JUAN PONCE ENRILE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. IGNACIO CAPULONG AND AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD., RESPONDENTS.

The petitioner
filed this Petition to stop the respondent court from acting on the private
respondent’s application for damages arising from the wrongful
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by that court, later
nullified by this Court in Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong.^[1]
Ayer’s findings are as follows:

xxx                               xxx                               xxx

On 23 February 1988, private respondent filed a Complaint with
application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as
Civil Case No. 88-151 in Branch 134 thereof, seeking to enjoin petitioners from
producing the movie “The
Four Day Revolution”.  The complaint
alleged that petitioners’ production of the mini-series without private
respondent’s consent and over his objection, constitutes an obvious violation
of his right of privacy.  On 24 February 1988, the trial court
issued ex-parte a Temporary Restraining Order and set
for hearing the application for
preliminary injunction.

On 9 March 1988,
Hal McElroy filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Petition for
Preliminary Injunction contending that the mini-series film would not involve
the private life of Juan Ponce Enrile nor that of his
family and that a preliminary injunction would amount to a prior restraint on
their right of free expression. 
Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of cause of action as the
mini-series had not yet been completed.

In an Order dated 16 March
1988, respondent court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction
against the petitioners, the dispositive portion of
which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued, ordering
defendants, and all persons and entities employed or under contract with them, including actors, actresses
and members of the production staff and crew, as well as all persons and
entities acting on defendants’ behalf, to cease and desist from producing and
filming the mini-series entitled “The Four Day Revolution” and from
making any reference whatsoever to plaintiff or his family and from creating
any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on,
or bears remote, substantial or marked resemblance or similarity to, or is
otherwise identifiable with, plaintiff in the production and filming any
similar film or photoplay, until further orders from this Court, upon
plaintiff’s filing of a bond in
the amount of P2,000,000.00, to answer for whatever damages defendants may suffer
by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that plaintiff
was not entitled thereto.

xxx                               xxx                               xxx

(Underscoring supplied)

On 22 March 1988,
petitioner Ayer Productions came to this Court by a Petition for Certiorari
dated 21 March 1988 with an
urgent prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order, which petition
was docketed as G.R. No. L-82380.

A day later, or on 23 March 1988, petitioner Hal McElroy
also filed a separate Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for a Restraining Order or Preliminary
Injunction, dated 22 March 1988,
docketed as G.R. No. L-82398.

By a Resolution dated 24
March 1988, the petitions were consolidated and private respondent
was required to file a consolidated Answer. 
Further, in the same Resolution, the Court granted a limited Temporary
Restraining Order partially enjoining the implementation of the respondent
Judge’s Order of 16 March 1988 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued
therein, and allowing the petitioners to resume producing and filming those
portions of the projected mini-series which do not make any reference to
private respondent or his family or to any fictitious character based on or
bearing substantial resemblance or similarity to or identifiable as private
respondent.

Private respondent seasonably filed his Consolidated Answer on 6 April 1988 invoking in the main a
right of privacy.^[2]

On April 29, 1988,
this Court rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE,

a)      The Petitions for Certiorari
are GRANTED DUE COURSE, and the Order dated 16 March 1988 of respondent trial court granting a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is hereby SET ASIDE. 
The limited Temporary Restraining Order granted by this Court on 24
March 1988 is hereby MODIFIED by enjoining unqualifiedly the implementation of
respondent Judge’s Order of 16 March 1988 and made PERMANENT, and

b)      Treating the
Manifestations of petitioners dated 30 March 1988 and 4 April 1988 as separate
Petitions for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or
Restraining Order, the Court, in the exercise of its plenary and supervisory
jurisdiction, hereby REQUIRES Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 147, forthwith to DISMISS Civil Case No. 88-413 and accordingly to SET
ASIDE and DISSOLVE his Temporary Restraining Order dated 25 March 1987 and any
Preliminary Injunction that may have been issued by him.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.^[3]

On May 16,
1988, the petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration.^[4] On June 9, 1988, this Court denied the Motion with finality.^[5] On June 20, 1988, our Decision was entered in the Book of
Entries.^[6]

