JOSE MARIA ANDUIZA AND NENITA DEZALISA ANDUIZA, PETITIONERS, VS. SANTOS DY-KIA AND HON. VALERIANO A. DEL VALLE, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ALBAY, NINTH REGIONA…

Anduiza versus Dy-Kia

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, brought by the spouses Jose Maria Anduiza and Nenita Dezalisa Anduiza against Santos Dy-Kia and the presiding judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations of Albay. The Anduizas ask the Supreme Court to annul three orders of the agrarian court which, in effect, revived a tenancy suit that had already been dismissed as against them and refused to execute that dismissal. The case matters because it is a clean lesson on two things every examinee must know: when an order is final and therefore appealable, and when an appeal from an interlocutory order may be treated as a petition for certiorari. It is also a stern reminder on the finality of judgments.

Procedural History

Santos Dy-Kia filed an amended petition in the Court of Agrarian Relations of Albay against his stepmother Filomena Cajarito Vda. de Dy-Kia and against the Anduiza spouses, who had bought the three parcels of land from her while the case was pending. After Dy-Kia had presented his evidence, the respondents filed a joint motion to dismiss. The agrarian court denied it on April 24, 1963. On motion for reconsideration, the court issued an order on May 4, 1963 dismissing the petition as against the Anduiza spouses only, on the ground that there was no tenancy relationship between them and Dy-Kia. Dy-Kia moved to reconsider, and on August 1, 1963 the agrarian court ruled that it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the case entirely. Dy-Kia's motion for reconsideration of that order was denied on August 29, 1963.

New counsel then appeared for Dy-Kia and, on March 31, 1964, filed what he called a second motion for reconsideration. The agrarian court granted it on August 22, 1964, reconsidered its earlier dismissal, and reset the case for further proceedings, giving no reason except that it was in the interest of justice. The Anduizas' motion to reconsider that order was denied on September 12, 1964, and their motion for execution of the May 4, 1963 dismissal order was denied on October 26, 1964. The Anduizas then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari or review with injunction, and the Court issued a cease-and-desist order.

Facts

Santos Dy-Kia claimed that he had been a tenant of the three parcels of land in Barrio Humapon, Legazpi City, from 1943 to 1959, that he had planted and introduced improvements on them, and that in 1948 he left for Legazpi City but hired a caretaker while continuing to supervise the landholding. He alleged that Filomena refused to reimburse his expenses, and that on December 6, 1961, while the case was pending, she sold the lands to the Anduiza spouses, who knew of the tenancy litigation. Invoking the Agricultural Tenancy Act, he claimed the spouses were solidarily liable with their vendor.

The Anduizas admitted the purchase but denied the rest, setting up the defense that Dy-Kia was not a tenant at all but merely a protege of Filomena, dependent on her for support. After Dy-Kia rested his evidence, the respondents moved to dismiss on the ground that the agrarian court had no jurisdiction because there was no landlord-tenant relationship, and that in any event Dy-Kia had abandoned the landholding voluntarily and could not demand payment for improvements.

The agrarian court first denied the motion, then on May 4, 1963 dismissed the petition as against the Anduiza spouses only, finding that when they bought the lands there was no tenant on the property and that Dy-Kia was not connected with it in any manner whatsoever. Dy-Kia received notice of that order on May 6, 1963, and filed a motion to reconsider on May 14, 1963. The subsequent orders of August 1 and August 29, 1963, and the late motions that followed, set the stage for the question of whether the May 4, 1963 dismissal had already become final.

Issues

• Whether or not the disputed orders of the agrarian court are final and appealable, or merely interlocutory.
• Whether or not an appeal from an interlocutory order may be treated as a petition for certiorari where want or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is alleged.
• Whether or not the May 4, 1963 order dismissing the petition as against the Anduiza spouses had already become final and executory when the agrarian court ordered the proceedings to continue and denied execution.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, on appeal from the Court of Agrarian Relations, provides:

An appeal may be taken from a final order, ruling or decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

This fixes the rule that only final orders of the agrarian court are appealable, which is why the Anduizas' appeal could not stand as an ordinary appeal from interlocutory orders.

Section 4 of Rule 43, in relation to Section 1 of Rule 39, on the finality of judgments, provides:

A judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations becomes final and executory upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice of the order, ruling or decision.

This is the period the Court counted to determine that the May 4, 1963 dismissal had become final and executory on August 14, 1963.

Section 8 of Rule 13, on service by registered mail, provides:

Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or upon the expiration of five days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier.

This is the rule the Court applied to hold that service on Dy-Kia's first counsel was completed on September 15, 1963, despite his failure to claim the registered mail.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the disputed orders are interlocutory. They were aimed at continuing the proceedings before the agrarian court, the hearing on the merits was not yet finished, and final judgment was yet to be rendered. An order which does not finally dispose of the pending case so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court is interlocutory, and any issue relating to it must wait until the trial court writes its final determination. It is only then that appeal is proper. Dy-Kia was therefore correct that only final orders of the agrarian court are appealable.

On the second issue, the Court held that while interlocutory orders are not appealable, when want or excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion is averred in the petition for review, an appeal may, in the discretion of the court, be converted into a special civil action for certiorari, to avert injustice and thwart delay. Although the Anduizas' notice of appeal mentioned only an appeal, their verified petition contained all the necessary allegations of a petition for certiorari, including that the agrarian court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and that there was no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. There was substantial compliance with the requisites, and no obstacle to viewing the petition in the concept of certiorari.

On the third issue, the Court held that the May 4, 1963 order had long become final and executory. Counting from Dy-Kia's receipt of notice on May 6, 1963, his motion for reconsideration filed on May 14, 1963 left eight days elapsed. Notice of the denial of that motion was received on August 6, 1963, so another motion could have been filed until August 13, 1963. Instead, Dy-Kia filed his motion only on August 20, 1963, clearly out of time, and the May 4 order became final on August 14, 1963. Even granting the widest latitude, the Court noted that Dy-Kia's new counsel received a copy of the August 1, 1963 order on March 4, 1964, yet filed his next motion only on March 31, 1964, a delay of twenty-one days, and the judgment had again become final. The Court closed with the stern reminder that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law, for the very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies.

Doctrine

First, an order which does not finally dispose of the pending case so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court is interlocutory and is not appealable; the remedy must await the final judgment. Second, an appeal from an interlocutory order may, in the discretion of the court, be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where the petition alleges want or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Third, a judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations becomes final and executory upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice, and a motion for reconsideration filed beyond that period does not toll the running of the period. Fourth, service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt or upon the expiration of five days from the first notice of the postmaster, whichever is earlier, so a party who fails to claim the mail cannot complain of lack of notice.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, set aside and declared null and void the agrarian court's orders of August 22, 1964, September 12, 1964, and October 26, 1964, made the preliminary injunction permanent, and declared the May 4, 1963 order of dismissal final and executory, with costs against Santos Dy-Kia.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: an interlocutory order is not appealable, but an appeal from it may be treated as a petition for certiorari when want or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is alleged. Examiners use this case to test the finality of judgments, the fifteen-day period from notice, and the rule on service by registered mail.