VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO, ZENAIDA ARCEO, ROMEO ARCEO, RODOLFO ARCEO AND MANUEL ARCEO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER 16TH DIVISION), PEDRO …

The Court grants this petition on a successful demonstration of
error committed by the Court of Appeals.^[1]

It appears that the spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo
were the owners of four parcels of unregistered land (six were involved
but only four were disputed) located in Pulilan, Bulacan, identified as lots nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and
8131.  Escolastica died on September 16, 1942 while Abdon passed
away in 1953.  They had one son, Esteban, who died on September 2, 1941.  Esteban had five children Jose, Pedro,
Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera.  Jose
married Virginia Franco, with whom he fathered six children, Carmelita,
Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel, Cesar, and Romeo.^[2] Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera
are the private respondents herein while Jose’s widow, Virginia
(Jose died on March 8, 1970), and their children are the petitioners.

It also appears that on October (or September) 27, 1941, the Arceos executed a deed of donation
inter vivos, marked as exhibit “J”, in which the spouses bestowed the
properties in favor of Jose.^[3] Since 1942, Jose had been paying taxes
thereon.^[4]
In 1949, he took personal possession thereof, worked thereon, and claimed them
as owner thereof.^[5]

It furthermore appears that on August 2, 1950,
the spouses executed another deed of donation
inter vivos, marked as exhibit
“T”, disposing of the properties further in
favor of Jose.^[6]

On October 3 (or 30), 1941, the Arceos supposedly signed a deed
of donation mortis causa, marked as exhibit “1” revoking exhibit “J” and giving away the
properties in question in favor of all his grandchildren including Jose.  It seems however that it was notarized only
on November 3, 1944, after
Escolastica had died.

On January 12, 1972,
Virginia, together with her
children, filed with the cadastral court^[7]
an application for registration in their names of lots nos. 2582, 2595, 3054,
and 8131 on the strength of
exhibits “J” and “T”.  Pedro,
Antonio, Lorenzo, and Sotera opposed the application on the basis of exhibit
“1”.  Pedro and Lorenzo specifically
contested the application on lots
nos. 3054 and 8131 on claims that each of them were
entitled to one-third thereof.^[8]

The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed
the properties according to the law on intestate
succession.^[9]

Virginia and her children shortly went to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the cadastral court and dismissed the appeal.

On February 15, 1988,
Virginia et al. petitioned this Court.

The petitioners argue
that the cadastral court was
bereft of the power to determine conflicting claims of ownership, and that its
authority was solely to confirm an existing title, and that anyway, all the
lots should have been awarded to them by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession since 1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the
parcels) or otherwise, by acquisitive prescription.^[10]
They also assert that exhibits “J” and “T” had validly
transferred the subject lands to them.

In their comment, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera contend
that the cadastral court had the jurisdiction to decide questions of ownership
of property; that the issue of prescription was never ventilated below; and
that exhibit “J” had been validly rescinded by exhibit “1”.

The parties do not quarrel over the genuineness of all three
exhibits but rather, over the dates thereof. 
Pedro, et al. allege that exhibit “J” was executed on
September 27, 1941, and not October 27, 1941, and that exhibit “1”,
the instrument that revoked it, came later, or on October 3, 1941.  Virginia et al. maintain on the other hand
that exhibit “J” was actually made on October 27, 1941, twenty-four days after the execution of
exhibit “1”, and that assuming exhibit “1” came earlier, it
was notarized, and took effect, only on November
3, 1944, after the death of Escolastica, one of the donors.

Although the parties wrangle over dates, the Court observes that
there is no real question of fact to be
resolved in this case.  The important question, so we find, is, based
on existing facts, legal in character: 
Who has the right over lots nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131?

As we indicated, we find merit in this petition.

The first question must, however, be resolved against the
petitioners.  We have held that under
Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is no longer as
circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration law.^[11]
We said that the Decree “has eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a
cadastral court.” The amendment was “[a]imed at avoiding multiplicity
of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon
the required trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for
‘original registration’ but also ‘over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising
from such applications or petitions.’”^[12]
At any rate, we have also stated
that the limited-jurisdiction-rule governing land registration courts is
subject to recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the parties mutually agreed
or have acquiesced in submitting controversial issues for determination; (2) where they have been given
full opportunity to present their evidence; and (3) where the court has
considered the evidence already of record and is convinced that the same is
sufficient for rendering a decision upon such controversial issues.^[13]
By the same token, it has been held that the rule is not, in reality, one of
jurisdiction, but rather, of mere procedure, which may be waived.^[14]
It is not amiss to state likewise that where the issue, say, of ownership, is
ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration, the cadastral
court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in
this case, where both parties rely on their respective exhibits to defeat one
another’s claims over the parcels sought to be registered, in which case,
registration would not be possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the
court first decided it.

The next question refers to acquisitive prescription.  In support of their claims, Virginia, et al.
cite four events:  (1) In 1941, Jose
entered upon the properties and until his death in 1970, worked thereon; (2)
Upon his death, they, Virginia, et al., divided the same by virtue of an
extrajudicial partition; (3) Ever since, Jose had paid taxes thereon until he
died; (4) Pedro, et al. have not lifted a finger to oust him, Jose, in
possession, or otherwise, to impugn his
right. 
Virginia, et al. now say
that barring the above exhibits, they have anyway acquired the parcels by
prescription.

