright under Philippine laws for their failure to
comply with the deposit and registration requirements of Presidential Decree
No. 49, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1988.”^[6]

On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals, through Justice Salome
A. Montoya, rendered its decision sustaining petitioners’ first and third assignment of errors
but rejecting petitioners’ second assignment of error. It, therefore, still affirmed the quashal of
the search warrants.

Hence, this petition (G.R. No. 96597-99). Another decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals in another case (CA-G.R. No.
20617), involving the same petitioners on substantially identical facts and issues,
was also brought before this Court (G.R. No. 97156). In a Resolution, dated 06 March 1991, this Court consolidated the
two petitions.

We affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals.

This Court, in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (164
SCRA 655) has already laid down the rule that a basic requirement for the
validity of search warrants, in cases of this nature, is the presentation of
the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which pirated films are supposed
to have been copied. We quote:

“The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films
from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the
validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the
pirated films. The petitioner’s
argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of
application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature
and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the
issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were
necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.

“The application for search warrants was directed against
video tape outlets which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and
renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D.
49.

“The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or
at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the
copyrighted work. Hence., the applicant
must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the
purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether
the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the
pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Mere allegations as to the
existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant.”

We also fully concur with the Court of Appeals when, in resolving
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 22133-35, it
ratiocinated thusly:

“It is not correct to say that ‘the basic fact’ to be proven
to establish probable cause in the instant cases is not the ‘unauthorized
transfer’ of a motion picture that has been recorded’ but the ‘sale, lease, or
distribution of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films.’

“In applying for the search warrants the NBI charged violation
of the entire provisions of Section 56 of P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D. No.
1988. This included not only the sale,
lease or distribution of pirated tapes but also the transfer or causing to be
transferred of any sound recording or motion picture or other audio visual
work.

“But even assuming, as appellants argue, that only the sale,
lease, or distribution of pirated video tapes is involved, the fact remains
that there is need to establish probable cause that the tapes being sold,
leased or distributed are pirated tapes, hence the issue reverts back to the
question of whether there was unauthorized transfer, directly or indirectly, of
a sound recording or motion picture or other audio visual work that has been
recorded.”^[7]

With due respect to petitioners, the Court does not see a
compelling reason to reexamine its previous position on the issue.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions
are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, (Chairman) and
Bidin, JJ., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo of G.R. No. 97156, p. 110.

^[2]
Rollo of G.R. No. 96597-99, pp. 126-127.

^[3]
Rollo of G.R. No. 96597-99, p. 126.

^[4]
Rollo of G.R. No. 96597-99, pp. 127-128.

^[5]
Rollo of G.R. No. 96597-99, p. 128.

^[6]
Rollo of G.R. No. 96597-99, pp. 128-129.

^[7]
Rollo of G.R. No. 96597-99, pp. 160-161.