ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA, NORMANDY OCCIANO, JORGE DAYAON, LOURDES BANARES, BARTOLOME IBASCO, EMMANUEL BARBA, SONNY MORENO, GIOVANI PALMA, JOSELITO VILLALON, LUIS SANTO…

Petitioners urge the Court en banc to
review and reverse the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz, et al. v. Philippine School of Business Administration, et al., G.R. No. 76353,
May 2, 1988, 161 SCRA 7, to the effect that a college student, once admitted by
the school, is considered enrolled only for one semester and, hence, may be
refused readmission after the semester is over, as the contract between the
student and the school is deemed terminated.

Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini
Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines
Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year
1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the
school in the preceding semester.  The
subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.

Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo
seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court
dismissed the petition in an order dated August 8, 1988, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the fact that the ruling in the
Alcuaz vs. PSBA is exactly on the point at issue in
this case but affirming the authority of the school regarding admission of
students, save as a matter of compassionate equity – when any of the
petitioners would, at the least, qualify for re-enrolment, this petition is
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.  [Rollo, p. 12-A.]

A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by
the trial court on February 24, 1989
in this wise:

Perhaps many will agree with the critical comment of Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., and that really there must be a better way of
treating students and teachers than the manner ruled (not suggested) by the
Supreme Court, the Termination of Contract at the end of the semester, that is.

But the applicable rule in this case is that enunciated by the
Supreme Court in the case of Sophia Alcuaz, et al.
vs. Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon
City Branch (PSBA), et al., G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988; that of the
termination at the end of the semester, reason for the critical comments of
Joaquin G. Bernas, and Doods
Santos, who both do not agree with the ruling.

Petitioners’ claim of lack of due process cannot prosper in view of
their failure to specifically deny respondent’s affirmative defenses that
“they were given all the chances to air their grievances on February 9,
10, 16, and 18, 1988, and also on February 22, 1988 during which they were
represented by Atty. Jose L. Lapak” and that on
February 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at Mabini
College, petitioners continued their rally picketing, even though without any
renewal permit, physically coercing students not to attend their classes,
thereby disrupting the scheduled classes and depriving a great majority of
students of their right to be present in their classes.

Against this backdrop, it must be noted that the petitioners waived
their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when
they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of
school year 1988-89.  Said form
specifically states that:

The Mabini
College reserves the right to deny
admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and
to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution
and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient
operation of the college.  Students,
therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College
code of conduct and discipline.

In addition, for the same semester,
petitioners duly signed pledges which among others uniformly reads:

In consideration of my
admission to the Mabini College and of my privileges
as student of this institution, I hereby pledge/promise under oath to abide and
comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by competent authorities in
the College Department or School in which I am enrolled.  Specifically:

*           *          *

3.            I will respect
my Alma Mater, the Mabini
College, which I represent and see
to it that I conduct myself in such a manner that the college will not be put
to a bad light;

*           *           *

9.            I will not
release false or authorized announcement which tend to cause confusion or
disrupt the normal appreciation of the college.

Moreover, a clear legal right must first be established for a petition for mandamus to
prosper (Sec. 3, Rule 65).  It being a
mere privilege and not a legal right for a student to be enrolled or
re-enrolled, respondent Mabini College is free to
admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic
freedom enjoyed by the school in accordance with the Supreme Court rulings in
the cases of Garcia vs. Faculty [Admission Committee] (G.R. No. 40779, November
28, 1975) and Tangonon vs. Pano,
et al. (L-45157, June 27, 1985).

WHEREFORE, premises and jurisprudence considered, and for lack of
merit, the motion for reconsideration of the order of this Court dated August 8, 1988 is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.  [Rollo, pp. 15-16.]

Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction.

The case was originally assigned to the Second Division of the
Court, which resolved on April 10,
1989 to refer the case to the Court of Appeals for proper
determination and disposition.  The Court
of Appeals ordered respondents to comment on the petition and set the
application for issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for hearing.  After considering the comment and hearing the
injunction application, the Court of Appeals resolved on May 22, 1989
to certify the case back to the Supreme Court considering that only pure
questions of law were raised.

