GUILLERMO PONCE, PETITIONER, VS. MARCELO GUEVARRA, RICARDO DINGLASAN, FRANCISCO GUEVARRA, TIBURCIO DE JESUS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Guillermo Ponce seeks the review by certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations in Cases Nos. 199 to 206,
208 to 220 and 222, Laguna, L’58, dismissing said cases and ordering
him to maintain the defendants therein and respondents hereinMarcelo
Guevarra, Ricardo Dinglasan, Francisco Guevarra, Tiburcio de Jesus,
Quirino Mendoza, Romeo Guevarra, Ruperto Latay, Luciano Escarez,
Quirino Millar, Melecio Flores, Jose Centino, Baylon Latay, Braulio
Angeles, Teofilo Guevarra, Catalino Reyes, Marciano Makahiya, Cayetano
Malapascua, Juan Angeles, Flaviano Angeles, Manuel Latay, Ciriaco
Guevarra, and Bonifacio Mabilangan -as tenant-leases, with all the
rights accorded and obligations imposed upon them by Republic Act No.
1199, as amended.

On May 27, 1958, petitioner filed with said Court of Agrarian
Relations 24 individual complaints against the above named respondents,
and Hermenegildo Guevarra and Apolonio Javinia, to enjoin them from
continuing with the plowing and cultivation of their holdings,
referring to several parcels of agricultural land situated in the sitio
of Balanoy, Municipality of Calauan, Province of Laguna, and belonging
to said petitioner, and to recover from them a reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of said holdings, as well as damages and
attorney’s fees.

Upon denial of their motion to dismiss said complaints, the
above-named defendants filed their answers admitting some allegations
of the respective complaints, denying other allegations thereof and
setting up special defenses. After appropriate proceedings, the lower
court rendered the aforementioned decision dismissing the cases against
respondent herein, but in favor of the petitioner as regards defendants
Hermenigildo Guevarra and Apolonio Javinia. Hence, this appeal with
respect to said dismissed cases, upon the ground that the lower court
erred:

“x x x in not holding in disregard of the provisions
of Law then in force and which should control, thit Respondents’
tenanry relationship with petitioner’s lessee (Miguel Donato), assuming
the same even existed, terminated as of January, 1955.

“x x x
in applying the provisions of Republic Act Nos. 1199 and 2263 to the
cases at bar, rontrary for settled doctrine that no law should operate
retroactively in imnpairment of vested rights, and concluding thereby
that upon the transfer of legal possession of the landholdinss in
question from Miguel A. Donato to petitioner in January, 1958, the
petitioner assumed the rights and obligations of Miguel A. Donato as
landholder-lessor in relation to respondents as tenants-lessees.

“x x x in not holding that respondents violated material conditions of the tenancy agreements, if one be deemed to exist.

“x
x x in not holding that more than half of the coconuts on the
landholdings where coconuts wore planted died because of the willful
negligence of the respondents concerned.

“x x x in not
holding that respondents failed to take care of the coconuts planted on
the landholdings with the diligence of a good father of the family.

“x x x in not ordering the ejectment of respondents from petitioner’s lands.”

I. The records show that petitioner and his wife Adela R. Ponce are
the registered owners of the aforementioned parcels of land, which have
an aggregate area of 72 hectares, more or less; that on August 31,
1950, these spouses executed a contract of lease (Exhibit H, Donato)
over said land, in favor of Miguel Donato, for a non-extendible period
of 5 agricultural years, beginning from the crop-year 1950-1951; that,
although the contract provided that the lessee could not sublease the
land or any portion thereof without the written consent of the lessors,
Donato did sublease said land to respondents herein, and the other two
defendants in the lower court, as tenant lessees, without the lessors’
consent; that by virtue of the deeds, Exhibits A-5 and A-6, executed,
respectively, on January 31, 1956 and March 11, 1956, the lifetime of
the lease contract was extended for two years (Exhibits A-6) ; and that
when these extensions were agreed upon, and prior thereto, petitioners
were aware of the said contracts of sublease between Donato as
sublessor and the respondents, and the aforementioned defendants, as
sublessees or tenant-lesses.

Petitioner maintains that having been made orally, these contracts
of sublease are void pursuant to Act No. 4054 (Sec. 4) as amended, and
that, in any event, the rights of the sub-lessees cannot, pursuant to
the Civil Code of the Philippines, extend beyond the life-time of the
right of the sublessor, which, petitioner avers in his brief, was
extinguished in January, 1955.