We also regret that one can not agree with this proposition.  The petitioners suppose that the parcels had
come under the category of a co-ownership, following the death of their
grandparents, but in that case, it has been held that in order for prescription
to set in, the following requisites must concur:  (1) there is a clear showing that the
claimant has repudiated the co-ownership; (2) he has made known to the rest of
the co-owners that he is assuming exclusive ownership over the property; (3)
there is clear and convincing evidence thereof; and (4) his possession is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious.^[15]

The evidence for Virginia et al. do not
persuade us that they (through Jose) have acquired the lots by lapse of
time.  The fact that in 1941, Jose
wrested possession thereof, so we hold, does not amount to adverse possession
because as a co-owner, he had the right of enjoyment, and his use thereof can not
by itself prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners.  The fact that he paid taxes thereon is not
controlling either because payment of real estate taxes does not necessarily
confer title upon a claimant.^[16]
The fact finally that Virginia,
et al. had sought to extrajudicially divide the property is nothing conclusive because there is no showing that they,
Virginia, et al. had made this
known to Pedro, et al.  Under these
circumstances, we can not validly say that the lands had devolved on Virginia,
et al. by way of prescription.

We are granting the petition nonetheless on the finding that the
lots had been conferred to Jose by a valid
donation inter vivos, that is, exhibit “J”.

Other than the claims by Pedro, et al., that exhibit
“J” had been revoked by exhibit “1”, exhibit “J” appears to
have been executed in compliance with legal requirements, i.e., as to form and
acceptance.^[17]
It is true that the cadastral court was supposed to have attributed fraud on
the part of Jose in making Abdon sign the exhibit,^[18]
(according to Pedro, Abdon affixed his signature thereon upon “the belief
that it was a deed of sale of the land purchased from one Marciano Santos“^[19])
but as found by the Court of Appeals, it is a theory that “must be
received with a ‘grain of
salt’,”^[20]
because, for one thing, Jose is dead, and for another, the petitioners have
adduced evidence that exhibit “J” was genuine.  We are bound by the factual finding of the
Appellate Court and as we averred, we are disposing of this question on pure
questions of law.

As to exhibit “T”, the finding of the Court of Appeals
that it was defective is just as controlling on this Court, that is, that
“it was signed by Abdon
Arceo after the death of his wife on September
16, 1942 and does not contain the acceptance … by Jose
Arceo.”^[21]

We can not say that exhibit “1” had validly revoked
exhibit “J”.  The weight of
authority is that a valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable,^[22]
except on account of officiousness,^[23]
failure by the donee to comply with charges imposed in the donation,^[24]
or by reason of ingratitude.^[25]
There is simply no proof that Abdon, when he executed exhibit “1”,
was in possession of a legal ground for annulment.

We can not thus accept the Court of Appeals’ holding that exhibit
“1” had “neutralized the force and effect”^[26]
of exhibit “J”.

It is therefore this Court’s ruling that the disposition under
exhibit “J” in favor of Jose (whose rights were transmitted to Virginia,
et al.) should be respected.

We find no need in settling the issue of true dates of the parties’
exhibits, because first, it is an issue of fact and second, because whatever
their true dates, there is no obstacle to the validity of the
claims of Virginia, et al.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET ASIDE.  The court a quo is ORDERED to distribute the
properties covered by the donation inter vivos, dated October (or September)
27, 1941, exhibit “J”, according to the terms and conditions set forth therein, and in the proportions indicated thereby. 
No costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Ines-Luciano, Leonor, J., Nocon, Rodolfo and Cui, Emeterio JJ., Concurring.

^[2]
Rollo, 45.

^[3]
Id.

^[4]
Id., 13.

^[5]
Id.

^[6]
It is not clear which portions were covered by exhibit “J” and which
were embraced by exhibit “T”.

^[7]
L.R.C. No. N-29443-M, LRC Rec. No. 41856 (CFI Branch
VI, Malolos, Bulacan); the decision was rendered by Judge Roque Tamayo.

^[8]
Rollo, id., 10.

^[9]
Id., 45-46.

^[10]
Id., 13-21.

^[11]
Averia, Jr. v. Caguioa, No. 65129, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 459.

^[12]
Supra, 462.

^[13]
Zuñiga v. Court of Appeals, No. L-49776, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 740,
749.

^[14]
Manalo v. Mariano, No. L-33850, January 22, 1976,  69 SCRA 80.

^[15]
Adille v. Court of Appeals, No. L-44546, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA
455.

^[16]
Pangan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-39299, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 375.

^[17]
CIVIL CODE, art. 749.

^[18]
Rollo, supra, 106.

^[19]
Id., 46.

^[20]
Id.

^[21]
Id.

^[22]
See II TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
510 (1972 ed.)

^[23]
CIVIL CODE, art. 760.

^[24]
Supra, art. 764

^[25]
Supra, art. 765.

^[26]
Rollo, id., 46.