ELIZALDE MALALOAN AND MARLON LUAREZ, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 131, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF KALOOKAN …

Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with another primae impressionis case through the present petition wherein
the parties have formulated and now pose for resolution the following
issue: Whether or not a court may take
cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense
committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant
to conduct a search on a place outside the court’s supposed territorial
jurisdiction.^[1]

The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are
best taken from the findings of respondent Court of Appeals^[2] on
which there does not appear to be any dispute, to wit:

“From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court,
it can be gathered that on March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the
CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged
violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions)
perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon
City. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued
Search Warrant No. 95-90. On the same
day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search
warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor
seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (EILER)
was then taking place. According to
CAPCOM’s ‘Inventory of Property Seized,’ firearms, explosive materials and subversive
documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found
within the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but
most of them were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners,
EILER Instructors, who were indicted for violation
of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso
D.C. Velasco.

“On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a ‘Motion for
Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All
Illegally Acquired Evidence’ before the Quezon City court; and a ‘Supplemental
Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion
of Evidence Illegally Obtained’.

“On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge
issued the challenged order, consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer
for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of which
warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and
Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court
(National Capital Judicial Region); x x x

“Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the said Order
under challenge, having been denied by the assailed Order of October 5, 1990,
petitioners have come to this Court via the instant petition, raising the
sole issue:

‘WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION FOR A
SEARCH WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE A WARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE
LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.’”

x x x

Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment,^[3]
in effect affirming that of the trial court, by denying due course to the
petition for certiorari and lifting the temporary restraining order it
had issued on November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now
impugned in and sought to be reversed through the present recourse before us.

We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners
in support of their submissions. Their
disquisitions postulate interpretative theories contrary to the letter and
intent of the rules on search warrants and which could pose legal obstacles, if
not dangerous doctrines, in the area of law enforcement. Further, they fail to validly distinguish, hence they do not convincingly delineate
the difference, between the matter of (1) the court which has the competence to
issue a search warrant under a given set of facts, and (2) the permissible
jurisdictional range in the enforcement of such search warrant vis-a-vis
the court’s territorial jurisdiction. These issues while effectively cognate are essentially discrete since
the resolution of one does not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to avoid compounding the
seeming confusion, these questions shall be discussed seriatim.

I

Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of
criminal actions to invalidate the search warrant issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City because it is directed toward the seizure of firearms
and ammunition allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is sought to be buttressed by
the fact that the criminal case against petitioners for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in the latter court. The application for the search warrant, it
is claimed, was accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since venue
in criminal actions involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such
warrant is void for having been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do
so.

The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the
application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and
prosecution of a criminal action in a
trial court. It would thus categorize
what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts,
as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites,
procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely
different from those for the institution of a criminal action.

For, indeed, a warrant,
such as a warrant of arrest or a
search warrant, merely constitutes process.^[4] A search warrant is defined in our
jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him
to search for personal property and bring it before the court.^[5] A search warrant is in the nature of a
criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made
necessary because of a public necessity.^[6]

In American
jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on
search warrants,^[7] such warrant is definitively
considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of
its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a
court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for
purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of
authorities herein.

Invariably, a judicial
process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also the
means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings,^[8]
or all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers.^[9] It is likewise held to include a writ,
summons, or order issued in
a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to
expedite the cause or enforce the judgment,^[10] or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other process issuing from a
court of justice.^[11]

2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a
judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the
main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the case at
bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance to require observance of the
rules as to where a criminal case may
eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such action having as yet
been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction other
than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then
located. This is aside from the
consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different venues under the
rules for delitos continuados or in those instances where different trial courts have concurrent
original jurisdiction over the same criminal offense.

In fact, to illustrate
the gravity of the problem which petitioners’ implausible position may create,
we need not stray far from the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court on the venue of criminal actions and which we quote:

“Sec. 15. Place
where action to be instituted. –

(a)  Subject to existing laws, in all criminal
prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place.

(b)  Where an offense is committed on a railroad
train, in an aircraft, or any other public or private vehicle while in the
course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the
court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other
vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of departure and arrival.

(c)  Where an offense is committed on board a vessel
in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in
the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory
through which the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally
accepted principles of international law.

(d)  Other
crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein under
Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the proper court in
which the charge is first filed. (14a)”

It would be an exacting
imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial agencies
to unerringly determine where they should apply for a search warrant in view of
the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case under
the foregoing rules. It would be doubly
so if compliance with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of
said warrant should they file their application therefor in and obtain the same
from what may later turn out to be a court not within the ambit of the aforequoted
Section 15.

