PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ERLINDA BACLAYON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

In the evening of 19 May 1992, the accused was arrested during an
alleged buy-bust operation in her house in sitio Bato, barangay Ermita, Cebu
City, by the members of the Anti-Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section
(ANDDRUS) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Cebu City assigned to the
Fuente Osmeña Police Station.

In an information filed under Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court by Prosperidad L. Latorena, State Prosecutor II, detailed with the City
Prosecutor of Cebu City, the accused was charged with the violation of Section
15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended,
committed as follows:

“That on or about the 19th day of May, 1992, at about 7:30
o’clock P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and
there sell, deliver and give away one (1) deck of ‘Shabu’ powder which contains
a methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, to a person who posted
himself as buyer, without authority of law.”^[1]

which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-25835 and raffled to Branch 8 of the said
court. No bail was recommended for her
temporary liberty.

She entered a plea of not
guilty upon her arraignment on 6 July 1992.^[2] The trial commenced in due course.

The prosecution presented
as its witnesses, Eduardo Hipolito and Gualberto Gabales of the ANDDRUS-PNP,
and Myrna P. Ariola of the Chemistry and Crime Laboratory Section of the PNP
Crime Laboratory Service in Cebu City.

The accused and her
14-year-old daughter, Lissette Baclayon, testified for the defense.

On 18 December 1992, the
trial court promulgated its decision^[3] finding the accused guilty as charged and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 and the costs.

The facts established by
the evidence for the prosecution are succinctly summarized in the Appellee’s
Brief in this wise:

“At about 7:30 o’clock in the evening of May 19, 1992, Police
Officers Eduardo Hipolito, Gualberto Gabarles [Gabales] and others, led by
Inspector Wendell M. Tanza, all of the Anti-Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Section of PNP Cebu City, were at the back of Carbon Market in sitio Bato, Cebu
City to conduct a ‘buy-bust’ operation against a certain Mommy Baclayon, who
turned out later to be appellant, in response to an earlier information
provided by an anonymous caller that she is engaged in the sale of shabu. Pretending to be a buyer, Officer Eduardo
Hipolito approached appellant, then in her house, who asked if he wanted to buy
shabu. In reply, he gave her a marked
P100.00 bill (Exh. “A”). Thereafter, she went upstairs and shortly returned, giving him a deck of
shabu (Exh. “C-1”). Immediately, he touched his head, signaling his companions, who rushed
to the house (TSN, July 21, 1992, pp. 3-5). After frisking her, Officer Gualberto Gabarles [Gabales] recovered the
marked money and another deck of shabu (Exh. “C-2”) (TSN, July 22,
1992, p. 6).

Subsequently, the two (2) decks of suspected shabu were turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. After examination, OIC Myrna P. Ariola of the Chemistry and Crime
Laboratory Section submitted her report (Exh. “B”), with a finding
that the suspected shabu ‘gave positive result for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug’ (Exh. “B-1″, TSN,
July 22, 1992, p. 3).”^[4]

The defense presented another version of the incident. According to the accused, she is a widow of a former member of the Philippine
Constabulary. She receives a monthly pension of P1,200.00 and is
engaged in the handicrafts business from which she earns a monthly income of
more than P2,000.00. Her three
dependent children live with her at their residence in Bato, Carbon, Cebu
City. In the evening of 19 May 1992,
while she was having a visitor, Philip Infanta, who is a tourist guide and who
had come to inform her of the approval of her application to export native
products, somebody with a bicycle and who looked pale went inside her
house. Then three other persons, one of
whom she came to know later as Gualberto Gabales, a policeman, also
entered. Gabales went to her and got a pack of blue seal Champion
cigarettes containing 19 sticks from her pocket. He informed her that he has a warrant of arrest against the
person who had entered her house — she learned later at the police station
that the person to be arrested was a certain Nido who was, however, released
later. After he got the cigarettes,
Gabales and his companions searched the house and even lifted her bed
repeatedly. She was arrested and
brought to the police station. While
there, she heard a person typing something asking for marked money, and someone
then handed him money saying that it could be used as the marked money. She claimed that Hipolito was not among the
companions of Gabales; that she saw Hipolito for the first time at the police
station; and that it is not true that there was a standing warrant of arrest
against her. Finally she declared that
there are many persons known as Mommy.^[5] Her
14-year-old daughter, Lissette, corroborated her testimony on the search of the
house.^[6]

The trial court accepted the version of the prosecution and
brushed aside the story of the accused.

