G.R. No. 90640. March 29, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BONIFACIO BARROS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
FELICIANO, J.:
Bonifacio Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of R.A. No.
6425, as amended (known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), in an information
which read as follows:
“That on or about September 6, 1987, from Chackchakan, Bontoc,
Mountain Province, to Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while being a
passenger in a Dangwa Bus with Plate No. ABZ 242, destined for Baguio City,
without lawful authority did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously carry with him as part of his baggage and transport about four (4)
kilos of dried marijuana which the accused intended for distribution and sale
at Baguio City, knowing fully well that said marijuana is a prohibited drug or
[a] source of [a] prohibited drug.
Contrary to law.”[1]
After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of
violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 as amended and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua[2] and
to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
Barros now appeals from the judgment of conviction and essentially
asks this Court to determine -?
“Whether the [trial] court deprived [the] accused of his right
to due process by:
(1) ignoring manifest
absence of the mandatory warrant in the arrest and search of the accused;
(2) admitting confessions extracted from the
accused after two hours of interrogation conducted by four (4) soldiers one after the other under
intimidating circumstances; and
(3) misappreciation of
facts.”[3]
The relevant facts as found
by the trial court and as set forth in the court’s decision are as follows:
“That on September 6, 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt.
James Ayan, both members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa
Bus bearing Plate No. ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain
Province, the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were
seated at the back, saw accused carrying a carton, board the bus and seated
himself on seat No. 18 after putting the carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued and upon
reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being
their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat
No. 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the
carton, he found out that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers
[who] the owner of the carton [was] but nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the
carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C Bongyao invited the herein accused to the
detachment for questioning as accused was the suspected owner of the carton
containing marijuana. As both P.C.
officers Yag-as and Ayan saw accused, Bonifacio Barros carrying that same
carton when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan. That upon entering the detachment the carton was opened in the presence of
accused and accused Bonifacio Barros was asked if he owned the carton of
marijuana and accused denied [this]. That when accused denied ownership of the carton of marijuana, the P.C.
officers called for the bus conductor who pinpointed to Bonifacio Barros as the
owner of the carton of marijuana. That
during the oral investigation of accused, he finally admitted ownership of the
carton (Exhibit ‘B’) containing [four] 4 paper-wrapped packages of dried
marijuana. (Exhibits ‘B-1, ‘B-2,’ ‘B-3’
and ‘B-4’).
x x x [A]fter he was orally investigated, [the accused] was brought
to the Abatan General Hospital, Bauko, Mountain Province, for physical
examination and a Medico Legal Certificate was issued (Exhibits ‘F’ and ‘F-1’),
indicating that accused suffered no physical injuries and that accused was
probably under the influence of marijuana. That Dra. Danna Aleta inquired from accused Bonifacio Barros if he
smoked marijuana and accused admitted having smoked marijuana. That after accused was medically examined, he
was escorted by three members of the P.C. to the P.C. detachment at Tadian,
Mountain Province, where the carton of marijuana (Exhibit ‘B’) was also
brought. That at Tadian, a seizure
receipt was made together with a certification (Exhibit ‘C’) pointing out the
fact that approximately 4 kilos of
dried marijuana leaves were from accused Bonifacio Barros and which
certification was signed by the accused (Exhibit ‘C-1’) and subscribed before
Judge Romualdo P. Awisan (Exhibit ‘C-2’). That in connection with the confiscation of the marijuana subject of the
instant case and the apprehension of accused Bonifacio Barros, the P.C.
officers who figured in this case namely M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C
Bongyao have correspondingly executed their sworn statements (Exhibits ‘A,’
‘A-1, ‘A-2, ‘D,’ ‘D-1’ and ‘D-2’).
x x x [S]amples of the marijuana were taken from each of the four
packages marked Exhibits ‘B-1,’ ‘B-2,’ ‘B-3’ and ‘B-4’ and placed in four
separate envelopes, following an order of the court to that effect and were
hand-carried by Police Officer Jack Masilian to Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for laboratory test. That Capt.
