PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JESUS DEUNIDA Y ENRIQUEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Following his arrest six months after the fatal shooting of Felipe
Ramos, Jr. in the evening of 31 December 1990, accused Jesus Deunida was
charged before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila with murder and illegal possession of firearms under P.D.
No. 1866 in two separate informations, dated 26 June 1991, which were docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 91-95987 and 91-95988, respectively,^[1] and
consolidated with and raffled to Branch 49 of the said court.

However, after a reinvestigation which the court ordered upon
motion^[2]
of the accused and for lack of the requisite prior preliminary investigation,
the prosecution, in a Manifestation filed on 18 September 1991,^[3]
moved for the withdrawal of the information for murder and the amendment of the
information for illegal possession of firearms on the ground stated in the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor^[4] that
the filing of two separate informations was erroneous since what the accused
had committed is only one offense, viz., the violation of the second
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 or “Qualified Illegal Possession
of Firearm.” The amended informations^[5]
attached to the manifestation bears the docket number for the case for murder, viz.,
Criminal Case No. 91-95987. However,
the body thereof is for violation of P.D. No. 1866, which is the offense
charged in Criminal Case No. 91-95988, and reads as follows:

“The undersigned accuses JESUS DEUNIDA Y ENRIQUEZ of violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:

‘That on or about December 31, 1990, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control the
following, to wit: one (1) caliber .38
revolver (Paltik) marked Smith and Wesson, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities, which
described firearm was used by the accused
in the commission of the crime of
homicide.'”

Although the original records transmitted to this Court by the
trial court do not show that the latter formally acted on the manifestation,
the challenged decision states that the withdrawal and amendment were both
granted.^[6]
From the certificate of arraignment,^[7] it
likewise appears that the accused was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 91-95987,
evidently on the amended information for illegal possession of firearms.^[8]

During the testimony of Dr. Marcial Cenido, the first witness for
the prosecution, the trial court discerned,^[9] and
the defense counsel confirmed,^[10] that
the theory of the accused was self-defense. The parties then stipulated that: (1) the amount of actual damages (funeral expenses) incurred by the
private complainant was P50,000.00;^[11] (2)
the gun used in the fatal shooting was the “paltik” .38 caliber revolver (“Exhibit
“P”) turned over by the accused to P/Cpl. Meneleo Renon after the
shooting, and the copper slug (Exhibit “E”) was the one recovered
from the body of the victim;^[12] and
(3) at the time the gun was fired, the accused had no license or permit to
possess the gun and the recovered live bullets (Exhibit “P-1”) as
certified to by the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National
Police (PNP).^[13]
The parties then agreed to have the “reverse trial” method to
expedite the disposition of the case and the prosecution marked and submitted
its evidence consisting of the post-mortem findings of Dr. Cenido, the human
sketch prepared by him, the certificate of death, the recovered slug, sworn
statements of Marlon Comia, Joel Baltazar, Cpl. Meneleo Renon, advance
information on the case, progress report, certification of the Firearms and
Explosives Unit, booking sheet and arrest report, the paltik revolver, and the bullets.^[14]
The defense then presented as its witnesses the accused himself and his two
friends, Aurelio Sta. Cruz and Agustin Arigore. The prosecution presented as rebuttal witnesses Mrs. Belen
Fortes, an eyewitness to the shooting, and P/Cpl. Meneleo Renon, an off-duty
traffic policeman who had placed the accused under arrest shortly after the
shooting. These witnesses are neighbors
of the accused. Thereafter, the defense
recalled the accused as a surrebuttal witness.

The inculpatory evidence adduced by the prosecution is faithfully
summarized by the appellee as follows:

“On December 31, 1990, New Year’s Eve, at about 10:30 o’clock
in the evening, Belen Fortes of 2347-A Amatista St., San Andres Bukid, Manila,
went to the store of her neighbor, accused Jesus Deunida, at 2323 Amatista St.,
San Andres Bukid, Manila (TSN, Nov. 13, 1991, p. 8), to buy some things in
preparation for the midnight celebration to welcome the New Year. As she approached the store, she saw ahead
of her Felipe Ramos, Jr. who was about two feet away to her left (TSN, Feb. 4,
1992, p. 8) also approaching the store. Ramos was about two feet away from the store and he addressed appellant
Deunida who was inside the store, ‘Hinahanap mo raw ako?’ (Ibid., pp. 2 and 4).

