MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. PASCUAL ORTAÑEZ, FRANCISCO P. GENEROSO, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N

This is an action of certiorari and prohibition against the Court of
Industrial Relations to prohibit it from taking cognizance of a case
(CIR Case No. 1432-V, Pascual Ortanez, et al. vs. Manila Electric
Company) filed on January 16, 1961 by Pascual Ortanez and others,
against the Manila Electric Company to compel the company to pay them
overtime wages and night premium pay earned since 1956, and for other
relief. The petition contains the following allegations: that the
petitioners are employees of the respondent Manila Electric Company;
that the petitioners rendered overtime and night work, the allegation
thereon being as follows:

“3. That since 1956 up to the present petitioners
rendered overtime work and night work, during which period of
employment, said petitioners were NOT paid of their overtime
pay, as well as their night premium pay of 25% additional compensation
to their present wages and/or salaries, notwithstanding, that such
benefits were granted by respondent Company and were made available to
all employees except the petitioners pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement entered into by and between the Company and the
representative Union therein;

“4. That respondent refused and
is still refusing to pay petitioners’ earned overtime wages and night
premium pay, despite repeated demands, thereby, violating and has in
fact violated Commonwealth Act 444;”

Upon the filing of the petition, the respondent Manila Electric
Company moved to dismiss the same on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because the number of employees
involved in the case does not exceed 30, as provided for in section 4
of Commonwealth Act 103. The majority of the members of the court below
held that the Court of Industrial Relations has authority to enforce
and apply the Labor Laws, among which is the eight-hour labor law. To
support its ruling it cited the case of Monares vs. CNS Enterprises, G.
R. No. L-11749, May 29, 1959. Judge Tabigne dissented on the ground
:(1) that the number of employees involved is 20 and not more than 30
as required by Commonwealth Act 103; (2) that the demand is a money
claim and the court cannot pass on the merits of the same.

A study of the petition filed in the court below shows that it is
for mandamus to compel the respondent Manila Electric Company to pay
supposed overtime and night work pay, and is not for a money claim or
demand, as no specific amount is demanded. It also appears from the
petition that a collective bargaining agreement exists between the
company and the representative union in the said company, but that
notwithstanding the existence of the said agreement, all the employees
except the petitioners, have been paid their overtime wages and the 25%
additional compensation for night work. The petition does not describe
the provisions of the supposed collective bargaining agreement. If it
is true that all the employees of the company, except the petitioners
Ortanez et al., were given overtime and night pay, it would seem that
the case involves a violation of the Eight-Hour Labor Law and this
violation would make the case cognizable by the Court of Industrial
Relations.

It is also possible that the right to overtime pay and night pay is
a matter that could be determined by the interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement, in ease there was a provision on such
matter therein. In this last case, the question would be the
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and the
provisions thereof. In such case there would be a question as to the
interpretation of the agreement and its application, which question may
either be cognizable by the Court of First Instance, if it is plainly a
question of the enforcement of a contract, or by the Court of
Industrial Relations, if the agreement was made under its supervision,
or the application thereof involved discrimination amounting to an
unfair labor practice.

From all the above circumstances, whether or not the Court of
Industrial Relations has jurisdiction would depend Upon the facts of
the case as proved at the trial and not, merely upon the allegations in
the complaint. Following the ruling of procedure that in case of doubt
a case may not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, We
hold that the Court of Industrial Relations cannot be prohibited from
hearing the case until such a time as it may appear clear from the
facts appearing in the course of the trial that the case falls beyond
the jurisdiction of the court.

WHEREFORE, without deciding conclusively that the Court of
Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over the case, and until such
time as facts appear more clearly at the hearing of the case that would
justify a prohibition, the petition for certiorari and prohibition
should be, as it is hereby, denied. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.