INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND NESTOR B. MICOSA, RESPONDENTS.

Posed for determination in this petition for certiorari is
the question of whether a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for dismissal from employment and corollarily, whether a conviction of a
crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.

International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) is an international organization recognized by the
Philippine government and accorded privileges, rights and immunities normally
granted to organizations of universal character. In 1977, it hired private respondent Nestor B. Micosa as laborer,
who thereby became bound by IRRI Employment Policy and Regulations, the
Miscellaneous Provisions of which states viz:

“C. Conviction and Previous Separation

‘1. x x x

‘2. An employer who has been convicted of a (sic) criminal offense
involving moral turpitude may be dismissed from the service.'”^[1]

On February 6, 1987, Micosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo Ortega
inside a beer house in Los Baños, Laguna.

On September 15, 1987, Micosa was accused of the crime of
homicide. During the pendency of the
criminal case, Micosa voluntarily applied for inclusion in IRRI’s Special
Separation Program. However, on January
9, 1990, IRRI’s Director General, Klaus L. Lampe expressed deep regret that he
had to disapprove Micosa’s application for separation because of IRRI’s desire
to retain the skills and talents that persons like him possess.^[2]

On January 23, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision finding
Micosa guilty of homicide, but appreciating, however, in his favor the presence
of the mitigating circumstances of (a) incomplete self-defense and (b)
voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance.

Subsequently, Micosa applied for suspension of his sentence under
the Probation Law.

On February 8, 1990, IRRI’s Director General personally wrote
Micosa that his appointment as laborer was confirmed, making him a regular core
employee whose appointment was for an indefinite period and who “may not
be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent
provisions of the Philippine Labor Code.”^[3]

On March 30, 1990, IRRI’s Human Resource Development Head, J.K.
Pascual wrote Micosa urging him to resign from employment in view of his
conviction in the case for homicide.

On April 4, 1990, the Laguna Parole and Probation Office No. II
wrote IRRI informing the latter that said office found Micosa’s application for
probation meritorious as he was evaluated “to possess desirable social
antecedents in his life.”^[4]

On April 6, 1990, Micosa informed J.K. Pascual that he had no
intention of resigning from his job at IRRI.

On April 22, 1990, J.K. Pascual replied to Micosa’s letter
insisting that the crime for which he was convicted involves moral turpitude
and informing him that he is thereby charged of violating Section I-AA, Par
VII, C-2 of the Institute’s Personnel Manual.

On April 27, 1990, Micosa explained to J.K. Pascual that the
slaying of Reynaldo Ortega on February 6, 1987 arose out of his act of
defending himself from unlawful aggression; that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude and that he opted
not to appeal his conviction so that he could avail of the benefits of
probation, which the trial court granted to him.

On May 7, 1990, Micosa sought the assistance of IRRI’s Grievance
Committee who recommended to the Director General, his continued
employment. However, on May 21, 1990,
J.K. Pascual issued a notice to Micosa that the latter’s employment was to
terminate effective May 25, 1990.

On May 29, 1990, Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.

On August 21, 1990, Labor Arbiter Numeriano D. Villena rendered
judgment finding the termination of Micosa illegal and ordering his
reinstatement with full backwages from the date of his dismissal up to actual
reinstatement. The dispositive portion
of the same is hereunder quoted:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are
hereby entered:

“1. Finding the termination
of complainant’s services illegal;

“2. Ordering respondent
International Rice Research Institute to reinstate complainant Nestor B. Micosa
to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
appurtenant thereto immediately upon receipt hereof;

“3. Ordering respondent
International Rice Research Institute to pay complainant Nestor B. Micosa his
full backwages computed from the date of his dismissal on May 25, 1990 up to
actual reinstatement based on his latest salary rate of P4,068.00 per month.

“4. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to
pay complainant’s counsel the amount of Five Thousand Pesos P5,000.00,
representing his attorney’s fees; and

“5. Dismissing the claim
for damages for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.”^[5]

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission was basically
in agreement with the findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, in a resolution dated January 31,
1991, it affirmed the appealed decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:

“WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with
modification deleting the award of attorney’s fees.

