PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. LIBERTAD LAGON AND HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O. BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT OF ROXAS CITY, RESPONDENTS.

On 7 July 1976, a
criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City and docketed
as Criminal Case No. 7362, charging private respondent Libertad Lagon with the
crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.  The information charged that the accused had
allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or
merchandise purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover
the check, which check therefore subsequently bounced.

The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its evidence.  However, in an Order dated 2 December 1976, the City Court
dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by law
for the offense charged was beyond the court’s authority to impose.  The judge held that the jurisdiction of a
court to try a criminal action is
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action,
and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the
crime.  At the time of the alleged
commission of the crime in April 1975,
jurisdiction over the offense was vested
by law in the City Court.  However, by the time the criminal information
was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had
already been amended and the penalty imposable
upon a person accused thereunder increased, which penalty was beyond the City
Court’s authority to impose. 
Accordingly, the court dismissed the information without prejudice to
its being refiled in the proper court.

Hence this Petition for
Review brought by the People, arguing that the City Court of Roxas City had
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 7362 and that it had erred in issuing its Order dismissing the case.  Because the Petition for Review was signed by
the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City as counsel for the People, the Court referred
the petition to the Office of the Solicitor General for comment.  Responding to the Court’s resolution, the
then acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza stated that the Office of
the Solicitor General, having been previously consulted by the Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City, agreed with the
position taken by the latter that the City Court had jurisdiction over
the criminal case involved, and asked that the petition be given due course.

After deliberation on the instant Petition for Review, the Court
considers that petitioner has failed to show that the City Court had committed
reversible error in dismissing the criminal information in Criminal Case No.
7362 without prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.

Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended, the law governing the subject matter jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts in criminal cases in 1975 and 1976, “[m]unicipal judges in the capitals of
provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like
jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an
offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by
law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than
six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both x x x.” It appears that at the
time of the commission of the offense charged on 5 April 1975, the penalty imposable for the offense charged
under paragraph 2(d) in relation to the third sub-paragraph of the first
paragraph, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, was arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; at that time
therefore, the offense clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the City Court
of Roxas City.

At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the penalty imposable for
the offense charged in Criminal Case
No. 7362 had been increased by P.D. NO. 818 (effective 22 October 1975) to prision mayor in its medium period.

It is firmly
settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured by
the law in effect at the time of the commencement
of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of
the commission of the offense charged.^[1]
Thus, in accordance with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case
pertained to the then Court of First Instance of Roxas City considering that
P.D. No. 818 had increased the imposable penalty for the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level
in excess of the maximum penalty
which a city court could impose.

The real question raised by the petitioner is:  would application of the above-settled
doctrine to the instant case not result in also applying Presidential Decree
No. 818 to the present case, in disregard
of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? 
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only “insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, xxx.” We do not
believe so.

In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases
is determined by the authority of the court
to impose the penalty imposable
under the applicable statute given the allegations of a
criminal information.  In People
v. Purisima,^[2]
the Court stressed that:

“xxx               xxx                   xxx

x x x The issue here is one of
jurisdiction, of a court’s legal competence to try a case ab origine.  In criminal prosecutions, it is settled
that the jurisdiction of the court is
not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or
even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by
the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or
violation charged in the complaint. 
If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by
law are sufficient to show that
the court in which the complaint
is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction.^[3]
(Citations omitted; underscoring supplied.)

The
same rule was set forth and amplified in People v. Buissan,^[4]
in the following terms:

“xxx               xxx                   xxx

x x x (i]n criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is
not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial (People
v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or even by the result of the evidence that would be
presented during the trial (People v. Co Hiok, 62 Phil. 503) but by the
extent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with other legal
obligations, on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or
information (People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 347) constitutive of the offense
charged, for once
jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the information is filed, it is
retained regardless whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that
charged in the information (People v. Mision, 48 O.G. 1330)”^[5]
(Underscoring supplied.)

Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the
maximum imposable under the statute is proper under the specific facts and
circumstances proven at the trial.  In
such a case, that lesser penalty may be imposed by the trial court (provided it
had subject-matter jurisdiction under the rule above referred to) even if the
reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an
inferior court.

In People v. Buissan,^[6]
the Court also said:

“xxx               xxx                   xxx

x x x It is unquestionable that the Court of
First Instance, taking cognizance of a criminal case coming under its jurisdiction may, after trial,
impose a penalty that is proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of
a municipal or city court as the evidence would warrant.  It may
not be said, therefore, that the Court of First Instance would be acting
without jurisdiction if in a simple seduction case, it would impose penalty of
not more than six months of
imprisonment, if said case, for
the reason already adverted to, be held to fall under the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance, not a city or municipal
court.”^[7]
(Underscoring supplied.)

In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the
offense charged in Criminal Case
No. 7362 by P.D. No. 818 (prision mayor in its medium period) is
obviously heavier than the penalty provided for the same offense originally
imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (up to prision correccional in its minimum period).

Should the criminal
information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial
Court, that court may not impose that more onerous penalty upon private
respondent Libertad Lagon (assuming the evidence shows that the offense was
committed before 22 October 1975).  But
the Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction
to try and decide the (refiled) case even though the penalty properly
imposable, given the date of the commission of the offense charged, should be
the lower penalty originally provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code which is otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the City Court of Roxas City.  In other
words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818 would be inapplicable to the refiled
case would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing subject-matter
jurisdiction, nor in the case falling back into the
City Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for
Review for lack of merit.  The Order
dated 2 December 1976
of the public respondent Presiding Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is hereby AFFIRMED.  NO costs.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

^[1]
People v. Pegarum, 58 Phil. 715 [1933]; People v. Romualdo, 90
Phil. 739 [1952]; People v. Pecson,
92 Phil. 172 [1952]; Lee v. Presiding Judge, 145 SCRA 408 [1986];
Dela Cruz v. Moya, 160 SCRA 838 [1988].

^[2]
69 SCRA 341 (1976).

^[3]
69 SCRA at 347.

^[4]
105 SCRA 547 (1981).

^[5]
105 SCRA at 552-553

^[6]
Supra.

^[7]
105 SCRA at 551-552.