On November
24, 1988, the
private respondent filed a “Motion to Resolve” with the respondent
court, in connection with its Motion to Dismiss filed on March 9,
1988.^[7]

On January
19, 1989, the
respondent court issued an Order, granting the Motion to Dismiss.^[8]

On February
10, 1989, the
private respondent filed a “Motion for Reconsideration and/or Application
to Hold Plaintiff and the Surety Bond Company the First Integrated
Bonding Insurance Company, Inc.  Jointly
and Severally Liable on the Bond.”^[9]
The private respondent claimed that as a consequence allegedly of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, it was forced to “[move] the filming of the
picture to Sri Lanka after an extensive locational
survey,”^[10] that “[the] move caused over
[sic] budget travelling costs of entire cast and crew
from Manila to Sri Lanka and Australia; additional days of shooting in excess
of original schedule; additional communications costs; costs for building
additional sets and decorations in Australia and Sri Lanka; insurance costs;
location survey costs, accommodations; and special unit shooting costs,”^[11]
and that “as a direct result of [the] preliminary injunction issued in
this case, [it] suffered losses and damages totalling
FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT THOUSAND SEVENTY-THREE AUSTRALIAN DOLLARS …”^[12] It also sought to hold the petitioner
(along with its surety, the First Integrated Bonding Insurance Company, Inc.)
liable on his (the petitioner’s)
bond, FIBICI Board No. JCL-(8)00323, in the sum of P2,000,000.00, Philippine
Currency.^[13]

Subsequently, on February
12, 1989, the private respondent filed a “Notice to Take Oral
Deposition,” in support of
its claim for damages, of four witnesses, all residents of New
South Wales, Australia,
before Consul Petronila Carbonell
of the Philippine Consulate General of Australia, Sydney,
Australia.^[14]

On February 28, 1989, the petitioner filed a “Motion to Suppress
Notice to Take Deposition and/or For Protective Order,” on the ground, inter
alia, that the private respondent’s right to
damages under the bond was not indubitable and prayed that pending the
determination thereof, the deposition-taking be postponed.  The private respondent opposed the Motion.

After a further exchange of pleadings, the respondent court, on May 2, 1989, issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff’s motion to suppress notice to take deposition
and/or for protective order be, as it is,
hereby, DENIED.^[15]

According to the respondent court, the private respondent had the
right to an award of damages, “resulting from [the Supreme Court’s] ruling
that [the petitioner] is not entitled to the writ [of preliminary injunction].”^[16]

On May 9, 1989,
the petitioner was served a copy of another
“Notice to Take Oral Deposition.”^[17]
On May 15, 1989, he filed a
“Motion to Suppress Notice to Take Oral Deposition.”^[18]
On May 19, 1989, he filed a
“Motion for Reconsideration (Re:  Order
dated 2 May 1989).”^[19]
The private respondent opposed it.

On June 1, 1989,
the respondent Court issued an Order, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff, is
hereby DENIED.^[20]

According to the respondent court:

… The Court finds and resolves that the
application or claim for damages of the [private respondent] was filed within
the reglementary period of time, considering that the
fifteen (15) day period should be counted from the receipt of the Order of this
Court dismissing this case, dated January 19, 1989, and not from the receipt of
[the private respondent] of the decision of the Supreme Court dated April 29,
1988 … and this Court in effect recognizes the right of [the private
respondent] to file its application and claim for damages under the injunction
bond filed by [the petitioner].^[21]

On June 6, 1989,
the petitioner filed the present Petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.  The petitioner as we indicated, asks this
Court to stop the respondent court from
conducting further proceedings below, specifically, to nullify its Order, dated
May 2,1989,
and its Order, dated June 1, 1989.  He
submits that both Orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion, to wit:

I

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ADMITTING AYER’S
APPLICATION FOR DAMAGES, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION
IN G.R. NO. 82380, WHICH HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.  OPERATED TO DISMISS, OR RESULTED IN THE
EFFECTIVE DISMISSAL OF, THE MAIN CASE.

