MS. EMILY YU FAJARDO, SPOUSES SALVADOR AND ENGRACIA GIANAN, SPOUSES RENE AND BEVERLY RODELAS, SPOUSES JULIAN AND TERESITA CUIZON, MS. TERESITA RIVERA AND RICARDO VILLANUEVA, PET…

This is a special civil action for certiorari which seeks to annul the 4 September 1991 Order
of the respondent Judge dismissing the complaints of the petitioners for lack
of jurisdiction, and the 20 September 1991 Order denying the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration. The
respondent Judge had ruled that jurisdiction over the cases pertained to the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLRB) and not the Regional Trial Court. The petitioners asseverate that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the cases.

The pleadings of the parties disclose the following facts:

Private respondents Isabelo Jareño and Purita Jareño (hereinafter
JAREÑOS) are the owners and
developers of a subdivision known as the Calamba Central Compound. On various dates, they as SELLERS, and the petitioners as BUYERS
signed separate contracts, each designated as a CONTRACT TO SELL, under which, for the considerations therein
stated, they bound themselves to sell to the petitioners the lots subject
thereof, and after the latter shall have paid the purchase price and interest,
to execute in favor of the petitioners the corresponding deeds of transfer of
title, free from any lien or encumbrance except those expressly provided for in
the Contract to Sell. The Contracts to
Sell are herein described:

On the other hand, private respondent Fernando Realty and
Development Corporation (hereinafter FERNANDO) as SELLER, and petitioner Emily
Yu Fajardo as BUYER signed on 22 February 1985 a CONTRACT TO SELL^[7]
under which for the considerations therein stated, FERNANDO agreed to sell to
Fajardo Lot No. 10, Block No. 3, also located at the Calamba Central Compound
Subdivision,^[8]
and upon full payment of the agreed price and interest thereon, to execute a
deed of absolute sale in favor of Fajardo.

It appears, however, that on 18 October 1986, the JAREÑOS sold
the aforesaid lots subject of the different contracts to sell to private
respondent Ruben Habacon (hereinafter HABACON) under separate documents
denominated as “Kasulatan ng Bilihan.”^[9] On 18
February 1991, HABACON caused the cancellation of the certificates of title
covering the said lots and the issuance of new ones in his name.^[10]

When the petitioners learned of these, they filed on 21 June 1991
separate complaints with the court a quo for annulment of the sales in
favor of HABACON and of the new certificates of title issued to him, for
reinstatement of the certificates of title cancelled by those issued to
HABACON, and for accounting and damages. They prayed in their complaints for a judgment (a) declaring the “Kasulatan na Bilihan” executed
in favor of HABACON as an equitable mortgage; (b) annulling the new
certificates of title issued to HABACON and reinstating those previously
cancelled by the new certificates of title; (c) ordering HABACON and the
JAREÑOS to respect the Contracts to Sell; (d) ordering the JAREÑOS to determine
the unpaid balance of the purchase price under the Contracts to Sell, to accept
payments thereof, and to execute the deeds of absolute sale in favor of the
petitioners; and (e) ordering the defendants to pay actual and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees specified therein, as well as the costs.

The complaints were docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 1683-91-C,^[11]
1684-91-C,^[12]
1685-91-C,^[13]
1686-91-C,^[14]
and 1688-91-C^[15]
and were assigned to Branch 37
of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba.

On 9 August 1991, HABACON filed a motion to dismiss the
complaints on the ground that the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) have no legal
capacity to sue because they were not parties to the “BILIHAN.”^[16]

In its Order of 12 August 1991,^[17] the
trial court, through the respondent Judge, directed the plaintiffs to show
cause why their complaints should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
pursuant to P.D. No. 957 (Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective
Decree), as amended by P.D. No. 1344, and the doctrine laid down by this Court
in Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal.^[18]

In their compliance^[19] with
the show cause order, the petitioners maintained that it is the trial court,
and not the HLRB, which has jurisdiction over the complaint. They contend that Solid Homes, Inc.
vs. Payawal is inapplicable
because in their cases: (1) the title
of the developers, the JAREÑOS, had already passed to a third person, HABACON;
(2) their action is for the annulment of the title of a third person; (3)
HABACON is not a developer; and (4) Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129 vests upon
the Regional Trial Court the jurisdiction to hear and decide all civil actions
which involve title to or possession of any real property or any interest
therein, except actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry.

