PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. LIBERTAD LAGON AND HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O. BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE CITY COURT OF ROXAS CITY, RESPONDENTS.

People versus Lagon

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Libertad Lagon and the presiding judge of the City Court of Roxas City. The People ask the Supreme Court to reverse a city court order that dismissed, before trial could be completed, a criminal information for estafa through the issuance of a bouncing check. The case matters because it fixes, in one clean statement, the rule every bar candidate must know: subject matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is measured by the law in force when the criminal action is commenced, not by the law in force when the crime was committed. It also answers the follow up question that examiners love: does applying that rule violate the prohibition on retroactive penal laws? The Court says no.

Procedural History

A criminal information for estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the City Court of Roxas City. The prosecution began presenting its evidence. The city court then issued an order dated 2 December 1976 dismissing the information, on the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond its authority to impose. The dismissal was without prejudice to refiling in the proper court. The People brought a petition for review to the Supreme Court. Because the petition was signed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal as counsel for the People, the Court referred it to the Office of the Solicitor General for comment. The acting Solicitor General agreed with the city fiscal that the city court had jurisdiction and asked that the petition be given due course. The Supreme Court, however, denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the order of dismissal.

Facts

On 7 July 1976, an information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City charging Libertad Lagon with estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The information alleged that she issued a check in the amount of 4,232.80 pesos as payment for goods or merchandise, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover it, and the check subsequently bounced.

The offense was allegedly committed on 5 April 1975. At that time, the penalty for the offense was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, and the offense clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the city court. But before the information was filed, Presidential Decree Number 818, effective 22 October 1975, increased the penalty to prision mayor in its medium period, which was beyond the city court's authority to impose.

The city court held that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the crime. Since the increased penalty exceeded its authority, it dismissed the information without prejudice to refiling in the proper court. The People then brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the City Court of Roxas City had subject matter jurisdiction over the estafa case at the time the information was filed, given that the penalty had been increased by Presidential Decree Number 818.
• Whether or not applying the rule that jurisdiction is measured by the law in force at the commencement of the criminal action results in the retroactive application of Presidential Decree Number 818, in violation of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws.

Applicable Provisions

The penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, defines the criminal jurisdiction of city courts:

Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both.

This fixes the ceiling of the city court's authority, and the increased penalty under Presidential Decree Number 818 exceeded that ceiling.

Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code governs the retroactive effect of penal laws:

Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as hereinafter defined, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

The Court uses this provision to show that determining jurisdiction by the law in force at the time of filing does not amount to applying the heavier decree to the accused.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the city court correctly dismissed the information. Subject matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of the criminal action, not by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. Since Presidential Decree Number 818 had raised the imposable penalty to prision mayor in its medium period by the time the information was filed, jurisdiction belonged to the then Court of First Instance of Roxas City, not the city court. The Court stressed that jurisdiction is determined by the penalty which the law imposes on the basis of the facts alleged in the information, not by what may be meted out after trial or by the result of the evidence.

On the second issue, the Court held that no retroactive application of the heavier penal law results. Jurisdiction is one thing; the penalty ultimately imposed is another. Should the information be refiled in the proper Regional Trial Court, that court may not impose the more onerous penalty under Presidential Decree Number 818 if the evidence shows the offense was committed before 22 October 1975. But the Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject matter jurisdiction even though the penalty properly imposable is the lower one originally provided by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315, which would otherwise fall within the city court's exclusive jurisdiction.

Doctrine

The subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal matters is determined by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of the criminal action, not by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged. Jurisdiction is measured by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes on the basis of the facts alleged in the information, not by what may be meted out after trial or by the result of the evidence. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is retained regardless of whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged. Applying this rule does not violate Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, because the retroactivity of penal laws concerns the penalty ultimately imposed, not the court's competence to try the case.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition for review for lack of merit and affirmed the order of the City Court of Roxas City dismissing the information without prejudice to refiling in the proper court.

Remember This

Memorize this line: criminal jurisdiction is fixed by the law in force at the commencement of the action, not at the commission of the crime. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between jurisdiction, which follows the law at filing, and the penalty, which follows the law favorable to the accused.