II

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THIS HONORABLE
COURT’S DECISION IN G.R. NO. 82380 DID NOT OPERATE TO DISMISS, OR RESULT IN THE
EFFECTIVE DISMISSAL OF, THE MAIN CASE. 
RESPONDENT JUDGE NEVERTHELESS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING AYER’S APPLICATION FOR DAMAGES CONSIDERING THAT AYER,
IN VIOLATING THE PREVIOUS INJUNCTIVE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE, FORFEITED THE
RIGHT TO CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE BOND FOR THE VERY INJUNCTION WHICH AYER
DEFIED IN THE FIRST PLACE.

III

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT AYER HAD NOT
FORFEITED THE RIGHT TO CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE INJUNCTION BOND,
RESPONDENT JUDGE NEVERTHELESS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING AYER’S APPLICATION FOR DAMAGES
CONSIDERING THAT, HYPOTHETICALLY ADMITTING THE ALLEGATIONS IN SAID APPLICATION. 
THE CLAIMED DAMAGES RESULTED NOT FROM COMPLIANCE WITH THE INJUNCTION BUT
RATHER FROM AYER’S DEFIANCE THEREOF.

IV

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS THE
DEPOSITION PROCEEDING WHICH WAS PROPOSED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INADMISSIBLE
APPLICATION FOR DAMAGES.^[22]

On June 13,
1989, this Court
issued the following Resolution:

G.R. No. 88373 (Juan Ponce Enrile vs.
Hon. Ignacio Capulong, et al.).  – Acting on the special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order, the Court Resolved, without giving due course to the
petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days
from notice.

The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
ordering the respondent judge from implementing the questioned Orders (dated
May 2, 1989 and June 1, 1989) issued by him in Civil Case No. 88-151, entitled
“Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Ayer Productions, Pty.
Ltd.”, from conducting further proceedings in Ayer’s applica­tion for
damages against the injunction bond and from taking depositions or conducting
other discovery proceedings, or any other proceedings.”^[23]

On June 21,
1989, the private
respondent filed its comment, holding that:

I

RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CORRECTLY WHEN HE
REFUSED TO ACCEPT PETITIONER’S GRATUITOUS CLAIM THAT THE DECISION OF THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 82380, “OPERATED TO DISMISS” CIVIL CASE NO. 88-151,
AND THAT THE 15-DAY PERIOD FOR FINALITY OF THE DECISION SHOULD BE COUNTED FROM
RECEIPT OF THIS HONORABLE COURT’S DECISION.^[24]

II

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY WHEN IT
ALLOWED [THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT] TO TAKE THE DEPOSITION BY ORAL INTERROGATORIES
OF ITS WITNESSES TO PROVE THE DAMAGES IT SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF THAT
INJUNCTION.  THE CLAIM THAT [THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT] VIOLATED THE INJUNCTION IS FALSE.^[25]

III

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED CORRECTLY WHEN
IT ALLOWED [THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT] TO EXERCISE ITS RIGHT TO TAKE ITS
WITNESSES’ DEPOSITION BY ORAL INTERROGATORIES SINCE PETITIONER’S GRATUITOUS
SPECULATION THAT [THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT] “CAUSED ITS OWN DAMAGES” IS
A FACTUAL ISSUE SUBJECT TO PROOF.^[26]

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN ALLOWING
THE DEPOSITION TAKING.^[27]

After exchanges of further pleadings, this Court issued a
Resolution considering the private respondent’s Comment as an Answer, giving
due course to the petition, and directing the parties to file their Memoranda.^[28]

A rule firmly settled in this jurisdiction is that a claim for
damages arising from a wrongful injunction should be filed in the main case
with notice to the surety.^[29]
If the lower court’s decision, denying injunction, is however appealed to the
Appellate Court, and the latter affirms the denial, the application may be
commenced in the Appellate Court, which may
either direct a remand of the case for reception of evidence or
otherwise hear the claim itself.^[30]
So also, it must be commenced before judgment attains finality.^[31]
Otherwise, it is barred.  Thus, it is
provided under Section 9, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 20, Rule 57 thereof:

SEC. 9.  Judgment to include
damages against party and sureties.  ?
Upon the trial the amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff, or to the
defendant, as the case may be, upon the bond of the other party, shall be
claimed, ascertained, and awarded under the same procedure as prescribed in
section 20 of Rule 57.