The case was assigned to the Third Division of the Court, which
then transferred it to the Court en banc on August 21, 1989 considering that the issues
raised are jurisdictional.  On September 14, 1989, the Court en
banc accepted the case and required respondents to comment.

Respondents filed their comment on November 13, 1989. 
Petitioners were required to reply. 
As reply, they filed a pleading
entitled “Counter-Comment,” to which respondents filed a rejoinder
entitled “Reply to Counter-Comment.” To this, petitioners filed a
“Rejoinder to Reply.”

The issues having been joined, the case was deemed submitted.

At the heart of the controversy is the doctrine encapsuled in the following excerpt from Alcuaz:

It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is
considered enrolled for one semester.  It
is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that
when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is
enrolling for the entire semester. 
Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the “written
contracts” required for college teachers are for “one semester.”
It is thus evident that after the
close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC
no longer has any existing contract either
with the students or with the intervening
teachers.  Such being the
case, the charge of denial of
due process is untenable.  It is a
time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the
contracting parties (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No.
72456, February 19, 1987, citing:  Castro
vs. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court
of Appeals, 100 SCRA 197).  The
contract having been terminated, there is
no more contract to speak of.  The school
cannot be compelled to enter into another
contract with said students and teachers.  “The courts, be they the original trial
court or the appellate court, have no power to make contracts for the
parties.” (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., supra).  [At 161 SCRA 17-18; underscoring supplied.]

In Alcuaz, the Second Division
of the Court dismissed the petition filed by the students, who were barred from
re-enrolling after they led mass assemblies and put up barricades, but it added
that “in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of
the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school
year when this petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to
graduate in due time.” [At 161 SCRA 22.] Mr. Justice Sarmiento
dissented from the majority opinion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the dismissed teachers
in Alcuaz. 
The students did not move for reconsideration.  The Court en banc, to which the
case had been transferred, denied the motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution dated September 29, 1989,
but added as an obiter dictum:

In conclusion, We wish to reiterate that while We value the right
of students to complete their education in the school or university of their
choice, and while We fully respect their right to resort to rallies and
demonstrations for the redress of their grievances and as part of their freedom
of speech and their right to assemble, still such rallies, demonstrations, and
assemblies must always be conducted peacefully, and without resort to
intimidation, coercion, or violence. 
Academic freedom in all its forms, demands the full display of
discipline.  To hold otherwise would be
to subvert freedom into degenerate license.

The majority’s failure to expressly repudiate the
“termination of contract” doctrine enunciated in the decision
provoked several dissents on that issue. 
Although seven (7) members of the Court* disagreed
with the Second Division’s dismissal of the students’ petition, a definitive
ruling on the issue could not have been made because no timely motion for
reconsideration was filed by the students. 
(As stated above, the motion for reconsideration was filed by the
dismissed teachers.)

Be that as it may,
the reassessment of the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz,
insofar as it allowed schools to bar the readmission or re-enrollment of
students on the ground of termination of contract, shall be made in this case
where the issue is squarely raised by petitioners [Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 5.]

Initially, the case at bar must be put in the proper
perspective.  This is not a simple case
of a school refusing readmission or re-enrollment of returning students.  Undisputed is the fact that the refusal to
readmit or re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school
authorities as a reaction to student mass
actions directed against the school. 
Petitioners are students of respondent school who, after leading and
participating in student protests, were denied readmission or re-enrollment for
the next semester.  This is a case that
focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-a-vis the
right of school officials to discipline them.

Thus, although respondent judge believed himself bound by the
ruling in Alcuaz [Order dated August 8, 1988; Rollo,
pp. 12-12-A], he actually viewed the issue as a conflict between students’
rights and the school’s power to discipline them, to wit:

Students should not be denied their constitutional and statutory
right to education, and there is such denial when students are expelled or
barred from enrollment for the exercise of their right to free speech and
peaceable assembly and/or subjected to disciplinary action without abiding with
the requirements of due process.  Also,
it is understandable for student leaders to let loose extremely critical and,
at times, vitriolic language against school authorities during a student rally.

But the right of students is no license and not without limit . . .
. [Order of February 24, 1989;
Rollo, p. 13.]

1.  The Student Does Not
Shed His Constitutionally Protected Rights at the Schoolgate.

Central to the democratic tradition which we cherish is the
recognition and protection of the rights of free speech and assembly.  Thus, our Constitution provides:

Sec. 4.  No law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances.  [Art. III.]

