JOSE MARIA ANDUIZA AND NENITA DEZALISA ANDUIZA, PETITIONERS, VS. SANTOS DY-KIA AND HON. VALERIANO A. DEL VALLE, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ALBAY, NINTH REGIONA…

Upon the averment that the Court of Agrarian Relations acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its orders of August 22, 1964 and September 12, 1964 granting private
respondent’s motion to reconsider the allegedly final order of May 4, 1963
dismissing private respondent’s suit against herein petitioners and its order
of October 26, 1964 denying petitioners’ motion for the issuance of a writ of
the execution of the said dismissal order, said petitioners now come to this
Court on certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.  We issued a cease-and-desist order.

This case began when private respondent Santos Dy-Kia filed in the Court of Agrarian Relations his amended
petition^[1]
impleading herein petitioners, the spouses Jose Maria
Anduiza and Nenita Dezalisa, the vendees of three parcels of land situated in
Barrio Humapon, Legazpi City,
and therein original respondent Filomena Cajarito Vda. de Dy-Kia.  That amended
petition below alleged that Santos Dy-Kia was a
tenant who had planted and intro­duced improvements on the three parcels from
1943 up to 1959; that in 1948 he left Humapon to work
in Legazpi City but hired a caretaker to work on the
lands even as he continued to super­vise and manage the landholding and
introduce improvements therein; that Filomena Cajarito Vda. de Dy-Kia refused to reimburse him for the expenses he
incurred in the maintenance and introduction of said improvements; that on
December 6, 1961, while this case was pending, Filomena
sold the lands to the spouses who knew about the tenancy litigation; and that
in accord­ance with Section 9 of Republic Act 1199^[2]
the spouses are liable in solidum with
their vendor.

In their answer below, the spouses Anduiza
(petitioners herein) admitted the purchase, denied the other substantial aver­ments
of the amended petition and set up as defense, inter alia
that there existed no tenancy relationship between Santos Dy-Kia
and respondents below, the former being merely a protege
of Filomena and dependent upon her for support.

After Santos Dy-Kia had presented his
evidence, respondents below filed a joint motion to dismiss dated October 15,
1962 on the grounds that the agrarian court lacked jurisdiction because there
was no landlord-tenant relationship between the parties; and that even granting
that such a relationship existed, Santos Dy-Kia had
no right to demand payment for the improvements because he was not ejected but
he voluntarily abandoned the landholding when he employed himself in Legazpi City.

On April 24, 1963,
on opposition of Santos Dy-Kia, the agrarian court
denied the motion to dismiss.

On May 2, 1963, the Anduizas
(petitioners herein) filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that
Santos Dy-Kia had admitted in his testimony in open
court that he was merely an “encargado” of
his step-mother Filomena Cajarito
Vda. de Dy-Kia and that
indemnity for improvements is not recoverable.

On May 4, 1963,
the agrarian court, upon being clarified that the motion to dismiss was only
for the Anduizas, resolved “to amend the order
dated April 24, 1963,
ordering the dismissal of the petition as regards respondents (herein
petitioners) Jose Anduiza and Nenita
Dezalisa Anduiza only”,
leaving the rest of the order to stand. 
In absolving the spouses Anduiza, the court
pointed out that the purchase of the property did not include any lien or
encumbrance thereon; that at the time they bought the lands, “there was no
tenant on the property”; and that Santos Dy-Kia
was not connected therewith “in any manner whatsoever”.

On May 6, 1963,
Santos Dy-Kia, thru counsel, received a copy of the
foregoing resolution.

On May 14, 1963, Santos Dy-Kia in turn
filed a motion (amended on June 20) to reconsider the May 4, 1963 order, claim
being made by him that said order was null and void because he was not afforded
opportunity to be heard and to oppose the spouses’ motion.

On July 1,1963,
Filomena Cajarito Vda. de Dy-Kia filed a motion to
resolve the question of jurisdiction and for this pur­pose adopted the spouses’
May 2, 1963 motion for
reconsideration.

On August 1, 1963,
the agrarian court, having before it the two motions just adverted to, declared
that Santos Dy-Kia had no tenancy relationship with Filomena Cajarito Vda. de Dy-Kia or with the
spouses, and ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case, and forthwith
dismissed the same.

Copy of this resolution was received by counsel for Santos Dy-Kia on August 6.

On August 20, 1963,
Santos Dy-Kia, by his then counsel Jaime N.
Hernandez, filed a motion for the reconsideration of this order of August
1.  The grounds he there advanced were
that the motion of Filomena to resolve the question
of jurisdiction was filed out of time and was based on grounds already existing
at the time the May 2, 1963
motion of the Anduiza spouses was filed; and that
there was a landlord-tenant relationship between him and the respondents below.

On
August 29, 1963, the
agrarian court, on objection of herein petitioners, denied for lack of merit
the motion for recon­sideration just referred to.