It has been held that this procedure is mandatory, and the
failure to observe it deprives the aggrieved party the right to proceed against
the surety bond.^[32]

The Court finds that the single most important question that
confronts it pertains to whether or not the claim for damages was filed before
finality of judgment.  Corollarily, whose “judgment” is to be
considered, ours or the respondent court’s?

The petitioner contends that the reckoning point should be prior
to June 20, 1988, the date
our Decision became final by virtue of the issuance of an Entry of
Judgment.  On the other hand, the private
respondent insists that our Decision delved alone on the incidental issue of
whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction was proper, and avoided the
case on the merits, amongst others, as to damages.  Hence, so it is submitted, the departure
point should be January 19, 1989,
the date the respondent Judge issued the Order dismissing the case.  The issue then turns on whether or not our
Decision was one on the merits of Civil Case No. 88-151, for if it was so, it
is the Decision to be considered, and the point of reference should be prior to
June 20, 1988, the date judgment was entered.

Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. vs. Capulong,
so we hold, is in the nature of disposition of Civil Case No. 88-151 before
Judge Ignacio Capulong on its merits.  Hence, when we held in that case that the
petitioner was not entitled to injunctive relief, we spoke in the clearest
terms possible that the petitioner lacked any cause of action for injunction,
whether preliminary or permanent.  It is
notable that, as Ayer decreed in part:

…
The limited Temporary Restraining Order granted by this Court on 24 March 1988 is hereby MODIFIED by
enjoining unqualifiedly the implementation of respondent Judge’s Order of 16 March 1988 and made PERMANENT…^[33]

If we made the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) of March 24,
1988 permanent, it means that no injunctive writ may be issued in any manner whatsoever, because, as we said
there:  “The production and filming
by petitioners of the projected motion picture ‘The Four Day Revolution’ does
not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon
[the petitioner’s] ‘right of privacy,’ “^[34]
and that injunction was a prior restraint to free speech and consequently,
injunction was not permissible. 
Accordingly, there is no doubt that when we gave due course to the
private respondent’s Petition, and made the TRO permanent, we could not have
been any more clear that we were disposing of Civil Case No. 88-151 on the
merits.  And when we granted the private
respondent’s Petition, we also unavoidably dismissed Civil Case No. 88-151.

It is also to be
noted that the petitioner’s Complaint was in essence one for injunction, and corrollarily,
for the issuance of preliminary injunction pending further proceedings.  The fact that it also prayed for damages, the
question of which the private respondent alleges has been left untouched, is
insignificant, because demands for damages customarily shadow actions for
injunction.  In the petitioner’s
Complaint, it was prayed thus:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that:

1.       Upon the filing of
this Com­plaint, this Court issue a temporary restraining order enjoining
defendants and all persons and entities employed or under contract with them,
including actors, actresses and members of the production staff and crew, as well as all persons and entities
acting on defendants’ behalf, from producing filming, distributing and
exhibiting the aforesaid mini-series and from making any reference whatsoever
to plaintiff or his family or creating any fictitious character in lieu of
plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears remote, substantial or
marked resemblance or similarity to, or is otherwise identifiable with,
plaintiff, in the production, filming, distribution, promotion, airing or
exhibition of any similar film or photoplay.

2.       After notice and
hearing, and the filing of such bond as may be required, this Court convert the
foregoing temporary restraining order into a writ of preliminary injunction.

3.       After trial of the
issues, this Court convert the writ of preliminary injunction into a permanent
injunction and, further, order defendants to pay plaintiff the following:

a.       P1 Million, by way of
moral damages;

b.       P1 Million by way of exemplary damages; and

c.       P300,000.00 by way of
attorney’s fees and costs of litigation.

