PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROLANDO PRECIOSO, ALIAS “BODOT,” GERARDO MONFORTE, JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, ACCUSED, ROLANDO PRECIOSO, ALIAS “BODOT,” AND GERAR…

Accused-appellants Rolando Precioso, alias “Bodot,” and
Gerardo Monforte have come to us for a second opinion and the reversal of their
conviction for the composite crime denominated as robbery in band with multiple
rape. Although not raised in issue, we
are persuaded that they were indicted and condemned for the wrong offense; but,
although assigned as error, we are not convinced that they are innocent of the
felonious acts that they actually committed, as we shall shortly explain after
the factual backdrop recounted hereunder.

In an amended information dated October 14, 1985, the accused
were charged in Criminal Case No. 144 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7 at
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur of the aforesaid offense of robbery in band with
multiple rape allegedly committed as follows:

“That on or about the 6th day of August, 1985 at about 9:30
o’clock in the evening more or less, particularly at the residence of Mrs.
Irene Galvadores situated at Sitio Andanan, Barangay Maygatasan, Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent, with unity of purpose
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with a
firearm (short arm) with intent to gain and by means of force and violence
against persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
stea(l) and carry away cash money in the amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, jewelries valued at FOUR THOUSAND (P4,000.00)
PESOS, car stereo valued at TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS, three (3) pieces of
calculator(s) valued at ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS, assorted personal
belongings valued at SEVEN THOUSAND (P7,000.00) PESOS to the total amount of
THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, belonging to Mr. and
Mrs. Rafael Galvadores and on the occasion thereof the above-named accused, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and
intimidation and in pursuance to (sic) their conspiracy succeeded (sic) in
having sexual intercourse with Leah Alimpoos three (3) times and Teresita
Pescador once both of minor age against there (sic) will and a woman (sic) of
good reputation.

CONTRARY TO LAW, Art. 294 Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code.”^[1]

to which indictment herein appellants,
when arraigned with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty.^[2]

The crime was committed, according to the Solicitor General in
the brief filed for the People, in the following manner, to wit:

“About 9:30 p.m. of 6 August, 1985, Leah Alimpoos, who was sleeping at the
Galvadores’ store at Sitio Andanan, Maygatasan, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, with
her niece, Maryjane, and Paquito Camarin, a househelp, was awakened by four armed men. The faces of the four were covered with handkerchiefs and
stockings and only their eyes and mouths were visible. Despite this, the frightened girl recognized appellant Rolando Precioso, a
neighbor, through his voice and general physical appearance. The men instructed her to wake up her elder
sister, Irene Galvadores, on the pretext that Maryjane was suffering from a
stomach ache (May 2, 1986 tsn, pp. 3-8).

“Appellant Precioso and two of his companions then escorted
Leah to the house, which was ten (10) meters away from the store. As instructed, the hapless girl shouted,
‘Ne, mata kay guisakitan si Maryjane ng
tiyan’ (Ne, you wake up because Maryjane has a stomach ache) (Ibid., p. 9; April 21, 1986
tsn, p. 10; August 18, 1986 tsn, pp. 10, 22).

“Rafael Galvadores and his wife, Irene, were roused from their
sleep. Rafael called out to Teresita
Pescador, a househelp, who was sleeping with
their daughter, Ana, in another room to open the door (August 18, 1986
tsn, p. 22).

“Teresita, who had just awakened, did as told and was surprised to see the three
armed men rushing inside and
telling her not to move and to keep quiet. She immediately recognized appellant Precioso, one of their neighbors
who frequented the store, through his physical appearance, his clothes, and his
voice (May 2, 1986 tsn, pp. 38-40).

“The three intruders then told Teresita to wake up the
Galvadores couple. When the couple went
out of their room, appellant Precioso herded them to the sala of the house, and
forced Teresita and Ana into the couple’s room. At the sala, Rafael was made
to lie down on his stomach, as the men ransacked the house looking for
valuables (Ibid., pp.
39-42; August 18, 1986 tsn, pp. 11, 14, 24).

“Later, Rafael and Leah were brought to the store by appellant
Precioso, where Rafael was made to lie down
on his stomach again. While one of the
men pointed a gun at him, appellant Precioso forced Leah to lie down, removed
her panties, and raped her in
the presence of Rafael, Paquito and Maryjane, all the time threatening Leah
with death if she would not keep quiet and submit to his lust. The poor girl was unable to do anything, but
cry. Appellant Precioso removed the
cover of his face to kiss Leah,
allowing Leah and Rafael to recognize him (May 2, 1986, tsn, pp. 12-14; August
18, 1986 tsn, pp. 24-28).

