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FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 110571. October 07, 1994 October 7, 1994

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First Lepanto Ceramics versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a motion for reconsideration filed by First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. against the Court of Appeals and Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to reverse the decision of its Second Division, which had sustained the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals from decisions of the Board of Investments and had dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari and prohibition. Because of the importance of the question raised, the Court en banc agreed to accept the matter for consideration. The case matters because it settles where an appeal from the Board of Investments must be filed, and it turns on the constitutional requirement that no law increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be passed without its advice and concurrence.

Procedural History

The petitioner, First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc., filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals from decisions of the Board of Investments. The Second Division of the Supreme Court rendered a decision sustaining the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and dismissing the petition. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision. Because of the importance of the question raised, the Court en banc agreed to accept the matter for consideration and resolved the motion for reconsideration.

Facts

Judicial review of the decisions and final orders of the Board of Investments was originally provided for in the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981, which directed that all appeals be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty days from receipt of the order or decision. That provision was thereafter amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which granted exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals, over the decisions and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies.

When the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 was promulgated on July 17, 1987, the right to appeal from the decisions and final orders of the Board of Investments directly to the Supreme Court was again granted. By then, however, the present Constitution had already taken effect.

The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and concurrence. The petitioner contended that Circular Number 1-91 could not be deemed to have superseded Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, because the Code is a substantive act defining the jurisdiction of courts, while the circular is a rule of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court under its rule-making power.

Issues

  • Whether or not Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, which provides for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders of the Board of Investments, is effective despite having been enacted without the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court.
  • Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions and final orders of the Board of Investments.

Applicable Provisions

Article 78 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 provides:

All orders or decisions of the Board in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or decision of the Board by the party adversely affected shall stay such order or decision: Provided, That all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty days from receipt of the order or decision.

This original provision directed all appeals from the Board of Investments to the Supreme Court, and it was later amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which transferred appellate jurisdiction over quasi-judicial agencies to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 provides:

All orders or decisions of the Board in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall immediately be executory. No appeal from the order or decision of the Board by the party adversely affected shall stay such order or decision: Provided, That all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty days from receipt of the order or decision.

This provision again granted direct appeals to the Supreme Court, and the question is whether it validly increased the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and concurrence.

Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution provides:

No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

This provision is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction, and it bears directly on whether Article 82 of the 1987 Code ever became effective.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, by providing for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders of the Board of Investments, increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Since it was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it can never be deemed to have amended Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The Court explained that the constitutional requirement is intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction, because the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction can unnecessarily burden the Court and thereby undermine its essential function of expounding the law in its most profound national aspects.

On the second issue, the Court held that the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases appealed to it from the Board of Investments must be deemed to have been conferred by Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, to be exercised by it in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Circular Number 1-91. The Court noted that there is no reason why decisions and final orders of the Board of Investments must be directly appealed to the Supreme Court, since the purpose of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is to provide uniform appeals to the Court of Appeals from the decisions and final orders of all quasi-judicial agencies, with the exception only of those issued under the Labor Code and those rendered by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.

Doctrine

A law that increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution is ineffective unless it was enacted with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court. Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, which provided for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the decisions and final orders of the Board of Investments, never became effective because it was enacted without such advice and concurrence, and it can never be deemed to have amended Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Consequently, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions and final orders of the Board of Investments, to be exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Circular Number 1-91.

Disposition

The motion for reconsideration was denied, and the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over appeals from the decisions of the Board of Investments was sustained.

Remember This

No law increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is effective without the Court's advice and concurrence, so Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 never took effect and appeals from the Board of Investments go to the Court of Appeals. Examiners like to use this case to test the constitutional limitation on legislative power over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction and the distinction between substantive rights and procedural rules.