Despite the screen covering the front of the store, Fortes could
clearly see the face of appellant inside the store because the screen had an
opening of about 10 by 12 inches and the street light overhead illuminated the
store (Ibid., pp. 1-13). Fortes heard
appellant reply but could not make out the words after which she saw appellant
aim a gun at Ramos, the muzzle of the gun jutting through the opening in the
screen (Ibid., pp. 4-5, 13-14).

When Ramos saw the gun aimed at him, he turned around and was about
to run away when the gun fired hitting Ramos at the back and causing him to be
thrown to the other side of the street (Ibid., p. 5).

Appellant came out of his store, approached Ramos and again aimed
the gun at him. But neighbor pleaded
with appellant not to shoot again, shouting ‘Mang Jess, huwag, si Ato yan’
(Ibid., pp. 5-6).

Appellant relented and Ramos stood up to look for help. Fortes ran home to tell her husband what
happened and then returned to the scene and helped the other neighbors bring
Ramos to the Philippine General Hospital where he would expire later (page 5 of
the Amended Decision, as annexed
in the Appellant’s Brief).

The autopsy conducted by Dr. Marcial Cenido on January 1, 1991
revealed that Ramos suffered a gunshot entry wound in the back, specifically at
the left posterior thorax below the level of the armpit with a copper slug
found inside the body. According to Dr.
Cenido, the entry wound and slug are consistent with a handgun as the firearm
used in killing the victim (TSN, Nov. 5, 1991, pp. 10-11) and in the absence of
powder burns that the muzzle of the gun was about 24 inches from the body when
it fired. The trajectory of the bullet
is forward or from back to front, very slightly downward and slightly towards
the left lateral line penetrating the posterior thorax and left side
of the liver. He
concludes from the foregoing findings that the assailant was at the back of the
victim, that the position of the assailant was possibly standing and the victim
could have been seated. He also
explained that the abrasions in the right forearm could have been due to a fall
(TSN, Nov. 5, 1991, pp. 24, 17).

Appellant was placed under arrest by Cpl. Meneleo Renon who was at
home watching television when the incident happened. He was called to the scene right after the shooting by his
daughter and niece who called him; telling him ‘Papa, papa, si Mang Jess
binaril si Ato’ (TSN, Jan. 28, 1992, pp. 49-50).

Renon immediately went to the crime scene. He saw appellant holding a gun and about to
leave and he called appellant. Appellant handed to him the gun and said ‘Pasensiya na kayo nabaril ko
si Ato’ (Ibid., pp. 51-52, 54, 56). Renon opened the gun and discovered one (1) empty shell and four (4)
live bullets ( Ibid., p. 53).

Renon told appellant that he was under arrest and made him sit in
front of his house to wait for the policemen from homicide section (Ibid., p.
54).

While waiting for the policemen, appellant asked Renon if he could
go inside his house to drink water. Since appellant was his neighbor, Renon allowed him to enter his house
to drink (Ibid.).

When the policemen from the homicide section arrived, Renon called
appellant but discovered that the latter had escaped to the roof top by using a
long ladder (Ibid., p. 55).

Renon and the homicide operatives tried to locate the appellant at
a place called Texas Anakbayan where the appellant was known to have many
friends but they failed to find him (Ibid.).

Appellant was finally arrested on June 12, 1991 in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan.”^[15]

On the other hand, the accused denied both the possession of the
fatal gun and the responsibility for shooting the victim, and offered a
different version of the incident which he summed up in his brief, citing the
testimonies of Aurelio Sta. Cruz and Agustin Arigore:

“[A]t
about 11:00 o’clock in the evening of December 31, 1990, both of them
[Sta. Cruz and Arigore] went to the house of the Accused-Appellant to invite him
to join the celebration of their [barkada] in the house of Chairman Alfredo
Tan. While he was outside the store and
at the gate with his two (2) friends, the victim arrived, approached him,
saying ‘Mang Jess, babarilin mo raw ako,’ then poked a gun at him. It was
parried by the Accused-Appellant, but when it was poked again, the latter tried
to get it by grappling with the victim. It was at the [sic] point when Accused-Appellant was twisting the
victim’s arm with the gun, and the latter almost on his knees, that the gun
fired. The victim d[i]sengaged himself
by running to the other side of the street. He was pursued by Accused-Appellant, poked the gun at him but he was prevented
by his friends.