Nothing happened until February 18, 1964 when Atty. Melencio O. Orbase entered his
appearance below as counsel of record for Santos Dy-Kia
in lieu of Atty. Jaime N. Hernandez who allegedly ceased as attorney as of
August 30, 1963.  The clerk of the
agrarian court sent Atty. Orbase a copy of the August 29, 1963 order.  Atty. Orbase
received it on March 4, 1964.^[3]

On March 31, 1964, Atty. Orbase, on
behalf of Santos Dy-Kia, filed a motion dated March
28, 1964(which he called second motion for reconsideration, the first being
that of August 20, 1963) alleging that the acts performed by him (Dy­Kia) with respect to the lands qualified him as tenant
of Filo­mena Cajarito Vda. de Dy-Kia; that the sale of
said property to the spouses while his claim was pending constituted fraud;
that proof of the admission of the tenancy relationship by Filo­mena
Cajarito Vda. de Dy-Kia automatically placed the case within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the agrarian court; and that the resolution of August 1, 1963 was not in accordance
with the evidence presented by him.

The spouses opposed, averred amongst others that the order of
dismissal had become final and executory.

The first order petitioners now question before this Court
was issued by the agrarian court on August
22, 1964.  Santos Dy­Kia’s motion for reconsideration and resetting the case
for further proceedings was there granted. 
The agrarian court gave no reason for this order except that it would be
“[i]n the interest of justice.”

The Anduizas moved to reconsider the August 22, 1964 order and upon
opposition of Santos Dy-Kia the court issued its second
questioned order on September 12, 1964
denying the motion of the spouses, “for being untenable.”

On September 25, 1964,
Santos Dy-Kia moved for reins­tatement as
tenant.  The Anduizas
opposed.

On October 23, 1964,
the spouses Anduiza moved for the issuance of a writ
of execution of the order of dismissal of the case dated May 4, 1963.

On October 26, 1964,
the agrarian court handed down its third disputed order denying the
motion for execution “for lack of merit.”

Promptly, on October
27, 1964, the Anduizas appealed to this
Court.

1.  The forefront question
is whether the disputed orders are final and appealable.  Private respondent Santos Dy-Kia
seeks to strike down the appeal because the orders are inter­locutory.  And citing Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court, he puts forth the claim that only final orders of the agrarian
court are appealable. 
He is correct.

The orders of the lower court are aimed at continuing the
proceedings before it.  Hearing of the
case on the merits is not yet finished. 
Final judgment is yet to be rendered. 
A rule long standing and frequently cited is that orders which do not
finally dispose of the pending case so that nothing more can be done with it in
the trial court are interlocutory.  Any
issue relating thereto must wait until the trial court writes its final deter­mination.  It is only then that appeal is proper.^[4]

2.  While interlocutory orders
are not appealable, none­theless, when want or excess
of jurisdiction or abuse of dis­cretion is averred in the petition for review,
an appeal may, in the discretion of the court, be converted into a special
civil action for certiorari, to avert injustice and thwart delay.^[5]

To be conceded is that certiorari was not specifically availed of
by petitioners in their notice of appeal. 
They there merely signified their intention to appeal pursuant to Rule
43.  They labelled
their petition before this Court as a “Petition For Certiorari or Review
with Injunction”.  But said verified
petition before this Court contains all the necessary allegations to make it a
petition for certiorari.  Thus, under
paragraph XXI of said peti­tion, it is alleged that “the respondent,
Honorable Judge Valeriano A. del Valle, of the CAR,
exercising judicial functions has acted: (a) without or in excess of its
jurisdiction; (b) or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 1, New Rules of Court.” We required respondents
Santos Dy­Kia and Judge del Valle to answer that
petition within ten days after receipt of summons.

There is then no obstacle to viewing this petition in the concept
of certiorari.  The interests of justice
would not coun­tenance tying down petitioners to what their notice of appeal
expressed when there was substantial compliance with the regle­mentary
requisites for the remedy of certiorari. 
This is not an entirely new practice. 
In Tengco vs. San Jose,^[6]
which involves a more complicated situation, this Court dispensed with the
filing of an appeal and considered the petition for mandamus to compel the
trial judge to give due course to the appeal, a petition for certiorari to
annul or set aside the order yet to be appealed.  Again, in Gutierrez vs. Villegas,^[7]
citing the Tengco case, this Court declared that the appeal from an
interlocutory order may not be considered as a petition for certiorari because
of the absence of allegations to the effect that the court
had no jurisdiction or it acted in excess thereof or with grave abuse of
discretion.^[8] Conversely then, an appeal from an inter­locutory
order may, in the discretion of the court, be con­sidered as a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 when the necessary allegations are present.

3.  The core of this case, the validity of the
disputed orders of the lower court, depends upon whether or not the May 4,
1963 order
dismissing the petition as against the spouses had already become final and executory when the agrarian court directed the proceedings
to continue and denied execution of said order.

Respondents admit the
following facts in their answer:

On May 4,
1963, the lower
court dismissed the petition solely as against the spouses.  On May 6, 1963, a copy of the order was received by private
respondent.  On May 14,
1963, private
respondent filed a motion to reconsider. 
On August 1, 1963, the court dismissed the case.

Of importance is August
6, 1963.  It was on this date
-August 6 – that private respondent received a copy of the August 1 resolution.

On August
20, 1963, Dy-Kia moved to reconsider this resolution.

