PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JOSE L. CHUPECO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in
its Crim. Case No. 14786) to the Court of Appeals, but which the latter
court, pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
had certified to the Supreme Court as a case in which the jurisdiction
of an inferior court is in issue.

The accused-appellant, Jose L. Chupeco, was charged on 2 February
1951 before the Court of First Instance of Manila under the following
information:

“That on or about the 28th day of November, 1947, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being the owner of,
and, having previously on the 24th day of July, 1946, executed a
Chattel Mortgage on the following properties:

“An
open shed under construction to he used as sawmill building, containing
an area of 350 sq.ra. more or less, located at Sitio Saguing,
Dinalupihan, Bataan.

SAWMILL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT:

One ‘Wheland’ Circular sawmill No. 3 complete “with carriage and w/60” inserted circular saw (new) ;

One Gray Marine Full Diesel Engine 225 H.P. Serial No. 13835, Engine No. C-17040;

One RD-14 Tractor with Bulldozer, motor No. 6719028;

One D-6 Caterpillar tractor motor 626-134;

One Clitract International Caterpilar Motor No. 2398-D

One Air compressor (Aray type) ;

One complete set of welding instruments (local made);

One Lathe machine—F.E. Reed Co. Length 8′ swing 8″;

One planer for iron and steel—F.E. Reed & Co.;

One tracing machine and one vise (local made) ;

Transportation Units:

One Chevrolet truck Model 1941 Motor No, KR-214658— 1946 Plate No. 9794;

One International Baby truck Model 1938 Motor No. ND-13-6470;

One G.M.C Array truck 6 x 6 Motor No. 70485739—Plate No. 10239;

One Willys Jeep Motor No. Dp2977—Plate No. 1512″;

located at sitio Saguing. Dinalupihan, Bataan, in favor of the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank, whose capital, assets, accounts,
contracts and choses in action were subsequently transferred to the
herein complainant Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, an institution
created and operating pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
85, with principal office at the City of Manila, Philippines, to secure
a loan of P20,000.00 from said Agricultural and Industrial Bank, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (on the aforesaid
date of 28th day of November, 1947, with intent to defraud the said
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, pledge and incumber, or cause to be
pledged and ineumbered the same personal properties to one Mates B.
Pinilo without having fully satisfied the mortgage and during the term
thereof and without the consent of the mortgagee bank written on the
back of the mortgage, and, thereafter knowingly transfer and remove, or
cause to be transferred and removed the said properties to the
municipality of Subic, Zambales, also without the written consent of
the mortgagee bank, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation in the sum of P15,935.80, Philippine
currency, representing the unpaid balance of the aforesaid mortgage.”

The accused moved to quash the foregoing information on the ground
that more than one offense is charged and that the court had no
jurisdiction. Upon denial of the motion, the accused was arraigned and
he entered a plea of not guilty. After the case was partly tried, the
defense counsel and the fiscal entered into an agreement to have the
information amended to the effect that the charge be only for removal
of properties mortgaged, eliminating the portion referring to pledging
already pledged property. The information, however, remained
un-amended. The accused then filed a motion to dismiss invoking the
agreement, but the court denied it, and ordered that the case be tried
on the charge “of having pledged property which had been previously
pledged or mortgaged”. After trial, the court found the accused guilty
of the said offense, and imposed a penalty of two months and one day of
arresto mayor.

Not satisfied, the accused interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals, but the said court certified the case to the Supreme Court, as
formerly stated.

The accused attacks the jurisdiction of the trial court on the
strength of the agreement with the fiscal to discard the charge of
repledging or reincumbering the chattels already mortgaged to the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank, thus leaving in force only the
accusation of having transferred the encumbered property from Bataan to
Zambales without the consent of the mortgagee. It is argued that since
the place where the chattels were, as well as the site to which they
were moved, are both outside of Manila, the courts of the latter
acquired no jurisdiction to try the case, because the offense was not
committed within the Manila territory.

We find this stand without merit. The original terms of the charge
averred (and it is not disputed) the crime of repledging already
encumbered property without the creditor’s consent, and one of the
essential ingredients of the offense (the execution of the first
mortgage) having been alleged to have taken place in Manila, the court
of first instance of that city acquired jurisdiction over the offense
under the Rules of Court (People vs. Mission, 48 O.G., 1331; Rule 110,
section 9). It is well established that once vested, the jurisdiction
is not tolled by subsequent amendment or stipulation (McClain vs.
Kansas City Bridge Co., 83 SW, 2d, 132; Shankle vs. Ingram, 45 S.E.
578; Walton vs. Mardeville Dowling & Co., 5 NW. 776), which in this
case amounted to no more than an avowal by the prosecution that it
could not establish the other elements of the offense.

Furthermore, the court actually rejected the defense motion to
dismiss, and directed that the case be tried on the original charge of
repledging property already encumbered. The accused obeyed that
directive, and by so doing it renounced the claim that the information
had been so amended as to discard that particular averment.

But the fatal error in the decision appealed from is its disregard
of the fact that the evidence fails to show that the properties
mortgaged to the Bank are the same ones encumbered afterwards to Mateo
Pinili. In fact, the Office of the Solicitor General recommends the
acquittal of the accused on this very ground (Brief, pp. 10-11).

There is no question that the herein accused executed in the City of
Manila a Chattel Mortgage, Exhibit “D”, on the properties located in
Bataan and listed in the information in favor of the Agricultural and
Industrial Bank on 24 July 1946; and that the accused pledged or
encumbered, in the City of Manila, on 28 November 1947 the properties
listed in Exhibit “E”, which are as follows:

“One (1) sawmill with gray marine engine 125 H.P.
circular saw and all appurtenances, implements and parts, also
building, camarin and housing improvements under Tax No. 1260-V for
1947, assessed at P8,000.00 paid under O.R. No. 59318, dated May 14,
1947, Dinalupihan, Bataan;

“One (1) bulldozer H.D.-14, with dozor, Make: Allis-Chalmers, Eng. No. 3251541;

“Two (2) cargo trucks (6 x 6), Eng. No. 220314218—Reg. No. 17094 aftd Eng. 220359225—Eng. No. 17093.”

However, there is nothing in the evidence to show that the
properties listed in Exhibit “D” and in the information are the same
properties listed in Exhibit “E”. The descriptions are materially
different.

An essential element common to the two acts punished under Article
319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed or
repledged, as the case may be, should be the same or identical property
that was mortgaged or pledged before such removal or repledging.
Therefore, even if the Court of First Instance of Manila had
jurisdiction over the case, the accused cannot be found guilty on the
evidence on record of the crime for which he stands indicted.

For the foregoing reasons, the appealed decisions is hereby
reversed, and another one entered acquitting the accused Jose L.
Chupeco. No pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.