DIOSDADO TINGSON, JR., GODOFREDO OBLEFIAS, CARMELO MOLINO, AND GEORGE DRAPER, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIRST DIVISION, THENMARIS (SHIP…

This petition assails the decision of the respondent National
Labor Relations commission which affirmed the decision of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) dismissing the complaint for illegal
dismissal, recovery of unpaid salaries, and non-payment of overtime and other
benefits filed by the petitioners against the private respondents.  The records show that:

Petitioners Diosdado Tingson,
Jr., Godofredo
Oblefias, Carmeno Molino
and George Draper were members of the crew of the vessel M/V “Sea
Princess” owned by Sea Proud Shipping of Greece.  They were hired on April 1983 by Sea Proud
Shipping, represented here in the Philippines
by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc., as Chief Mate, Second Engineer,
Fourth Engineer and Carpenter respectively, for a contract period of 12
months.  On 16 August 1983, while the vessel was at the port
of Rosario, Argentina,
they were ordered by the ship master Captain Manuel Tacata
to disembark for repatriation to Manila.^[1]

As a consequence, the petitioners, on December 5, 1983, filed a complaint with the POEA
for illegal dismissal, recovery
of unpaid salaries, and non-payment of benefits against the private respondents.

On January 24, 1984, the
private respondents filed an answer alleging that the petitioners were
repatriated “because they [had] committed acts of insubordination incompetence
and inefficiency, disrespect towards a superior officer and
abandonment of post of [sic] duty
without [having been] properly relieved.”^[2]

On January 28, 1988,
the overseas employment office rendered a decision sustaining the private
respondents.^[3]

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission, the latter affirmed the POEA decision.

The petitioners^[4]
seasonably came to this court assailing
both rulings on the grounds, first, that no competent
evidence had been presented to show
insubordination, and second, that they were deprived of due process of
law.

In his comment, the Solicitor General upholds the validity of the
petitioner Diosdado Tingson’s
dismissal for acts of insubordination. 
He, however, avers that the proofs presented against the petitioner Godofredo Oblefias and Carmeno Molino
constituted hearsay evidence.

Except for their claims of violation of due process, the
petitioners’ contentions relate to the evidence presented before the POEA.  The well-settled principle, however, is that
our jurisdiction is confined to
questions of law,^[5]
and not or fact or evidence.

Be that as it may,
we can not leave untouched the question
of due process, which we indeed find to be present, and which appears to be the gravamen of this petition.

According to the petitioners, they were ordered to disembark at
the port of Rosario, Argentina
“within ten (10) minutes”^[6]
from the ship captain’s order.  The parties are indeed agreed that “[o]n
August 16, 1983, while [M/V Sea Princess] was docked at Rosario,
Argentina, the [petitioners] were informed by the ship captain that a telegram
was received from the general manager of the respondent shipping firm, lntermare Maritime Agencies, Inc., ordering the four
complainants to be sent home.”^[7]

The Solicitor General states, however, that the petitioner Tingson had, on the same day, gone to see the ship captain to demand an explanation.  Furthermore, upon arriving in Manila, he saw Captain Francisco Adviento, general manager of Intermare
Marine Agencies, Inc., who informed him of the cause for the petitioners’ repatriation.  “There is, therefore,” so the Solicitor
General submits, “substantial compliance with the requirements of due
process.”^[8]

On the other hand,
the private respondents aver that the petitioners
had the opportunity to refute the charges against them before the POEA.^[9]

Based upon these facts, the Court is of the opinion, and so
holds, that the petitioners had been denied due process of law and
consequently, they had been unlawfully terminated from work.

The Court rejects the Solicitor General’s contention that the
petitioners had been given substantial due process.  The fact that the petitioner Tingson had been granted
an audience with the ship captain and the ship agent’s general manager is not
the “due process” contemplated
by law.  We have held that prior to dismissal, the employer is obliged to observe the
procedure laid down by the Labor Code. 
Thus:

“x x x SUBJECT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF WORKERS TO
SECURITY OF TENURE AND THEIR
RIGHT TO BE PROTECTED AGAINST DISMISSAL
EXCEPT FOR A JUST OR AUTHORIZED CAUSE AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE
REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE UNDER ARTICLE 284
OF THIS CODE, THE CLEARANCE TO TERMINATE EMPLOYMENT SHALL NO LONGER BE NECESSARY.”