When Cpl. Meneleo (Pandong) Renon arrived, the Accused-Appellant
handed him the gun saying ‘Pandong, baril ito ni Ato, naagaw ko’ to which the
policeman responded, ‘Sige Jess, ako na ang bahala dito.’ With his two (2)
friends, they proceeded to the drinking party, stayed there overnight. When in the morning he was informed that Ato
died and that he was being hunted by the victim’s relatives, he went to his
in-laws in Bulacan, stayed there until his arrest.”^[16]

This version is of course not absolutely consistent with the accused’s
earlier stand that he acted in self-defense, which resulted in an agreement for
the holding of a “reverse trial” method. This prompted the trial court to remark that by the evidence he
offered in court, the accused:

“evolved an alternative defense, to
wit, (a) that at the time the gun, Exhibit ‘P,’ was fired, the first right
finger of the deceased was on the trigger and that the accused was merely
holding the handle of the gun and implied that it was not the Accused who shot
the deceased; and (b) assuming, gratia arguendo, that it was the Accused
who shot the deceased, while they were wrestling for the possession of the gun,
he did so only in self-defense.”^[17]

In its Decision^[18]
promulgated on 3 April 1992, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of “qualified violation of Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866” and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P50,000.00 by
way of actual damages and P50,00.00 by way of indemnity. It further ordered the confiscation in favor
of the government of the gun and the four live bullets and one empty cartridge
and directed the branch clerk of court to cause the delivery thereof to the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the PNP for
disposition in accordance with law upon the finality of the decision.

On 10 April 1992, the trial court amended its decision,^[19]
a copy of which was received by the accused’s counsel on 14 April 1992. The trial court rejected the accused’s claim
of self-defense in view of the “cogent facts and circumstances spread in
the records, not to mention the testimony of the [a]ccused himself, belying and
discrediting his claim.” It gave more credence to the prosecution
witnesses’ accounts of the incident and the medical findings and opinion of Dr.
Cenido, held that the accused’s flight after the incident as an indication of
guilt, and considered his statement to Cpl. Renon admitting the shooting as
part of the res gestae.

It also disregarded for lack of substantial basis the accused’s
allegations of bias and ill-motive against witnesses Mrs. Belen Fortes and Cpl.
Renon, ruling instead that the accused’s self-serving claim that the victim was
a “protege” or “bata” of Renon was belied by the
latter’s leniency and lack of vindictiveness towards the accused after the
shooting, such as allowing the accused to go inside his house to drink water
without being handcuffed, enabling him to escape.

The Court stated that Renon satisfactorily explained why he made
his sworn statement only on 22 June 1991; moreover, he had promptly reported
the incident to the Homicide Section, turned over the gun, the four live
bullets and the empty cartridge, and informed the police of the accused’s
escape. The Court explained that Fortes
did not report the incident to the police and give a sworn statement because
she helped bring the victim to the hospital and thereafter the accused’s
relatives brokered for an amicable settlement of the case which would render
her sworn statement useless. It also
said that the accused’s allegations that the relatives of the victim threatened
to kidnap her daughter and that Fortes went on television to denounce him were
unsubstantiated and pure hearsay since the same were only relayed to him by his
wife who did not testify.^[20]

On 21 April 1992, the accused filed his notice of appeal.^[21]

In his Appellant’s Brief,^[22] the
accused prays that we reverse the amended decision of the trial court and
acquit him because the trial court erred: (1) in finding the testimonies of Fortes and Renon credible and free
from ill-motive or vindictiveness, fabrication, and collusion; (2) in relying
on the said testimonies as basis for his conviction; (3) in finding that the
victim, Felipe Ramos, Jr., was not the aggressor; (4) in convicting him on the
basis of contradicting testimonies, assumptions, and conclusions; (5) in
considering his “alleged flight” as evidence of his guilt; (6) in
“misappreciating and ignoring” his evidence of self-defense; and (7)
in not applying the “equipoise rule” in his favor.^[23]
In further amplification thereof, he asserts that the testimonies of Fortes and
Renon are inconsistent and improbable; that Dr. Cenido was not a qualified
forensic expert to testify on the distance at which the victim was shot based
on the absence of gunpowder burns at the victim’s
wound, which absence can be explained; that Dr. Cenido’s findings also
support his claim that the victim was shot from the back while seated; that his
evidence amply proves self-defense; and that
his flight was due to the threats to his life and his family and cannot
be taken as evidence of guilt.^[24]