This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution.  A similar provision was found in the 1973
Constitution, as amended [Art. VI, sec. 9], the 1935 Constitution, as amended
[Art. III, sec. 8], the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) [Sec. 3, para. 13], and the Philippine Bill of 1902 [Sec. 15, para. 13.] Thus, as
early as 1907, the Court in People v. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422, upheld the right to
speech and assembly to overturn a conviction for sedition.  It said:

Section 5 of Act No. 292 is as follows:

All persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain
by force or outside of legal methods any of the following objects are guilty of
sedition:

*           *           *

2.            To prevent the
Insular Government, or any provincial or municipal government or any public
official, from freely exercising its or his duties or the due execution of any
judicial or administrative order.

But this law must not be interpreted so as to abridge “the freedom
of speech” or “the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government for redress of grievances” guaranteed by the
express provisions of section 5 of “the Philippine Bill.”

*           *           *

It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark
the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or
imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the
greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a
rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible
followers.  But if the prosecution be
permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual
members of a crowd as an excuse
to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the
authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of
grievances would become a delusion and a snare and the attempt to exercise it
on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose
all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment,
if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to
the prosecuting authorities.  If
instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals
should be sought out and punished therefor, but the
utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly and
seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a tumultuous
uprising.  [At pp. 424, 426.]

That the protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly
guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available to students is
well-settled in our jurisdiction.  In the
leading case of Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984, 129
SCRA 359, the Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Fernando in an en
banc decision, declared:

*           *           *

4.       Petitioners invoke
their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech.  They are entitled to do so.  They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the
freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed
to listen in gatherings such as was held in
this case.  They do not, to borrow
from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des
Moines Community School
District, “shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” While,
therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of
students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative
of constitutional safeguards.  [At pp.
367-368.]

The facts in Malabanan are
only too familiar in the genre of cases involving student mass actions:

… Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of
respondent (Gregorio Araneta) University.  They sought and were granted by the school
authorities a permit to hold a meeting
from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. on August
27, 1982.  Pursuant to such
permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science
(VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as
therein stated but at the second floor lobby. 
At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language
their opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute
of Animal Science with the Institute
of Agriculture.  At 10:30 A.M.,
the same day, they marched toward the Life Science building and continued their
rally.  It was outside the area covered
by their permit.  They continued their
demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the University
authorities and using megaphones in the process.  There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held.  Also, the non-academic employees, within
hearing distance, stopped their work because of the noise created.  They were asked to explain on the same day
why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal assembly.  Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed through a memorandum
that they were under preventive suspension for their failure to explain the
holding of an illegal assembly in front of the Life Science Building.  The validity thereof was challenged by
petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
in a petition for mandamus with damages against private respondents and
before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports.  On October
20, 1982, respondent Ramento, as Director
of the National Capital Region, found petitioners guilty of the charge of
having violated par. 146(c) of the Manual for Private Schools more specifically
their holding of an illegal assembly which was characterized by the violation
of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral
defamation.  The penalty was suspension
for one academic year . . . . [At pp. 363-364.]

The Court found the penalty imposed on the students too severe
and reduced it to a one-week suspension.

The rule laid down in Malabanan
was applied with equal force in three other en banc decisions of
the Court.

In Villar v. Technological
Institute of the Philippines, G.R. No. 69198, April 17, 1985, 135 SCRA 706, the
Court reiterated that the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a
basis for barring students from enrolling. 
It enjoined the school and its officials from acts of surveillance, blacklisting,
suspension and refusal to re-enroll.  But
the Court allowed the non-enrollment of students who clearly incurred marked
academic deficiency, with the following caveat:

*        *          *

4.       The academic freedom
enjoyed by “institutions of higher learning” includes the right to
set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades
suffice for the expulsion of students. 
Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed
meticulously.  It cannot be utilized to
discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to
peaceable assembly and free speech.  If
it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus
prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded.  [At p. 711.]

