AMBROSIO DIAMALON ALIAS AMPUANG DIAMALON, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. JESUS QUINTILLAN, RESPONDENT.

Diamalon versus Quintillan

The Case

This is an administrative case for serious misconduct in office, brought by Ambrosio Diamalon against Judge Jesus Quintillan. The complainant charges that the respondent Judge included him in an information for murder and issued a warrant for his arrest without giving him the opportunity to appear and defend himself, thereby violating the due process requirement. The case matters to a reviewee because it teaches a threshold rule of administrative liability: an administrative proceeding rests on the holding of a public office, so once the respondent's resignation has been accepted, the proceeding may be dismissed without any further inquiry into the charge.

Procedural History

The complaint for serious misconduct in office was filed on March 29, 1967. On April 7, 1967, the Supreme Court required the respondent Judge to file an answer within ten days, and he filed his answer on June 21, 1967, praying for the dismissal of the complaint. In a resolution of August 30, 1967, the Court considered the case submitted for decision. On August 7, 1969, the respondent Judge filed an urgent petition for dismissal, alleging that he had already resigned and that his resignation had been accepted. The case was thus resolved by the Supreme Court as an original administrative proceeding, on the basis of that urgent petition.

Facts

Ambrosio Diamalon filed a complaint for serious misconduct in office against Judge Jesus Quintillan on March 29, 1967. He alleged that he was only an eye-witness, yet he was thereafter included in an information for murder without having the opportunity to appear and to defend himself. The serious misconduct imputed to the respondent Judge consisted in the issuance of a warrant of arrest and in causing the complainant's unlawful detention without observing the due process requirement.

In his answer, the respondent Judge denied that his actuation offended the due process clause. He insisted that he had fully investigated and fairly appreciated the evidence against the complainant before issuing the warrant of arrest, and that he was of the sincere belief that the presence of the accused before the issuance of the warrant was not necessary, since the rule allowed him to conduct the preliminary examination and the preliminary investigation simultaneously in cases directly filed with him.

On August 7, 1969, the respondent Judge filed an urgent petition for dismissal. He alleged that the case should be dismissed because the complainant had no valid cause to complain, and because he had already resigned from his position on August 12, 1967, which resignation the President of the Philippines accepted on August 24, 1967, effective at the close of office hours on August 31, 1967. He further pleaded that his application for retirement gratuity could not be favorably acted upon while this administrative case was pending, and that he had been sick for sometime already and was very seriously ill, then confined at the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital in Davao City.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent Judge's actuation in issuing the warrant of arrest and causing the complainant's detention failed to satisfy the due process requirement.
• Whether or not the administrative case against the respondent Judge should be dismissed in view of his resignation having been accepted.

Applicable Provisions

No statutory provision is quoted or construed in the decision. The respondent Judge invoked Rule 112, Section 13 of the Rules of Court in his answer, but the Court did not quote or construe it, and it resolved the case on the resignation instead. The decision therefore turns on the nature of an administrative proceeding rather than on any quoted text.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court declined to rule. It held that there was no need to inquire further into the charge imputed to the respondent Judge that his actuation in this particular case failed to satisfy the due process requirement. The Court thus left the merits of the due process charge unresolved.

On the second issue, the Court granted the petition for dismissal. It reasoned that an administrative proceeding is predicated on the holding of an office or position in the Government, and that there being no doubt as to the resignation of the respondent Judge having been accepted as of August 31, 1967, there was nothing to stand in the way of the dismissal prayed for. The Court stated the premise plainly:

As an administrative proceeding is predicated on the holding of an office or position in the Government and there being no doubt as to the resignation of respondent Judge having been accepted as of August 31, 1967, there is nothing to stand in the way of the dismissal prayed for.

The Court added that the petition for dismissal was likewise grounded on the plea that the respondent Judge's application for retirement gratuity could not be favorably acted upon while this administrative case was pending, and on his serious illness.

Doctrine

An administrative proceeding is predicated on the holding of an office or position in the Government. When the respondent's resignation from that office has been accepted, the foundation of the proceeding is removed, and the case may be dismissed without further inquiry into the charge. A Bar candidate should state the rule in that order: first, identify the office held; second, establish that the resignation was accepted as of a definite date; third, conclude that nothing stands in the way of dismissal. The Court's refusal to pass on the due process charge shows that this ground is procedural and threshold in character, not a finding of innocence on the merits.

Disposition

The Court granted the urgent petition for dismissal filed by the respondent Judge, without pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line that an administrative proceeding is predicated on the holding of an office or position in the Government, so that an accepted resignation leaves nothing to stand in the way of dismissal. Examiners use this case on the effect of resignation and mootness in administrative and disciplinary proceedings, and on the point that dismissal on that ground is not an adjudication of the respondent's innocence.