Plaintiff prays for such further and other relief as may be deemed
just or equitable.^[35]

Again, when this Court
declared that the petitioner had no cause of action for injunction because,
first, of an insufficient showing of invasion of his privacy, and second,
because injunction operated as a prior restraint to the guaranty of free
expression, we declared to all intents and purposes, that he, the petitioner,
had no right of relief whatsoever, preliminary or permanent injunction or
damages.  And when we declared so, there
was therefore absolutely nothing else for Judge Capulong
to hear and decide.  Certainly, His Honor
could not have further acted on petitioner Enrile’s
right to stop the filming of the motion picture in question, when we had
already spoken:  petitioner Enrile had no right.

It is not indeed
surprising that in its “Motion to Resolve” (the Motion to Dismiss),^[36] the private respondent relied on our very
Decision to portray the invalidity of the Complaint, thus:

ASSUMING THAT THE FILM THE
FOUR-DAY REVOLUTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED, NEVERTHELESS THE COMPLAINT WOULD STATE
NO CAUSE OF ACTION.^[37]

For if there was indeed something left for the court a quo
to try, the private respondent should have asked for trial.  Obviously, however, this would have been poor
strategy because in that event, it would have been hard put to justify a
request for trial after having moved for dismissal from the beginning.

The Court’s ruling, therefore, is that the private respondent’s claim for damages brought about
by a wrongful injunction should have been commenced prior to June 20, 1988 (the
date Ayer judgment was entered) either with this Court or with the court
below.  What is plain is that it had
neglected to file its claim speedily and seasonably, and for what clearly
emerges as an effort to revive a lost opportunity, it sought a court order to
raise the case long decided by this Court as having had no leg on which to
stand.

The private respondent can not deny the application of Rivera
v. Talavera,^[38]
where we said that the request for damages arising from injunction may be
ventilated in the Appellate Court, because although Talavera
involved an appeal, whereas Ayer was one for certiorari
(special civil action), the distinction is, for purposes hereof, tenuous
because, in both cases, there was a final resolution on the merits that left
nothing for the trial court to adjudicate.

Because the case had achieved a character of finality, it follows that all proceedings below,
including the request for deposition, after June 20 1988, are void and of no
effect.  The challenged Orders, dated May 2, 1989 and June 1, 1989,
respectively, are equally null and inexistent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.  The Order, dated May 2, 1989, and the Order,
dated June 1, 1989, are declared NULL AND VOID.

Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., and Feliciano, J., joins J.
Narvasa in his
dissenting opinion.

Medialdea, J., no part.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

---

^[1]
Nos. L-82380 & 82398, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA
861; Feliciano, J.

^[2]
Supra, 867-869.

^[3]
Supra, 878.

^[4]
Rollo, G.R. Nos. 82380 & 82398, 242-252;
211-221.

^[5]
Id., 276-277; 237-238.

^[6]
Id., 280; 248.

^[7]
Ayer, supra,
867.

^[8]
G.R. No. 88373, rollo,
123-124.

^[9]
Id.,
125-129.

^[10]
Id.,
126.

^[11]
Id.

^[12]
Id.

^[13] Id.,
130-131.

^[14]
Id.,
131.

^[15]
Id.,
217.

^[16]
Id., 216.

^[17]
Id., 16.

^[18]
Id.,
220-223.

^[19]
Id.,
223-244.

^[20]
Id.,
266-267.

^[21]
Id.,
267.

^[22]
Id., 17-18.

^[23]
Id., 268, 269.

^[24]
Id.,
272.

^[25]
Id.,
279.

^[26]
Id.,
283.

^[27]
Id.,
288.

^[28]
Id., 338.

^[29]
Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation v. Pascual, 85 Phil. 779 (1950).

^[30]
Rivera v. Talavera, Nos. L-16280 & 16805, May 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 272.

^[31]
Pacis v. Commission on Elections, No. L-29026,
August 22, 1969, 29 SCRA
24.

^[32]
Aguasin v. Velasquez, 88 Phil. 357 (1951).

^[33]
Ayer, supra, 878; emphasis supplied.

^[34]
Supra, 878.

^[35]
Rollo, id., 50-51.

^[36]
See Ayer, supra, 867.

^[37]
Rollo, id., 120.

^[38]
Supra.

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