In Arreza v. Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation,
G.R. No. 62297, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 94, a case arising from almost the same
facts as those
in Malabanan, the Court rejected “the
infliction of the highly-disproportionate penalty of denial of enrollment and
the consequent failure of senior students to graduate, if in the exercise of
the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly, improper conduct
could be attributed to them.” [At p. 98.]

In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699, respondent school
was directed to allow the petitioning students to re-enroll or otherwise
continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to any disciplinary
proceedings that may be conducted in connection with their participation in the
protests that led to the stoppage of classes.

2.  Permissible
Limitations on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights Within the School.

While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the
rights to free speech and assembly, this should not be taken to mean that
school authorities are virtually powerless to discipline students.  This was made clear by the Court in Malabanan, when it echoed Tinker v. Des Moines Community
School District, 393 US 503, 514: 
“But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which
for any reason – whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior –
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”

Thus, in Malabanan, the Court
said:

*           *           *

8.       It does not follow,
however, that petitioners can be totally absolved for the events that
transpired.  Admittedly, there was a
violation of the terms of the permit. 
The rally was held at a place other than that specified, in the second
floor lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the VMAS building of the
University.  Moreover, it was continued
longer than the period allowed. 
According to the decision of respondent Ramento,
the “concerted activity [referring to such assembly] went on until 5:30 p.m.” Private respondents could
thus, take disciplinary action. . . . [At pp. 370-371.]

But, as stated in Guzman, the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions requires observance of procedural due process.  Thus:

. . . There are withal minimum standards which must be met to
satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the
students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them,
with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.  [At pp.
706-707.]

Moreover, the penalty imposed must be proportionate to the
offense committed.  As stated in Malabanan, “[i]f the
concept of proportionality between the offense committed and sanction imposed
is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes.” [At p. 371.]

3.  Circumventing
Established Doctrine.

Malabanan was decided by the
Court in 1984.  Since then, student mass
actions have escalated not only because of political events that unfurled but
also because of the constantly raging controversy over increases in tuition
fees.  But the over-eager hands of some
school authorities were not effectively tied down by the ruling in Malabanan. 
Instead of suspending or expelling student leaders who fell into
disfavor with school authorities, a new variation of the same stratagem was
adopted by the latter:  refusing the
students readmission or re-enrollment on grounds not related to their alleged
“misconduct” of “illegal assembly” in leading or
participating in student mass actions directed against the school.  Thus, the spate of expulsions or exclusions due
to “academic deficiency.”

4.  The
Nature of the Contract Between a School
and its Student.

The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored
its decision on the “termination of contract” theory.  But it must be repeatedly emphasized that the
contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract.  It is imbued with public interest,
considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the
grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions [See Art. XIV, secs. 1-2, 4(1).]

Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on
Paragraph 137 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides
that “[w]hen a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is
enrolling . . . for the entire semester for collegiate courses,” which the
Court in Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to
refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a
term of one semester, has already expired.

The “termination of contract” theory does not even find
support in the Manual.  Paragraph 137
merely clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester.  It serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid
on an installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of the downpayment upon enrollment and the balance before
examinations.  Thus, even if a student
does not complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for
more than two weeks, he may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole
semester before he is given his credentials for transfer.  This is the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed
under Section VII on Tuition and Other Fees, which in its totality provides:

137.  When a student
registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
school year for elementary and secondary courses, and for the entire semester
for collegiate courses.  A student who transfers or otherwise
withdraws, in writing, within two weeks after the beginning of classes and who
has already paid the pertinent tuition and other school fees in full or for any
length of time longer than one month may be charged ten per cent of the total
amount due for the term if he withdraws within the first week of classes, or
twenty per cent if within the second week of classes, regardless of whether or
not he has actually attended classes. 
The student may be charged all the school fees in full if he withdraws
anytime after the second week of classes. 
However, if the transfer or withdrawal is due to a justifiable reason,
the student shall be charged the pertinent fees only up to and including the
last month of attendance.

Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that
the student shall be enrolled for only one semester, and that after that
semester is over his re-enrollment is dependent solely on the sound discretion
of the school.  On the contrary, the
Manual recognizes the right of the student to be enrolled in his course for the
entire period he is expected to complete it. 
Thus, Paragraph 107 states:

Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or
university upon meeting its specific requirement and reasonable
regulation:  Provided, that except in the
case of academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation, the
student is presumed to be qualified for enrolment for the entire period he is
expected to complete his course without prejudice to his right to transfer.