Our Rules of Court,
whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and, for that matter, the
Judiciary Act of 1948^[12] or
the recent Judiciary Reorganization Act,^[13] have
never required the jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners’ thesis would
seek to be inferentially drawn
from the silence of the reglementary provisions. On the contrary, we are of the view that said statutory omission
was both deliberate and significant. It
cannot but mean that the formulators of the Rules of Court, and even Congress
itself, did not consider it proper or correct, on considerations of national
policy and the pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal manacle on those who
would ferret out the evidence of a crime. For us to now impose such conditions or restrictions, under the guise of
judicial interpretation, may instead be reasonably construed as trenching on
judicial legislation. It would be
tantamount to a judicial act of engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted but which someone believes
ought to have been embraced therein.^[14]

Concededly, the problem
of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if a criminal case has already
been filed in a particular court and a search warrant is needed to secure
evidence to be presented therein. Obviously,
the court trying the criminal case may properly issue the warrant, upon proper
application and due compliance with the requisites therefor, since such
application would only be an incident in that case and which it can resolve in
the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction. If the contraband articles are within its territorial jurisdiction,
there would appear to be no further complications. The jurisdictional problem would resurrect, however, where such
articles are outside its territorial jurisdiction, which aspect will be
addressed hereafter.

3.  Coming back to the first
issue now under consideration, petitioners, after discoursing on the respective
territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional Trial Courts which
correspond to the thirteen judicial
regions,^[15]
invite our attention to the fact that
this Court, pursuant to its authority granted by law,^[16]
has defined the territorial
jurisdiction of each branch of a Regional Trial Court^[17]
over which the particular branch concerned shall exercise its authority.^[18] From this, it is theorized that
“only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the
place to be searched could grant an application for and issue a warrant to
search that place.” Support for such position is sought to be drawn from
issuances of this Court, that is, Circular No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as
amended by Circular No. 19 on August 4, 1987.

We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not intended to be of
general application to all instances involving search warrants and in all
courts as would be the case if they had been adopted as part of the Rules of
Court. These circulars were issued by
the Court to meet a particular exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on
applications for search warrants filed only in the courts of Metropolitan Manila
and other courts with multiple salas and only with
respect to violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order
under the Revised Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or
ammunitions, and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the aforesaid theory on the
court’s jurisdiction to issue search warrants would not apply to single–sala courts and other crimes. Accordingly, the rule sought by
petitioners to be adopted by the Court would actually result in a bifurcated
procedure which would be vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections.

For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners’
contention that Administrative Order No. 3 of this Court, supposedly
“defining the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts,” was the source of the subject matter jurisdiction of, as
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction by, the courts. As earlier observed, this administrative
order was issued pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, the pertinent portion of which states:

“SEC. 18. Authority
to define territory appurtenant to each branch. – The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch
of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed
to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes
of determining the venue of all writs, proceedings or actions,
whether civil or criminal, x x x.” (Italics ours.)

Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a procedural law and, much less, by an administrative
order or circular. The jurisdiction
conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is basically regional
in scope. Thus, Section 17 thereof
provides that “(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region
which shall be his permanent station,” and he “may be assigned by the
Supreme Court to any branch or city or municipality within the same region
as public interest may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an
assignment to another station x x x”
which, otherwise, would necessitate a new appointment for the judge.

In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner,
Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on
the covered regional trial court or its branches, such that non-observance
thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of the administrative
area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant
to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only allocated to the three
executive judges the administrative areas for which they may
respectively issue search warrants under the special circumstance contemplated
therein, but likewise pursuant to the jurisdiction vested in them by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the
conclusion that the grant of power to the courts mentioned therein, to
entertain and issue search warrants where the place to be searched is within
their territorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from
exercising the same power. It will
readily be noted that Circular No. 19 was basically intended to provide prompt
action on applications for search warrants. Its predecessor, Administrative Circular No. 13, had a number of
requirements, principally a raffle of the
applications for search warrants, if they had been filed with the executive
judge, among the judges within his administrative area. Circular No. 19 eliminated, by amendment,
that required raffle and ordered instead that such applications should
immediately be “taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose
jurisdiction the place to be searched is located,” or by their substitutes
enumerated therein.

