FRISCO ILAGAN, PETITIONER VS. MACARIO ADAME, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Prisco Ilagan filed on June 21, 1960 a petition before the Court of
Agrarian Relations (San Pablo City) against Concepcion Dimaculangan, et
al. praying for his reinstatement as tenant of a parcel of land
situated in Tiaong, Quezon, and damages.

He claims that he and Concepcion DimacuSangan sometime in 1947
entered into an oral contract of share tenancy on the above parcel of
land with an area of 1.27 hectares by virtue of which he immediately
took possession of and worked the land. On June 9, 1954, Dimaculangan
sold the land to Macario Adame with right to repurchase and, as a
consequence, Adame dispossessed him from the land alleging that he
would work it himself, but instead he appointed one Casimiro Lalawigan
as his tenant. Immediately after his ejectment, he approached
Dimaculangan asking her to intercede in his behalf, whereupon
Dimaculangan promised him that as soon as she has repurchased the land
she would reinstate him. On January 29, 1960, Dimaculangan repurchased
the land, and when he requested her to comply with her promise to place
him back on the land, she refused.

Respondents denied the allegations of petitioner. They claimed that
Concepcion Dimaculangan, being in need of money, approached Macario
Adame offering him to sell the land in question with right to
repurchase to which Adame agreed on condition that the land should be
cleared of any tenant because he would work it himself. There upon, the
deed of sale was executed and the land was delivered to Adame without a
tenant sometime in June, 1954. After taking possession of the land,
Adame appointed Casimiro Lalawigan as tenant with the consent of
Dimaculangan. Adame denied any knowledge of Ilagan being the tenant of
Bimaculafigan when he filed the pet’tion under consideration.
Respondents set up the special defense that the claim of petitioner is
already barred by the statute of limitations.

After due hearing, the court a quo dismissed the petition on
two grounds: (1) the cause of action of petitioner has already
prescribed, and (2) the preponderance of evidence shows that petitioner
had voluntarily surrendered the possessions of the land to facilitate
its sale by his landlord Concepcion Dimnculangan to Macario Adame and
so he has relinquished his right to reinstatement.

Ilagan interposed the present petition for review.

In concluding that petitioner’s action has already prescribed, the court a quo
found that from July 3, 1954, when he was dispossessed, to the date of
the filing of the petition on June 21, 1960, exactly 5 years, 11 months
and 18 days had elapsed. Inasmuch as Republic Act No. 1189, as amended,
does not contain any provision regarding prescription of action with
regard to a tenant’s claim for reinstatement and such action is not
covered by the provisions of Article 1140 to 1147 of the Civil Code,
the instant action should be brought within five years pursuant to
Article 1149 of the same Code which provides that all other actions
whose periods are not fixed in said Code or in other laws must be
brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.
Consequently, the court a quo concludes, the present action has already prescribed.

We believe, however, that the action of petitioner comes under
Article 1145 of the Civil Code which provides that an action upon an
oral contrac shall be brought within six years inasmuch as its main
purpose is to enforce the oral contract of tenancy which he had entered
into with Concepcion Dimaculangan which the latter later repudiated
after repurchasing the property from Macario Adame. This contract gave
petitioner a sort of a security of tenure of which he cannot be
deprived except as prescribed by law. This is precisely the basis of
his action.

With respect to the second issue, the court a quo found by
preponderance of evidence that petitioner had voluntarily surrendered
his landholding to Conception Dimaculaiigan immediately before the sale
with option to repurchase to Macario Adame because the latter would not
purchase the land unless it was without a tenant. Petitioner agreed to
surrender the land in order that he may not be a standing block to the
transaction subject, however, to the condition that upon repurchase of
the land by Dimaculangan the latter would take him back as her tenant.
The court a quo did not believe petitioner’s claim that he did not
voluntarily surrender the land but that when Adame took possession
thereof he forcibly dispossessed him upon the claim that he would work
and cultivate it himself. It may be true that the deed of sale with
option to repurchase does not contain any statement that Adame
purchased the land with the understanding that it would be without a
tenant, but such an omission does not necessarily negate the claim that
the purchase was made with that understanding. At any rate, this
finding that the court a quo has made cannot now be looked into under
well-known rules and precedents it appearing that it is supported by
preponderance of evidence.

There is, however, one factor that should not be overlooked which in
our opinion is decisive of the present case. This refers to the fact
that, as the evidence shows, Adame bought the land with the
understanding that he would work and cultivate it himself. In fact,
this is the only condition he imposed when he bought the land. As a
matter of fact also Adame, soon after the sale, worked and cultivated
the land himself for sometime until he injured one of his feet with the
result that he had to ask for the help of Casimiro Lalawigan. And as
his injury took a long time to heal, he allowed Lalawigan to work the
land indefinitely.

On the other hand, the record shows that Concepcion Dimaculangan
assured petitioner that after she has repurchased the land she would
reinstate him as tenant considering his readiness to yield its
possession to facilitate the transaction, her only impediment now being
the desire of Casimiro Lalawigan to continue holding the land as
tenant. But such desire cannot deprive petitioner of his right to
reinstatement considering that the designation of Lalawigan as tenant
was merely temporary. Lalawigan knew, as he should know, that he has
been designated tenant merely as a consequence of the injury suffered
by Adame in one of his feet, and it is undisputed that Adams purchased
the land on the main condition that he would work and cultivate it
personally. Lailawigan’s holding is, therefore, precarious and as such
cannot give him any tenure that may legally bar his dispossession.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. The reinstatement of petitioner is hereby ordered. No costs.

Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.