Carlos Figueroa, the Forensic Expert conducted two kinds of test on the four
samples sent by the court and found them to be positive of marijuana as per his
report No. D-011-88. (Exhibits ‘I’ and
‘I-1’).”[4]
The defense of the accused on the facts consisted of a simple
denial of the ownership or possession of the carton box containing the four (4)
kilos of marijuana. The trial court
summarized the story of the accused in the following manner:
“That accused Bonifacio Barros since 1984 was employed at the
Honeymoon Disco Pad, Baguio City. That
on September 5, 1987, accused was sent by his Manager, Engineer Arsenio
Cuanguey to Bontoc, Mountain Province, to get their records from one Billy
Cuanguey at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province. That upon arriving at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province,
accused looked for the residence of Billy Cuanguey and he was pointed to a
house where someone was tending a store. That accused asked the man if Billy Cuanguey was there and the man
answered that he did not know where Billy went. So accused asked the man if Billy left [in] his room the tapes
and records and the man said he did not know. Thereafter, accused asked the man to stay over night in that house where
Billy was staying as it was the instruction of his manager. That the following day, September 6, 1987,
after taking breakfast, accused, was going back to Baguio. On that morning of September 6, 1987,
accused Bonifacio Barros boarded the Dangwa Bus at Chackchakan, Bontoc,
Mountain Province bound for Baguio City. That when the Dangwa Bus reached the P.C. Checkpoint, soldiers went
inside the bus and checked the baggages. That a soldier fished out a carton under the seat of [the] accused and
shouted who owns the carton but nobody answered. Thereafter, the soldier went down with the carton and moments
later returned to the bus and called accused Bonifacio Barros to alight from
the bus. That Mr. Barros was surprised
why he was ordered to alight and accused took his baggage which consisted of a pasiking
and went down the bus. That accused was
led by the soldiers to a house where his pasiking was taken and his
clothes removed and his wallet taken. Accused was made to accept ownership of the carton of marijuana but he
refused.
x x x [A]t 11:00 o’clock that same day, September 6, 1987, three
soldiers escorted accused to the hospital and from the hospital, they proceeded
to the Municipality of Tadian, Mountain Province. That upon reaching Tadian, accused was brought to the P.C. Camp
and there he saw someone typing. Later,
the soldiers allegedly presented to accused some papers which he was asked to
sign but accused refused. That accused
was threatened and if he refused to sign the papers that something will happen
to him. That moments later, accused was
threatened [by] a soldier [who] pointed a gun to him and told him to sign the
paper and because of fear, he had to sign the document marked Exhibit ‘C.’
Thereafter, the soldiers allegedly threatened again accused and asked him to
sign his name on the inside part of the cover of the carton of marijuana. Exhibit ‘X’ for the court and Exhibit ‘B-5’
for the prosecution. That after staying
at Tadian for one night, accused was brought back to Sabangan and later
transferred to the Bontoc Provincial Jail.”[5]
Turning to the legal defenses of the accused, we consider first
his allegation that the police authorities had impermissibly extracted confessions
from him after two (2) hours of interrogation, “under intimidating
circumstances,” by four (4) soldiers one after the other. The accused complains that he was not
informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, that he had not waived
his rights as an accused person, and that he had signed a confession
involuntarily and without the assistance of counsel. He essentially contends that the confession is inadmissible as
evidence against him.
We find, however, that it is not necessary to pass upon the above
contention of appellant Barros. For the
trial court in reaching its judgment of conviction had not taken into
consideration the statements which had been obtained from the appellant during
the interrogation conducted by the police officers. The trial court, so far
as can be determined from its decision, totally disregarded Exhibits
“C,” “E” and “B-5,” the alleged uncounselled
confessions. The trial court made very
clear the bases of its conclusion that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged; those bases did not include the alleged
confessions:
“First – M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan testified
that they saw the accused carrying the carton (Exhibit ‘B’) when he boarded the
bus at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province. That the bus conductor pointed to accused at the checkpoint of Sabangan,
Mountain Province. That accused is the
owner of the carton (Exhibit ‘B’). That
the carton (Exhibit ‘B’) which contained four packages of dried marijuana
leaves (Exhibits ‘B-1’, ‘B-2’, ‘B-3’ and ‘B-4’) was fished out from under the
seat of the accused which fact was admitted by the accused himself.
Second – That per testimony of Dra. Danna Aleta, she examined
accused Bonifacio Barros and that he suffered no physical injuries that would
show that the accused was in anyway maltreated by the police authorities, and
this fact was also admitted by accused to the effect that he was never harmed
by the police nor the soldiers. Dra.
Aleta also found that the accused was under the influence of drug[s] and that
the accused admitted [to] her that he, accused, smoked marijuana. This is clear evidence that accused is not
only a pusher of marijuana but also a user of said prohibited drugs. (See Exhibits ‘F’ and ‘F-1’ and TSN – Page
24 – Orpecio).
