PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. REY CRUZA Y BAUIO, JOEMARIE PALMAREZ Y PAGDATU, JIMMY PALMAREZ Y PAGDATU AND GARRY PADRE-E Y PALLORE, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

The basic question before the Court is whether the appellants
actively participated in the killing of Canuto Natividad by Arnold Fuentes on
July 10, 1991. The trial court
convicted them as conspirators in the commission of the crime, but they
continue to contend that they were mere spectators.

The incident occurred at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening of
the said date at Barangay Mapulang Lupa, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.^[1]
The evidence of the prosecution showed that Fuentes drove his truck into, and
damaged, the gate of the lot owned by Canuto, resulting in an exchange of words
between the two.^[2]
Fuentes left in a rage but returned minutes later with Rey Cruza, Roy Cruza,
Joemarie Palmarez, Jimmy Palmarez and Garry Padre-e. These five persons approached Canuto from behind and started
mauling him. Fuentes struck at him
twice with a bladed weapon but missed. Afterwards, his four companions held Canuto’s arms to render him
defenseless, and Fuentes then succeeded in stabbing him in the abdomen.^[3]
Rey Cruza was heard to say: “Pare, saksakin mo na!”^[4]
and later Roy Cruza exclaimed: “Pare,
takbo na, napuruhan mo na!”^[5]
The five ran away, but Fuentes was overtaken by the townspeople who had
witnessed the incident. They hacked him
to death. Canuto also expired that same
night.^[6]
The other four assailants were subsequently found hiding under a bulldozer in
the JPL trucking compound where they were employed.^[7] Roy
Cruza disappeared completely and remains at large to date.

After investigation, an information
was filed against the afore-named companions
of Fuentes but, before arraignment, the prosecution moved for a
reinvestigation of the case. The trial
court granted the motion. Subsequently,
State Prosecutor Rafael Señora recommended the dropping of the charges against
Joemarie and Jimmy Palmarez for lack of evidence. Second Assistant City Prosecutor Bayani M. Jamias moved for the
dismissal of the charge against all the accused on the ground that there was no
showing of a conspiracy among them. However, Judge Teresita Capulong of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela denied the motion and proceeded with the trial.^[8]

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Teodulo Natividad, Canuto’s son, Rosauro
Arsala and Tony Go, both neighbors. All three of them described the incident as
above narrated.^[9]
They identified the four accused as the persons who, together with Rey Cruza,
assisted Fuentes in attacking and killing Canuto.^[10]
There was no difficulty in recognizing the accused because the place where the
offense was committed was well lighted at the time.^[11]

For the defense, three of the accused testified, to wit: Joemarie Palmarez, Garry Padre-e and Rey
Cruza. All of them declared that they
had been requested that night by Fuentes to help him push his truck, which had stalled
at the gate of the victim’s lot. They
said that they then proceeded to the place as requested but as they were about
10 meters away, they saw Fuentes arguing with a fat man, whom they later
identified as Canuto Natividad. The
argument deteriorated into a scuffle, resulting in the stabbing of Canuto by
Arnold, who thereafter fled. He was
chased by the townspeople and beaten to death by them. Frightened that they might be implicated,
they all ran to the JPL trucking compound, where they were arrested later by
the police.^[12]

After assessing the evidence of the parties, the trial court
convicted the accused as charged and imposed on each of them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and all the accessory penalties, besides holding them solidarily
liable in civil indemnity to the victim’s heirs in the amount of P50,000.00,
plus the payment of the costs.^[13]

Joemarie Palmarez, Jimmy Palmarez and Garry Padre-e all appealed
the decision in due time. Rey Cruza did
not. But in a motion filed later, he
submitted a brief and moved that it be admitted, claiming that he could not
file the appeal on time “because he was so terribly shocked by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and almost lost faith in the administration of
justice because he believed in his innocence of the crime charged as his only
intention on that night of the incident in question to help Fuentes remove the
truck.”^[14]

The motion should, of course, he denied. We deal here only with the appeal filed on
time by the other accused.

It is settled that factual questions as resolved by the trial
court on the basis of the evidence before it are not subject to review by this
Court.^[15]
There are several accepted exceptions to this rule but none of them has been
established in this case. The
resolution of such questions will therefore not be disturbed in this appeal.

We acknowledge the superior competence of the trial court to
assess the testimonies of the witnesses because of its opportunity to observe
their deportment on the stand and determine therefrom whether they are telling
the truth or falsifying it.

We are convinced with the trial court that the four accused went
with Arnold Fuentes that night to help him attack Canuto Natividad. The three prosecution witnesses testified to
seeing them gang up on the victim and restrain his arms to enable Fuentes to
strike the blow that resulted in the former’s death.

There is no plausible reason why these three witnesses should lie
under oath and implicate the accused, whom
they hardly knew. If they
testified as they did, the explanation could only be that they really saw and
heard the accused as they attacked and killed Canuto and then fled together
even as the townspeople pursued them.

The Court finds it hard to believe that the accused were 10
meters away from the scene of the crime when it was committed, in light of the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses that actually placed them at the scene
of the crime and showed that they actively aided Fuentes in killing
Canuto. Significantly, the defense has
not explained why, if they were really
that far away from the locus criminis, they should feel threatened and
frightened into running away and hiding themselves under a bulldozer in the
compound. That is curious conduct
indeed. We have stressed often enough
that unexplained flight, as in this case, is evidence of guilt.

