JOSE S. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, BRANCH VI, CEBU CITY, HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, PRESIDING, AND CONSOLADOR LAO, RESPONDENTS.

These two consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to
annul the following orders of respondent judge, to wit:  (1) In G.R. Nos. 57190-91, the orders dated
April 10, 1981 and April 20, 1981 insofar as the same declare petitioner guilty
of direct contempt; and (2) In G.R. No. 58532, the order dated August 17, 1981
suspending petitioner from the practice of law for the acts and omissions for
which he has been found guilty of contempt of court.

Petitioner, a member of the Philippine Bar and a legal officer in
the Bureau of Customs, Manila, was
the complaining witness in Criminal Cases Nos. CU-4457 and CU-4458 for falsification
of commercial documents and perjury, respectively, both entitled “People
vs. Consolador Lao” and filed with Branch VI of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu presided by
respondent judge.

On December 24, 1980, the accused Consolador
Lao, private respondent herein, filed a motion to have petitioner declared in
contempt of court for having allegedly (1) obtained the postponement of the
hearing of the two cases scheduled on August 27 and 28, 1979 on the false claim
that his father had died; 2) testified falsely on October 6, 1980 that he was
not at a time connected with any government office and that he was a practicing
lawyer; and (3) executed an affidavit imputing derogatory conduct to the lower
court, thus placing it in discredit and subjecting it to disrespect.^[1]

What transpired thereafter is recited in the aforesaid order of April 20, 1981.^[2]
Respondent judge, in an order dated December
29, 1980, directed petitioner to submit his explanation on the
contempt charges and set the hearing thereof on January 19, 1981 at 8:00
o’clock in the morning.  On January 14, 1981, the court received
petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file his explanation and for the
resetting of the hearing to another date. 
On January 19, 1981,
petitioner appeared before respondent court and reiterated his plea for time to
file his explanation and for the resetting of the hearing.  Petitioner was given up to February 6, 1981
to submit his explanation, whereupon he manifested that he was not taking the
witness stand any more and that he would submit the incident for resolution on
February 6, 1981.  On February 5, 1981, respondent court
received the petitioner’s answer to the contempt charges.

On February 6, 1981,
petitioner did not appear in court.  The
hearing of the contempt motion was reset to February 27, 1981. 
On February 23,1981, respondent court received petitioner’s
motion to reset the hearing scheduled for February 27, 1981 to April 6, 1981 on the ground that he had accepted various
engagements which were intransferable in nature such
that his calendar for February and March, 1981 was full.  On February
24, 1981, respondent judge issued an order denying petitioner’s
motion since it did not specify what petitioner’s various engagements were, why
they were intransferable and why it asked for a date
more than 30 days away.

On February 27, 1981,
petitioner did not appear in court.  He
merely sent to respondent court two telegrams requesting for the
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to reset the hearing on the ground
that he had to attend to cases in the Bicol
area.  For his failure to appear in court
on this date, the hearing was reset to March 12, 1981 and petitioner was
directed by telegram to appear on that date to explain why he should not be
held in contempt of court.

On March 12, 1981,
petitioner still did not appear in court. 
Fiscal Gabiana, the prosecutor assigned to
prosecute Criminal Cases Nos. CU-4457 and CU-4458, manifested that petitioner
had instructed him to tell the court that he was submitting the incident for
resolution. The court accordingly required movant to
present evidence in support of the contempt charge, after which it set one more
hearing thereof on March 23, 1981, to give petitioner a chance to cross-examine
the witnesses or otherwise meet the evidence against him if he so desired.  In the meantime, for his failure to appear on
said hearing of March 12, 1981
and to explain his non-appearance at the previous hearing of February 27, 1981, petitioner was
declared in contempt of court.^[3]

On March 20, 1981,
respondent court received petitioner’s explanation, dated March 16, 1981, explaining petitioner’s
non-appearance before the court on February
27, 1981 and March 12,
1981.  On March 23, 1981 petitioner,
still did not appear.  Fiscal Gabiana reiterated the information he gave the court on March 12, 1981 that he was instructed
by petitioner to tell the court that he was submitting the incident for
resolution.  Movant
then wound up the presentation of evidence in support of the contempt motion
and, in addition, presented, evidence disputing certain assertions made by
petitioner in his explanation. 
Thereupon, the incidents were submitted for resolution.  On March
26, 1981, respondent court received petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the court orders dated February 27, 1981 and March 12, 1981.