This “presumption” has been translated into a right in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 232,
the “Education Act of 1982.” Section 9 of this act provides:

SEC. 9.  Rights of
Students in School.  – In addition to other rights, and subject to
the limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all
schools shall enjoy the following rights:

*           *           *

2.            The right to
freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.

*           *           *

5.  Academic Freedom Not
a Ground for Denying Students’ Rights.

Respondent judge, in his order dated February 24, 1989, stated that “respondent Mabini College
is free to admit or not admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the
academic freedom enjoyed by the school” [Rollo,
p. 16.] To support this conclusion, he cited the cases of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology, G.R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277, and Tangonan v. Pano, G.R. No. L-45157, June
27, 1985, 137 SCRA 245, where the Court emphasized the
institutions’ discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as a major
component of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher
learning.

These cases involve different facts and issues.  In Garcia, the issue was whether a female lay student has a clear
legal right to compel a seminary for the priesthood to admit her for
theological studies leading to a degree. 
In Tangonan, the issue was whether a nursing
student, who was admitted on probation and who has failed in her nursing subjects,
may compel her school to readmit her for enrollment.

Moreover, respondent judge loses sight of the Court’s unequivocal
statement in Villar that the right of an
institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to
discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to
speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to
equal protection [At p. 711.]

6.  Capitol
Medical Center
and Licup.

In support of the action taken by respondent judge, private
respondents cite the recent cases of Capitol Medical Center,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82499,
October 13, 1989, and Licup v. University
of San Carlos, G.R. No. 85839, October 19, 1989, both
decided by the First Division of the Court.

We find the issues raised and resolved in these two decisions
dissimilar from the issues in the present case.

In Capitol Medical Center, the Court upheld
the decision of the school authorities to close down the school because of problems
emanating from a labor dispute between the school and its faculty.  The Court ruled that the students had no
clear legal right to demand the reopening of the school.

On the other hand, in Licup the
issue resolved was whether or not the students were afforded procedural due
process before disciplinary action was taken against them.  Thus, the Court stated:

The Court finds no cogent basis for the protestations of
petitioners that they were deprived of due process of law and that the
investigation conducted was far from impartial and fair.  On the contrary, what appears from the record
is that the charges against petitioners were adequately established in an
appropriate investigation.  The
imputation of bias and partiality is not supported by the record.

Moreover, Licup, far from
adopting the “termination of contract” theory in Alcuaz,
impliedly rejected it, to wit:

While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to
pursue their education, the USC as an educational institution is also entitled
to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concommitant
right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized.

True, an institution
of learning has a contractual obligation
to afford its students a fair
opportunity to complete the course they
seek to pursue. 
However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails
to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right;
and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities. [Underscoring
supplied.]

7.  The Instant Case.

To justify the school’s action, respondents, in their Comment
dated November 12, 1989, quoting from their answer filed in the trial court,
allege that of the thirteen (13) petitioners eight (8) have incurred failing
grades, to wit:

a)      Ariel Non has not only
failed in four (4) subjects but also failed to cause the submission of Form 137
which is a pre-­requisite to his re-enrollment and to his continuing as a
student of Mabini;

b)      Rex Magana not only
has failed in one (1) subject but also has incomplete grades in four (4)
subjects as well
as no grades in two (2) subjects;

c)      Elvin Agura failed in two (2) subjects and has three (3)
incomplete grades;

d)      Emmanuel Barba has failed in one (1) subject, and has to still take
CMT 11 to 22.  He is already enrolled at
Ago Foundation;

e)      Joselito
Villalon has incomplete grades in nine (9) subjects;

f)       Luis Santos has
failed in one (1) subject;

g)      George Dayaon has failed in four (4) subjects and has to remove
the incomplete grade in one (1) subject;

h)      Daniel Torres has
failed in five (5) subjects, has to remove incomplete grades in five (5) more
subjects, and has no grade in one (1) subject. 
[Rollo, p. 79.]