“HOWEVER, THE EMPLOYER SHALL FURNISH THE WORKER WHOSE
EMPLOYMENT IS SOUGHT TO BE TERMINATED A WRITTEN NOTICE CONTAINING A STATEMENT
OF THE CAUSES FOR TERMINATION AND SHALL AFFORD THE LATTER AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO
BE HEARD AND TO DEFEND HIMSELF WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF HIS REPRESENTATIVE IF
HE SO DESIRES IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY RULES AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED
PURSUANT TO GUIDELINES SET BY THE MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT.  ANY DECISION TAKEN BY THE EMPLOYER SHALL BE WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHT OF THE WORKER TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OR LEGALITY OF HIS
DISMISSAL BY FILING A COMPLAINT WITH THE REGIONAL BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION.  THE BURDEN OF
PROVING THAT THE TERMINATION WAS FOR A
VALID OR AUTHORIZED CAUSE SHALL REST ON THE EMPLOYER.  THE MINISTRY MAY SUSPEND THE EFFECTS OF THE
TERMINATION PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE CASE IN THE EVENT OF A PRIMA FACIE FINDING BY THE MINISTRY THAT THE TERMINATION MAY CAUSE A SERIOUS LABOR
DISPUTE OR IS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF A MASS
LAY-OFF.”^[10]

Failure to comply therewith taints the dismissal with illegality.

In another case, we held that the employer is bound to furnish
the employee two notices, the written charge and the notice of dismissal, if
after hearing dismissal is indeed
warranted.^[11]

We have also held that
this procedure is mandatory, in the absence of which, any judgment reached by
management is void and inexistent.^[12]

The private respondents can not rely on the POEA proceedings to
justify the dismissal of the petitioners. 
The hearing conducted by the POEA was on the petitioners’ own complaint
(for illegal dismissal).  The fact,
however, is at that time, they, the petitioners, had already been terminated. 
What the law (Batas Blg. 130) sets forth is
the procedure prior to dismissal.

That there was evidence to justify termination is of no
moment.  For one thing, the Solicitor
General himself says that insofar as the petitioners Oblefias
and Molino are concerned, the proofs
submitted against them were hearsay in character.  For another, even if this were the case–that
there was sufficient evidence against the petitioners–it does not justify the
private respondents from unceremoniously dumping them, the petitioners, in
strange shores without hearing them.  The
Court is thus convinced that the petitioners have been deprived of due process.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The private respondents are ordered to PAY Diosdado Tingson, Jr. Godofredo Oblefias, and Carmeno Molino their wages they should have
earned from August 16, 1983 until April
28, 1984, the date
of expiration of the parties crew agreement, as follows:

Diosdado Tingson, Jr.———– US$ 975.00
a month

Godofredo Oblefias————– US$ 975.00 a month

Carmeno Molino
—————– US$ 760.00 a month

in their
equivalent in Philippine pesos, plus legal interest thereon at the rate of six (6%) per cent per annum reckoned from August 16, 1983 until fully and finally paid.

The private respondents are also ORDERED to pay overtime pay and other benefits allowed by
law.  Let this case be REMANDED to the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration for the computation of overtime pay and
other unpaid benefits.  Costs are
adjudged against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 122-123.

^[2]
Id., 123.

^[3]
Id.

^[4]
It appears that the petitioner George Draper subsequently withdrew his
complaint with the POEA.  (See rollo, 100; also,
206.)  Accordingly, the Court is deciding
the case without the said petitioner.

^[5]
See Bondoc v. Court of Industrial Relations,
No. L-33955.  January 26, 1989, 169 SCRA 379, one
of the later cases on the matter.

^[6]
Rollo, id., 29-30, 154.

^[7]
Id., 95-96.

^[8]
Id., 177.

^[9]
Id., 188.

^[10]
Batas Blg. 130, sec. 13.

^[11]
National Service Corporation v. NLRC, Nos. 69870 &
70295, November
29, 1988, 168 SCRA 122.

^[12]
Ruffy v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 84193, February 15, 1990.