The appellant’s brief also focuses on the statement of the trial
court that the appellant mauled Canuto and suggests that this proves
lack of conspiracy to kill. It is
argued that the object apparently of the parties – if indeed they were involved
in the attack against Canuto – was merely to maul and not to murder him.

In so arguing, the defense disregards the basic rule in criminal
law that a person is responsible for all the consequences of his unlawful act
although such consequences were not the ones originally intended.^[16]
Even if it be assumed that the real intention of the accused was only to maul
and not to kill the victim, the appellants would still be responsible for
Canuto’s death as the graver consequence of their unlawful acts.

It is also asserted by the appellants that the solitary wound
sustained by the victim should prove that there was indeed no conspiracy among
them. This is a non sequitur. The mere fact that there was only one wound
does not necessarily establish the lack of conspiracy, particularly in the face
of the testimony of prosecution witnesses to the contrary. Neither does the fact that the accused were
not armed negate conspiracy, for their purpose was obviously to assist Fuentes,
who was armed, in killing Canuto.

The prosecution witnesses testified that the accused cooperated
with each other in the commission of the crime. They restrained Canuto’s arms as Fuentes dealt the fatal blow
after one of them urged him to do so thus: “Pare, saksakin mo na!” Afterwards, they all fled
together because, as one of them said: “Pare,
takbo na, napuruhan mo na!” It is clear that they were acting in
concert, from the time they commenced the attack until, still together, they
fled and hid.

The appellant’s brief points to certain discrepancies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, but these are only minor
inconsistencies that do not militate against the correctness of the
decision. As repeatedly ruled by this
Court, the witnesses testifying on the same event do not have to be consistent
in every detail as differences in recollection or viewpoints or impressions are
inevitable. Total recall or perfect
symmetry is not required. As long as
the witnesses concur on material points, slight differences in their
remembrance of the details do not reflect on the essential veracity of their
testimony.^[17]

Discrepancies between statements in the affidavit and testimonies
in court can also be sufficiently explained. An affidavit, being ex parte, is almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate, sometimes from want of suggestion and inquiries, but they do not
really detract from the credibility of witnesses.^[18]

Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In this case, Canuto was attacked from
behind by the five men while he was assessing the damage to his gate. Due to the suddenness of the attack, he
never had the opportunity to defend himself. Alevosia thus qualified the crime to murder
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

It should be stressed that once the complaint or information is
filed, the trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case and all
subsequent acts that may be taken by the public prosecutors in relation to its
disposition must be subject to the approval of that court.^[19]
Before a reinvestigation of the
case may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of
the court must be secured.^[20] If
after such reinvestigation, the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw
the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed
course of action must be addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which
has the sole authority to decide.^[21]

It appears in the case at bar that the trial court did not err in
denying the motions for the dismissal of the charges against the accused. Contrary to the initial findings of the
prosecution, there really was a conspiracy among all of them that justified the
judgment holding them equally liable with Arnold Fuentes in the murder of
Canuto Natividad.

The accused declared that Arnold Fuentes, their co-conspirator
and the actual knife-wielder, was intoxicated when he drove his truck into
Canuto Natividad’s gate and thereafter quarreled with and killed him. This tragic incident would not have happened
at all if Fuentes had been sober at the time and liquor had not muddled his
mind into the frenzy of a senseless murder.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED in
toto and the appeal is DISMISSED, with costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason, and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Decision penned by Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Regional Trial Court, Branch
172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, January 16, 1992, p. 2; rollo, p. 20.

^[2]
TSN, October 11, 1991, pp. 9-10; October 28, 1991, pp. 4-6; December 2, 1991,
pp 8-9.

^[3]
Ibid., October 11, 1991, pp. 10-17; October 28, 1991, pp. 6-10; December
2, 1991, pp. 9-14.

^[4]
Id., October 11, 1991, pp. 17-18.

^[5]
id., supra, pp. 19-20.

^[6]
id., October 11, 1991, p. 21; October 28, 1991, p. 11; December 2, 1991,
pp. 14-15.

^[7]
id., December 18, 1991, pp. 9-10, 12.

^[8]
Decision, supra, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 19-20.

^[9]
TSN, October 28, 1991, pp. 2-13; October 11, 1991, pp. 7-24; December 2, 1991,
pp. 7-17.

^[10]
Ibid., October 11, 1991, pp. 12-17; October 28, 1991, pp. 8-10; December
2, 1991, pp. 10-15.

^[11]
Id., October 16, 1991, p. 10.

^[12]
id., December 18, 1991, pp. 3-12; January 10, 1992, pp. 5-12; 16-31.

^[13]
Decision, supra, p. 15; rollo, p. 33.

^[14]
Rollo, pp. 149-150.

^[15]
People v. Yadao, 216 SCRA 1; People v Cabactulan, 216 SCRA 178;
People v. Celis, 214 SCRA 755.

^[16]
Article 4, Revised Penal Code.

^[17]
People v. de Guzman, 188 SCRA 407; People v. Cabanban, 196 SCRA
353; People v. Fabros, 214 SCRA 694.

^[18]
People v. Molina, 213 SCRA 52; People v. Padilla, 213 SCRA 631.

^[19]
Balgos, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 176 SCRA 287.

^[20]
Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462.

^[21]
Balgos, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra.