PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EDUARDO CAMBA Y RAPISORA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

In an information^[1] filed
on 6 February 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, docketed therein
as Criminal Case No. 7309-MN and assigned to Branch 169 thereof, the accused, a
fisherman of Navotas, Metro Manila, was charged with the violation of Section
4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended,
committed thus:

“That on or about January 30, 1989, in the Municipality of
Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being a private person and without any authority under the
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, deliver
and distribute two (2) tea bags of marijuana fruiting tops, and found in his
possession one (1) aluminum foil bag containing four (4) tea bags of marijuana
fruiting tops, all having a total weight of 14.2 grams, which are prohibited
drugs.

Contrary to law.”

A plea of not guilty having been entered
by the accused at his arraignment on 10 April 1989,^[2] trial
on the merits was held on various dates. P/Capt. Lina Sarmiento (a forensic chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory),
Pat. Rizalito Francisco, Pat. Nemesio Era, and Pat. Emmanuel Buhisan took the
witness stand for the prosecution. The
accused and his wife, Elizabeth Camba, testified for the defense.

On 4 June 1990, the trial court rendered its decision^[3]
thus:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused EDUARDO CAMBA Y
RAPISORA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 4,
Art. II of R. A. 6425 as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
pay a fine of P20,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with all the accessory penalties
provided for by law and to pay the costs.

The four (4) tea bags of marijuana fruiting tops all having a total
weight of 14.2 grams are hereby confiscated in favor of the government,
ordering the Officer-In-Charge of this Court to transmit the same to the
Dangerous Drugs Board, Manila for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.”

The evidence for the prosecution, upon which the trial court
based its decision, is summarized in the Appellee’s Brief^[4] as
follows:

“On 30 January 1989, members of the Navotas Police
Anti-Narcotics Unit received a confidential telephone call from an unidentified
civilian informant that someone was selling marijuana at the corner of M. Naval
and Liongson Streets, San Roque, Navotas, Metro Manila (p. 2, tsn, Aug. 14,
1989).

Acting on said information, Sergeant Tomas Mabini, Chief of the
Anti-Narcotics Unit Special Action Team, immediately organized and dispatched a
team of policemen to conduct surveillance and effect the arrest of the person
reportedly selling marijuana. For this
purpose, Sgt. Mabini designated Pat. Rizalito Francisco to act as poseur-buyer
(p. 3, tsn, id.). Thereafter,
Francisco together with Patrolmen Emmanuel Buwisan, Leandro Serrano and Nemesio
Era proceeded to the abovementioned place (id.).

Upon reaching the corner of M. Naval and Liongson Streets,
appellant was spotted at a vacant lot (p. 21, id.). In accordance with their plan for Pat.
Francisco to act as poseur-buyer, the latter approached and paid appellant with
a marked twenty (P20.00) peso bill with Serial No. DN068193 (Exhs.
“D” and “D-1”). Appellant in turn gave Pat. Francisco two (2) tea bags of suspected
dried marijuana leaves (p. 4, tsn, id.).

Pursuant to the pre-arranged signal agreed upon for Francisco to
raise his right hand as soon as the sale was consummated, other members of the
back-up team who had earlier positioned themselves behind a nearby tricycle
about five (5) meters from where the drug deal was taking place, immediately
moved in to effect the arrest of appellant (pp. 12-13, tsn, id.).

The arrest yielded two (2) tea bags of suspected marijuana. An additional four (4) tea bags in aluminum
foil were also seized from his possession. (p. 4, tsn, id.).

Thereupon, appellant was brought to the Navotas Police Station and
detained for violation of Sec. 4, Article II of R. A. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act) (p. 5, tsn, id.)

The suspected marijuana specimen contained in six (6) tea bags were
forthwith sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City for
laboratory examination (id.).

During the trial, the prosecution presented Police Captain Lina
Sarmiento, forensic chemist of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. She testified that on January 31, 1989,
suspected marijuana leaves contained in one (1) aluminum foil weighing 14.2
grams were forwarded to her office by the Navotas Police Anti-Narcotics Unit
requesting laboratory examination. After personally conducting said examination, Sarmiento concluded that
said specimen was indeed marijuana (Exh. “E”), a prohibited drug. The result of said examination was
consequently reduced into writing and marked as Exhs. “B” to
“B-1” (pp. 3-5, tsn, August 9, 1989).”^[5]

The accused’s version, corroborated by the testimony of his wife,
Elizabeth, is entirely different. At
around 1:00 p.m. of 30 January 1989, he was standing at the corner of M. Naval
and Liongson Streets, Navotas, Metro Manila, waiting for his co­worker, Jose
Silva, to collect his wages. As a
fisherman under the employ of one Tacquio Emson, he was supposed to get his
share from the proceeds of the sale of fish at the said designated place. Suddenly, four men from the Navotas Police
Station arrived and arrested him for allegedly selling marijuana. He knew two of them, namely, Pat. Francisco
and Pat. Serrano, because they were his former neighbors. Despite his denial of the accusation against
him, he was brought to the Police Headquarters of Navotas where Pat. Buhisan
took P350.00 from his wallet and divided the same among his fellow
policemen. His Seiko wrist watch was
also taken from him but his wife, Elizabeth, was able to recover it three
months later. He was followed to the
police headquarters by his wife who was informed that he was being detained for
selling marijuana. In exchange for the
dropping of the case against him, the policemen allegedly demanded from her
P6,000.00. Because they were not able
to raise the P6,000.00, a case for selling and possessing marijuana was filed
against him.^[6]

No rebuttal evidence was presented by the prosecution.

In convicting the accused, the trial court relied on the
testimony of Pat. Rizalito Francisco who claimed to have acted as the buyer and
whose testimony was corroborated by the testimonies of Pat. Nemesio Era and
Pat. Emmanuel Buhisan. It said that
“[i]t was not shown they had any improper motive to testify falsely against accused,” and they
testified “merely in compliance with their duty as enforcer of the
law.”^[7] As against the accused, it opined that he
“did not offer very good defense for his part,” as his “denial
cannot prevail over the positive identification of a credible prosecution
witness who identified [him] x x
x to be the seller of
marijuana.” It also ruled that Elizabeth’s testimony “could not even
destroy the positive identification by a credible witness.”^[8]

The accused (hereinafter appellant)
seasonably appealed to us from the judgment of conviction and, in
his brief, raised the following assignments of errors:

“1. The trial court erred in giving credence to
the testimony of Pat. Rizalito Francisco to be the basis for the conviction of
the accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;

2. The trial court also failed and erred to
consider the inconsistency of testimonies between Pat. Rizalito Francisco and
Pat. Emmanuel Buhisan;

3. The trial court erred in saying that the arresting
officers did not have any improper motive to testify falsely against the
accused.”^[9]

Regarding the first assigned error, the appellant contends that:

“it
would be foolish for a drug pusher to deliver and sell marijuana to a
policeman who was his former neighbor … [he] cannot be foolish to do the same
and only to find himself locked in jail forever.” That Pat. Francisco did
not actually see [him] selling marijuana x x x. Even the alleged six (6) tea bags of marijuana weighing 14.2
grams were not shown to him in court for his identification; x x x.”^[10]

Anent the second assigned error, he points out the inconsistency
between the testimony in open court and the sworn statement^[11]
of Pat. Francisco that while in the former he declared that the police team was
composed of Patrolmen Buhisan, Era, Serrano, and himself, in the latter he
stated that only Era, Serrano, and himself composed the team.^[12]
The inclusion of Buhisan in the former was even denied by Buhisan himself who
testified that he was not one of the arresting officers but merely “the
officer-on-case.”^[13]

As regards the third assigned error, the appellant maintains that
the arresting policemen were in fact impelled by ulterior motives as shown by
their failure to “refute the testimony of Elizabeth Camba that [they]
asked P6,000.00 from her in exchange for the dropping of the case”;
“they even divested [him] of his earnings in the amount of P350.00.”^[14]

By the mandate of the Constitution, an accused is presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved.^[15] It
is a firmly settled doctrine that to overcome such presumption, nothing but
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged must be established by the prosecution,^[16]
or, put a little differently, a finding of guilt must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt or that degree of proof which produces a conviction in an
unprejudiced mind; it should not be based on a mere accusation for an
accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt.^[17]

We have carefully and painstakingly examined the records of this
case and the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties and we are convinced
that the evidence for the prosecution falls short of the required quantum of
proof for the conviction of the appellant. The haphazard presentation of the evidence for the prosecution only
exposed the gaps in material facts which cannot put our minds to rest and
engender a moral certainty that the appellant is guilty of the offense charged.

Firstly, the alleged poseur-buyer, Pat. Rizalito Francisco,
unwittingly admitted on cross-examination that he did not actually knew if the
appellant was selling marijuana when he arrested him. Thus:

“Q:  That
is why you are not so serious when you gave your written statement to Pat.
Emmanuel Buhisan in filing this complaint in court?

A:    No,
sir.

Q: Because you are not so serious in the filing of this complaint because
you are a new member of the Navotas Police, on January 30, 1989, you don’t
even know whether the accused was actually
selling marijuana when you arrested him?

A:    No,
sir.”^[18]

The answer “no sir” could not
have been due to a misinterpretation of the question. If it were, the prosecution should have clarified the matter on
re-direct. It did not.

Secondly, we agree with the appellant that no member of the
arresting team identified the alleged six tea bags of marijuana in court. Although Pat. Francisco mentioned them,^[19]
Pat. Era referred to only four tea bags^[20] and
Pat. Buhisan merely spoke of “the exhibits.” But none of them were
made to identify in open court the six or the four tea bags alleged to have
been recovered from the appellant. No
tea bag was marked in evidence. As
proof of the prohibited drug, only the Certification of Laboratory Result^[21]
dated 31 January 1989 prepared by the forensic chemist, P/Capt. Lina Sarmiento,
was identified by the latter and formally offered in evidence. The testimony of P/Capt. Sarmiento, however,
does not at all establish the chain between the tea bags allegedly recovered
from the appellant and the specimen submitted for examination. All that P/Capt. Sarmiento could state was
that the specimen was submitted on 31 January 1989 by the OIC of the
Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Navotas Police Station whose identity was never
disclosed.^[22]
No sound explanation exists as to why the prosecution failed to mark as
exhibits and offer in evidence the six tea bags.

Thirdly, it is equally difficult to understand why Pat. Francisco
was not even made to identify in open court the alleged P20.00 marked money
which he, as the supposed poseur-buyer, claimed to have delivered to the
appellant. It was only two months and
ten days after Pat. Francisco had testified that the existence of the bill
surfaced. It only occurred to the
prosecution to present the marked money during the course of the testimony of
Pat. Emmanuel Buhisan on 24 October 1989,^[23] when
he produced the P20-bill and claimed that it was the marked money. Only then did the prosecuting fiscal move to
have it marked as Exhibit “D.”^[24] But
again, Pat. Buhisan was merely the investigator assigned to the case who took
the statement of Pat. Francisco. He was
not even a member of the arresting team as, in fact, he did not know when the
arrest of the appellant was made.^[25] How
he came into possession of the bill is unclear from the prosecution’s evidence.

Fourthly, the belated introduction of the alleged marked bill in
evidence raises grave doubts as to its origin. If, according to Pat. Francisco, he had delivered to the appellant a
marked bill in exchange for the alleged two tea bags of marijuana, and it was
after the exchange that he gave the pre-arranged signal and arrested the
appellant, then the marked bill should have been in the possession of the
appellant at the time of the arrest and merely recovered from him. The evidence for the prosecution does not
yield this fact. Pat. Francisco did not
testify that he retrieved it from the appellant. He only declared the following on direct examination:

“Q:  When
you gave your signal by raising your right hand, what did your companions do?

A:    They
immediately approached us, Sir.

Q:   After
approaching you, what did they do?

A:    We
arrested the accused, Sir.

Q:   What
about you?

A:    I
held the evidence, Sir.

Q:   What
evidence are you referring to?

A:    The
two (2) tea bags of marijuana and the other four (4) tea bags of marijuana
contained in an aluminum foil, Sir.

Q:   Where
did you recover the four (4) other tea bags of marijuana?

A:    In
his possession, Sir.

Q:   Who
recovered that?

A:    I
was the one, Sir.”^[26]

Thus, it was not shown in Pat.
Francisco’s own testimony that the marked bill, which is a vital piece of
evidence, was recovered from the appellant. Otherwise, he should have included it among the items of evidence which
he held.

Also, the testimony of Pat. Francisco that he was the one who
discovered from the appellant the alleged four other tea bags in the course of
the latter’s arrest is inconsistent with the declaration of Pat. Era that he
was the one who obtained them from the appellant, although it was Pat. Buhisan
who first frisked him:

“Q:  You
immediately approached the accused?

A:    Yes,
Sir.

Q:   Then
what did you do with the accused?

A:    Pat.
Buhisan was the one who frisk the accused, Sir.

Q:   Were
you able to find anything?

A: Yes, Sir. When I frisk the
accused I was able to recover four (4) tea bag [sic] of marijuana placed in an
aluminum foil, Sir.”^[27]

This testimony of Pat. Era further strengthens the conclusion
that the marked bill was not in the possession of or recovered from the
appellant.

The testimony of Pat. Era does not inspire belief. For one, Pat. Buhisan, by his own admission,
was not with the arresting team; therefore, he could not have frisked the
appellant as alleged by Pat. Era. For
another, assuming that Pat. Buhisan lied when he testified that he was not a
member of the team, and thus he did frisk the appellant, then he must have
found nothing from the latter, thereby contradicting the claim of Pat. Era that
four tea bags were found in the appellant’s possession.

Finally, it is incomprehensible that despite the appellant’s
serious accusations that the members of the arresting team not only took from
him P350.00, which they divided among themselves, plus his Seiko wrist watch
which was returned only three months later, and also demanded P6,000.00 in
exchange for the dropping of the case against him, none of the policemen
involved were called to the witness stand to rebut the charges.

In the light of all the foregoing, the appellant must be
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. The lackadaisical, if not inept, manner the prosecution presented its
case could not result in any other conclusion. We stress once more what we reiterated in People vs. Tantiado^[28]
regarding the role of law enforcers and prosecutors in drug cases:

“Because of its ineptitude, the Government has again lost a
case in the fight against drug pushers and users. It is then timely to exhort the law enforcement agencies,
especially those assigned to enforce the Dangerous Drugs Act, to carefully
prepare their plans for buy-bust operations and to efficiently and effectively
carry them out, ever mindful of the possibility that their blunders may not only frustrate the efforts to eradicate
the drug menace but worse, embolden drug lords, pushers or users into defying the
authorities. The drug problem has
reached harrowing proportions. It has
broken the lives, shattered the hopes and destroyed the future of thousands of
our young citizens. Society can hardly
excuse such blunders in the relentless war against the menace.

To the prosecuting arm of the Government, We reiterate what this
court had said in People vs. Esquival [82 Phil. 453, 459]:

‘In this connection it may not be out of place to bring to the
attention of prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of laying before the
court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous
attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their
evidence, to the end that the court’s mind may not be tortured by doubts, that
the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution’s
prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state.’ “

Although the penalty is now immaterial, it would not be amiss to
make another observation. The trial
court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which was not the
penalty provided for by law at the time the offense charged was allegedly
committed. The penalty then imposable
was life imprisonment. We
have time and again declared that both penalties are not synonymous but are
entirely different and distinct penalties.^[29]
Evidently, it considered the latter as the English translation of the former,
which is not the case.^[30]
Courts must impose only those penalties which the law prescribes and strictly
use its terminology.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of Branch 169 of the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 7309-MN is REVERSED and, on ground of
reasonable doubt, the appellant EDUARDO CAMBA y RAPISORA is hereby ACQUITTED
and ordered released from detention, unless further detention for any lawful
cause is warranted.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Original Records (OR), 1; Rollo, 2.

^[2]
OR, 15.

^[3]
Id., 70-76; Rollo, 9-15, 49-55. Per Judge Eufrocinio S. dela Merced.

^[4]
Rollo, 84-106.

^[5]
Rollo, 89-91.

^[6]
TSN, 16 January 1990, 2-6; TSN, 9 January 1990, 5-6.

^[7]
OR, 75; Rollo, 14.

^[8]
Id.

^[9]
Rollo, 46.

^[10]
Id., 47.

^[11]
Exhibit “C.”

^[12]
Rollo, 47.

^[13]
Id.

^[14]
Id., 48.

^[15]
Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution.

^[16]
People vs. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349 [1992].

^[17]
People vs. Matrimonio, 215 SCRA 613 [1992].

^[18]
TSN, 14 August 1989, 9 (emphasis supplied).

^[19]
TSN, 14 August 1989, 4-5.

^[20]
Id., 13-14.

^[21]
Exhibit “B.”

^[22]
TSN, 9 August 1989, 7.

^[23]
Pat. Francisco testified on 14 August 1989.

^[24]
TSN, 24 October 1989, 7.

^[25]
Id., 4-5.

^[26]
TSN, 14 August 1989, 4.

^[27]
TSN, 14 August 1989, 13.

^[28]
213 SCRA 365, 379-380 [1992].

^[29]
People vs. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546
[1992].

^[30]
People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459
[1991].