Third – The samples taken from Exhibits ‘B-1’, ‘B-2’, ‘B-3’ and
‘B-4’ sent by the court for laboratory test at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet were all positive of marijuana per Report No. D-011-88 (Exhibits ‘I’
and ‘I-1’) of Captain Carlos Figueroa, forensical expert.
Lastly, accused’s testimony in his own behalf does not impress the
court at it lacks the ring of truth. Besides, it is devoid of any corroboration. Our Supreme Court in this respect said:
‘The weak and uncorroborated denial of the accused cannot prevail
over the clear, positive and straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses
[sic].’ (People v. Acelajao, 148 SCRA 142).’ “[6]
We turn, therefore, to the second legal defense asserted by appellant
Barros — i.e., that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures had been violated by the police authorities. The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2
and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
“Sec. 2. The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness as he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
Sec. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this
or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.”
The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable” within
the meaning of the above quoted constitutional provision.[7] The
evidence secured thereby — i.e., the “fruits” of the search and
seizure — will be inadmissible in evidence “for any purpose in any
proceeding.”[8]
The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to
the carrying out of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in
our law, one of which relates to the search of moving vehicles.[9]
Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles — automobiles,
trucks, etc. — without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure
a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be
sought.[10]
In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace
officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither
really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the
examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection. In Valmonte v. De Villa[11],
the Court stated:
“[N]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not
to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds,7 or simply looks into a vehicle,8 or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.” (Citations omitted)
When, however, a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law-offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have
been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal
offense.[12]
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct
without a judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations
where (1) there had emanated from a package
the distinctive smell of marijuana;[13] (2) agents
of the Narcotics Command (“Narcom”) of the Philippine National Police
(“PNP”) had received a confidential report from informers that a
sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the
search was conducted;[14] (3)
Narcom agents were informed or “tipped off” by an undercover
“deep penetration” agent that prohibited drugs would be brought into
the country on a particular airline flight on a given date;[15] (4)
Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada,
Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom
agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his
waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers
when requested to do so;[16] and
(5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the
same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting
marijuana.[17]
In the case at bar, however, we have been unable to find in the
record of this case any circumstance which constituted or could have reasonably
constituted probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box
allegedly owned by appellant Barros. The carrying of such a box by appellant onto a passenger bus could not, by
itself, have convinced M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan
either that the appellant was a law violator or the contents of the box were
instruments or the subject matter or proceeds of some criminal offense. The carrying of carton boxes is a common
practice among our people, especially those coming from the rural areas since
such boxes constitute the most economical kind of luggage possible. The peace officers here involved had not
received any information or “tip-off” from an informer; no such a
“tip-off” was alleged by the police officers before or during the
trial. The police officers also did not
contend that they had detected the odor of dried marijuana, or appellant Barros
had acted suspiciously in the course of boarding the bus and taking a seat during
the trip to Sabangan, nor in the course of being asked whether he owned the
carton box later ascertained to contain four (4) kilos of marijuana. The testimony of the law enforcement
officers who had apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt.
James Ayan), and who had searched the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando
Bongyao), simply did not suggest or indicate the presence of any such probable
cause.
M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as testified as follows:
“Direct Examination by Fiscal
Moises Ayochok:
x x x x x x x x x
Q: On
September 6, 1987, do you recall if you reported for duty?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: And
where did you go on the morning of September
6, 1987?
A: I
went to Sabangan, sir.
Q: What
transportation did you use?
A: Dangwa
Bus with Plate No. ABZ-242.
Q: Where
did you board the Dangwa Bus?
A: At
the Dangwa Terminal at Bontoc.
Q: When you said you boarded the bus with Plate No. ABZ-242 which started
for Baguio City from Bontoc, Mountain Province, and while it stopped at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain
Province, was there anything that happened.
x x x x x x x x x
A: When the bus stopped at Sitio Chackchakan, we saw a person carrying a
baggage or carton and boarded the bus then took his seat, seat No. 18.
Q: What was he carrying that time Mr. witness?
A: A carton.
Q: And
where did he place that carton which he was carrying?
A: In
front of seat No. 18 where he sat.
Q: You
mean inside the bus?
A: Yes.
Q: And after this person boarded the bus at sitio Chackchakan and holding a
carton and placed it in front of seat No. 18, what happened to the bus afterwards?
A: It
proceeded to Sabangan.
Q: And
at Sabangan, Mountain Province, what happened, if any?
