RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION         AND  ELEANOR BARREDO, RESPONDENTS.

The petitioner, Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI, for brevity), seeks to reverse: (1) the decision of the Fourth Division, National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC, for brevity) in NLRC-RAB-VI­-06-04-50060-88 dated January 24,
1991 which affirmed with modification the decision of Labor Arbiter Danilo C.
Acosta; and (2) the resolution dated March 14, 1991 denying RCPI’s motion for
reconsideration of said decision.

RCPI is a firm engaged in telecommunications business. Since July 19, 1979 the private respondent,
Eleanor D. Barredo, had been employed as Accounting Clerk at the RCPI branch
office in Roxas City since July 19, 1979. In June 1983, she was extended a permanent appointment.

On July 27, 1987, private
respondent applied for sick leave of absence duly supported by a medical
certificate. Having been advised by her
attending physician to rest for
a period of from four to five months, she requested an extension of her sick
leave of absence on October 26, 1987.

On December 12, 1987, she
received a letter from Reynaldo Alovera, Net Control Manager of RCPI,
instructing her to report for duty. In
reply, she explained that she could not as yet report for duty because her
physician found her not yet fit to resume working.

RCPI reiterated its order
requiring her to report for work. When
she failed to comply, her employment was terminated on February 11, 1988.

In its position paper,
RCPI claimed that Barredo’s dismissal was for a valid cause. Since the two (2) medical certificates
submitted by her in support of her application for sick leave appeared to have
been written by two (2) different persons, the petitioner required her to
report for work to enable the company physician to check and examine her. Furthermore, the company physician who was
consulted regarding Barredo’s alleged ailment opined that the latter’s
“length of absence due to allergic dermatitis is not in any medical
knowledge compatible (sic)” (p.112, Rollo).

Petitioner gave Barredo
three (3) chances to report and submit herself for medical examination, but she
did not comply. Her conduct was
considered by petitioner “reprehensible and constitute serious misconduct
and/or willful disobedience to lawful orders of her superior as will warrant
her termination.” (p. 113, Rollo.)

On Jannuary 15, 1990,
Labor Arbiter Danilo C. Acosta rendered a Decision finding private respondent’s
dismissal illegal and held as follows:

“Respondent advances the view that the complainant was given
three (3) chances to report and submit herself for physical examination by the
respondent’s physician but complainant refused to obey the lawful orders of her
superior. This allegation of the
respondent could not be given much weight for evidently, the two orders of the
respondent are inconsistent for how could an employee report back to work only
to be subjected to another physical examination.

“In the matter of the medical examination of the complainant
respondent should have required complainant to submit herself for examination before a competent public health
physician and not before the Company’s physician whose findings maybe tainted
with certain bias and prejudice. The
complainant, in this regard, had also been remiss but we certainly cannot fault
her for she may not be aware of the legal implication. Because of the foregoing, the
complainant could not have been guilty of insubordination.

“It would then seem inconceivable that an employee would fake
illness in order not to report for work only later on to demand reinstatement
from her employer. In view of the
foregoing and in order to give meaning to the constitutional and legal
provisions on security of tenure of workers, this office finds the dismissal of
the herein complainant as illegal.

x x x                          x x x                             x
x x

“WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant
the amount of P49,834.85 representing her backwages and 13th month pay as of
January 15, 1990 the date of this decision and pursuant to the implementing
rules and regulations of Republic Act 6715, to immediately reinstate the complainant
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to her dismissal.”
(pp. 85-86, Rollo.)

RCPI appealed to the NLRC arguing that the dismissal of Barredo
should be sustained on the ground of illness which incapacitated her for a
period of more than six (6) months. It
questioned the award of backwages and 13th month pay as unjust and unfair
because Barredo who was absent due to illness did not render any work.

In its Decision promulgated on January 24, 1991, public
respondent affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In sustaining the Labor Arbiter’s finding of
illegal dismissal, public respondent rationalized as follows:

“Since this appeal raises only the issue of whether or not
disease as a ground for termination under Article 284 of the Labor Code is
applicable in this case, we shall confine our disposition of this appeal on
this point.

“At the outset, we cannot understand why respondent seek to
justify the dismissal of the com­plainant [Barredo] under Article 284 when the
notice of dismissal they sent to complainant does not even mention disease as
one of the grounds for dismissal. The
validity of the dismissal of complainant must be determined on the basis of the
grounds relied upon by respondent in the notice of dismissal. In view of this fact any discussion on the
applicability of Article 284 is pointless and irrelevant to the case at bar.