Petitioners have not
denied this, but have countered this allegation as follows:

*           *           *

(11)   Petitioners were and
are prepared to show, among others, that:

a)      Three of the 13 of
them were graduating.  (Admitted in the
Answer.)

b)      Their academic
deficiencies, if any, do not warrant non-readmission.  (The Answer indicates only 8 of the 13 as
with deficiencies.)

c)      Their breach of
discipline, if any, was not serious.

d)      The improper conduct
attributed to them was during the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech
and peaceable assembly, particularly a February 1988 student rally.  (The crux of the matter, as shown even in the
Answer.)

e)      There was no due
investigation that could serve as basis
for disciplinary action.  (In effect,
admitted in the Answer; even Alcuaz required
due process.)

f)       Respondents admit
students with worse deficiencies – a clear case of discrimination against petitioners for their role in the
student rally.  (An equal protection
question.)

g)      Respondent school is
their choice institution near their places of residence which they can afford
to pay for tertiary education, of which they have already lost one-and-a-half schoolyears – in itself punishment enough.  [Rollo, p. 86.]

Clearly, the five (5) students who did not incur failing marks,
namely, Normandy Occiano, Lourdes Banares,
Bartolome Ibasco, Sonny Moreno
and Giovani Palma, were refused re-enrollment without
just cause and, hence, should be allowed to re-enroll.

On the other hand, it does not appear that the petitioners were
afforded due process, in the manner expressed in Guzman, before they
were refused re?enrollment.  In
fact, it would appear from the pleadings that the decision to refuse them
re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought.  It is
not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities was the
student mass actions conducted in February 1988 and which were led and/or
participated in by petitioners. 
Certainly, excluding students because of failing grades when the cause
for the action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of
discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation
of the basic tenets of fair play.

Moreover, of the eight (8) students with failing grades, some
have only one or two failures, namely, Rex Magana, Elvin Agura,
Emmanuel Barba, and Luis Santos.  Certainly, their failures cannot be
considered marked academic deficiency within the context of the Court’s
decision in Villar.

Then, as to the students who incurred several failing grades,
namely, Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon,
George (Jorge) Dayaon, and Daniel Torres, it is not
clear from respondents’ enumeration whether the failures were incurred in only
one semester or through the course of several semesters of study in the
school.  Neither are the academic
standards of respondent school, from which we can gauge whether or not these students are academically deficient,
alleged by respondents.  Thus, while the
prerogative of schools to set
academic standards is recognized, we cannot affirm respondent school’s action
as to petitioners Non, Villalon, Dayaon
and Torres because of insufficient
information.

With regard to petitioner Emmanuel Barba
who respondents claim has enrolled in Ago Foundation, such fact alone, if true,
will not bar him from seeking readmission in respondent school.

However, these should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary
action could have been taken against petitioners for breach of discipline if
the facts had so warranted.  In line with
the Court’s ruling in Malabanan, petitioners
could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the
February 1988 mass actions.  But the
penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense
committed and, as
set forth in Guzman, it must be imposed only after the requirements
of procedural due process have been complied with.  This is explicit from the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph 145 that
“[n]o penalty shall be imposed upon any student, except for cause as
defined in this Manual and/or in the school’s rules and regulations duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”

But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of
administrative sanctions have become moot and academic.  Petitioners, who have been refused
readmission or re-enrollment and who have been effectively excluded from
respondent school for four (4) semesters, have already been more than
sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed when
they led and participated in the mass actions
that, according to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes.  To still subject them to disciplinary
proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the
strained relations between petitioners and the officials of respondent school
which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle here, in the Court of
Appeals and before the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The orders of respondent judge dated August 8, 1988 and February 24, 1989 are hereby
ANNULLED.  Respondent Mabini
College is ORDERED to readmit and to allow the re-enrollment of petitioners, if
they are still so minded, without prejudice to its taking the appropriate
action as to petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon
and Daniel Torres, if it is shown by their records (Form 137) that they have
failed to satisfy the school’s prescribed academic standards.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., see concurring opinion.

Grino-Aquino, J., on leave.

---

* Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, Mr. Justice Narvasa, Mme.
Justice Herrera, Mr. Justice Cruz, Mr. Justice Feliciano, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, and Mme. Justice Cortes.

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