JOSE S. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, BRANCH VI, CEBU CITY, HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, PRESIDING, AND CONSOLADOR LAO, RESPONDENTS.

Santos versus Court of First Instance of Cebu

The Case

This is a consolidated petition for certiorari filed by Jose S. Santos, a member of the Philippine Bar and a legal officer of the Bureau of Customs in Manila, against the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch Six, presided over by Judge Rafael T. Mendoza, and against Consolador Lao, the accused in two criminal cases where Santos was the complaining witness. Santos asks the Supreme Court to annul the orders of the respondent judge finding him guilty of direct and indirect contempt and suspending him from the practice of law. The case matters because it draws the line between direct and indirect contempt, insists that contempt proceedings are criminal in nature and must observe due process, and reminds us that the power to punish for contempt is preservative and not vindictive.

Procedural History

Santos was the complaining witness in two criminal cases for falsification of commercial documents and for perjury, both filed against Consolador Lao before Branch Six of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. On motion of the accused, the respondent judge initiated contempt proceedings against Santos. After a series of hearings, some of which Santos did not attend, the respondent judge issued an order on April 10, 1981 finding Santos guilty of indirect contempt and of direct contempt, imposing fines and imprisonment, directing a preliminary investigation for use of a falsified document, and suspending him from the practice of law. A second order on April 20, 1981 found him guilty of indirect contempt and of direct contempt on other charges, again imposing penalties and suspending him. On reconsideration, the respondent judge denied the motion as to the contempt findings but lifted the suspension, at the same time requiring Santos to explain why he should not be suspended. Santos filed a motion to quash the suspension proceedings, which was denied. He then filed a petition with the Supreme Court to review the contempt orders, and the Court issued a temporary restraining order. The respondent judge thereafter issued an order on August 17, 1981 suspending Santos from the practice of law. Santos filed a second petition for review on certiorari, and the Court consolidated the two petitions and issued another temporary restraining order against the suspension.

Facts

Santos was the complaining witness in two criminal cases against Consolador Lao before the respondent court. On December 24, 1980, Lao filed a motion to have Santos declared in contempt, alleging that Santos had obtained a postponement on the false claim that his father had died, had testified falsely that he was not connected with any government office and that he was a practicing lawyer, and had executed an affidavit imputing derogatory conduct to the court.

The respondent judge directed Santos to explain and set the hearing. Santos repeatedly asked for extensions and resettings. He failed to appear on February 6, February 27, and March 12, 1981, sending telegrams and claiming prior engagements, including a trip to the Bicol area and later to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. On March 12, 1981, the prosecutor manifested that Santos had instructed him to submit the incident for resolution, and Santos was declared in contempt for failing to appear and to explain his non-appearance. On March 23, 1981, Santos again did not appear, and the prosecution presented evidence, including evidence disputing his explanation.

On April 10, 1981, the respondent judge found Santos guilty of indirect contempt for abusing legal process and of direct contempt for using a falsified certification from the Collector of Customs of Bislig and for claiming he learned of the March 12 hearing only upon his return. On April 20, 1981, the respondent judge found him guilty of indirect contempt as to the falsity of the ground for postponement and of direct contempt for false testimony regarding his employment and for his affidavit on the alleged agreement for inhibition. Both orders suspended him from the practice of law. After the suspension was lifted on reconsideration and Santos failed to explain, the respondent judge suspended him again on August 17, 1981.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding the petitioner guilty of direct contempt for allegedly using a falsified document and for his claim that he learned of the hearing only upon his return from Bislig.
• Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding the petitioner guilty of direct contempt for alleged false testimony regarding his employment and for his affidavit on the alleged agreement for inhibition.
• Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the petitioner from the practice of law for the acts and omissions for which he was found guilty of contempt.

Applicable Provisions

Section 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as discussed in the decision, governs the suspension of attorneys:

No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession until after a hearing upon a complaint filed against him.

This provision bears on the third issue, because the Court examines whether Santos was given a hearing before being suspended.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled in favor of Santos. The imputed use of a falsified document, especially where the falsity is not apparent on its face, does not constitute direct contempt; it may at most constitute indirect contempt, subject to such defenses as may be raised in the proper proceedings. The Court held that a doubt as to whether a contemnor is guilty of direct or constructive contempt should be resolved in favor of constructive contempt, and that the petitioner may be punished only after a written charge and hearing. The Court found that the alleged falsity was based solely on the findings of the respondent judge, and that Santos was not given the opportunity to meet the charges and be heard in his defense.

On the second issue, the Court likewise ruled for Santos. The charge that he executed an affidavit imputing derogatory conduct to the court is not supported by the evidence; the affidavit merely narrated his request for inhibition and expressed misgivings, without derogatory or disrespectful language. The Court quoted its ruling in Austria versus Masaquel that a citizen is entitled to expect that courts are presided by judges free from bias and prejudice, and that a judge should not be so thin-skinned as to feel offended by an honest opinion. The Court stressed that contempt proceedings are criminal in nature, that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the person charged, and that the power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly, on the preservative and not the vindictive principle.

On the third issue, the Court ruled against Santos. It held that the suspension order was not issued without due process, because Santos was given ten days from the June 3, 1981 order and another five days from the July 16, 1981 order to explain, with a warning that failure to do so would be considered a waiver, and he still failed to file any explanation. The suspension was therefore validly issued.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate must retain these rules. First, the use of a falsified document, where the falsity is not apparent on its face, is not direct contempt; it may only be indirect contempt, which requires a written charge and hearing. Second, any doubt as to whether a contemnor is guilty of direct or constructive contempt should be resolved in favor of constructive contempt. Third, contempt proceedings are criminal in nature, and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the person charged. Fourth, the power to punish for contempt is drastic and extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly, on the preservative and not the vindictive principle, and only when necessary to prevent actual, direct obstruction of or interference with the administration of justice. Fifth, under Section 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession until after a hearing upon a complaint filed against him.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petitions as to the contempt findings, annulled the orders of April 10 and April 20, 1981 insofar as they declared Santos guilty of direct contempt, and upheld the suspension order of August 17, 1981.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and any doubt as to whether contempt is direct or indirect is resolved in favor of indirect contempt. Examiners like to use this case to test the distinction between direct and indirect contempt, the due process requirements in contempt proceedings, and the limits on a judge's power to punish for contempt.