On April 10, 1981,
respondent judge issued an order finding petitioner guilty of contempt, with
the following dispositive part:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Atty. Jose
S. Santos guilty:  (a) of indirect
contempt of court by abuse of legal process in frustrating the order of this
Court of February 24, 1981, denying his motion to reset the hearing of February
27, 1981, by the simple expedient of transmitting to this Court two last-minute
and improperly filed telegraphic motions for postponements, and in failing to
observe truthfulness and candor with this Court with respect to the ground
relied upon by him for his motion to reset the hearing of February 27, 1981 and
his justification for his non-appearance on said dates; b) of direct contempt
for using a falsified document consisting of the supposed certification of the
Collector of Customs of Bislig, Surigao
del Sur, that Atty. Santos appeared before that
office from March 9 to 13, 1981, and of claiming to have acquired knowledge of
the hearing of March 12, 1981 only upon his return from his trip to Bislig, Surigao del Sur on the aforesaid dates.

“Accordingly, this Court sentences Atty. Jose S. Santos to pay
a fine of P1,000.00 and to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months on the first
count and a fine of P200.00 and imprisonment for ten (10) days on the second
count.

“Pursuant to the ruling of our Supreme Court
in the case of U.S. versus Lumampao, 20 Phils.
168, the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu is hereby
directed to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine the culpability of
Atty. Jose S. Santos for violation of Art. 172, last paragraph, of the Revised
Penal Code (use of falsified document) in connection with the presentation by
Atty. Santos to this Court, as part of his justification for his non-appearance
before this Court on March 12, 1981, of a falsified document consisting of the
supposed certification of the Collector of Customs of Bislig,
Surigao del Sur, that said
Atty. Santos appeared before said office from March 9 to 13, 1981, and to file
thereafter the corresponding information with the appropriate court.

“The Office of the Solicitor General is also hereby directed
to determine the feasibility of instituting disbarment proceedings against
Atty. Jose S. Santos on the basis of the premises herein-above cited.

“Meanwhile, pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, and for the reason that the acts for which he is herein found guilty of
contempt of court constitute deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct, violation
of his oath and disobedience to a lawful order of a superior court, this Court
hereby suspends Atty. Jose S. Santos from his office as attorney.”^[4]

x x
x

On April 20, 1981,
another order was issued by respondent judge, the pertinent part of the dispositive portion reading as follows:

“WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing consideration, this
Court finds Atty. Jose S. Santos guilty of:

1.       Indirect contempt of
court with respect to the first charge concerning the falsity of the ground on
which he sought and obtained the postponement of the hearing of August 27, and
28, 1979, and accordingly hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P1,000,00 and
to suffer imprisonment for six (6) months;

2.       Direct contempt of
the second and third charges relating to his false testimony in court regarding
his employment and to his affidavit on his alleged agreement with this Court
for its inhibition, and accordingly hereby sentences him to pay a fine of
P200.00 and to suffer imprisonment for ten (10) days on each of
said charges.

“Pursuant to the ruling of our Supreme Court
in the case of U.S. vs. Lumampao, 20 Phils.
168, the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu is hereby
directed to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine the culpability of
Atty. Jose S. Santos for perjury under Art. 183 of the
Revised Penal Code, and to file thereafter the corresponding information with
the appropriate court.

“The Ministry of the Solicitor General is also hereby directed
to determine the feasibility of instituting disbarment proceedings against
Atty. Jose S. Santos on the basis of the premises hereinabove cited.