“SO ORDERED.”^[6]

Accordingly, petitioner filed this
instant petition raising the following issues:

“1. THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
IRRI HAD NO RIGHT NOR AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE ANY OTHER CAUSE/S FOR DISMISSAL IF
THE SAME IS NOT AMONG THOSE ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE.

“2. THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT
“THERE IS NO BASIS TO APPLY PETITIONER’S INSTITUTE PERSONNEL MANUAL IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINANT ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT HIS CONVICTION OF HOMICIDE
CONSTITUTE MORAL TURPITUDE.”^[7]

The basic premise of petitioner is that Micosa’s conviction of the crime of homicide, which is a
crime involving moral turpitude, is a valid ground for his dismissal under the
Miscellaneous Provisions of IRRI’s Employment Policy Regulations.

In addition to its claim that it has the prerogative to issue
rules and regulations including those
concerning employee discipline and that its employees are bound by the
aforesaid personnel manual, petitioner justifies its action as a legitimate act of self-defense. It admits that Micosa’s interests — in his
employment and means of livelihood — are adversely affected; that a convict
should not be discriminated against in society and that he should be given the
same opportunities as those
granted to other fellow citizens but claims that at times, one’s right is
deemed superior than that of another. In this case, petitioner believes that it has a superior right to
maintain a very high degree or standard not only to forestall any internal
problem hampering operations but also to prevent even the smallest possibility
that said problems could occur considering that it is an international
organization with concomitant obligation to the host country to avoid creating
disturbance or give occasion for such disturbance..

It should be recalled, however, that Micosa was issued an
appointment with an assurance from the IRRI’s Director General that as regular
core employee he “may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as
defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code.”^[8]
Thus, IRRI could not remove him from his job if there existed no justifiable
cause as defined by the Labor Code.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein
an employer may terminate an employment. Verily, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of
these justifiable causes. Neither may
said ground be justified under Article 282 (c) nor under 282 (d) by
analogy. Fraud or willful breach by the
employees of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative under Article 282 (c) refers to any fault or culpability on the
part of the employee in the discharge of his duty rendering him absolutely
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. It cannot be gainsaid that the breach of
trust must be related to the performance of the employee’s function.^[9]
On the other hand, the commission of a crime by the employee under Article 282
(d) refers to an offense against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representative. Analogous causes must have an element
similar to those found in the specific just cause enumerated under Article
282. Clearly lacking in the ground
invoked by petitioner is its relation to his work or to his employer.

In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of homicide was
outside the perimeter of the IRRI complex, having been committed in a
restaurant after office hours and against a non-IRRI employee. Thus, the conviction of Micosa for homicide
was not work-related, his misdeed having no relation to his position as laborer
and was not directed or committed against IRRI or its authorized agent.

Besides, IRRI failed to show how the dismissal of Micosa would be
in consideration of the safety and welfare of its employees, its reputation and
standing in the community and its special obligations to its host country. It did not present evidence to show that
Micosa possessed a tendency to kill without provocation or that he posed a
clear and present danger to the company and its personnel. On the contrary, the records reveal that
Micosa’s service record is unblemished. There is no record whatsoever that he was involved in any incident
similar to that which transpired on that fateful night of February 6,
1987. In fact, even after his
conviction, the IRRI’s Director General expressed his confidence in him when he
disapproved his application for special separation in a letter dated January 8,
1990 and when he conveyed to him IRRI’s decision to promote him to the status
of a regular core employee, with the commensurate increases in benefits in a
letter dated February 8, 1990. Respondent IRRI derogates the letters’ significance saying that they
were mere pro-forma communications which it had given to numerous other
workers. But whether or not such
letters were “form letters,” they expressed the message that were
meant to be conveyed, i.e., that Micosa is fit for continued
employment. In addition, the employees
at IRRI’s Grievance Committee interceded favorably in behalf of Micosa when
they recommended his retention despite his conviction showing that the very
employees which IRRI sought to protect did not believe that they were placing
their very own lives in danger with Micosa’s retention.

