DR. ADRIANO B. VELASQUEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. APOLONIO BARRERA, RESPONDENT.

In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1960,
Dr. Adriano B. Velasquez sought the disbarment of Apolonio Barrera for alleged
acts committed in violation of
his oath of office.  In due time, the res­pondent
Barrera filed his answer denying the charges. 
The proceedings had thereafter are detailed in the report submitted by
the Office of the Solicitor General, as follows:

“In its resolution dated February 12, 1960, this Honorable
Court referred this case to this Office for investigation, report and
recommendation.  Most of the parties
being residents of Baguio, this Office indorsed the case to the city fiscal of
Baguio.  In his report dated May 16,
1961, he recommended that the case be dismissed for lack of interest because
the complainant failed to appear at the hearing.  In view of this report the Office of the
Solicitor General addressed a letter to the com­plainant informing him of the
report of the fiscal of Baguio and inquired from him as to whether or not he was no longer
interested in the case.  In a letter
dated July 31, 1961, however, the complainant Adriano B. Velasquez, wrote the
Office of the Solicitor General inquiring as to the status of the case.  He also vehemently denied the report of the
City Attorney of Baguio that he failed to appear for hearing of the
administrative case.  According to the
complainant, he was never notified or summoned to appear for hearing.  As a matter of fact, he had been attending
trials of his criminal case in Baguio City yet he was never informed of the alleged hearing of the administrative
case.  In view of this circumstance, the
complainant requested that the hearing be conducted by the Solicitor
General.  Forthwith, this Office set the
administrative case for hearing at 9:00 a.m. on August 21, 1961.  Only the complainant and his witnesses
appeared.  At about 10:30 a.m., the
undersigned investigator received a long distance telephone call from the
respondent at Baguio requesting for a postponement on the ground that de was
ill with fever.  The hearing was
transferred to September 7, 1961 at 9:00 o’clock a.m.  On Sep­tember 2, 1961, the respondent filed a
manifes­tation waiving his right to appear at the hear­ing set on September 7,
1961 on the ground that he was still ill. 
He further stated that he was submitting his defense contained in his
answer.

“In a manifestation made by the complainant himself, he stated
that he went to the Office of the respondent in Baguio City and actually saw
him well and strong attending to his clients and typing.  He therefore requested that the
administrative case be set for hearing. 
The hearing was, nevertheless, postponed to October 26, 1961.  The respondent failed to appear and
reiterated his manifestation in writing that he was waiving his right to appear
and to submit his defense contained in his answer.  Notwithstanding this manifestation, the
hearing was set on December 14, 1961.  In
spite of due notice to him, the respondent failed to appear.  The case was again set for hearing on
February 20, 1962 at 2:30 p.m.  The
hearing was again postponed to April 25, 1962 and again on May 9, 1962.  The respondent was duly notified of all of
these hearings.  In a motion, the
complain­ant requested for the postponement of the hearing set on May 9, 1962 to another date after the
criminal case involving the subject matter of this administrative case is termi­nated.

“The hearing was held in abeyance until January 16, 1963.  Upon motion of the res­pondent that he had
scheduled cases to attend to, the investigator set the hearing on Feb­ruary 25,
1963.  Respondent again requested for a
postponement of the hearing on the ground that he had other cases to attend to
on said date.  In view of the many
requests for postponements by the respondent, and con­sidering that he had
waived his right to appear in his defense, and that the complain­ant objected
to further postponements, the investigator allowed said complainant to
introduce his evidence.  To give an
opportunity to respondent to cross examine the complainant and his witness to
make his defense, the case was postponed to March 12, 1963 at 9:30 A.M.  In view of the failure of the respondent to
appear, the undersigned investigator cross-examined the complainant and
thereafter re­quested him to submit his memorandum furnish­ing a copy thereof
to the respondent and giv­ing the latter a period of ten (10) days from receipt
thereof to file his reply if he so desires. 
According to the evidence of the complainant, the respondent received
his memorandum on March 27, 1963.  Up to
this date, respondent has not filed any memorandum, hence, he is deemed to have
submitted this case for report and recommendation.