“Meanwhile, pursuant to Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, and for the reason that the acts for which he is herein found guilty of
contempt of court constitute malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and
violation of his oath as a member of the bar, this Court hereby
suspends Atty. Jose S. Santos from his office as attorney.”^[5]

x x
x

On May 18, 1981,
petitioner filed a verified motion for reconsideration of the orders dated March 12, 1981, April 10, 1981 and April 20, 1981. 
Respondent judge, in his order dated June 3, 1981, denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration insofar as said orders declared petitioner guilty of
contempt but granted the lifting of his suspension from the practice of law
imposed in the orders of April 10, 1981 and April 20, 1981.  He was, however, directed to explain within
ten days from notice why he should not be suspended from the practice of law
for the acts and omissions for which he was found guilty of contempt in the
aforesaid two orders.^[6]

Before submitting the required explanation, on June 29, 1981
petitioner first presented a motion to quash the suspension proceedings on the
ground that respondent judge could not act upon the former’s
suspension without violating the constitutional provision on due process of
law, that is, respondent judge could not act with impartiality or cold
neutrality as the grounds for suspension are the same grounds for which he had
previously found petitioner guilty of direct and indirect contempt.  In an order dated July 16, 1981, respondent
judge denied the motion to quash on the ground that, in setting aside the
suspension in the order of June 3, 1981, he did not recognize that petitioner
was unlawfully deprived of his right to be heard, the court’s purpose being
allegedly to give petitioner a chance to present evidence other than those
already presented in the contempt proceedings. 
In the same order, petitioner was given another five days from receipt
of the order to explain and show cause why he should not be suspended from the
practice of law.^[7]

On July 20, 1981,
petitioner filed a petition with this Court, docketed herein as G.R. No.
57190-91, to review on certiorari the ruling of respondent judge finding
petitioner guilty of direct contempt in his orders of April 10, 1981 and April 20, 1981.  On July 31, 1981, we issued a temporary
restraining order ordering respondent judge and/or any person or persons acting
upon his orders not to enforce and carry out said orders and the warrant of
arrest issued pursuant thereto.^[8]

On August 3, 1981, petitioner filed in the court below a motion
for reconsideration of the order dated July 16, 1981, asserting that the five
counts of contempt of which petitioner was found guilty are on appeal before
the Court of Appeals (two counts for indirect contempt) and the Supreme Court
(three counts for direct contempt) and, as the suspension proceedings are based
on the very same grounds for which he was found guilty of contempt in the
orders of April 10, 1981 and April 20, 1981, the proceedings may not proceed
until the five counts of contempt are finally resolved by the appropriate
courts.^[9]

On August 17, 1981,
respondent judge issued an order suspending petitioner from the practice of
law, the dispositive part of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

“Accordingly, for failure on the part of Atty. Santos to
explain and show cause to this Court why he should not be suspended from the
practice of law for the acts and omissions for which he has been found guilty
of contempt of court in the Orders of this Court of April 10,1981and April 20,
1981, this Court hereby suspends Atty. Jose S. Santos from his office as
attorney and from the practice of law, for said acts and omissions and upon the
grounds stated in said Orders which are hereby incorporated hereto in toto by reference, effective immediately and until
otherwise lifted by this or a higher court.

“Forward certified copies of this Order, together with the
Orders of April 10, 1981
and April 20, 1981, to the
Honorable Supreme Court and the Honorable Solicitor General for their
appropriate action.”^[10]

On September 16, 1981,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order which was
denied by the respondent court in its order dated September 25, 1981. 
Petitioner then filed another petition for review on certiorari
before us, docketed as G.R. No. 58532. 
On February 10, 1982,
the Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions.  On the same date, a temporary restraining
order was issued ordering respondent judge, his agents or representatives,
and/or any person or persons acting in his place or stead not to enforce or
carry out the order dated August 17,
1981 suspending the petitioner from the practice of law.^[11]

The two petitions raise the following as the errors committed by
respondent judge and as the central issues for resolution.

G.R. Nos. 57190-91

Respondent court acted arbitrarily, capriciously, without due
process of law, without competent evidence, without legal basis, with extreme
bias, and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt.

1.       In its Order dated
April 10, 1981 for allegedly presenting a falsified document, namely, the
certification of the Port Collector of Customs of Bislig,
Surigao del Sur, stating
that petitioner “personally appeared (in) this office from March 9-13,
1981, on official business,” and for “claiming to have acquired
knowledge of the hearing of March 12, 1981 only upon his return from his trip
to Bislig, Surigao del Sur, on the aforesaid dates.”