Insisting on her innocence, the accused filed her Notice of
Appeal on 22 December 1992.^[7]

In the Brief for the Appellant, the accused ascribes to the trial
court the commission of the following errors: (a) in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses;
(b) in disregarding the testimonies for the defense; and (c)
in convicting her without establishing proof beyond reasonable doubt. In amplification thereof, she contends that
the testimonies of Hipolito and Gabales do not merit belief. Both never knew her until the alleged
buy-bust operation. Her name cropped up
only in a tip relayed to the police that same day. The said policemen never knew her exact residence, yet they
testified that when they reached the locality they were able to go straight to
her residence and entrap her. She
claims that she was a victim of a frame-up as a result of a saturation drive
undertaken by the police to rid sitio Bato of drug pushers, that the pieces of
evidence supposedly recovered were merely planted, and that Hipolito was never
a member of the raiding team much less the alleged poseur-buyer whose name
never appeared as a witness in the information filed against her. The fact that she did not protest or
interfere with the search indicates that she hid nothing illegal in her
residence. There was no reason for her
to be a drug peddler since her pension and income from her business are enough
to support her family and there is no evidence that she indulged in luxurious
living. Finally, the prosecution failed
to rebut her testimony that there was an unidentified man who barged into her
residence and who was pursued by the police, and that the police considered
everybody in sitio Bato a drug pusher.

In the Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor
General prays for the affirmance of the challenged decision mainly because the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were consistent with one another and
there was no proof that they had any improper motive in testifying against the
accused.

The paramount issue then in this case is the credibility of the
witnesses. When the issue is one of
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the
findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it
has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.^[8]

After a careful review of the records of this case and a thorough
evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties, we find certain facts of
substance which the trial court failed to consider and which create reasonable
doubt in our minds on the culpability of
the accused.

The format of the
challenged decision immediately gives one the impression that the court a
quo gave primacy to the weakness of
the evidence for the accused. The trial
court first summarizes the evidence for the defense and meticulously probes
into its weakness, faulting it for its failure — to the “surprise”
of the court — to present as witness Philip Infanta and to prove improper
motive on the part of the police raiding team.^[9] The trial court concludes with what it
believes to be the established facts by summarizing the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, which it considers to be credible. While the format might be but a style of
writing, it might, nevertheless, likely mislead one to believe that the accused
has the burden of proving her innocence. This is, of course, not so because of the solemn mandate of the Constitution
that an accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In order to overcome this presumption,
nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the
prosecution. Save in certain
circumstances, as where the accused admits the commission of the imputed crime but
interposes justifying circumstances, that burden is never shifted to the
accused or diminished by the weakness of the defense. Unless the prosecution discharges that burden, the accused need
not even offer evidence in his behalf.^[10]

While it may be conceded
that the evidence for the accused in this case is weak, that of the prosecution
is, in our view, much weaker and its insufficiency to prove the guilt of the
accused is all too clear.

There is enough doubt on
whether there was, in fact, a buy-bust operation undertaken by the police
raiding team. In the first place, in
his cross-examination, the principal witness for the prosecution, Eduardo
Hipolito, disclosed that their office was then conducting a “saturation
drive”: persons who appeared to be
drug addicts were brought to their headquarters and were interrogated. In the course thereof, it received
information that one “Mommy” of sitio Bato, Carbon, Cebu City,
has been “peddling shabu.” Regrettably, however, Hipolito could not
even recall the name of the “informant,” justifying such inability by
saying that either there were many suspected users who were, nevertheless,
released, or he simply “forgot the name [and could not] mention a
particular person.”^[11] On the other hand, on direct examination,
prosecution witness Gualberto Gabales told the court that the information their
office received was that “a certain Mommy Baclayon is possessing
shabu.”^[12] There
is thus an inconsistency as to
what the alleged information was precisely all about, i.e., whether the
accused was “peddling” or “possessing” shabu. Needless to state, the identity of the
source of the said information is equally unclear for it allegedly came from
one of the suspected users whose name Hipolito either “did not know at all
or simply forgot.” Further muddling the situation, Gabales attempted to
supply the name of an informant by referring to a certain Bodong, whom he
described as “one of the drug pushers that we backed up.”^[13] Unfortunately, however, that is only a nickname, for he even forgot to ascertain the true name or, if he did, forgot the
true name altogether. Thus:

“Q    Were you able to ascertain the true name of
the person?

A     I
forgot.

Q    Did
you enter that in the blotter wherein that particular person Bodong have
knowledge regarding the alleged activity of the accused in this case.?

A     No,
sir.”^[14]

Both
law enforcers also admitted that they did not know the accused and have not
conducted any surveillance on her activities before the incident in question.^[15] Gabales even candidly admitted that
other than her age, no other particular description of the accused was
given. Thus:

“Q    There was no particular description of her
person whatsoever?