“In his urgent petition dated March 10, 1963, received by this
office after the hear­ing on March 12, 1963, the respondent request­ed the
postponement of the hearing set on March 12, 1963 on the ground that he had a
full calendar of cases to attend to in March, April, and May.  He requested that the case be set any day in
June, 1963.  Respondent has not indicated
what cases and in what courts he was attending throughout the months of March, April and May.  In spite of this long period of postponement,
the investi­gator, in order to accommodate the respondent, set the case for
hearing on June 27 and 28, 1963 at 2:30 p.m. 
On June 27 and 28, 1963, neither the respondent nor his witnesses
appeared.”

Complainant’s specific
charges against the respondent, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General, are the following:

“1.  After receiving from the complainant
attorney’s fees in the amount of P120.00 and the sum of P100.00 for payment of
appeal bond and for other expenses for instituting the appeal of a civil case
from the municipal court of the City of Baguio to the Court of First Instance,
wherein complainant’s brother was involved, the respondent attorney failed to
file the appeal bond (p. 1, rec.) and the necessary pleading thus losing the
case by default.

“2.  Respondent attorney, through insi­dious
machinations induced the complainant to sign an alleged chattel mortgage over
his personal properties in favor of Alberto Ym­son and Nicolas Ymson to prevent
their con­fiscation by the Sheriff should the case be decided against
complainant’s brother; that said respondent represented to the complain­ant
that the chattel mortgage would not be registered.  It turned out later that said respondent not
only did sue the complainant for estafa on said chattel mortgage which he
himself prepared and induced the complainant to sign but also instituted
foreclosure proceedings.  Respondent also
filed a fourth party complaint in his capacity as attorney of the mortgagees Nicolas
Ymson and Alberto Ymson, thus betraying his confidence and trust imposed on him
as his attorney;

“3.  Respondent
himself demanded and forced complainant and his brother to turn over to him the
personal properties mort­gaged in the chattel mortgage in question (pp. 3-4,
rec.).”

Respondent’s answer to
the above charges have been similarly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General, as follows:

“In his defense, respondent filed his answer alleging among
other things that there never existed an attorney and client relation­ship
between him and the complainant; that he was in fact the attorney of Pedro
Velasquez and Jose P. Pañgan; that the complainant Adria­no Velasquez came to
the picture only when he defrayed the expenses in the appeal of the civil case
of his brother Pedro Velasquez.  He
admitted that he sent a telegram to the complainant to ask money to defray the
expenses of the civil suit of his brother (pp. 19-20, rec.).

“Respondent also admitted that it was he who prepared a
chattel mortgage signed by the complainant but said chattel mortgage was valid
and legal on its face; that upon failure of Pedro Velasquez to pay his
obligations, he de­manded from the complainant to make good his guarantee that
he assumed in behalf of his brother (p. 23, rec.).

“Respondent denied having used force on Pedro Velasquez in
taking possession of the mortgaged properties the truth being that be­cause
Adriano Velasquez surreptitiously hid the mortgage properties, the sheriff of
Baguio City could not execute the mortgage foreclosure, hence, he had to
prosecute the complainant for violation of the Chattel Mortgage Law (p. 24,
rec.).

“Respondent alleged
that the civil case he handled for Pedro Velasquez was not declared in
default, for he in fact filed an answer, Pedro Velasquez lost the case on
appeal because he had no valid defense whatsoever and in fact he admitted that
he failed to pay the rentals of the premises from July, 1958 to January, 1959
(p. 25, rec.).

“Respondent alleged that he prosecuted the complainant in
behalf of his clients Alberto and Nicolas Ymson and that the complainant was
never his client; that furthermore, it was his duty to implead complainant
Adriano Velasquez who guaranteed the payment of whatever damages they may
sustain as indemnitors (p. 25, rec.).”

On September 11, 1963,
the Solicitor General filed with this Court his report and recommendation
finding the respondent guilty of having violated his oath of office by
committing the acts complained of, and recom­mending his reprimand.  Its pertinent portions read as follows:

“Notwithstanding the denials of the respondent in his answer,
this investigator finds that respondent has, one way or another, committed
malpractice or miscon­duct by taking undue advantage of the com­plainant, and in fact abused his confidence in
violation of his oath of office, as a lawyer.