Likewise, noteworthy is the
fact that Micosa, although found guilty as charged, was also found worthy of
probation. This means that all the
information regarding his character, antecedents, environment, as well as his
mental and physical condition were evaluated as required under Section 8 of the
Probation Law and it was found that there existed no undue risk that Micosa
will commit another crime during his period of probation and that his being
placed on probation would be to the benefit of society as a whole.

In the face of all these, IRRI remained adamant and insisted on
Micosa’s termination. Certainly, said
termination cannot be upheld for it lacked not only a legal basis but factual basis as well.

Even under IRRI’s Employment Policy and Regulations, the
dismissal of Micosa on the ground of his conviction for homicide cannot be
sustained. The miscellaneous provisions
of said personnel manual mentions of conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude as a ground for dismissal. IRRI simply assumed that conviction of the crime of homicide is conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude. We do not subscribe to
this view.

Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing^[10]
citing In Re Basa^[11]
and Tak Ng v. Republic^[12] as
everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act
of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.

As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme
Court to determine.^[13]
Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of
homicide involves moral turpitude is unwarranted considering that the said
crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful
aggression by the victim has not been so classified as involving moral
turpitude.

IRRI argues that the crime of homicide committed by Micosa
involves moral turpitude as the killing of a man is conclusively an act against
justice and is immoral in itself not merely prohibited by law. It added that Micosa stabbed the victim more
than what was necessary to repel the attack.

IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their
totality. The facts on record show that
Micosa was then urinating and
had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa’s face; that the
victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa’s face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa
pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while
Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of
his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on
Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa’s intention was
not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of
self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating
circumstance demonstrate that Micosa’s character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or unjust.

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide
do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide
may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.^[14]
Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every
known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the surrounding circumstances.^[15]
While xxx generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral
turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a
crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are
crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude
and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita
only.^[16]
It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite
term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or
exclusion as the cases are reached.

In fine, there is nothing in this case to show any abuse of
discretion by the National Labor Relations Commission in affirming the decision
of the Labor Arbiter finding that Micosa was illegally dismissed. For certiorari to lie, there must be
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of
the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil and common
traditions.^[17]
The abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the
discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically.^[18]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 13.

^[2]
Records, p. 56.

^[3]
Id., p. 57.

^[4]
Id., p. 60

^[5]
Rollo, pp. 26 and 27.

^[6]
Id., p. 32.

^[7]
Id, p. 12.

^[8]
Supra.

^[9]
Quezon Electric Cooperative v. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 79718-22, 172
SCRA 88 (1989).

^[10]
G.R. No. 54258, 155 SCRA 663 (1987).

^[11]
41 Phil. 275.

^[12]
106 Phil. 727.

^[13]
In Re: Victorio Lanuevo, Administrative
Case No. 1162, 66 SCRA 245 (1975).

^[14]
Hartman v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 66 P. 2d 705, 706, 20 Cal.
App. 2d 76; U.S. ex rel. Mongiovi v. Karnuth, D.C.N.Y., 30 F. 2d 825,
826, cited in 58 CJS, Moral Turpitude, p. 1206.

^[15]
Cal.- Brainard v. Board of Medical Examiners of California, 157 P. 2d 7,
8, 68 Cal App. 2d 591 cited in 58 CJS, Moral Turpitude, p. 1204.

^[16]
Ariz. – Du Val v. Board of Medical Examiners of Arizona, 66 P. 2d 1026,
1030, 49 Ariz. 329, cited in 58 CJS, Moral Turpitude, p. 1205.

^[17]
Panaligan v. Adolfo, G.R. No. L-24100, 67 SCRA 176 (1975).

^[18]
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-32550,
125 SCRA 337 (1983).