At the outset, it must be stressed that, contrary to the
prosecution’s legal position in withdrawing the information for murder, the
offense defined in the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not
absorb the crime of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and,
therefore, does not bar the simultaneous or subsequent prosecution of the
latter crime. The 1982 decision in Lazaro
vs. People^[25] involving a violation of P.D. No. 9, which the investigating prosecutor
invokes to justify the withdrawal, is no longer controlling in view of our
decisions in People vs. Tac-an,^[26] People vs. Tiozon,^[27]
and People vs. Caling.^[28]

In Tac-an, we ruled that the accused who had been
charged with illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition under the second
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 was not placed in double jeopardy when
he was also charged in another case with murder because the former offense is a
different offense punished by a special law while the latter offense is defined
and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. We reiterated that the constitutional right against double jeopardy
protects one against a second or later prosecution for the same offense
and that when the subsequent information charges another and different offense,
although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no double
jeopardy. In Tiozon, we
explicitly stated that the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed
firearm may give rise to two separate prosecutions: one for the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and another
for murder or homicide under Article 248 or Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. And in Caling, we also ruled that the
use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder gives rise
to two distinct crimes, viz., unlawful possession of firearms, which may
be either simple or aggravated as defined and punished respectively by the
first and second paragraphs of Section 1 of P.D. 1866; and homicide or murder,
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The killing is obviously distinct from the act of possession and
is separately defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant case, the
information for murder was erroneously withdrawn.

Let us now draw our attention to the merits of the appeal.

After a careful review and consideration of the records, the
evidence, and the arguments of the parties, we find the appeal to be without
merit.

In the first place, having pleaded self-defense, the accused
necessarily admitted having shot and killed the victim with an unlicensed
firearm (Exhibit “P”). It was
then incumbent upon him, to avoid criminal liability, to prove that justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. To do so, he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if that were weak it could not be
disbelieved after he had admitted the killing.^[29]
Being an affirmative allegation, its elements, namely, (a) unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
repel the aggression, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused, must be proved with certainty by sufficient and convincing evidence
which excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person
invoking it.^[30]

The accused failed to discharge the burden which was shifted to
him by his plea of self-defense. He was
not able to show unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. On the other hand, the prosecution, through
the testimony of Belen Fortes, successfully proved that it was the accused who
assaulted the victim with a gun and shot the latter at his back,^[31]
which facts she elaborated in detail on cross-examination.^[32]
Cpl. Renon, to whom the accused surrendered the gun and the live bullets after
the incident, testified that the accused told him that he shot Felipe Ramos.^[33]

The allegation that the testimonies of Belen Fortes and Cpl.
Renon are not credible does not convince us. The trial court gave them full faith and credit thus:

“More, the Court belabored to monitor and keenly observe the
conduct and demeanor of Belen Fortes and Cpl. Memeleo Renon when they testified
before the Court, and the Court is fully convinced, without equivocation that
they testified before the Court spontaneously, in a candid and straightforward
manner, their testimonies bereft of tell-tale signs and the affectations and
artificialities of perjured or rehearsed witnesses.”^[34]

The rule in the appellate process is that the trial court’s
determination on the issue of the credibility of witnesses must be given great
weight and respect, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance
and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. The rationale for this is that the trial
court is in a much better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial. It can thus easily
detect whether a witness is telling the truth or not.^[35]
In the instant case, we find no cogent reason to depart from this rule. The alleged ill-motive or vindictiveness on
the part of prosecution witnesses Fortes and Renon were not proved. They are thus presumed not to have been
actuated by any improper motive.^[36]

Since unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was absent,
the second requisite for self-defense, which presupposes the presence of the
first, cannot logically exist.