“In the first place, respondent’s general denial that
complainant was never his client is not sufficient to exculpate him from
responsibility of the charges of gross misconduct and abuse of confidence as
established by the complainant.  While it
is true that the civil case for eject­ment (Civil Case No. 2174, municipal
court of Baguio City) was filed against Pedro Velasquez, who is complainant’s
brother, it was the complainant himself who hired the services of the
respondent to institute the appeal to the Court of First Instance of Baguio
City (Civil Case No. 837, CFI, Baguio) paying him P100.00 for his attor­ney’s
fees and P120.00 for appeal bond and other expenses.  It cannot be denied on this point that the
complainant himself was an interested party in the outcome of the case since he
was a part owner of the per­sonal properties to be confiscated by the
sheriff.  While the evidence does not
clear­ly show that the civil case sought to be appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City was dropped due to default for failure to file a timely
answer, it appears that the respondent failed to pay the appeal bond out of the
amount of P100.00 he received from the complainant (pp. 3-4, t.s.n., July 22,
1963, Exh. J).

“Furthermore, in order to stay the execution of the decision
of the municipal court of Baguio, the complainant had to execute a chattel
mortgage on his properties in favor of Alberto Ymson and Nicolas Ymson.  The execution of the chattel mortgage was
upon the advice of the respondent.  In
other words, there is no question here that the respondent was already giving
legal advice not only to the parties to the civil case, namely, Pedro Velasquez
and Jose Pañgan, but also the com­plainant himself, who was to be adversely
affected in the outcome of the case.

“Instead of prosecuting the appeal for Pedro Velasquez, the
brother of the complainant wherein it was the complainant who engaged his
services, having paid him the amount of P120.00 as attorney’s fees and P100.00
as expenses for the appeal bond, the said respondent neglected and failed to
exert all his efforts to protect the interests of his client.  Instead, he even induced the complainant to
sign an alleged chattel mortgage and later turned against him representing this
time Nicolas and Alberto Ymson as mortgagees. 
On top of this, he even instituted a criminal case of estafa against the
complainant.  In fact, he also
represented the Ymson brothers in the third and fourth party complaints in
Civil Case No. 837, Court of First Instance of Baguio City.  These actuations of the respondent indeed as a member of the bar is not only highly
improper but also violative of his oath to conduct himself as a lawyer to act
in good faith and fidelity.  This
practice of representing two adverse in­terests has been severely disapproved
as strongly tending to deprive the relation of attorney and client of those
special ele­ments which make it one of trust and con­fidence and to change it
into one which may be modified or dallied with at the expense of those special
obligations under which an attorney lies to his client by reason of such
relation.  It is very difficult for an
attorney to give disinterested advice where he represents both parties to a
controversy; so difficult, in fact that it has become a fixed rule in all
branches of the law that when one is representing another in a given matter, he
cannot, at the same time, legally represent
his principal’s adversary (In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil. 258).

“Without impugning the
lawyer’s good faith, his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who
had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm cannot, nevertheless, be
sanctioned; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to that party but to
keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar
(Hilado v. Gutierrez David, et al., L-961, Sept. 21, 1949, 47 O.G. (3), 1135).

“Moreover, as admitted by the respondent himself in his
answer, the civil case for ejectment against complainant’s brother was a
hopeless case since they admitted
that they failed to pay the annual rentals. 
That being the case, respondent
in the performance of his duty as attorney, should have advised
complainant and his brother not to institute the appeal.  Said advise if properly made, would have
saved complainant and his brother from a hopeless appeal and filing of notice
of appeal, payment of supersedeas bond, appeal bond and necessary docket fees, and
attorney’s fees (pp. 24-25, rec.).  It is
a settled rule
in legal ethics that it is unwise if not im­proper for a lawyer to take
a case unless he has a reasonable chance of success.  He has no right to his retainer or to fees in
such a case unless the client, understanding all the probabilities, voluntarily
assumes the risk.  Even then the lawyer
owes a duty to his own reputation as an attorney note to take cases in which he
must inevitably fail.

“This investigator has also observed that in spite of several
notices of hearing, the respondent refused and did not take interest in appearing in these proceedings at least to
explain his side to the complainant who, to all interests and purposes, is con­vinced
that he was given a raw deal by him.  For this actuation alone, the respondent should be reprimanded.

“The record shows that this administra­tive case was postponed
no less than eleven times since August 21, 1961 just to give an opportunity to the respondent himself to
appear for his defense.  In one of his
motions, dated March 10, 1963, he requested that the hearing be set in June,
1963, that is more than three months, on the ground that he had a full calendar
of cases to attend to for March, April and May. 
To allow him this opportunity, this office granted this request and set
the hearing on June 27, and 28, 1963. 
Notwithstanding due notice, respondent failed to appear.

