AMALIA VDA. DE SUAN, JACOBO SUAN, CAMILA SUAN, ROSALINDA SUAN, BENJAMIN PARILLA, FE SUAN AND ULPIANO ALVARICO, PETITIONERS, VS. ERIBERTO A. UNSON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SHERIFF EX-…

This special civil action for prohibition with application for a
writ of preliminary injunction, assails the decision of respondent Judge Vicente M. Cusi in
Civil Case No. 5654 of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
16th Judicial District, Branch I.

Civil Case No. 5654 was an action for “Cancellation of Document,
Recovery of Possession and Damages” instituted by herein petitioners against
herein private respondents.  On November 27, 1967, a decision was
rendered in the said case with the following dispositive
portion:

“WHEREFORE, judgment
is hereby rendered:

“1.     Dismissing the
complaint;

“2.     Finding the plaintiffs jointly and severally liable to
defendant Segundo Empasis
in the amount
of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages and another Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) as exemplary damages;

“3.     Finding the plaintiffs
jointly and severally liable to defendant Lorenzo L. Evicta
in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages and another Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

“4.     Finding the plaintiffs
jointly and severally liable to defendants Segundo Empasis and Lorenzo L.
Evicta for Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) as attorney’s fee, with costs.

“SO ORDERED.” (p. 68, Rollo)

From the aforesaid decision, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.  The appeal was, however, dismissed in the
Resolution, of the Third Division
promulgated on February 11,
1969 “for failure to pay the docket fee and to file the required
printed Record on Appeal.” (p. 49, Rollo)

The decision having become
final and executory private respondents before the
trial court a Motion for Execution dated April
7, 1969.  Petitioners, thru
counsel, were served with a copy of said motion but they did not file any
opposition thereto.  Pursuant to the writ
of execution, respondent sheriff issued the corresponding Notice of Levy on May 26, 1969.

Alleging that they were served with a copy of the Notice of Levy
on May 28, 1969,
petitioners filed the instant petition for “Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction”
on July17, 1969.  They further alleged
that the decision issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 5654 which ordered the payment of
moral and exemplary damages to private
respondents (then defendants in the lower court) “is absolutely null and void and of no legal effect whatsoever
for the reason that the same was rendered without any legal basis, without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction and/or in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, therefore unenforceable; that the decision
being null and void, the notice of levy predicated upon said
decision must also be null and void and that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.” (pp. 8-9, Rollo)

The Court resolved to dismiss the petition in its Resolution
dated July 22, 1969 “for
being filed late and for lack of merit.” (p. 20, Rollo)

On July 31, 1969,
the properties subject of the Notice of Levy were sold
at public auction after the required publications in the newspaper of general
circulation and the corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued to the highest
bidder.  The sale was duly registered
with the Register of Deeds of Davao under Act 3344.

On August 26, 1969,
petitioners moved to reconsider the July
22, 1969 resolution dismissing their petition.

On August 18, 1970 the Court adopted a Resolution (a) granting petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, thereby setting aside the July 22, 1969 resolution; (b)
requiring respondents to answer the petition within ten (10) days from
notice; and (c) issuing the writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioners’
filing an injunction bond in the amount of Five Hundred (P500.00)
Pesos.  (p. 34, Rollo)

There is no merit at all to this petition.

To begin with, the instant petition is one for prohibition, to prohibit the
execution of the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No.
5664.  Petitioners alleged that the lower
court acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
ordered the payment of moral and exemplary damages to private respondent.  Invoking the case of Malonzo v. Galang, et al., G.R. No. L-13851, July 27, 1960 petitioners contend that there should be no penalty on the right to litigate. 
(p. 9, Rollo)

It is basic, that a petition for prohibition must be based on jurisdictional grounds against the trial court’s judgment
because, as long as the trial
court acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by it in the exercise
thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which is reviewable only by a timely appeal.

The allegation in the
instant petition of lack of jurisdiction, notwithstanding, We
find that the question raised therein, which is the propriety of awarding moral
and exemplary damages, is merely an error in judgment.  The proper remedy of petitioners should have
been an appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners took the
proper move when they appealed the decision of the lower court to the Court of
Appeals.  Unfortunately, however, for
them their appeal was not perfected because of their failure to pay
the docket fee and to file the required printed Record on Appeal.  Hence their appeal was dismissed and the
trial court’s decision lapsed into finality. 
They are now precluded from questioning the validity of this final and executory decision. 
As this Court held in Agricultural and Industrial Marketing Corporation,
118 SCRA 49, re-echoed in Santos Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 378, “it is beyond
question that the perfection of an
appeal within the statutory or reglementary period
is mandatory and jurisdictional and that failure to so perfect an appeal renders final and
executory the
questioned decision.  The lapse of the
appeal period deprives the courts of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment and the prevailing party
becomes entitled as a matter of rights to its execution and for the
court, it becomes its ministerial duty to order the execution of judgment.” The
doctrine of finality of judgments is
grounded on fundamental considerations
of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error the judgments of the courts must
become final at some definite date
fixed by law.  (Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. v. Arciaga, 148 SCRA 433) Even an
erroneous imposition of penalty cannot be modified anymore after the judgment
has become final.  (Castillo v. Donato, 137 SCRA 210)

The instant petition for
prohibition was filed long after the trial court’s decision had become final
and executory. 
Time and again We have dismissed
petitions for certiorari and prohibition to annul decisions or orders
which could have, but have not been appealed. 
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter as respondent
Judge has in this case, the orders or decisions upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders or decisions
within its jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they
cannot be corrected by certiorari and prohibition.  These special civil actions do not lie where the remedy by appeal has been lost
because said special civil actions
cannot take the place of an
appeal.  (Dela Cruz v. IAC, 134 SCRA 417; Santos,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
supra).  Evidently, petitioners
had no valid excuse to resort to the extraordinary writs of certiorari
and prohibition when appeal had been available to them and which they, in fact,
already initiated but did not pursue.  (Sarmiento v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 153 SCRA 104).

Finally, as may be seen from the petition itself, the only prayer
of petitioners is for this Court “to issue an order enjoining the respondent Sheriff Ex-Officio, Eriberto A. Unson, or his
deputies to desist from executing the decision in Civil Case No. 5654 referred
to above and desist from levying the properties of the petitioners.” (p. 11, Rollo) As already earlier pointed out,
however, the properties subject of the Notice of Levy issued pursuant to the
writ of execution were in fact sold at public auction on July 31, 1969 which sale was duly registered with the
Register of Deeds of Davao on September 1, 1969.  Under the foregoing circumstances, the instant petition is now moot and academic.

ACCORDINGLY, this petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.  No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman),
Padilla, Sarmiento, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.