In its Order of 4 September 1991,^[20] the
trial court dismissed the aforesaid civil cases for lack of jurisdiction. It held:

“The Court does not agree with the plaintiffs. PD No. 957 as amended by P.D. No. 1344 gives
the National Housing Authority now the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission
(HSRC)^[21]
inclusive [sic] jurisdiction to hear and, decide cases of ‘unsound real estate
business practices’ (Sec. 1(a), P.D. 1344). This authority is broad enough to include all kinds of real estate
transactions involving subdivision lot or condominium, wherein either the
subdivision lot or condominium buyer, project owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman is involved.”

The petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
order, but the trial court denied this in its Order of 20 September 1991.^[22] It ruled that while HABACON may not
be the developer, the JAREÑOS are, and by selling the same lots to HABACON
after they were previously sold to different parties, the JAREÑOS may have committed an
“unsound business practice.” Moreover, it ruled that Section 19(2) of
B.P. Blg. 129, being a general law, should yield to P.D. No. 957, as amended by
P.D. No. 1344, which is a special law.

On 24 October 1991, the petitioners filed the instant special
civil action for certiorari to
annul the 4 September 1991 and 20 September 1991 Orders of the trial court on
the ground that the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in dismissing their complaints and that they have no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioners maintain that the trial court has jurisdiction
over their complaints.

In the Resolution of 18 November 1991,^[23] we required the respondents to
comment on the petition. Private
respondent HABACON filed his comment and opposition on 27 August 1992^[24]
while public respondent Cesar S. Reyes filed his comment on 24 August 1993.^[25] Both respondents rely on our
pronouncement in Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal and echo the ruling of
the trial court in the questioned orders. The copy of the resolution sent to the JAREÑOS was returned unserved and
in the Resolution of 21 July 1993, we considered it as served on them.^[26]
As required, the petitioners filed a reply to the comment.^[27]
On 8 November 1993, we resolved to give due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their memoranda, which the petitioners complied with on
29 December 1993^[28]
and the private respondents, on 28 March 1994.^[29]

The core issue in this case is whether the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, the complaints
filed by the petitioners. Before
resolving this issue, a procedural matter must first be considered. Generally, an order of dismissal, whether
right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of appeal, not certiorari.^[30]
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or successive.^[31]
Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is not
proper when an ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is
shown that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient, and will not
promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained of,
or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual.^[32]
Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost or lapsed
remedy of appeal,^[33]
where such loss is occasioned by the petitioner’s own neglect or error in the
choice of remedies.^[34]

The petitioners admit that they received a copy of the trial
court’s order dismissing their complaints on 4 October 1991.^[35]
The instant petition was filed on 24 October 1991 or beyond the 15-day period
to appeal from the order. The
petitioners have not even attempted to explain why they were unable to appeal
from the challenged order within the reglementary period. This civil action then was resorted to as a
substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, and since none of the
exceptions to the rigid rule barring substitution of remedies was alleged to
exist in this petition, or even indicated by the pleadings, this petition must
be dismissed.

Even if we were to accept this petition in the broader interest
of justice, it must still fail for the trial court correctly ruled that it has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter in Civil Cases Nos. 1683-91-C,
1684-91-C, 1685-91-C, 1686-91-C, and 1688-91-C. Jurisdiction thereon was originally vested in the National
Housing Authority (NHA) under P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1344. Under E.O. No. 648 of 7 February 1981, this
jurisdiction was transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC) which, pursuant to E.O. No. 90 of 17 December 1986, was renamed as the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board.

We agree with the trial court that the complaints do involve
unsound real estate business practices on the part of the owners and developers
of the subdivision who entered into Contracts to Sell with the
petitioners. By virtue of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1344 and our decision in Solid
Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, the
NHA, now HLRB, has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
matter. In addition to involving
unsound real estate business practices, the complaints also involve specific
performance of the contractual and statutory obligations of the owners or developers
of the subdivision. The claims for
annulment of the “Kasulatan ng
Bilihan” in favor of HABACON and the certificates of title
issued to him and for damages are merely incidental.

Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344, promulgated on 2 April 1978, provides
as follows:

“SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to
regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims
filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific
performance of contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.” (Emphasis
supplied)

Conformably with this section, we had earlier upheld the
jurisdiction of the NHA to determine the rights of the parties under a contract
to sell a subdivision lot in Antipolo Realty Corp. vs. National Housing
Authority^[36] and struck down the exercise of jurisdiction
by the Regional Trial Court over a case instituted by a lot buyer for delivery
of title against the subdivision owner in Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal. We also sustained the
jurisdiction of the HLRB over complaints for (a) the refund of reservation fees
for the purchase of a subdivision lot,^[37] (b)
specific performance filed by a lot buyer against the seller of a subdivision
lot,^[38]
(c) annulment of the mortgage constituted by the project owner without the
buyer’s consent, the mortgage foreclosure sale, and the condominium certificate
of title issued to the highest bidder at the said foreclosure sale,^[39]
and (d) collection of the balance of the unpaid purchase price of a subdivision
lot filed by the developer of a subdivision against the lot buyer.^[40]

In CT Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs. Hibionada,^[41] we further declared that incidental
claims for damages may be resolved by the HLRB. Thus:

“It is clear from Section 1(c) of the above quoted PD No. 1344
that the complaint for specific performance with damages filed by Diongon with
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental comes under the jurisdiction of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. Diongon is a buyer of a subdivision lot seeking specific performance of
the seller’s obligation to deliver to him the corresponding certificate of
title.