The accused further failed to prove the third requisite of
self-defense. On the contrary, his own
evidence discloses that minutes before the shooting incident, the accused’s
daughter reminded the victim of the two empty beer bottles which he borrowed
from the accused’s store, but the victim, who appeared drunk as shown by his
bloodshot eyes and “broken voice,” arrogantly told her that no one
had yet shouted at him. Because of the
victim’s attitude, the accused told him to return the empty bottles. The victim came back with the bottles which
he dropped on top of the table in the store shouting at the same time, “Eto na ang bote. Wala na akong utang sa inyo na bote,” which
“irritated” the accused.^[37] When
the victim left, the accused even remarked, “Pag hindi mo hahabaan ang pasensiya mo dito kay Ato, mababaril mo.”^[38]

Finally, his own version of how the shooting took place further
befuddled his belated claim that the victim himself pressed the trigger of the
gun, thereby suggesting that the latter accidentally fired the gun and killed
himself. This is belied by the physical
evidence showing that the victim was shot from behind at a distance since there
were no contusions or gunpowder burns on the skin at the point of entry of the
bullet. The demonstration made by the
accused in court^[39]
further showed that it was physically impossible for the victim to have shot
himself, if indeed he was positioned in the manner demonstrated. The following findings and observations of
the trial court are well taken:

“The vacillating and chamelonic stance of the Accused bespoke
of the unreliability of his testimony. It must be borne in mind that when he testified before the Court, and as
borne by his Necropsy Report, Exhibit ‘B’, Dr. Marcial Cenido
averred that the trajectory of the bullet which hit the back of the deceased
was obliquely forward, slightly downward and very slightly towards the lateral,
grazing the left lateral side of the 8th thoracic vertebra of the
deceased. If the muzzle of the gun was
directed to the left side of the body of the deceased when it fired, the
deceased could not have been hit or that if he was hit by the bullet from the
gun, the trajectory should have been directed towards well the left side of the
body of the deceased, and not obliquely forward, slightly downward only and
very slightly towards the lateral side.

On the other hand, if, as claimed by the Accused, his left palm
held the right palm of the deceased and pressed it against the back of the
deceased, the muzzle of the gun could not have been directed towards the back
of the deceased, but towards the left side of the deceased. More, the deceased would have to move his
right hand outward from his back and from the waist and bended his hand from
his wrist towards his back which it would have been extremely difficult if not
impossible for the deceased to do so considering that the right arm of the
Accused was holding the right arm of the deceased between the elbow and the
wrist.

The scenario evolved by the Accused could not have happened for
another reason. According to Marcial
Cenido, infra, he found no contusion collar or gunpowder burns on the
skin of the point of entry of the bullet on the body of the deceased which
meant that the deceased must have been twenty-four (24) inches away from the
muzzle of the gun thus belied the claim of the Accused that the gun which was
pressed against the back of the deceased when the latter was shot and, on the
other hand, corroborated the testimony of Belen Fortes that the Accused shot
the deceased at a distance of about two (2) feet from the store.”^[40]

The accused’s contention that Dr. Cenido’s testimony should not
be considered “as he is not a forensic expert on the matter” is
untenable for before Dr. Cenido gave his testimony, the accused’s counsel admitted
in open court “the competency of the witness as an expert witness.”^[41]
Also, when the questioned testimony was given, the defense did not make any
objection thereto.

Finally, the accused’s flight after the incident removes any
remaining shred of doubt on his guilt. His flight is fully established and his allegation of threats to his
life and to his family, rightly brushed aside by the trial court as
unsubstantiated, dubious, and hearsay, is simply a fabricated tale to cover up
the naked fact of his flight. Undeniably, his flight evidenced guilt.^[42]

Consequently, there is no room for the accused’s plea for the
application of the “equipoise rule,” invoking “Cruz [should be Corpuz] vs. People.”^[43] As Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz
emphasized in the said case, the equipoise rule is applicable only where the
evidence of the parties is evenly balanced; there is no such equipoise if the
evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the
evidence of the defense.

The gravamen of
the offense under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 is the
possession of a firearm without a license and the use of such unlicensed
firearm in the commission of homicide or murder, which were alleged in the
amended information in this case. The
evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused who had in his
custody and possession the firearm (Exhibit “P”) had no license or
permit to possess it and that he used it in shooting to death Felipe Ramos, Jr.