“Back at the house, appellant Monforte dragged Teresita to the
garage where he removed her panties and raped her at gun point. Struggling and crying, Teresita scratched
his face, as a result of which his mask fell off, allowing her to see his
face. When he was finished, appellant
Monforte sent her back to the room of the Galvadores couple (May 2, 1986 tsn,
pp. 44-47).

“After raping Leah, appellant Precioso brought her back to the
sala of the house. A few minutes later,
appellant Monforte brought her to the pigpen at the back of the house. He threatened her with a gun, told her to
lie down, hit her at the back
just at the top of the shoulder, and then raped her. At the time of the rape, Leah was able to see his face since the
handkerchief over his face was removed (May 2, 1986 tsn, pp. 15-17).

“After raping her at the pigpen, appellant Monforte brought Leah to the side of
the house and raped her there a second time. Afterwards, he brought her to the house. Leah went directly to her room where
she continued crying (Ibid., pp.
19-21).

“About 11:00 p.m., appellants and their companions left,
taking with them P6,000.00 cash, pieces of jewelry valued at P4,000.00, three
pieces of calculators valued at P1,000.00, car stereo worth P2,000.00, personal
belongings valued at P7,000.00, and assorted stocks in the store valued at
P10,000.00 (August 18, 1986 tsn, p. 15).”^[3]

x x x

Faced with the issue of whether or not appellants are guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the trial court initially settled
the question concerning the positive identification of Precioso and Monforte
among the four accused who raped Alimpoos and Pescador. Then on an overall evaluation of the
evidence on record, on January 29, 1990 it rendered its judgment of conviction,
thus:

“ACCORDINGLY, Precioso and Monforte are sentenced:

1) to a penalty of
reclusion perpetua each;

2) to indemnify complaining witnesses Irene and
Rafael Galvadores (in) the amount of P30,000.00;

3) to indemnify complaining witnesses Leah Alim­poos
and Teresita Pescador (in) the amount of P20,000.00 each;

4) to pay the amount of
P30,000 representing moral damages;

5) to pay the expenses of
litigation in the amount of P10,000.00;

6) to pay (a)ttorney’s fees
in the amount of P5,000.00; and

7) to pay the costs.”^[4]

In their present appeal, the defense assigns as errors the
adjudication of the lower court (1) finding that the guilt of the accused had
been proven beyond reasonable doubt; (2) ruling that the two accused had been
positively identified by the rape victims, allegedly basing its decision not on
a correct findings of facts but on inferences, surmises and presumptions; and
(3) finding no motive or reason whatsoever for the complainants to charge the
accused, its decision being supposedly contrary to the common experience of
man, the natural course of events, and existing jurisprudence.^[5]

We find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court as
adopted and amplified in appellee’s brief, the pertinent portions whereof have
hereinbefore been reproduced. From the
narration of facts therein, the concerted acts of the accused clearly establish
conspiracy.

The issues on appeal hinge on the question of credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies. Once
again, we reiterate that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses’ testimony is accorded great respect on appeal,^[6] and
the records do not show that the court below disregarded any consideration
which would warrant a departure from this jurisprudential dictum. Appellate courts will generally not disturb
the factual findings of the trial court on the raison d’etre that
the latter is in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying, subject to exceptions which do not obtain in the present case.^[7]

The transcripts of the notes taken at the trial reveal that the
witnesses for the prosecution testified in a clear, consistent and forthright
manner. The testimonies of the
complainants were basically congruent with and mutually corroborative of each
other, and were confirmed by those of the other prosecution witnesses. Their minor errors and inconsistencies do
not affect the substance of their declaration or adversely reflect on their
veracity.

In contrast, the testimony of appellants consist merely of
denials and alibi, without any other credible evidence to sustain their
exculpatory claims and defense. We have
consistently ruled that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law
and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible
witnesses. Ergo, as between the
positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements
of the accused, the former deserve more credence.^[8]

Appellants further argue that they were not properly
identified. However, the records show that
Precioso and Monforte were positively identified by the two rape victims in a
police line-up and in open court.^[9] They
were further definitely identified by complainant Irene Galvadores^[10] and
her husband, complainant Rafael Galvadores.^[11] All
these witnesses had sufficient time and ample opportunity to recognize and
identify appellants. In People vs.
Calixtro,^[12]
we ruled that private complainant’s identification of the accused through the
latter’s voice may be accepted considering that they are barriomates and
friends. Here, with much more reason
can we accept the identification of appellants since the prosecution witnesses
not only heard their voices but actually saw their faces.