RECOMMENDATION

“PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is recommended that the respondent be
reprimanded.”

The evidence shows that Pedro B. Velasquez, brother of the complainant
herein, and Jose Pañgan were sued for ejectment in the Municipal Court of
Baguio by Ernesto Es­caler and others (Civil Case No. 2174).  While respondent’s claim that, in the
Municipal Court, he represented the de­fendants, is not supported by irrefutable
evidence, the record shows conclusively that, after judgment had been rendered
therein requiring said defendants to vacate the premises in question and to pay
back rentals, the respondent actually helped them in the preparation and filing
of the corresponding notice of appeal (signed by the defendants) and of the
appeal bond and supersedeas bond.

Upon the other hand, there is no clear evidence to show that the
complainant was the one who personally en­gaged respondent’s services in the
matters above referred to, on behalf of his brother.  It must have been the latter and his
co-defendant, Pafigan – both residents of Baguio City at the time – who asked
him for legal help.

As the appeal was duly perfected – as shown by the fact that the
case was docketed in the Court
of First In­stance of the City of Baguio as Civil Case No. 837 – it can not be
denied that the required appeal bond (P25.00 in cash) was filed.

Moreover, to stay the execution of the decision of the Municipal
Court of the City of Baguio during the pen­dency of the appeal, the required
supersedeas bond was also filed by the Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co.,
Inc. on February 10, 1959 (record p. 39). 
As usual in cases of such nature, said surety company protected itself
against liability by requiring the defendants in the case to put up a counter
bond.  Alberto and Nicolas Ymson, two
acquaintances of the defendant Pedro B. Velasquez, agreed to act as
counter-bondsman and en­tered into the corresponding Indemnity Agreement with
the Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. (Record p. 38).  Having done so merely as accommodation
parties, they, in turn, protected themselves against possible liability under
the Indemnity Agreement by demanding security from the defendants.  Thus it appears that defendant Velasquez who,
apparently was not in a position to give such security (nor was his
co-defendant) had to request his brother, the herein complainant, for authority
to make use of certain personal properties owned by the latter with the total
value of P4,432.00 “to answer for the guaranty bonds filed by Messrs.
Alberto Ymson and Nicolas Ymson in favor of my brother Mr. Pedro B. Velasquez
should the latter fail to pay the said obligation” (record p. 81).  The written authority further bound herein
com­plainant to “guarantee the fulfillment of said obligation of Mr. Pedro
B. Velasquez to his guarantors in said bonds”.  (idem). 
For this reason, perhaps, the chattel mortgage in favor of the Ymsons
was executed by complainant him­self (Record p. 9) on February 19, 1959.

The respondent, while admitting that he intervened in the
preparation and filing of the two bonds and indem­nity agreement
abovementioned, denies that thereafter he acted as counsel for the defendants
in the Court of First Instance.  In this
connection, the record really does not show that he ever filed his appearance
in the case as counsel for said parties, while, on the other hand, the same
record affirmatively discloses that the answer filed by the defendants was
signed by them personally (record pp. 177-178).

The record further discloses that under date of April 20, 1959,
the Court of First Instance of the City of Baguio rendered judgment in Civil
Case No. 837 ordering the defendants therein to vacate the premises in question
and to pay the plaintiff, jointly, the accrued sum of P2,247.50 as back
rentals, with interest at the legal rate from April 15, 1959, the sum of
P300.00 as attorney’s fees and the further sum of P250.00 a month as rentals
from April 15, 1959 until they have vacated the premises, and the costs of
suit.  The decision expressly stated that
the defendant Pedro Velasquez “admitted their in­debtedness and only ask
for more time within which to pay”. 
(record pp. 43-44).

As the decision
abovementioned became final and executory, the judgment-creditors took steps
for its execution and, as the judgment-debtors failed to pay, the former
moved for the confiscation of the supersedeas bond.  In connection with this incident the surety
(Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Company, Inc.) filed a cross-claim against
the judgment-debtors and a third party complaint against Nicolas and Alberto
Ymson – the counter-guarantors.  In turn,
the Ymsons filed a fourth party complaint against herein complainant Adriano B.
Velasquez who had executed in their favor the chattel mortgage mentioned
heretofore.  After proper proceedings the
Court of First Instance of the City of Baguio, under date of June 17, 1966,
rendered judg­ment as follows:

“Judgment is, therefore, rendered ordering Nicolas and Alberto
Ymson (Third Party Defendants) to reimburse the bonding company whatever sums
said bonding company may have to pay Plaintiff under the supersedeas bond; and
in turn, Adria­no Velasquez, Fourth Party Defendant is ordered to pay the two
Ymsons, whatever sums they may have to reimburse the bonding company and should
he fail to do so, the chattels mentioned in Ex­hibit ‘111’ are ordered sold at
public auction to answer for the same. 
Costs shall be paid by the Ymsons and Adriano Velasquez equally.”

