AMBROSIO DIAMALON ALIAS AMPUANG DIAMALON, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. JESUS QUINTILLAN, RESPONDENT.

A complaint for serious misconduct in office against respondent Judge
Jesus Quintillan, filed on March 29, 1967, was based on the allegation that
complainant, a certain Ambrosio Diamalon, who allegedly was only an
eye-witness, was thereafter included in an information for murder without
having the opportunity to appear and to defend himself, the serious misconduct
imputed consisting in the issuance of such warrant of arrest and causing the
unlawful detention by respondent Judge without the observance of the due
process of law requirement.

On April 7, 1967, this Court required respondent Judge to file
within ten days an answer to the above complaint against him.  In the answer filed by him on June 21, 1967,
he disputed the charge that his actuation was offensive to the due process clause
in this manner:  “That the undersigned
also denies the allegations of paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the complaint on
the ground that the undersigned had fully investigated and fairly appreciated
the evidence against the complainant herein before the issuance of the warrant
of arrest, and that previous to the occasion of the issuance of the warrant of
arrest against him, undersigned was of
the sincere belief and opinion that the presence of the accused before the
issuance of the warrant of arrest was not necessary as Rule No. 112, Section 13
provides that the undersigned may simultaneously conduct the preliminary
examination and preliminary investigation in cases that are directly filed with
him.  While it is true that the said
section provides that the procedure shall be in the manner provided for
municipal judges, yet the preceding sections provide that in cases of
preliminary examination for the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of
arrest, the presence of the accused is not necessary.  Therefore, if the preliminary examination by
the municipal judge is for the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of
arrest, the presence of the accused is not necessary, and the judge of
the Court of First Instance is authorized to conduct simultaneously, upon the
filing of the case before him, the preliminary examination and preliminary
investigation, in the honest opinion of the undersigned the warrant of arrest
may be issued without the presence of the accused.  Even now, in the preliminary examination
conducted by the Justice of the Peace for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest, the presence of the accused is not necessary, such presence being
indispensable only at the second stage of the preliminary investigation.  Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that
the presence of the accused is not necessary before the issuance of the warrant
of arrest by the undersigned.”^[1]
His prayer was for the dismissal of the complaint.

Thereafter, in a resolution of August 30, 1967 we considered the
case as submitted for decision.  Then
came, on August 7, 1969, an urgent petition for dismissal.  As alleged therein:  “That the above-entitled case should be
dismissed not only because of the fact that, as explained in respondent’s answer,
complainant has no valid cause to complain against the respondent as judge but
also because of the fact that respondent has already resigned from his position
on August 12, 1967 and it was accepted by the President of the Philippines on
August 24, 1967, which resignation was made effective at the close of the
office hours on August 31, 1967, as shown by the letter of Mr. Gilberto M.
Duavit, Assistant Executive Secretary, * * *.”^[2]
The communication from Assistant Executive Secretary Gilberto M. Duavit,
addressed to respondent Judge, reads as follows:  “With reference to your letter dated
August 12, 1967 tendering your resignation as District Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Cotabato, Branch II, I wish to inform you that the President
hereby accepts the same effective at the close of office hours on August 31,
1967.”^[3]

This petition for
dismissal or for the definite termination of the case is likewise based on the
plea that the respondent Judge’s application for his retirement gratuity cannot
be favorably acted upon in view of the pendency of this pending administrative
case.  Information is likewise furnished
this Court in said petition that respondent Judge “has been sick for
sometime already and is now very seriously ill and is presently confined at the
Brokenshire Memorial Hospital at Davao City so that it would be to the best interest
of simple and christian justice that the above-entitled case be dismissed
and/or decided as soon as possible to facilitate the processing of respondent’s
application for Retirement Gratuity.”^[4]

In the light of the above, the petition for dismissal must be
granted.  There is no need to inquire
further into the charge im­puted to respondent Judge that his actuation in this
particular case failed to satisfy the due process requirement.  As an administrative proceeding is predicated
on the holding of an office or position in the Government and there being no
doubt as to the resignation of respondent Judge having been accepted as of
August 31, 1967, there is nothing to stand in the way of the dismissal prayed
for.

WHEREFORE, the urgent petition for dismissal filed on
August 7, 1969 by respondent Judge is granted. 
Without pronounce­ment as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., on official
leave.

^[1]
Answer, par. 8.

^[2]
Urgent Petition to Dismiss and/or Decide Case, par. 3.

^[3] Ibid, Annex A.

^[4]
Ibid, par. 5.