EMILIANO LUSTRE AND FELIPE N. LUSTRE, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, PAULINO GUTIERREZ AND BENJAMIN GARCIA, RESPONDENTS.

Petition to review the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations,
Cabanatuan City, in CAR Case No. 1174NE (59), awarding damages to, and
ordering the reinstatement of, the tenants-respondents, Paulino
Gutierrez and Benjamin Garcia.

The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:

“With respect to Paulino Gutierrez and Benjamin
Garcia, the preponderance of evidence shows that in 1957 they were
engaged by Dominador Arambulo, former owner of the landholdings in
question, as share tenants on 50-50 sharing basis in two (2) hectares
each. Said petitioners began working and cultivating the land holdings
in the agricultural year 1957-58 under the supervision of Arambulo’s
duly appointed overseer, Jose Gutierrez (Exhs. “A” and “I”). They
realized gross harvests of 27 and 30 cavans of palay in said:
agricultural year and after deducting the seeds, reaping and threshing
fees the net harvests were divided on the 50-50 sharing basis,
petitioner sharing. 8.5 and 9.75 cavans of palay, respectively.
Landholder Arambulo received the same amount of shares from the
petitioners. Sometime in May 1958, Arambulo, who had incurred and was
incurring debts from Salud de Chico, in the form of seeds and tvactor
fees, entered into an agreement with said Salud Vda. de Chico whereby
she agreed to supply the seeds and tractor fees to be payable from the
landholder’s sharp, in the harvests in the agricultural year 1958-59,
Petitioners Gutierrez and Garcia continued working the same holdings in
said agricultural year under Salud Vda. de Chico. The gross harvests
from these holdings 1958-59 were 122 and 92 cavans of palay,
respectively. After deduction of the proper items from the gross
produce, petitioners Gutierrez and Garcia shared 52 and 37.7 cavans of
palay, respectively, with the landholder de Chico receiving the same
amount of shares. In 1959, Arambulo sold the whole parcel of twelve
(12) hectares to Icaciano Ruiz, Maria de Euiz and Leonor de Lustre, who
in the same year leased the land to Atty. Felipe Lustre, counsel for
and one oF the respondents in this case. Emilano Lustre, was
constituted manager of the property On April 2, 1959, Emiliano Lustre,
under the direction of Atty. Lustre, began plowing the land by tractor.
On April 3, 1959 while the plowing was still going on, petitioners
Gutierrez and Garcia seeing that their holdings were being plowed by
other persons approached Emilia no Lustre to object, to the plowing but
Lustre refused to recognize their status as tenants. Said petitioners
therefore repaired to the office of the Mayor of San Antonio and the
Agricultural Tenancy Commission in Cabanatuan City and reported the
incident. The efforts of the representatives of the Mayor and the
Agricultural Tenancy Commission to induce Emiliano Lustre to reinstate
petitioners it were of no avail. (Exhibit “B”). Notwithstanding,
petitioners. returned to their respective landholdinga and continued
cultivating the same until the latter part of May, 1959 when they were
again stopped by respondent Emiliano Lustre. Hence, they filed this
Action.”

In assailing the decision as not supported by substantial evidence
(Republic Act No. 1267, section 13), petitioners seem to have lost
sight of the fact that substantial evidence in support of the findings
of the Agrarian Court does not necessarily import preponderant
evidence, as is required in ordinary civil cases. Substantial evidence
has been denned to be “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion” (Ang Tibay vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642), and its absence is not
shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or
circumstantial, for the appellate court can not substitute its own
judgment or criterion for that of the trial court in determining
wherein lies the weight of the evidence, or what evidence is entitled
to belief. That has been the uniform doctrine of this Court, from
Saingco vs. C.A.R., L-13120, Nov. 20, 1957, down to Eugenio Chavez vs.
CAR, G.R. No. L-17814, Oct. 31, 1963.

The task of an appellant in agrarian cases, therefore, is to set out
the evidence in support of the findings made by the Court of Agrarian
Relations and show how no reasonable person would be willing to accept
it as adequate proof. For this purpose, it is not enough to indulge in
generalities, such as appellant’s thesis that one engaged in mechanical
farming can not possibly have tenants, a proposition that has been
rejected by this Court in Somera, et al., vs. Galman, et al., L-12592,
promulgated on 31 March 1959, wherein it was ruled that “the fact that
the landholding is under mechanized farming does not x x x necessarily
preclude the employment of tenants x x aside from or in addition to
hired laborers x x x”.

The second ground of contention refers to the measure of damages
awardable to unlawfully ejected tenants. The court a quo based its
award of damages on the harvest immediately preceding the unlawful
ejectment. On the other hand, the petitioners insist that damages
should be based on the harvest during the unlawful dispossession, and
that the tenants’ income during the period of ejectment be deducted
therefrom.

Section 27 (1) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, provides:

“The landholder shall not dispossess the tenant of
his holdings except for any of the causes enumerated in Section 50, and
without the cause having been proved before, and the dispossession
authorized by, the court otherwise, he shall, aside from the penalty of
fine and/or imprisonment provided for any violation of this Act, be
liable to the tenant for damages to the extent of the landholder’s
participation dn the harvest in addition to the tenant’s right under Section twenty-two of this Act.” (Underscoring supplied)

Since the burden of proving damages is on the dispossessed tenant,
he cannot be reasonably required to prove the harvest of the land
during his absence therefrom. And, as pointed out by respondents, there
is nothing to prevent the landlord from leaving the land uncultivated
during the years following the tenant’s ejection in order to block his
claim for damages. The Agrarian Court, therefore, should enjoy
discretion in selecting the year of tenure that is to serve as basis
for the award, so long as the harvest for that year is not an abnormal
one.

The earnings of the tenant during the period of unlawful ejectment
are not now deductible from the award of damages. In the case of
Potenciano vs. Estefani, L-7690, promulgated on 27 July 1955, this
Court, on grounds of equity, ruled to deduct such income; but said case
was decided under the prior law. Act 4054. The above-quoted Section 27
(1) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, which is the one applicable
to the present case, not only provides for a quantum of damages to the
tenant, based on the landlord’s share in the harvest, but adds thereto
his rights under Section 22, which states:

“(1) the tenant shall be free to work elsewhere
whenever the nature of his farm obligations warrants his temporary
absence from his holdings.”

This right, although already granted under Section 20 of Act 4054,
was not then a right additional to the recovery of damages consequent
to unlawful dismissal, but under Republic Act 1199, as amended, it is
to be added to the damages recoverable.

The denial of the motion for a new trial was correct, in as much as
what was sought to be introduced in evidence is not newly discovered
evidence within the contemplation of the rules but “forgotten
evidence”, its admission being within the discretion of the court. (I
Moran 506, 1957 Ed.).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ. concur.