The trial court thus correctly convicted the accused and imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua only, instead of the prescribed death
penalty under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. At the time the offense was committed, the
death penalty could not be imposed pursuant to Section 19(1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.

However, the awards for actual damages in the amounts of
P50,000.00, representing funeral expenses, although stipulated by the parties, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages, which the parties left to the discretion of the
trial court, are improper and should be deleted for, although death had taken
place, the offense charged is illegal possession of firearm and the killing
merely aggravated it. No private
interest is therefore involved. The
civil liability arising from death may be the subject of a separate civil
action or impliedly instituted with the criminal action for murder or homicide.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING, with the
above modification consisting of the deletion of the awards for actual and
moral damages, the challenged amended Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 45, dated 10 April 1992, in Criminal Case No. 91-95987.

Costs against accused
Jesus Deunida y Enriquez.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman),
Bellosillo, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Original Records (OR), Criminal Case No. 91-95987, 2; Criminal Case No.
91-95988, 1.

^[2]
Id., 18-21.

^[3]
OR, Criminal Case No. 91-95987, 32.

^[4]
Id., 33-35, citing Lazaro vs. People, 112 SCRA 430 [1982].

^[5]
Id., 36-37.

^[6]
OR, Criminal Case No. 91-95987, 144.

^[7]
Id., 44.

^[8]
There was an apparent confusion in the trial court for although the information
for murder was withdrawn, the subsequent orders, including the decision, bear
the two docket numbers, viz., Criminal
Cases Nos. 91-­95987 and 95988, and because of the erroneous docket number for
the amended information, Criminal Case no. 91-95987 ultimately became the case
for illegal possession of firearms.

^[9]
Order of 5 November 1991; OR, Criminal Case No. 91-95987, op. cit., 77. Subsequent references to OR pertain to
Criminal Case No. 91-95987.

^[10]
TSN, 5 November 1991, 22.

^[11]
Id., 22-23.

^[12]
Id., 19.

^[13]
Certification, Exhibit “M”; OR, 74.

^[14]
OR, 57-76; 119.

^[15] Brief for the
Appellee, 3-8; Rollo, 193-198.

^[16]
Rollo, 108-109.

^[17]
OR, 121-122.

^[18]
Id., 113-140; Rollo, 16-42. Per Judge Romeo J. Callejo.

^[19]
OR, 143-172; Rollo, 59-87.

^[20]
OR, 157-161.

^[21]
Id., 174.

^[22]
Rollo, 100-134.

^[23]
Id., 103-104.

^[24]
Rollo, 120-133.

^[25]
112 SCRA 430 [1982].

^[26]
182 SCRA 601 [1990].

^[27]
198 SCRA 368 [1991].

^[28]
208 SCRA 821 [1992].

^[29]
People vs. Ansoyon, 75
Phil. 772 [1946]; People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87 [1969]; People vs.
Molina, 213 SCRA 52 [1992]; People vs. Ybeas, 213 SCRA 793 [1992];
People vs. Mindac, 216 SCRA 558 [1992].

^[30]
People vs. Ybeas, supra., citing People vs.
Paya-an, 84 SCRA 353 [1978]; Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code; 1 RAMON C.
AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 132 (1987
ed.).

^[31]
TSN, 4 February 1992, 4-6.

^[32]
Id., 10-15.

^[33]
TSN, 28 January 1992, 52.

^[34]
OR, 130.

^[35]
People vs. Pascual, 208 SCRA 393 [1992]; People vs. Garcia, 209
SCRA 164 [1992]; People vs. Florida, 214 SCRA 227 [1992].

^[36]
People vs. Simon, 209 SCRA 148 [1992].

^[37]
TSN, 13 November 1991, 13-14.

^[38]
Id., 33. “Ato” is the nickname of the victim.

^[39]
TSN, 13 November 1991, 41-42.

^[40]
OR, 164-165.

^[41]
TSN, 5 November 1991, 2.

^[42]
People vs. Garcia, 209 SCRA 164, 177 [1992], citing People vs. Alegado,
25 Phil. 510 [1913].

^[43]
194 SCRA 73 [1991].