As the herein complainant failed to pay the Ymsons the amount
that the latter had paid to the Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Company, the
Ymsons proceeded to foreclose extrajudicially the chattel mortgage executed in
their favor.  What happened in this connection
is setforth briefly in the de­cision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
City in People of the Philippines vs. Adriano B. Velasquez, Criminal Case No.
2003, for violation of Article 319, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code, as
follows:

“On February 19, 1959, the accused executed a chattel mortgage
over certain personal proper­ties in favor of Alberto and Nicolas Ymson – an
International Harvester refrigerator was one of those given in chattel
mortgage.  On February 25, 1959, the
accused pledged this same refrigerator at the Pines Pawnshop, Baguio (Exh. ‘C’).  When
the Ymsons sought to foreclose their chattel mortgage they discovered the
pledge made of the refrigerator – hence this information.  The evi­dence for the prosecution sought to
show that Pedro Velasquez, brother of the accused, was about to be evicted from
the premises of the Manhattan Cafe by his landlord.  He needed a supersedeas bond and asked the Ymson brothers to sign an Indemnity
Agreement with him with the surety company. 
To protect themselves, the Ymsons demanded the chattel mortgage, Exhibit
‘A’.  The supersedeas bond was duly filed
but the case decided against Pedro Velasquez, who was evicted and the bond
answered for unpaid rentals.  The surety
com­pany had to make good and went against the Indemnity Agreement and when the
Ymsons had to pay, they sought to foreclose the chattel mortgage, and only
discovered then that the Pines Pawnshop had a prior right to the refrigerator,
as the chattel mortgage although dated February 19, 1959, was only recorded on
March 13, 1959.  So they filed this cri­minal
case.”

It appears, however, that the court not only acquitted the herein
complainant “on the ground of reasonable doubt” because he had acted
in good faith in pledging his refrigera­tor
to the Pines Pawnshop in the belief that the chattel mortgage he had
executed in favor of the Ymsons was null and void, but also made this
unfavorable finding against the herein respondent:

“x x x    
x x x     x x x convinced that there has
been a connivance of some kind between the Ymsons and their counsel to place in
a position where he would have to pay or face criminal prosecution.  This Court is convinced that the accused
was deceived into signing the deed of chattel mortgage.”

The respondent does not deny that he acted as counsel of the
Ymson brothers in the following matters: 
their fourth party
complaint against the herein complainant; in the fore­closure of the chattel
mortgage executed by the latter in favor of the Ymsons, and acted as private
prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 2003 filed against the complainant in the Court
of First Instance of Baguio City.

As already intimated
heretofore, the fact that the respondent helped Pedro B. Velasquez and Jose P.
Pañgan in perfecting their appeal from the adverse decision of the Municipal
Court of the City of Baguio and in the filing of the supersedeas bond and the
related Indemnity Agreement, did not necessarily make him their attorney of
record in the appealed case (Civil Case No. 837 of the Court of First Instance
of the City of Baguio).  As a matter of
fact, he filed no formal appearance as such in said case; neither did he appear
on their behalf in any of the incidents that arose in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Baguio, nor did he file and sign any pleading filed in
said court.

Upon the other hand, having intervened in the execution of the
Indemnity Agreement mentioned hereto­fore, We find nothing objectionable in his
having represented the Ymson brothers later on (a) to defend them against the claim
of the Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Company Inc. and (b) to enforce their
rights against the herein complainant in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the chattel mortgage executed by the latter in their favor.  As already intimated likewise in previous
paragraphs, there was no relation of attorney and client between the herein
respondent, on the one hand, and the herein complainant, on the other.  That they came into contact with each other
in connection with the filing of the cash appeal bond and the execution of the
chattel mortgage already referred to, did not create between them that
particular confidential relationship. 
Such being the case, We find no reason, legal or moral, to condemn his
actuations as counsel for the Ymson brothers as related heretofore.