“Moreover, the decision appealed from did not even mention
Article 284; and rightly so, because this was never an issue in the sense that
it was not among the ground for dismissal.

“Respondents should know that we do not deal with hypothetical
cases. It is immaterial and irrelevant
that respondents could have used Article 284 to terminate the employment of
complainant. The fact is that they did
not dismiss complainant on this ground. Thus, there is no point in defending their actions on this ground.

“As to the award for backwages and 13th month pay, the
computation is even favorable to respondents because the same as (sic) limited
to the period from April 12, 1988 to January 15, 1990 when the proper
limitation should be that the same shall not exceed three (3) years. However, since the complainant did not
appeal said award, we shall simply sustain the same. Besides, complainant also had shortcomings in this case.

“As to the feasibility of reinstatement, the Labor Arbiter is
directed to determine the feasibility thereof. If in his determination, supervening circumstances have rendered the
same impractical or the same is no longer feasible then in lieu thereof the
appropriate separation pay, in addition to backwages, in an amount equivalent
to one (1) month’s pay for every year of service shall be paid to the
complainant. In the computation of the
length of service for purposes of separation pay, an additional three (3) years counted from the date of
dismissal shall be considered. In this
case, however, we shall limit the length of
service to eight (8) years.

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that in the event
reinstatement is no longer feasible or has become impractical as determined by
the Labor Arbiter, in lieu thereof, and in addition to the award of backwages,
respondent shall pay the separation pay of complainant in an amount equivalent
to one (1) month’s pay for every year of service for eight (8) years as
hereinbefore discussed.” (pp. 20-23, Rollo.)

A motion for reconsideration was filed which was likewise denied
as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this motion for
reconsideration is hereby denied.

“No further motion for reconsideration
shall be entertained.” (p. 26, Rollo.)

In this petition for certiorari, RCPI contends that
respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in ordering it to “reinstate (with backwages) private
respondent [BARREDO] when the latter clearly disobeyed lawful orders to report
to the office for physical examination and committed an act of insubordination
when she re­fused to report despite three [3] notices.” (p. 5, Petition)

The petition is without merit.

The resolution of the instant case hinges on the determination of
whether or not the RCPI had complied with the procedural requirements before it
dismissed private respondent Barredo.

The pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code mandate, to wit:

Sec. 1. Security of tenure and due
process. No worker shall be
dismissed except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after
due process.

Sec. 2. Notice of dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice
stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice
shall be served at the worker’s last known address.

Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations stated
against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt
of such notice. The employer
shall afford the worker ample opportunity
to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of his representative,
if he so desires.

Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a
worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons
therefor. (Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code; Empha­sis Supplied.)

These guidelines mandate that the employer should send the
employee two (2) written notices of dismissal before a termination of
employment can be legally ef­fected. These are: (1) the notice which
apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought, and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee
of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. (National Service Corporation vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122).

In the case at bar, RCPI did not comply with the above-stated
guidelines in effecting Barredo’s dismiss­al. Barredo was never apprised nor given the chance to explain the charges
filed against her. The three (3)
notices sent to Barredo to report for work and submit herself for physical
examination by RCPI’s physician did not constitute “in itself opportunity
to be heard.” (p. 120, Rollo).

And as the Solicitor
General noted:

“Furthermore, it is important to point out that for the first time on appeal, petitioner
sought to justify the dismissal of private respondent on the ground of illness
under Art. 284 of the Labor Code. However, it is to be noted that the notice of dismissal is bereft of any
indication that private respondent was being terminated on that ground. As a result, public respondent was
constrained to consider discussion on the applicability of Art. 284 as
‘pointless and irrelevant to the case at bar.’ ” (p. 121, Rollo).

While the court recognizes the employer’s prerogatives to instill
discipline in his employees and to impose reasonable penalties, including
dismissal, on erring employees pursuant to company rules and regulations (Soco
vs. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, 148 SCRA 526), it should be emphasized
that due process must be observed in effecting an employee’s dismissal because
the dismissal of an employee affects not only his position but also his means
of livelihood and his dependents’ sustenance. Thus, strict adherence to the requirements set forth in the Labor Code,
as amended, is essential.

No grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the NLRC for
holding that Barredo was illegally termi­nated and ordering her reinstatement,
or in lieu there­of, the payment of separation pay, in addition to the award of
backwages.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated January 24, 1991 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Bellosillo, and
Quiason, JJ., concur.