We also gather from the evidence that the complainants have no
ill motives or any plausible reason whatsoever to impute the commission of such
serious offenses upon appellants if, in truth, the latter are guiltless as
claimed. Accordingly, as we have held
in a number of cases, the absence of evidence of any improper motive impelling
the principal witness sustains the conclusion that his testimony is worthy of
full faith and credit.^[13]

The foregoing doctrine squarely applies to the multiple rapes
committed by appellants on their two victims. Furthermore, considering the inbred modesty and antipathy of a Filipina
to airing in public things that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that
the complainant would assume and admit the ignominy she had undergone if it
were not true.^[14] Complainants Leah Alimpoos and
Teresita Pescador, both young barrio girls, would not have publicly admitted
that they had been criminally ravished if that was not true, for their natural
instinct is to protect their honor. Their testimony given at a public trial wherein they narrated their
ordeal with all the sordid details thereof, as synthesized in appellee’s brief
and set forth earlier, could not have been conjured and fabricated by these
hapless and innocent victims.

The defense of alibi interposed by appellants is evidentially
sterile and jurisprudentially weak as they were not able to demonstrate by
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. We need merely repeat the invariable rule that the defense of
alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on credibility,^[15]
and is an unavailing defense especially if contradicted by eyewitness testimony.^[16]

Precioso claimed that when the crime was committed, he was
sleeping in the house of his grandmother,^[17] but
said house is admittedly only around 150 meters away from the house of the
Galvadores spouses.^[18] His
pretension, therefore, cannot be sustained in the face of the settled rule that
it is not enough to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed but he must likewise show that it was physically impossible for him
to have been at the scene of the crime.

Monforte, on the other hand, would like to convince the trial
court that he was working at the time.^[19]
However, the lower court correctly made short shrift of said defense with this
terse documented observation: “Gerardo Monforte also negated the accusation, giving as a reason
thereof that they had an overtime at the bandsaw of Lucio Cortes that fateful
evening. Nonetheless, the prosecution
on rebuttal, presented a (c)ertification that at the time of the incident,
there was no operation at the Cortes’ bandsaw because their electrical power
was disconnected by ASELCO on July 25, 1985 (Exhs. ‘H’ and ‘H-1’) and
reconnected only on August 12, 1985 (Exhs. ‘I’ and ‘I-1’) for non-payment of
electric bills. (TSN, p. 4 & 5, x x
x August 8, 1989). Not a tiny thread of
evidence was introduced to contradict this vital aspect nor was it shown that
the Cortez sawmill has its own source of electric power or generator. As a matter of fact, sole reliance on the
ASELCO electric current was confirmed by defense witness, Francisco Bolanio
(TSN, p. 19, x x x September 12, 1982).”^[20]

Finally, appellant Precioso’s assertion that “(a) man who is
guilty flees. But being a close friend
and confidant, accused Rolando Precioso remained and helped the robbery victim
load the latter’s things preparatory to their evacuation,”^[21]
is a simple pettifogging argument to evade complicity. This uncorroborated imposture was
categorically belied by complainant Leah Alimpoos.^[22]

Furthermore, we have
ruled that an accused may not have fled from the scene of the crime, but this
is not necessarily indicative of a clear conscience. The crime may have been committed with impunity and the accused
may have thought that the victim or his heirs would not complain, or that
eyewitnesses will not be able to identify him.^[23] Appellant’s pretended innocence is
clearly non-sequitur to his decision not to flee. Apart from the fact that there is no case
law holding that non-flight is a conclusive proof of innocence, the argument
does not hold weight in the light of definite and inarguable identification of
appellant. The material factor here is
that there is positive identifi­cation of him as the author of the crime.^[24]

From what has been established by the evidence, the defense
version is entirely unbelievable. It
derives no support from the facts and circumstances that have been solidly
established by the prosecution. Appellants cannot, therefore, expect the absolution which they seek from
this Court in their appeal.

However, the crime charged in the case at bar cannot be correctly
categorized or denominated as robbery in band with multiple rape as there is no
such composite crime. This is not a
controversial problem nor one of first impression since this question has long
been laid to rest, yet we continue to be confronted with this terminological faux
pas in cases brought to us on
appeal. In fact, neither the
prosecution, the defense, the trial court nor the Solicitor General took note
of that mistake in this case. Accordingly, it behooves the prosecuting agencies and the lower courts
to review the case of People vs.
Apduhan, Jr.,^[25] wherein this Court exhaustively
explained the nature of the crime and how the aggravating circumstance of band
may be properly appreciated.

In that case, we ruled that:

“The afore-quoted art. 294 enumerates five classes
of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons and prescribes the
corresponding penalties. The case at
bar falls under art. 294 (1) which defines robbery with homicide and fixes the
penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.