The sum of P100.00 that the complainant sent to his brother Pedro
and which the latter turned over to the res­pondent appears to have been
accounted for.  It was spent to pay the
docket fees of the appellate court in connection with the ejectment case
(P10.00); to file the cash appeal bond (P25.00); to pay the registration fee
for the chattel mortgage (P6.50); to pay the notarial fees due for the pre­paration
and acknowledgement of the chattel mortgage (P20.00); to pay the notarial fees
due for the preparation and acknow­ledgement of the supersedeas bond (P10.00);
to pay the docu­mentary stamps affixed on the documents already mentioned
(P3.80), and to pay the notarial fees for the preparation and acknowledgement
of the Indemnity Agreement P10.00).  As
these expenses amount to a total of P85.30, there was left but the sum of
P14.70 in the hands of the respondent. 
This was retained by him as partial payment of his pro­fessional fees in
the preparation and filing of the notice of appeal; the filing of the appeal
and supersedeas bond, and in the execution of the Indemnity Agreement.

Complainant’s claim that aside from the P100.00 he also delivered
another sum of P120.00 to the respondent is not supported by convincing
evidence.  At any rate, even assuming
that the respondent received said amount and kept it for himself, the same,
added to the balance of P14.70 mentioned heretofore, could be considered as
reasonable compensation for the services he had rendered to com­plainant’s
brother.

Notwithstanding what has been said heretofore, it would have been
better if the herein respondent had acted more carefully in the premises.  If, as he claims, he represented Jose P.
Pañgan and Pedro B. Velasquez in the ejectment case before the Municipal Court
of the City of Baguio, he should have filed his formal appearance therein.  And if, as he now claims, he ceased to be
their counsel when the case was appealed to the Court of First Instance, he
should have seen to it that such fact was made of record.  Had this been done, herein complainant would
have had no reason to say or suspect
that he had represented conflicting interests.

As regards the opinion expressed in the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 2003 to the effect that the
respondent had conspired with the Ymsons to place the herein complainant
“in a posi­tion where he would either have to pay or face criminal
prosecution.  This Court is convinced
that the accused was deceived into signing the Deed of Chattel Mortgage”,
We believe that respondent’s alleged misconduct must be con­sidered in the
light of the fact that complainant’s brother was desperately in need of filing
a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the decision rendered in the ejectment case by the Municipal Court
of the City of Baguio.  Far Eastern
Surety and Insurance Company Inc., agreed to file said bond provided there was
a counter-guaranty.  For their part, the Ymsons
agreed to help complainant’s brother by acting as counter-guarantors but
demanded the execution of some sort of security from which they could seek
reimbursement of whatever amount they might be sentenced to pay the
surety.  The record is clear in this
connection that the complainant gave written authority to his brother to make
use of some of his personal properties for this purpose.  As a matter of fact, however, he was the one
who executed the chattel mort­gage in favor of the Ymsons.  Even assuming that it was the respondent who
suggested that a chattel mortgage be executed by the complainant in favor of the Ymsons to answer for any
possible loss by the latter, that act was in no way unlawful, immoral or
against respondent’s oath as an officer of the court.  Upon the foregoing facts, there was no legal
im­pediment for respondent representing the Ymsons in the foreclosure of the
chattel mortgage and in the criminal case mentioned heretofore.

Moreover, even though upon the evidence before Us, the respondent
did not represent complainant’s brother and the latter’s co-defendant in the
Court of First Instance of the City of Baguio in relation to Civil Case No. 837
of said court, it would have been more in ac­cordance with the demands of the
ethics of the legal profession that he should have refrained from represent­ing
the Ymsons in the latter’s fourth party complaint; in the foreclosure of the
chattel mortgage mentioned heretofore, and in the prosecution of Criminal Case
No. 2003 against herein complainant.  His
intervention in the ejectment case in the municipal court on behalf of Pedro B.
Velasquez apparently left the complainant with the impression that he had
continued to represent said party in the court of first instance, thus
concluding that his actuations in said case on appeal and in the criminal case
already mentioned, were in violation of his oath of office.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We hereby approve the recom­mendation
of the Office of the Solicitor General to the effect that the respondent be, as
he is hereby, admonished to be more careful in the future in the matter of his
relations with litigants; with the warning that similar conduct on his part in
the future will be dealt with more drastically.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo,
JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., on leave.