Evidently, that
particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer exclusive
jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact, however, that they were themselves directed to
personally act on the applications, instead of farming out the same among the
other judges as was the previous practice, it was but necessary and practical
to require them to so act only on applications involving search of
places located within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted was, therefore, in
the nature of an allocation in the assignment of applications among them, in
recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and not a mandate for the
exclusion of all other courts. In
truth, Administrative Circular No. 13 even specifically envisaged and
anticipated the non-exclusionary nature of that provision, thus:

“4.  If, in the implementation of the search
warrant properties are seized thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in
court, said case shall be distributed conformably with Circular No. 7 dated
September 23, 1974, of this Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the
judge to whom it has been assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who issued
the search warrant.” (Emphasis supplied.)

It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court
which has jurisdiction over the
criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of
petitioners’ position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy,
that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the
assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction
to issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been
filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and
for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.

This should not, however,
mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to
be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that
search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of
urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely,
neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction
over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or his lawful
substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied
enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the court’s
territorial jurisdiction.

This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the
permissible jurisdictional range of enforcement of search warrants.

II

As stated in limine, the affiliated issue
raised in this case is whether a branch of a regional
trial court has the authority to issue a warrant for the search of a
place outside its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the query in the negative. We hold otherwise.

1.  We repeat what we have
earlier stressed: No law or rule
imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no
such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the American
jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of arrest
could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for
the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the
delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made
to the issuing judge,^[19] said warrant does not become functus officio
but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime of a search
warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at ten days^[20] but
there is no provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it may be
enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the premises specifically
described therein which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction
of the issuing court.

We make the foregoing
comparative advertence to emphasize the fact that when the law or rules would
provide conditions, qualifications or restrictions, they so state. Absent specific mention thereof, and the
same not being inferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions
which are presumed to be complete and expressive of the intendment of the
framers, a contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not be
countenanced.

A bit of legal history on
this contestation will be helpful. The
jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs and processes of the so-called
inferior courts could be enforced outside the province only with the approval
of the former court of first instance.^[21] Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the
enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the approval of the
regional trial court.^[22] On the other hand, while, formerly, writs
and processes of the then courts of first instance were enforceable throughout
the Philippines,^[23] under
the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines, certain specified
writs issued by a regional trial court
are now enforceable only within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity and contrast, it is necessary that
said provision be set out in full:

“3. Writs and processes. –

(a)  
Writs of certiorari,
prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued
by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.

(b)  
All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial
court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit
trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last
three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial
court.” (Italics ours.)

We feel that the
foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed
in unwarranted polemics. The rule
enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a regional trial
court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that
all other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall
be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a search warrant is but a judicial process, not
a criminal action. No legal provision,
statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or
territorial limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the
above-quoted provision of the interim Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the
country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and
there is no distinction or exception made regarding the processes contemplated
in paragraph (b).

2.  This is but a necessary
and inevitable consequence of the nature and purpose of a search warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that
it is extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information
regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited
articles. The Court is accordingly
convinced that it should not make the requisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such
illicit items, once detected, more onerous if not impossible by imposing
further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through
decisional dicta. For that matter, we
are unaware of any instance wherein a search warrant was struck down on
objections based on territorial jurisdiction. In the landmark case of Stonehill,
et al. vs. Diokno, et al.,^[24] the
searches in the corporate offices in Manila and the residences in Makati of
therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search warrants issued by the
Quezon City and Pasig branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and by
the Municipal Courts of Manila and Quezon City,^[25] but the same were never challenged on
jurisdictional grounds although they were subsequently nullified for being
general warrants.

3.  A clarion call supposedly
of libertarian import is further sounded by petitioners, dubiously invoking the
constitutional proscription
against illegal searches and seizures. We do not believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a
court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is
located would create a constitutional question. Nor are we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law
enforcement authorities may resort to what could be a permutation of forum
shopping, by filing an application for the warrant with a “friendly”
court. It need merely be recalled that
a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated into
specifically enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant,^[26] and
all these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a
search warrant. Said requirements,
together with the ten-day lifetime of the warrant^[27]
would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only because
of the distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger involved,
unless there are really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such
constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are
enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only property
and privacy, but persons and liberty.