A: The
bus stopped for the routinary checkpoint and inspection.
Q: When
they [were at] the routinary checkpoint, what happened?
Atty. Sokoken:
He did not say routinary
checkpoint. He said routinary
inspection.
Fiscal Ayochok:
We substitute the word
inspection with checkpoint to satisfy the objection of counsel.
Q: What
happened when you stopped for the routinary inspection?
A: We
called C2C Bongyao a member of the
detachment to inspect the baggage of the
suspect and when C2C …
Atty. Sokoken:
We request that [the] witness
answers the question that he testifies [to] not in the narrative way.
Fiscal Ayochok:
He is answering the
question.
Court:
Let the witness finish.
A: When
Bongyao inspected the baggage of the suspect and he found out that it contained
MJ.
Q: What do you mean MJ?
A: Marijuana.
x x x x x x
x x x.”[18]
For his part, S/Sgt. James Ayan testified as follows:
“Direct Examination:
x x x x x x
x x x
Q: And in the morning of
September 6, 1987, do you recall where you were particularly in the afternoon?
A: In the morning of
September 6, 1987, we rode on a Dangwa bus [with Plate] No. ABZ-242 going to
Sabangan.
Q: You said we. Who was your companion that time?
A: Master Sgt. Yag-as, sir.
Q: And when this bus reached
Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, what did you see?
A: We saw a civilian board
the bus we were riding carrying a carton.
Q: And where did this
civilian who boarded the bus which you were riding on place that carton?
A: He placed the carton
under the seat of No. 18.
Q: Inside the bus, Mr.
witness?
A: Inside the bus, sir.
Q: And
what about the passenger who boarded the bus carrying the carton baggage, where
did he go?
A: He
sat facing the seat No. 18.
Q: Between
seat No. 18 and the seat seated by the civilian who brought the carton, where
was the carton exactly located?
A: As
far as I know, sir, it was located just beneath seat No. 18.
Q: When
this bus which you rode on which the passenger carrying the carton luggage you
saw reached Sabangan what happened there?
A: When
the bus reached Sabangan that we were riding, it was stopped for routinary
inspection.
Q: What
happened next?
A: We
called C2C Bongyao to inspect the baggage that we have just seen at
Chackchakan.
Q: Did he inspect the baggage?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: And
what was the contents of that baggage if there was any?
A: It
turned out that the contents of the baggage was MJ sir.
Q: You
mean marijuana?
A: Yes,
sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Cross Examination:
x x x x x x x x x
Q: You stated that on
September 6, 1987, a Dangwa bus stopped at Sabangan, Mt. Province for purposes
of military check-up, is that correct?
A: Routinary inspection,
sir.
Q: But it was not you who
entered the Dangwa bus for routinary check-up?
A: We were there riding in
the bus, sir, and we called C2C Bongyao to come.
Q: So your purpose in
riding inside the Dangwa bus was actually to see that person carrying this
carton which is marked Exhibit ‘B’?
A: No, sir, because I am a
detachment commander at Sabangan and that is why I called one of my men, sir.
Q: So that you have full
knowledge that from Chackchakan, Bontoc, going to Sabangan, there is already
marijuana being carried inside that bus?
A: That is only our suspect [should be suspicion], sir.
Q: Would you please tell
this Honorable Court why you have not inspected it when you arrived at Alab?
Why have you waited to reach Sabangan to inspect it?
A: Because
it is the checkpoint, sir, at Nacagang, Sabangan.
Q: Are
you now admitting that you do not have authority to inspect the baggage here in
Bontoc?
A: We
just wanted it checked in Sabangan, sir.
Q: Could
you give us a very special reason why you have to wait in Sabangan?
A: Because
we are stationed in Sabangan and that is the checkpoint.
Fiscal Ayochok:
Why argue with the
witness? It is up for them to check it
at the proper checkpoint.
Court:
Sustained.
x x x x x x x x x.”[19]
The testimony of C2C Fernando Bongyao is much briefer, but
equally uninformative:
“Direct Examination:
Q: On
September 6, 1987, at around 9:30 a.m., do you recall having reported for duty
at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: And
while you were on duty at Nacagang, Sabangan, was there anything unusual that
happened that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What
was that Mr. witness?
A: When
we were on the checkpoint, the bus stopped bearing Plate No. ABZ-242.
Q: When
the bus stopped, what did you do?
A: While on my way to check the bus,
Master Sergeant Yag-as and Ayan called for me, sir, and they told me that a carton was placed under seat No.