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims
resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code is out of step with the
fast-changing times. There are hundreds
of administrative bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid
authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as
an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain
activities falling under their particular expertise.

In the Solid Homes case for example the Court affirmed
the competence of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to award damages
although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable ordinarily only by
the courts of justice. This departure
from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified by
expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and competently to
the pressing problems of the modern world.”

Accordingly, the trial court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the complaints of the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the due course Resolution of 8 November 1993 is
RECALLED and, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs
against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 70-71 (Annex “A,” Complaint, Civil Case No. 1686-91-C).

^[2]
Subsequently exchange with another lot (Id., 63).

^[3]
Id., 72-73 (Annex “B,”
Complaint, Civil Case No. 1686-91-C).

^[4]
Id., 79 (Paragraph 2, Amended Complaint, Civil Case No. 1688-91-C).

^[5]
Id., 56-58 (Annex “A,” Complaint, Civil Case No. 1685-91-C).

^[6]
Rollo, 38-40 (Annex “A,” Complaint, Civil Case No. 1684-91-C).

^[7]
Id., 24-25 (Annex “A,” Complaint, Civil Case No. 1683-91-C).

^[8]
The relationship between FERNANDO and the JAREÑOS, who represented themselves
as the owners and developers of the Calamba Central Compound Subdivision, is
not disclosed by the pleadings.

^[9]
Rollo, op. cit., 27-29 (Annex “B,” Complaint, Civil
Case No. 1683-91-C); 41-42 (Annex “B,” Complaint, Civil Case No.
1684-91-C); 59-60 (Annex “B,” Complaint, Civil Case No. 1685-91-C);
76-77 (Annex “D,” Complaint, Civil Case No. 1686-91-C); 84-85 (Annex
“B,” Amended Complaint, Civil Case No. 1688-91-C).

^[10]
Id., 19, 32, 50, 64, 79.

^[11]
Entitled “Emily Yu Fajardo vs. Fernando Realty and
Development Corp., et al.“; Rollo, 17–23.

^[12]
Entitled “Salvador Gianan, et al., vs. Sps. Isabelo Jareño and Purita
Jareño, et al.“; Id., 30-37.

^[13]
Entitled “Rene Rodelas, et al. vs. Sps. Isabelo Jareño, et al.“;
Id., 49-55.

^[14]
Entitled “Julian Cuizon, et al. vs. Sps. Isabelo Jareño, et al.“;
Id., 62-69.

^[15]
Entitled “Teresita Rivera, et al. vs. Sps. Isabelo Jareño, et al.“;
Id., 78-83.

^[16]
Id., 87-91.

^[17]
Rollo, 92-93.

^[18]
177 SCRA 72 [1989].

^[19]
Rollo, op: cit., 96-98.

^[20]
Annex “A” of Petition; Id., 13-14.

^[21]
Should be HLRB.

^[22]
Annex “B” of Petition; Rollo, 15-16.

^[23]
Id., 106.

^[24]
Id., 118-124.

^[25]
Id., 143-148.

^[26]
Rollo, 140.

^[27]
Id., 156-158.

^[28]
Id., 161-169.

^[29]
Id., 235-242.

^[30]
Marahay vs. Melicor, 181 SCRA 811 [1990].

^[31]
Manila Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 200 [1990].

^[32]
Hualam Construction and Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA
612 [1992].

^[33]
Sy vs. Romero, 214 SCRA 187 [1992]; Aqualyn Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, 214 SCRA 307 [1992].

^[34]
Federation of Free Workers vs. Inciong, 208 SCRA 157 [1992].

^[35]
Paragraph 9, Petition; Rollo, 8.

^[36]
153 SCRA 399 [1987].

^[37]
Tejada vs. Homestead Property Corp., 178 SCRA 164 [1989].

^[38]
CT Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs. Hibionada, 191 SCRA 268 [1990].

^[39]
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board;
210 SCRA 558 [1992].

^[40]
Estate Developers and Investors Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 353
[1992].

^[41]
Supra note 38.