At the outset, it should be noted that, in view of the extensions
agreed upon on January 31, and March 11,1956, the right of lease of
Donato expired, not in January, 1955, but in March, 1958, as alleged in
petitioner’s complaints in the lower court. Then, too, although lease
contracts, in general, are governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the provisions thereof, are qualified, insofar as rice
share tenancy or agricultural tenancy is concerned, by those of Act No.
4054, Commonwealth Act No. 461 and 608, and Republic Act Nos. 44, 1199
and 2263. Again, although, Section 4 of Act No. 4054 provides that “the
contract on share tenancy, in order to be valid and binding, shall be
drawn” in writing, section 8 of the same act fixes the sharing basis
between tenants and landlords “in the absence of a written agreement to
the contrary.” This indicates clearly that a tenancy relationship may
validly be established, under said Act, without a written agreement
therefor, (Deato vs. Rural Progress Administration,L-3414, April 13,
1951; Camacho vs. CIR, 80 Phil. 848), and that, under said section 4 of
Act No. 4054, a written contract between the landholder and the tenant
is necessary only to establish a sharing basis other than that fixed in section 8 of said Act. Besides, Commonwealth Act No. 461, as amended, explicitly provides that:

“Section 1. Aaiy agreement or provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding,in all cases where land is held under any
system of tenancy, the tenant shall not he dispossessed of the land
cultivated by him except for any of the causes mentioned in section
nineteen of Republic Act numbered Four thousand and fifty-four or for
any just cause and without the approval of a representative of the
Department of Justice x x x x x x x.”

So too, Section 26 of said Act No. 4054, insofar as pertinent, reads:

“How extinguished. The contract of farm tenancy is extinguished.

x x x x

“(4) By the sale or alienation of the land which is the subject matter of the contract, in which case the purchaser shall assume tka rights and obligations of the landlord in relation with the tenant or farmer.” (Underscoring ours.)

Similarly, Republic Act No. 1199, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 2263, provided:

“SEC. 6. Tenancy Relationship; Its
Definition.Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between
&. landlord and a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly,
to undertake jointly the cultivation of land belonging to the former
either under the share tenancy or leasehold tcnaney system, as a result
of which relation- ship the tenant acquires the right to continue
working on and cultivating the land, until and unless he is
dispossessed of his holdings for any of the just causes enumerated in
Section fifty or the relationship is terminated in accordance with
Section nine” (Underscoring ours.)

“Section 7. Tenancy
Relationship; How established; Security of Tenure.- Renancy
relationship may be established either verbally or in writing,
expressly or impliedly. Once such relationship is established, the tenant shall be entitled to security of tenure as hereinafter provided.” (Unserscoring ours.)

“SEG.
9. Severance of Relationship. – The tenancy relationship is
extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or
incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his
immediate farm household may continue to work the land until the close
of the agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the
contract as fixed by the parties and the sate or alienation of the land
do not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case,
the purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of
the former landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume his rights and obligations.” (Underscoring ours.)

“Section 10. Contracts; Nature, and Continuity of Conditions.—The terms
and conditions of tenancy contracts, as stipulated by the parties or as
provided by law, shall be understood to continue until modified by the
parties. Modifications of the terms and conditions of contracts shall not prejudice the fight of the tenant to the security of his tenure on the land as determined in Section sis, seven, and forty-nine.” (Underscoring ours.)

“Section
49. Ejectment of Tenant.—Notwithstanding any agreement or provision of
law as to the period, in all cases where land devoted to any
agricultural purpose is held under any system of tenancy, the
tenant shall not he dispossessed of his holdings except for any of the
causes hereinafter enumerated and only after the same has been proved
before, and the dispossession is authorized by the court.” (Underscoring ours.)

As amended by Republic Act No. 2263, section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199, is couched in the following language:

“Sec. 9. Severance of Relations.—The tenancy
relationship is extinguished by the voluntary surrender or abandonment
of the land by. or the death or incapacity of, the tenant: Provided,
That in case of the tenant’s death or incapacity, the tenancy
relationship shall continue between the landholder and one member of
the tenant’s immediate farm household who is related to the tenant
within the second degree by consanguinity and who shall cultivate the
land himself personally unless the landholder shall cultivate the land
himself personally or through the employment of mechanical farm
implements, in accordance with Section 50 hereof. Should the deceased
or incapacitated tenant have two or more members of his immediate farm
household qualified to succeed him, the landholder shall have the right
to choose from among them who should succeed. The expiration of the
period of the contract as fixed by the parties, or the sale, alienation
or transfer of legal possession of the land does not of itself
extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or
transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of the former
landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his bteir or heirs shall likewise assume his right and obligations.” (Underscoring ours.)”