On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the
authorities have to contend now and then with local and national criminal
syndicates of considerable power and influence, political or financial in
nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search
warrant in the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact that to do
so will necessitate the transportation of applicant’s witnesses to and their
examination in said places, with the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously
born of experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo,
as quoted by respondent court:

“This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage
of information which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a search
warrant is secured (against) where the issuing magistrate within the region
does not hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the region,
where the place to be searched is located.”^[28]

The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken
into account in the foreign judicial pronouncement that, in the absence of
statutory restrictions, a justice of the peace in one district of the
county may issue a search warrant to be served in another district of the
county and made returnable before the justice of still another district or another
court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters involved.^[29]
In the present state of our law on the matter, we find no such statutory
restrictions both with respect to the court which can issue the search warrant
and the enforcement thereof anywhere in the Philippines.

III

Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or,
more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal
case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court
for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said
criminal case. This arrangement is not
unknown or without precedent in our jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was
anticipated in Circular No. 13 of this Court under the limited scenario
contemplated therein.

Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the
following policy guidelines:

1.  The court wherein the
criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search
warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be
filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that
the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or
may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the
justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary
jurisdiction thereover.

2.  When the latter court
issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall
be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the
appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the
issuing court. All grounds and
objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or
subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be
deemed waived.

3.  Where no motion to quash
the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the
interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for
the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant
if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are
involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to
suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion
to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however,
that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to
suppress. The resolution of the court
on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the
appropriate higher court.

4.  Where the court which
issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not
otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property
seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein
the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation
therefor.

5.  These guidelines shall
likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different
informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent
original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been
resolved, such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to
act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition
is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, and Kapunan,
JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., J., separate
opinion.

Padilla, J., no part.

^[1]
Petition, 4, Rollo, 11; Comment, 5, Rollo, 131.

^[2]
Decision, CA-G.R. SP No. 23533, November 28, 1991, 109-111.

^[3]
Penned by Justice Fidel P. Purisima, with the concurrence of Justices Eduardo
R. Bengson and Salome A. Montoya.

^[4]
72 C.J.S., Process, 988.

^[5]
Section 1, Rule 126, Rules of Court.

^[6]
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980 ed., Vol. IV, 387.

^[7]
See Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Bernabe, etc., et al., 67 Phil. 658
(1939); Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh, et al., 75 Phil. 113 (1945).

^[8]
Gollobitch vs. Rainbow, 84 Ia.,
567; 51 N.W. 48, cited in 3 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 2731.

^[9]
50 C.J.S., Process, 441-442.

^[10]
Royal Exchange Assurance of London vs.
Bennettsville & C.R. Co., 95 S.C. 375, 79 S.E. 104-105.

^[11]
Grossman vs. Weiss, 221 N.Y.S.
206, 267, 129 Misc. 234.

^[12]
R.A. No. 296, as amended.

^[13]
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.

^[14]
Tañada vs. Yulo, et al., 61 Phil. 515 (1935).

^[15]
Sec. 13, B.P. Blg. 129.

^[16]
Sec. 18, id.

^[17]
For the Regional Trial Court in the
National Capital Judicial Region, the Court issued Administrative Order No. 3.

^[18]
Par. 2(b), Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines.

^[19]
Sec. 4, Rule 113, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

^[20]
Sec. 9, Rule 126, id.

^[21]
Sec. 4, Rule 135, Rules of Court.

^[22]
Sec. 38(2), B.P. Blg. 129; Sec. 3(b),
Interim or Transi­tional Rules and Guidelines.

^[23]
Sec. 3, Rule 135, which was, however,
delimited on this particular score by Sec. 44(h) of R.A.
No. 296 with respect to writs of injunction, and by Sec. 2, Rule 102 with
regard to writs of habeas corpus.

^[24]
G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967, 20 SCRA 383.

^[25]
At that time, Manila constituted the Sixth Judicial District, while the
Province of Rizal and the Cities of Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan, inter alia, belonged to the Seventh Judicial District (Sec.
49, R.A. No. 296, as amended).

^[26]
Sec. 2 of said Rules declares what personal property may be seized; Sec. 3, the
requisites for the issuance of the search warrant, specifically the need for
probable cause and the limitation of the warrant to one specific offense; Sec.
3, the examination under oath of the complainant and his witnesses; Sec. 5, the
form of the warrant; Sec. 6, the permissible means to effect the search; Sec.
7, the need for a resident witness to the search; and Sec. 8, the time of
making the search.

^[27]
Sec. 9, id., id.

^[28]
Rollo, 48.

^[29]
79 C.J.S., Searches and Seizures, 855.

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