2.       In its Order dated April 20, 1981, for (a) giving
“false testimony in court regarding his employment,” and (b) for
submitting an “affidavit on his alleged agreement with the court for its
inhibition.”^[12]

G.R. No. 58532

Respondent Judge acted contrary to law, arbitrarily, capriciously,
without due process of law, with extreme bias and with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from the
practice of law for the alleged acts and omissions for which he was found
guilty of contempt of court in the orders of April 10, 1981 and April 20, 1981.^[13]

On the issue of contempt, we rule in favor of petitioner.

We agree that respondent judge denied petitioner due process of
law and acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding the latter guilty of
direct contempt for allegedly using a falsified document.  The imputed use of a falsified document,
especially in this case where the falsity of the document is not apparent on
its face, did not constitute direct contempt; it may only, if at all,
constitute indirect contempt, subject to such defenses as may be raised by
petitioner in the proper proceedings. 
This finds support, by analogy, in the case of Nava vs. Teodoro, etc., et al,^[14]
where we ruled that the giving of false information would not constitute direct
but constructive contempt, which requires proper investigation and the filing
of a formal charge, without which petitioner cannot be held guilty of
constructive contempt.  As laid down in Bengson vs. Tan,^[15]
a doubt as to whether a contemnor has been guilty of direct or constructive contempt
should be resolved in favor of constructive contempt.  Consequently, petitioner may be adjudged
guilty of and punished for alleged contumacious acts only after written charge
and hearing.^[16]

In the present case, the alleged falsity of the document and the
claim of petitioner that he acquired knowledge of the hearing of March 12, 1981 only upon his return
from his official trip to Bislig was
based solely on the findings of respondent judge as stated in his questioned
order, thus:

“As regards his non-appearance before this Court on March 12,
1981, Atty. Santos gives the impression to this Court that he came to know of
the order of February 27, 1981, resetting the hearing of the pending incidents
to March 12, 1981, only upon his return to his residence in Metro Manila from Bislig, Surigao del Sur, to which he had travelled
officially, appearing before the office of the Collector of Customs of that
place from March 9 to 13, 1981, per Annex ‘A’ to his explanation.  This claim, however, of Atty. Santos
appears belied by the manifestation of Fiscal Gabiana
on March 12, 1981, to the effect that ‘the other day, the complaining witness
in this case, Atty. Jose S. Santos, passed by Cebu on
his way to Surigao and he was already aware of the
hearing for today because not only (by) informing him of the resetting of this
case today but also by a long distance telephone made by him, that was I think
last Monday, wherein in our conversation I also informed him of the resetting
for today’s hearing of his Motion and according to him Your Honor please, he is
submitting this case for resolution of this court.’ (TSN-Ermita, 12 March 1981, pp. 2-3). This manifestation
of Fiscal Gabiana appears to be supported by the
evidence and even by the admission of Atty. Santos that he was in fact here in Cebu on March 11, 1981, the day before the scheduled hearing.

“Annex ‘A’ to the explanation of Atty. Santos certifies that
he was in Bislig, Surigao del Sur, from March 9 to 13, 1981.  The indubitable proof presented to this
Court, however, shows that Atty. Santos left Cebu
for Bislig on March
11, 1981, and returned to Cebu
from Bislig on March 13, 1981.  He
was not and could not have been in Bislig, Surigao del Sur,
from March 9 to 13, 1981.
Consequently, Annex ‘A’ to his explanation appears to be a false
document.”^[17]

The aforesaid findings of respondent judge necessarily require
that petitioner be granted the opportunity to meet said charges against him and
to be heard in his defense.  Although we
agree with respondent judge that such acts are contumacious, nevertheless the
same cannot be summarily punished with abuse of discretion and without due
process of law.  Even if the surmises of
respondent judge are correct, the acts attributed to petitioner would at most
be constitutive of indirect contempt. 
Direct contempt presupposes that the misbehavior was committed in order
to interrupt the administration of justice or with disrespect to the court.