On August 29, 1963,
the lower court denied the motion for reconsideration.

A copy of the August 29 order was sent to Atty. Hernandez, the
counsel of record for private respondent, by registered mail and the first
notice was given on September 9, 1963, a second notice on September 13, 1963,
and a third notice on September 25, 1963. 
The mail matter was thereafter returned unclaimed.

On March 4,
1964, Atty. Melencio O. Orbase, the new counsel for private respondent, received a copy of the order.

On March 31, 1964,
private respondent, thru Atty. Orbase, filed another
motion for reconsideration dated March
28, 1964.

With these facts on hand,
there could not be any question at all as to the finality of the May 4,
1964 order.  Under Section 4, Rule 43, in relation to
Section 1, Rule 39, Rules of Court, a judgment of the Court of Agrarian
Relations becomes final and executory upon the
expiration of 15 days from notice of the order, ruling or decision.  Since the May 4 order – a final order of
dismissal – was received on May 6, 1963, and the motion for reconsideration was
filed on May 14, 8 days had elapsed.  On
August 6, notice of the denial of such motion was received.  Another motion for reconsideration could have
been filed anytime from August 6 to August 13.^[9] Santos Dy-Kia
instead filed his motion for reconsideration only on August
20, 1963.  Clearly, it was filed out of time.  The May 4 order had become final and executory on August 14.

It would not avail private respondent any to say that his first
counsel, Atty. Jaime N. Hernandez, did not receive the registered mail
containing the order of August 29, 1963 denying his motion of August 20 to
reconsider the dismissal order of August 1, 1963.  First, because that motion as
aforesaid was filed out of time.  Second,
the fact that Atty. Hernandez con­cededly was given three notices to take
delivery of the registered mail containing the order of August 29 would also be
a sufficient cause to declare the dismissal order final.  The first of those notices was sent to him on
September 9.  We need but draw attention
to Section 8, Rule 13, Rules of Court. 
Santos Dy-Kia’s counsel having failed to claim
the mail from the post office within five days from the first notice of the
postmaster, service should take effect at the expiration of such time.^[10]
It should go without saying that service of the order was completed on September 15, 1963.  Since his new counsel filed another motion to
reconsider only on March 31, 1964,
we again say that the judgment had become final in the meantime.  More than six months had elapsed from the
first notice.

But even conceding to respondent Dy-Kia
the widest latitude, he will not escape the effects of the finality of the
order of dis­missal of August 1, 1963.  His new counsel received copy of that order
on March 4, 1964.  And yet, counsel took his first move by way
of another motion for reconsideration only on March 31, 1964, a delay of 21 days.  Judgment once again is final.

All of the foregoing brings to the fore the oft-cited stern
reminder in Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & O’Brien 38 Phil, 521,
526- 527, thus: “Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk
of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite
date fixed by law.  The very object for
which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies.  To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily,
certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the
slothful.  ‘If a vacillating, irresolute
judge were allowed to thus keep causes ever within his power, to determine and redetermine them term after term, to bandy his judgments
about from one party to the other, and to change his conclusions as freely and
as capriciously as a chameleon may change its hues, then liti­gation might
become more intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to redress.’ (See
Arnedo vs. Llorente
and Liongson [1911], 18 Phil., 257.).”

Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari is hereby
granted; the disputed orders of the Court of Agrarian Relations of August 22,
1964, September 12, 1964 and October 26, 1964 are hereby set aside and declared
null and void; the prelim­inary injunction issued by this Court on February 13,
1965 is hereby made permanent; and the order of the Court of Agrarian Relations
of May 4, 1963 dismissing this case against petitioners is hereby declared
final and executory.

Costs against private respondent Santos Dy-Kia.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J., is on official
leave.

^[1]
CAR Case No. 417-Albay ’61 entitled “Santos Dy-Kia,
Petitioner, versus Filomena Cajarito Vda. de Dy-Kia, Jose Anduiza and Nenita Dezalisa Anduiza, Respondents.” The original petition was filed
on October 11, 1961
against Filomena Cajarito Vda. de Dy-Kia alone.

^[2]
The Agricultural Tenancy Act. The pertinent portion of said Section 9 provides
that “the purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations
of the former landholder in relation to the tenant.”

^[3]
See: Rollo,
p. 108

^[4]
See: Samia vs.
Medina, 56 Phil. 613, 614, holding
that an order granting a motion for a new trial is interlocutory and, there­fore,
unappealable.  See
also: De la Cruz vs. Dollete (1962), 5
SCRA 257, 260.

^[5]
Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30570, July 29, 1969, citing cases
at footnote 31.

^[6]
97 Phil. 491, 505. See also: Pineda vs. Lantin (1962), 6 SCRA 757, 762.

^[7]
(1962), 5 SCRA 313, 318.

^[8]
Cf. Abaga vs. De Guzman (1962), 6 SCRA
870, 873.

^[9]
See: Lonaria vs. De Guzman (1967), 21
SCRA 349, 353-354; Jaugan vs. People (1969),
26 SCRA 851, 852-853.

^[10]
See: Grafil vs. Feliciano (1967), 20
SCRA 616, 619-6202