It is obvious from the foregoing provisions, that, regardless of the
existence or not of a written contract between respondents on the one
hand and either the petitioner or Donato, on the other, and regardless
of the extinction of the contractual relations between petitioner and
Donato and between Donato and respondents herein, the latter cannot be
ejected from petitioner’s land except upon judicial authority and for
one of the causes specified by law. Indeed, we so held in Joya vs.
Pareja (L-13258, November 28, 1959) from which we quote:

“Admittedly, the respondent-tenant cultivated the
land for the lessee for 16 years or for the entire duration of the
lease agreement. There is no controversy either that tenancy
relationship existed between Maximina Bondad, the lessee, and Pareja,
the tenant. The question now interposed in this petition is whether
the tenant of a lessee retains the right to work on the land despite
the termination of the lease, or said in other words, whether his being
a tenant of the lessee mates hint, upon the expiration of the contract,
“a tenant of that lessor.

“The question thus presented must be answered in the affirmative,
not so much because of Act 4054 relied upon by the Agrarian Court, but
pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act 1199, as amended by Section 3 of
Republic Act 2283, which reads in part:

‘Sec. 9. Severance of Relations.—The tenancy relationship is
extinguished t>y the voluntary surrender or abandonment of the land
by or the death or incapacity of, the tenant:

x x x x

The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, or the sale, alienation or transfer
of legal possession of the land does not of itself extinguish the
relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee shall
assume the rights and obligations of the former landholder in relation
to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or
heirs, shall likewise assume his rights and obligations.” (Exmphasis
supplied.)

“It is clear from the foregoing that tenancy relationship is not
extinguished by (1) the expiration of the contract (of tenancy); (2)
sale; (3) alienation; or (4) transfer of legal possession of the land.

“In a contract of lease, the lessee, for the duration of the
contract, acquires legal possession and control of the property subject
to the agreement. (1) The return by the lessee of the property to the
lessor upon expiration of the lease contract, naturally involves again
a transfer of the possession from one lawful holder to another. But it
may be asked, is this transfer of possession included in or
comprehended by the aforequoted Section 9 of Republic Act 1199, as
amended?

x x x x

“It is our considered judgment, since the return by the lessee of
the leased property to the lessor upon the expiration of the contract
involves also a transfer of legal possession, and taking into account
the manifest intent of the lawmakiiig body in amending the law, i.e.,
to provide the tenant with security of tenure in all cases of transfer
of legal possession, that the instant case falls within and is governed
by the provisions of Section 9 of Republic Act 1199, as amended by
Republic Act 2263. (2) The termination of the lease, therefore, did
not divest the tenant of the right to remain and continue on hie
cultivation of the land. Furthermore, should any doubt exist as to
the applicability of the aforementioned provisions of law to the case
at bar, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the tenant. (3)”
(Underscoring ours.)

II. Inasmuch, as the decision appealed from applied Republic Act
Nos. 1199 and 2263, which became effective, respectively, on August 30,
1954 and June 19, 1959, it is urged that the lower court thereby gave
retroactive effect to said laws and thus impaired rights vested in the
petitioner prior thereto.

This pretense is patently untenable, for the contract between Donato
and petitioner was renewed in 1956, or over a year and a half after
Republic Act No. 1199 had been in force, and pursuant to Section 22 of
Kepublic Act No. 2263, the provisions thereof “shall be applicable to all cases pending
in any court” at the time of the approval of said Act, on June 19,
1959, and these cases were not decided by the lower court until
February 14, 1962. Furthermore, it is well settled that the application
of our agrarian laws to contracts made prior to the enactment thereof
constitutes a valid exercise of the police power of the State. (Viuda
de Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 47 Off. Gaz., .5613; Valencia vs. Surtido,
L-17277, May 31, 1961.)

Petitioner maintains that the rule laid down in Joya vs. Pareja (supra)
should be deemed superseded by the decision in Ulpiendo vs. Court of
Agrarian Relations (L-13891, October 31, 1960), in which we held that
“the amendment to Section 9, Republic Act No. 1199 by Republic Act No.
2263 x x x can not be applied retroactively.” This pretense can not be
sustained, for the Ulpiendo case involved a decision and resolutions of
the Court of Agrarian Relations which had become final before the enactment of Republic Act No. 2263,
whereas the Joya case like the cases at barwas pending in the lower
court at the time ‘of said enactment, and, hence, subject to the
provision of Section 22 of said Act.

III. The third assignment of error is based upon the premise that
Donato had violated the original contract of lease, by subleasing
petitioner’s land without his written ‘consent; that the extension of
the term of said contract was subject to the condition that coconut
seedlings would be planted on the land in question; that respondents
herein had agreed to such condition; and that, in violation thereof,
respondents had refused to allow the planting of said coconut seedlings.