A court, as a rule, has the power to punish perjury as a contempt even though perjury is an indictable offense,
where the circumstances are such that the perjury obstructs the administration
of justice.  However, criminal contempt
proceedings are not available as a substitute for a perjury prosecution, and
that, inasmuch as perjury is a crime, it should not be punished as a contempt unless exceptional circumstances exist and the
administration of justice is obstructed.^[18]

The charge that petitioner executed an affidavit imputing
derogatory conduct to the court is not supported by the evidence on
record.  A cursory reading of the
affidavit itself negates the findings of respondent judge that it gives the
impression that he is approachable and willing to enter into an arrangement for
the benefit of one party to the prejudice of the adverse party.  Annexed to petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration filed in the court a quo for relief from the
orders declaring him in contempt,^[19]
said affidavit narrates petitioner’s request made to respondent judge in
chambers for the latter’s possible inhibition, and that the latter supposedly
agreed but thereafter changed his mind. 
It is actually an explanation for petitioner’s failure to testify
coupled with, at the most, an expression of misgivings on his part over the
denial by respondent judge of his motion for inhibition and the subsequent
dismissal of the criminal cases wherein petitioner was the complaining
witness.  Said affidavit neither contains
any derogatory statement nor uses disrespectful or contemptuous language.

As we held in Austria
vs. Masaquel:^[20]

“x x
x A citizen of this Republic is entitled to
expect that our courts of justice are presided by judges who are free
from bias and prejudice — and it should not be made a count against the
citizen if he so expresses himself truthfully, sincerely and respectfully.  A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if
a citizen expresses an honest opinion about him which may not altogether be
flattering to him. After all, what matters is that a judge performs his duties
in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light that God has
given him.  A judge should never allow
himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion or pettiness in the
performance of his duties.  And a judge
should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt
should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is
intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions
that they exercise.

“It is worth mentioning here that numerous cases there have
been where judges, and even members of this Court, were asked to inhibit
themselves from trying, or from participating in the consideration of, a case,
but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt
even if the grounds upon which they based their motions for disqualification
are not among those provided in the rules. 
It is only when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a
stubborn insistence to disqualify the judge, done in a malicious arrogant,
belligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants
were held in contempt of court.  And this
liberal attitudes of the courts is in keeping with the
doctrine that ‘the power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on
the preservative and not on the vindictive principle.  Only occasionally should the court invoke its
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration
of justice must falter or fail.’ The power to punish for contempt, being
drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless
necessary in the interest of justice.”

 Contempt proceedings being
also criminal in nature, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the person
against whom proceedings therefor have been brought.^[21]
This Court has been and continues to be committed to the authoritative doctrine
that the power to punish for contempt should be sparingly used and should be
exercised on the preservative, and not on the vindictive, principle.^[22]
It should be used sparingly, with caution, deliberation and due regard to
constitutional rights.  It should be
exercised only when necessary to prevent actual, direct obstruction of, or
interference with the administration of justice.^[23]

On the order suspending petitioner from the practice of law, we
do not agree that the same was unlawfully issued for having been rendered
without due process of law.  It will be
recalled that petitioner was first suspended in the two orders of April 10 and
20, 1981.  On his motion for
reconsideration, the suspension was recalled by respondent judge in an order
dated June 3, 1981 and
petitioner was given ten days from receipt thereof to explain and show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of
law.  Petitioner opted to file a motion
to quash the suspension proceedings, which was denied by respondent judge in
his order dated July 16, 1981.  In the same order, petitioner was granted
another five days within which to submit his explanation, with a warning that
his failure to do so would be considered as a waiver of his right to be heard
and the matter would be resolved on the basis of the evidence on hand.  Petitioner still failed to file any
explanation, and in an order dated August
17, 1981, he was suspended from the practice of law.