18, sir.
Q: And
when you were told to inspect that carton under Seat No. 18, did you inspect
that carton?
A: I
inspected it, sir.
Q: You
said you inspected that carton, what did you do in inspecting that carton?
A: I
inserted my hand inside and when I removed my hand, it was a stuff of
marijuana, sir.
x x x x x x x x x.[20]
So far as the record itself is concerned, therefore, it would
appear that there existed no circumstance which might reasonably have excited
the suspicion of the two (2) police officers riding in the same bus as
appellant Barros. They asked the police
officers at the checkpoint at Sabangan to inspect the box allegedly carried by
appellant Barros apparently on a mere guess that appellant Barros might be
carrying something in the nature of contraband goods. There was, in other words, nothing to show that appellant Barros
was then in the process of “actually committing” or “attempting
to commit” a crime.[21]
There was, moreover, nothing on the record that could have reasonably led the
two (2) police officers to believe that “an offense [had] in fact just
been committed” when appellant Barros boarded the bus at Chakchakan or
when he was asked whether he owned the box here involved at the checkpoint in
Sabangan. The two (2) police officers, according to the record, had
no “personable knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested (appellant Barros) had committed it.” There was, in brief, no
basis for a valid warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was equally
non-permissible and invalid.[22] The
“fruits” of the invalid search and seizure — i.e., the four (4)
kilos of marijuana — should therefore not have been admitted in evidence
against appellant Barros.
The Solicitor General, however, contends that appellant Barros
had waived any irregularities which may have attended his arrest. Presumably, the Solicitor General also
argues that appellant Barros has waived the non-admissibility of the carton
(Exhibit “B”) which contained
four (4) packages of dried marijuana leaves (Exhibits “B-1,”
“B-2,” “B-3” and “B-4”). The Solicitor General said:
“x x x [E]ven assuming in gratia argumenti that irregularities attended the arrest of
appellant, still the same cannot be questioned at this late stage. Well-settled is the doctrine laid down in
the case of Callanta v. Villanueva (77 SCRA 377), and later reiterated in the more recent case of Bagcal
v. Villaraza (120 SCRA 525), that ‘posting of [a] bail bond constitutes waiver
of any irregularity attending the arrest of a person and estops him from
questioning its validity.’ Here, appellant had in fact posted the required bail
to obtain his provisional liberty, albeit his application was subsequently
denied (see TSN, Feb. 10, 1988, p.65). Consistent with jurisprudence, therefore, he should be deemed to have
waived any irregularity attending his arrest, if any there be, and cannot now
be heard to assail the same.”[23]
It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence
secured through an invalid warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and
seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified
warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest
may be waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so
as to estop an accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of
his detention or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, that waiver of
the latter (by, e.g., applying for and posting of bail) necessarily
constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former — an argument that the
Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the “fruits” of an
invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not
casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches
and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had
expressly objected on constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box
and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally offered in
evidence by the prosecution.[24] We
consider that appellant’s objection to the admission of such evidence was made
clearly and seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive
his rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred from his conduct
before or during the trial.
In the dissenting opinion, my learned brother Melo, J.
takes the view that appellant Barros had waived his rights by his “stoic deportment”
consisting of failure to object to the search by the police authorities
immediately after the opening of the carton box:
“x x x. In point of
fact, when the police authorities inspected the carton of marijuana and asked
accused-appellant who owned the box, accused-appellant denied ownership of the
box or carton and failed to even mutter the least bit of protest (p. 3,
Decision). His demeanor should
therefore be construed as implicit acquiescence to the search inasmuch as the
objection thereto is vulnerable to express or implied waiver (People v. Kaqui
Malasuqui (63 Phil. 221 [1936]); 1 Bernas, Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines, First ed., 1987, p. 108). x x x.”[25]
It is submitted, with respect, that Kaqui
Malasugui is not applicable to the case at bar; rather it is People
v. Burgos,[26]
promulgated fifty (50) years after Kagui Malasugui, that is
applicable. In Burgos, this
Court ruled that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful
search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest “simply because
he failed to object” —
“x x x. To constitute
a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a
right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object
to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search
therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia
v. Locsin (supra):
‘x x x x x x x x x
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force,
or waiving his constitutional rights;
but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not
a consent or an invitation thereto, but
is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law.’ (Citation omitted).