“Article 295
provides, inter alia, that when the offense
described in subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 295 are committed by a band, the proper
penalties must be imposed in the maximum periods. The circumstance of band is therefore qualifying only in robbery
punished by subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294. Consequently, art. 295 is inapplicable to robbery with homicide,
rape, intentional mutilation,
and lesiones graves resulting in insanity, imbecility, impotency
or blindness. If the foregoing classes
of robbery which are described in art. 294 (1) and (2) are perpetrated by a
band, they would not be punishable under art. 295, but then cuadrilla
would be a generic aggravating (circumstance) under Art. 14 of the Code (People
vs. Casunuran L-7654, August 16, 1956; People vs. Leyesa, L-7842, August 30,
1956). Hence, with the present wording
of art. 295 there is no crime as “robbery with homicide in band.” If
robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would
still be denominated as “robbery with homicide” under art. 294 (1),
but the element of band, as stated above, would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating
circumstance.”

Therefore, following the aforementioned ruling which applies with
equal force to paragraph 2 of Article 294, the offense in the case at bar is
the special complex crime of robbery with rape. Cuadrilla, in this instance, is merely a generic aggravating
circumstance.

Presidential Decree No. 767, which took effect on August 15,
1975, amended Article 294 (2) of the Revised Penal Code to provide as follows:

“Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons. – Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery with the use of
violence against or intimidation
of persons shall suffer:

x x x

2. The penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua, when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of
the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been
inflicted: Provided, however, that when
the robbery accompanied with rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon
or by two or more persons the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.”

Withal, the lower court did not err in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, wherein it also took note of the proscription against the
death penalty, and in thereafter holding that “when a penalty is single
(and) indivisible, it shall be applied regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code). Such being the case, (the) Indeterminate
Sentence Law could not be invoked (Sec. 2, [Act] 4103, as amended).”^[26]

As to the awards of indemnification to the rape victims which
should be paid by accused-appellants in solidum, the same are
hereby increased from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 for complainant Teresita
Pescador, and to P50,000.00 for complainant Leah Alimpoos, in accordance with
present jurisprudence,^[27]
considering the deliberate acts of appellants in augmenting the ignominious
circumstances and results of their bestiality by alternately subjecting
complainant Leah Alimpoos to successive rapes and assaulting her once in the
presence of relatives and other persons.

ACCORDINGLY, as thus MODIFIED, the judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Original Record, 78.

^[2]
Ibid., 122.

^[3]
Brief
for Appellee, 4-9; Rollo, 109-113.

^[4]
Original
Record, 662-663; per Judge Zenaida P. Placer.

^[5]
Appellants’s
Brief, 6; Rollo, 62.

^[6]
People
vs. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 (1991); People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA
355 (1991); People vs. Tongson, 194 SCRA 257 (1991).

^[7]
People
vs. Demecillo, et al., 186 SCRA 161 (1990); People vs. Toring, et
al., 191 SCRA 38 (1990); People vs. Beringuel, et al., 192 SCRA
561 (1990).

^[8]
U.S.
vs. Bueno, 41 Phil. 447 (1921); People vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57
(1991); People vs. Song, et al., 204 SCRA 135 (1991).

^[9]
TSN,
Alimpoos, May 2, 1986, 8, 14, 17; ibid., Pescador,
May 2, 1986, 39-41.

^[10]
Ibid., Aug. 18, 1986, 12-14.

^[11]
Ibid., id., 26-29.

^[12]
193 SCRA 303 (1991).

^[13]
People
vs. Abonada,
169 SCRA 530 (1989); People vs. Rabang, 187 SCRA 682 (1990); People vs.
Mañago, 191 SCRA 552 (1990).

^[14]
People
vs. Eclarinal, 182 SCRA 106 (1990).

^[15]
People vs. Solis, et al., 182 SCRA 182 (1990).

^[16]
People vs. Francisco, et al., 182 SCRA 305 (1990).

^[17]
TSN, December 5, 1988, 12.

^[18]
Ibid., id., 29.

^[19]
Ibid., September 12, 1968, 49.

^[20]
Original Record, 659-660.

^[21]
Brief for Appellants, 9; Rollo, 65.

^[22]
TSN, May 2, 1988, 28.

^[23]
People vs. Songcuan, et al., 176 SCRA 354 (1989).

^[24]
People vs. Hangdaan, et al., 201 SCRA 568 (1991).

^[25]
24
SCRA 798 (1968). See also People vs.
Marquez, et al., 30 SCRA 442 (1969); People vs. Cruz, 133 SCRA 426
(1984).

^[26]
Original
Record, 662.

^[27]
See
People vs. Perez, 175 SCRA 203 (1989); People vs. Alegado,
201 SCRA 37 (1991).