A     He
gave the description regarding the age.”^[16]

Under these circumstances, it is doubtful if indeed the office of
the ANDDRUS had enough basis to conclude that the accused is a drug
peddler. On the contrary, it is more
likely that it believed that she was merely keeping or possessing shabu because
there is unrebutted evidence that the members of the team searched the house
and even lifted her bed repeatedly.^[17]

In the second place, we find unconvincing the story about the
alleged marked money. Hipolito claimed
that the marked money^[18] was
given to him by his superior to be used in buying shabu.^[19]
Yet, the four-page direct examination of Hipolito^[20]
miserably failed to disclose where the marking was placed on the alleged
marked money. In short, the said
witness was not asked about the marking, which is usually made before a buy-bust
operation is undertaken, and did not even volunteer to indicate any marking
thereon as proof that the bill had earlier been marked. This is unusual. There can be no “marked money” unless a mark thereon
was placed to identify it as marked money. There is, as well, an
unexplained deviation from the standard procedure concerning the preparation of
the buy-bust money and the buy-bust operation itself, which involves some
surveillance for the law enforcers to determine the identity of the suspect and
to verify that the latter is engaged in the illegal sale or distribution of
dangerous drugs so as to ensure the success of the entrapment.

There is also the
revelation of Hipolito that the accused “was already placed in the passed
[sic] for surveillance by the police operatives of San Nicolas but not
arrested.”^[21] The team of Hipolito is composed of members
of the ANDDRUS of the Fuente Osmeña police station^[22] and not of the San Nicolas Police
Station. If indeed the policemen of the
San Nicolas Police Station had her placed under surveillance but did not arrest
her, then they must have found nothing against her for we are not prepared to
conclude that the ANDDRUS at the Fuente Osmeña Police Station had misgivings on
the conduct of the policemen at the San Nicolas Police Station.

While in the minds of the
members of the police raiding
team the accused may indeed be a drug pusher or peddler who must be dealt with
without mercy, that alone, even if it be conceded ex gratia to be true, is not
enough justification for any shortcut in law enforcement. Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz in
the recent case of Sanchez
vs. Demetriou,^[23] even if the accused were the most notorious
person in our country today, and alleged to be committing the most serious
offense, she is, nevertheless, entitled to the full and vigilant protection of
the Bill of Rights. It was eloquently
proclaimed more than a hundred years ago in Ex parte Milligan^[24]
that “the Constitution is a law
for rulers and for people equally in war and in peace and covers with the
shield of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all
circumstances.”

In the light of the above
circumstances surrounding the raid on the residence of the accused and her
arrest, grave doubts on her culpability exist. She must therefore be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, on the ground of reasonable doubt, the appealed decision of Branch 8 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CBU-25835 is REVERSED and accused-appellant ERLINDA BACLAYON is hereby ACQUITTED and her immediate
release from imprisonment is ordered, unless her further detention for some other lawful cause is warranted.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
OR, 1-2; Rollo, 1-2.

^[2]
OR, 18.

^[3]
Id., 47-53; Id., 10-16. Per Judge Bernardo Ll. Salas.

^[4]
Rollo, 62-63.

^[5]
TSN, 13 August 1992, 2-8.

^[6]
TSN, 19 August 1992, 2-6.

^[7]
OR, 55.

^[8]
People vs. Garcia, 209 SCRA 164 [1992]; People vs. Florida, 214
SCRA 227 [1992].

^[9]
OR, 51; Rollo, 14.

^[10]
People vs. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349 [1992].

^[11]
TSN, 21 July 1992, 8-9.

^[12]
TSN, 22 July 1992, 5.

^[13]
Id., 8.

^[14]
Id.

^[15]
TSN, 21 July 1992, 7-8; Id., 9.

^[16]
TSN, 22 July 1992, 9.

^[17]
TSN, 13 August 1992, 6.

^[18]
A P100.00 bill with serial number PG687013 and offered in evidence as Exhibit
“A.”

^[19]
TSN, 21 July 1992, 3.

^[20]
Id., 2-6.

^[21]
TSN, 21 July 1992, 7.

^[22]
OR, 2; Rollo, 4.

^[23]
G.R. Nos. 111771-77, 9 November 1993.

^[24]
4 Wall. 2 (1866), cited in Cayaga vs.
Tangonan, 66 SCRA 216, 219 [1975]; Go vs. Olivas, 74 SCRA 230, 237
[1976]; and Martin vs. Ver, 123 SCRA 745, 750 [1983].