We apply the rule that: ‘courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that
we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’
(Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458).”[27]
(Underscoring supplied)
Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the instant case,
because there the Court explicitly found that there was probable cause for
the warrantless arrest of the accused and therefore, the warrantless
search effected immediately thereafter was equally lawful. In Kagui Malasugui, a Chinese
merchant was found lying on the ground with several nasty wounds in the head;
one resulted in skull fracture and proved fatal. He died in the hospital to which he had been immediately brought
by a policeman. Mr. Malasugui became a
suspect because when the victim was found, still alive, and upon being asked
who had attacked him, laconically answered, “Kagui.” On the same day,
the accused Kagui Malasugui was arrested and a search of his person was
conducted without objection from the accused. Before the body search of the accused was carried out, the accused
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities a couple of bracelets
belonging to the deceased victim and when asked if he had anything else to
surrender, he, in a trembling voice, answered in the negative. The police thereupon conducted a body search
of the accused, without any objection from him; the search resulted in the
production of additional personal effects belonging to the deceased
victim. Under these circumstances, the
Court ruled that:
“When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have
it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from complaining later
thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly.”
A propos my distinguished brother Melo, J.’s
suggestion that the right against an unlawful warrantless search or arrest is
personal and may not be invoked by the accused’s counsel during trial, it is
relevant to note that the law (the Rules of Court) specifies the proper time
when objections to admission of evidence must be raised and that in the case at
bar, a timely objection was made by appellant Barros. Finally, the accused’s silence during the warrantless search
should not be lightly taken as consent to that search, but rather construed as
explained by the Court in Burgos,[28] and
as pointed out by Mr. Justice Laurel, a “demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law.”
It is, of course, possible that appellant Barros may in fact have
been guilty of transporting the four (4) kilos of marijuana. His guilt must, however, be established by
constitutional means. The non-admissibility
of evidence secured through a disregard of the constitutional right of the accused
against unreasonable searches and seizures is the sanction imposed by the
Constitution for disregard of such right; the sanction is a powerful one, for
it renders inutile the work done by the police officers, by the prosecutor and
by the trial court. It is a sanction
which this Court has no choice but to apply in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Bontoc, Mountain Province, in Criminal Case
No. 687 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime charged, the evidence lawfully before the trial court not being
sufficient to establish his guilt thereof beyond reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Romero, and
Vitug, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., see dissent.
[1]
Rollo, p. 8.
[2]
The penalty properly imposable under R.A. No. 6425, as amended, was life
imprisonment and not reclusion perpetua; juridically, the former
is different from the latter.
[3]
Appellant’s Brief, Rollo, pp. 37-48 at 41.
[4]
Trial Court Decision, Records, pp. 207-208.
[5]
Id., pp. 209-210.
[6]
Records, p. 210.
[7]
Pita v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 362 (1989).
[8]
People v. Zapanta, 195 SCRA 200 (1991);
People v. Dendana, 190 SCRA 538
(1990); People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (1988).
[9]
People v. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63 (1992); People v. Rodriguez, 205
SCRA 791 (1992); People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991); Manipon v.
Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 (1986).
[10]
People v. Bagista, supra; People v. Lo Ho Wing, supra.
[11]
178 SCRA 211 (1989).
[12]
People v. Bagista, supra; Valmonte v. de Villa, 185 SCRA 665 (1990).
[13]
People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA
646 (1988).
[14]
People v. Maspil, 188 SCRA 751
(1990).
[15]
People v. Lo Ho Wing, supra.
[16]
People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991).
[17]
People v. Bagista, supra,
[18]
TSN, 10 February 1988, pp. 43-46.
[19]
TSN, 26 January 1988, pp. 3-13.
[20]
Id., pp. 19-20.
[21]
Section 5 [a], Rule 113, Rules of Court.
[22]
Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
[23]
Appellee’s Brief, Rollo, pp.
62-67.
[24]
Records, p. 191; See Interpacific
Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990) citing People v.
Teodoro 98 Phil. 569 (1956); People v. Santito, 201 SCRA 87 (1991);
People v. Sayat, G.R. Nos. 102773-77, 9 June 1993 where the Court ruled that objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is
formally offered as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time, i.e., when documents are merely being
marked or identified, is premature.
See also Section 36
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
[25]
Dissenting Opinion of Melo, J.,
p. 2.
[26]
144 SCRA 1 (1986).
[27]
144 SCRA at 16.
[28]
144 SCRA at 16, citing Pasion Vda. de
Garcia, 65 Phil. 689 (1938).