Section 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that no
attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession
until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges
against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself
or counsel.  But, if upon reasonable
notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to
determine the matter ex parte.  The failure of petitioner to submit the
required explanation constitutes a waiver of the right to be heard.  There is no denial of due process when a
party, a lawyer, was given all the opportunity to defend himself.  Failure on his part to defend himself is
equivalent to waiver of his right to due process.^[24]

We have held that where the contemnor is a lawyer, the
contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into
play the disciplinary authority of the court. 
Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the courts’ disciplinary
authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with
which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court.  The power to punish for contempt of court
does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the court over
lawyers.  The disciplinary authority of
the court over members of the Bar is but corollary to
the court’s exclusive power of admission to the Bar.  A lawyer is not merely a professional but
also an officer of the court, and as such, he is called upon to share in the
task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in
society.  Any act on his part which
visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of
justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting
application of the contempt power.^[25]

Upon a review of the evidence on record, we are satisfied that
herein petitioner committed the following acts, to wit:  (1) seeking the postponement of the hearing
scheduled on August 27 and 28, 1979 on a false ground that his father died,
when the records show that his father died on April 10, 1971; and (2)
testifying falsely in open court as to his personal circumstances.  These acts of petitioner constitute grave
misconduct and a violation of his oath of office for which he may be
disciplined by the courts.  They fall
short of the exacting standard of candor, fairness and good faith required of
lawyers.^[26]

A lawyer is called upon by virtue of his oath of office to do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court.  As an officer of the court, it is his sworn
and moral duty to help maintain and not destroy the high esteem and regard
towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice.  A lawyer’s oath is one impressed with the
utmost seriousness.  It must not be taken
lightly.  Every lawyer must do his best
to live up to it.^[27]

The fact that petitioner was acting as a witness and not as a
lawyer will not free him from the disciplinary authority of the court.  An attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privilege which his license and the law confer upon him.^[28]
Generally, any misconduct on the part of a lawyer in his professional or
private capacity which shows him to be wanting in moral character may justify
his suspension or removal from office even though the law does not specify the
act as a ground for disciplinary action.^[29]

However, under the factual milieu of this case, we believe that
the suspension of petitioner from August
17, 1981, the date of the order of suspension, to February 10, 1982, when the temporary
restraining order against its enforcement was issued by this Court, has subserved the disciplinary purpose and is sufficient
punishment for his misconduct.

WHEREFORE, certiorari is GRANTED in G.R. Nos.
57190-91 and DENIED in G.R. No. 58532. The rulings on and the penalties for
direct contempt imposed by respondent judge on petitioner in the questioned
orders of April 10, 1981 and April 20, 1981 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE,
while the order of August 17, 1981 is AFFIRMED. 
The temporary restraining orders issued in these cases are made
permanent.  The suspension of petitioner
is hereby LIFTED, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDRED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, G.R. Nos. 57190-91, 44.

^[2] Ibid., id., 44-59.

^[3] Ibid., id., 36.

^[4] Ibid., id., 41-43.

^[5] Ibid., id., 58-59.

^[6]
Rollo, G.R. No. 58532, 95-96.

^[7]Ibid., id., 101-106.

^[8]Ibid.,
G.R. Nos. 57190-91, 166-168.

^[9]
Ibid.,
G.R. No. 58532, 109-111.

^[10]
Ibid.,
id., 116-117.

^[11]
Ibid., id., 127-129.

^[12] Ibid., G.R. No. 57190-91, 13.

^[13]
Ibid.,
id., 309; Petitioner’s Brief, 1-3.

^[14] G.R. No. L-10074, April 30, 1959 (unpublished).

^[15] 103 Phil. 1154 (1958).

^[16]
Sec. 3 Rule 71, Rules of Court.

^[17]
Rollo, G.R. No. 57190-91, 38-39.

^[18] 17 C.J.S. 135.

^[19] Rollo, G.R. No. 57190-91, 139-140.

^[20] 20 SCRA 1247 (1967).

^[21] Pajao vs.
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, etc., et
al., 88 Phil. 588 (1951).

^[22] Lipata vs.
Tutaan, etc., et al., 124 SCRA 877 (1983); Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 (1984).

^[23] 17 C.J.S. 68.

^[24] Vda. de Laig, et al. vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., 86 SCRA 641 (1978).

^[25] Zaldivar vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al., and Zaldivar
vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316 (1988).

^[26] Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility.

^[27] Berenguer vs.
Carranza, 26 SCRA 673 (1969).

^[28] Hernandez vs. Villaruel, 107 SCRA
633 (1981).

^[29] Mortel vs.
Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586 (1956).