It is true that the subleasing of said land to respondents herein
without the written consent of the petitioner, constituted a violation
of the original contract of lease. The breach of contract was
committed, however, by Donato, not by respondents, who were not parties to the contract. At any rate, said breach of contract was, in effect, condoned
by petitioner when he extended the lifetime of the lease in 1956, with
full knowledge of the fact that respondents had been and were still
holding and intended to continue to hold his land as tenant-lessees of
Donato.

As regards the planting of coconut seedlings as a condition for the
extension of the term of the lease contract in favor of Miguel Donato,
which was allegedly made known to respondents, and who agreed thereto
according to the petitioner, the lower court fcund that no such
agreement had been reached between respondents on the one hand, and
either petitioner or Miguel Donato on the other. Petitioner’s
testimonial evidence thereon was contradicted by the evidence for
respondents herein, which merited more credence from the lower court,
and, we feel, correctly, for: (1) not being parties to the contracts
for the extension of the original term of the lease, there was no
reason why respondents should agree to the terms and conditions for
said extension, although Donato may have informed them of the
aforementioned conditions after the execution of Exhibits A-5
and A-6; and (2) had respondents agreed to be bound by said conditions
petitioner would have caused their conformity to be put in writing.

Moreover, although respondents maintain that they were under
no obligation to do the planting of said coconut seedlings, agents of
Donato were allowed to plant, and some of the tenants did actually
plant, altogether over 4,500 seedlings of coconuts. It is true that
some tenants objected thereto and that there had been some incidents in
connection therewith. This was obviously due, however, to the failure
of either petitioner or Donato to reach an understanding with
respondents on the conditions under which the seedling would be
planted. As a consequence, some of the respondents felt that the
planting of seedlings was undertaken in such a way as to unduly
interfere with their rights as tenant-lessees under Sections 42 and 43
of Republic Act No. 1193.

IV and V. Under the last two assignments of error, petitioner blames
respondents for the death of a substantial number of the coconut
seedlings planted as above stated.

To begin with, petitioner would Two us believe that only 2,000 – out
of over 4,500 – seedlings had survived. Testifying for tietitioror
herein, Miguel Donato affirmed, however, that the number of seedlings
that survived was 3,000, not 2,000. As regards the cause for the death
of over 1,500 seedlings, the lower court had the following to say:

“To substantiate his allegations, among them that
defendants intentionally and maliciously fhp, destruction of the permit
trees planted in their respective holdings, plaintiff presented his
wife Adela E. Fonce, Miguel A. Donato, Flaviano Banasiban and Ouintin
Danf as witnesses. Adela Ponce and Flaviano Banasihan had did not
testify on the allayed causes of destruction of the coconut trees.
Miguel Donato and Quintin Dangui testified, generally, that the coconut
trees they had planted died because of negligence of the defendants in
taking care of them. It was, however, elicited from witness Dangui, an
expert in planting and care of coconut trees, that to have a reasonable
expectancy for coconut seedlings to survive, the same should be planted
during the rainy season and thereafter the seedlings should be exposed
to Pain at least six (6) months (TSN October 10, 1961, p. 16). Most of
the 4,522 seedlings planted in the holdings in question were planted in
October and November of the same year (TSN October 11, 1081, p. 10).
The dry season in the locality, as admitted by Miguel Donato himself,
starts in the month of January and ends in April of the same year (TSN
October 10, 1961, p. 10). Thus the coconut seedlings planted by Donato
from October to December of 1957 had littte, if any, expectancy to
survive because barely three (3), months after, their planting the dry
season set in. It is incorrect, therefore, to lay the blame upon
defendants for the non survival of the coconut trees. We are more
inclined to believe that most of the coconut seedlings planted in the
landholdings of defendants i died because of inappropriate or untimely
planting.

“The alleged destruction of the trees by
defendants furthermore, is only a conclusion of Miguel A. Donato
derived, as he admitted from the fact that when he visited the holdings
in question on Weekends the trees were being destroyed. He did not,
howover, actually see the alleged intentional and malicious destruction
of the trees (TSN January 15, 1960, p. 19). For that matter, no witness
was presented by plaintiff to prove the alleged intentional and
malicious destruction of the coconut trees by defendants.”

In other words—except as regards Hermenegildo Guevarra and
Apolonio Javinia, who were held responsible for the death of 28 and 6
coconut trees, respectively, for which reason judgment was rendered
against them—the lower court found, not only that respondents are not
to blame for the Joss of the other coconut seedling’s, but also, that
such loss was due to the “inappropriate or untimely planting”.
Petitioner herein has not even tried to refute this conclusion, which
is substantially bome out by the record before us.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as. it is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner herein.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Bengzon, C, J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes J. B. L., Barrera, Dizon, and Regala, JJ., concur.