SPOUSES MANUEL AND TEODORA CAPULONG, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND GONZALO TOLENTINO, RESPONDENTS.

A little more insight and a little less technicality could have
prevented this simple ejectment case involving a small parcel of land from
reaching this Court, after going
through the three lower courts of the judicial hierarchy over a litigation
period of around three years.

We are now asked to review on certiorari the decision
promulgated on July 20, 1988 by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
13741^[1]
reversing the decision dated January 5,
1988 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 171, in its Civil Case
No. 2716-V-87 and dismissing the complaint for ejectment filed by herein
petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 82, in
Civil Case No. 3825 thereof.

The records show that petitioners are the registered owners of a
residential lot consisting of one hundred square meters, more or less, situated
at Dulong Tangke, Malinta, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119628 of
the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. 
It appears that private respondent Gonzalo Tolentino leased the said
property from petitioners’ parents and in 1958 built his residential house
thereon where he and his family reside.

On July 24 and September
16, 1985, petitioners, who had acquired said parcel of land from
their parents, sent demand letters^[2]
addressed to Salvador Tolentino at the above-mentioned address, reiterating
their previous oral demands that private respondent vacate the premises since
petitioner’s son and his family need the same for residential purposes.  Private respondent’s refusal to vacate prompted petitioners to refer the matter to the
Lupon Tagapayapa which sent a notice of hearing to the former at the same
address but in the name of Salvador Tolentino. 
When private respondent failed to appear before the Lupon, a certificate
to file action^[3] was issued.

On December 23, 1985,
petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment^[4]
in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 82, docketed therein as
Civil Case No. 3825, against herein private respondent who was then known to
them as Salvador Tolentino and was so named in the complaint as defendant.

In the sheriff’s return dated January 7, 1986,^[5]
Deputy Sheriff Napoleon Villanueva certified that copies of the summons and the
complaint were personally served upon therein defendant Salvador Tolentino
“as evidenced by the signature of one Gonzalo Tolentino on January 6, 1986
at the given address,” and that the latter “further claimed that he and the former are the same
and the only one (sic) person.” Parenthetically but significantly, prior
thereto private respondent had never called the attention of petitioners and
the Lupon Tagapayapa of their erroneous belief regarding private respondent’s true
given name.

In his answer,^[6] private respondent averred that said
metropolitan trial court had no jurisdiction over the case because there
was no demand made on him to vacate the
premises and he was not notified of the proceedings had before the Lupon
Tagapayapa; that his name is Gonzalo Tolentino and not Salvador Tolentino; and
that herein petitioners’ son is actually living in a separate house also owned
by petitioners.

On April 2, 1986,
petitioners filed an amended complaint^[7]
impleading the private respondent by his true and real name of Gonzalo Tolentino
and alleging therein, as an additional ground for ejectment, the fact of
private respondent’s failure to pay rentals. 
In its order of July 7, 1986,^[8]
the amended complaint was admitted by the trial court and the name Salvador
Tolentino was changed to Gonzalo Tolentino.

On October 14, 1987,
said court rendered judgment ordering therein defendant and all persons
claiming rights under him to vacate the premises in question and to restore possession thereof to the
plaintiffs.^[9]

Private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Branch 171, which affirmed the decision of the lower court.^[10]
Thereafter, private respondent filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Appeals
which, in a decision dated July 20,
1988, rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court a quo
and the questioned Decision of respondent court affirming the same are
reversed; and in lieu thereof the instant amended complaint for ejectment is
hereby DISMISSED on the grounds of prematurity, lack of cause of action and
want of jurisdiction.  No pronouncement
as to costs.”^[11]

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this
petition raising for resolution the issues as to whether or not private
respondent was properly notified of the proceedings in the Lupon Tagapayapa,
and whether or not demand letters were properly addressed to him.

We hold in the affirmative on both counts.

The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is anchored mainly on
the fact that the two demand letters to vacate sent by petitioners, as well as
the notice of hearing issued by the Lupon Tagapayapa, were addressed to
Salvador Tolentino, and not to herein private respondent Gonzalo
Tolentino.  Hence, since there was allegedly
no substantial compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 and Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the
complaint for ejectment was dismissed on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
and cause of action and for being premature. 
Respondent court’s conclusion is based
on the erroneous assumption that Salvador Tolentino and Gonzalo Tolentino are
two different individuals or, in its own words, “the defendant complained against was Salvador Tolentino,
who is not the same person as petitioner Gonzalo Tolentino.”^[12]

On the contrary, the evidence shows that Salvador
and Gonzalo Tolentino are one and the same person.  As earlier observed, the sheriff’s return
contains a statement to the effect that Gonzalo Tolentino, who signed the summons, and Salvador Tolentino,
the addressee thereof, are one and the same person, as declared by
private respondent Gonzalo Tolentino himself.  While private respondent raised a token
objection questioning the authenticity of the sheriff’s return, neither did he
present any evidence to disprove the veracity of the contents of the same.  In the absence of proof to the contrary, the
presumption is that official duty has been regularly performed.

Again, while private respondent Gonzalo Tolentino was erroneously
addressed as Salvador Tolentino in the two demand letters and the notice of
hearing before the Lupon Tagapayapa, there is no dispute at all that the parcel of land on which private respondent built his house and where he
now lives is the same property subject of the ejectment case and the same one
referred to in the demand letters and conciliation proceedings, as well as the
same address to which said letters and notice were sent.  Consequently, the true name of the person
occupying the premises is immaterial.  As
petitioners correctly asseverate, there is no other person residing in the
subject premises and who has a lease agreement with petitioners except the
private respondent herein.  For
purposes of the suit, the demand could even have been served on any person
found on the premises or merely posted thereon.^[13] The rules on pleadings even authorize a suit
against an unknown defendant or by such other designation as the case may
require.^[14]

In addition, petitioners aver, and private respondent does not
deny, that oral demands were made upon the occupants of the subject premises to
vacate the same, which were later followed by the two demand letters. 
Private respondent already knew beforehand that the petitioners wanted
to eject them from the premises.  Thus,
by the time he received the demand letters addressed to Salvador Tolentino, he
knew perfectly well that the same were actually intended for him and for no other person.  It
is significant that private respondent never claimed that there was any other person leasing the subject property of herein
petitioners.  The reason is simple.  Private respondent and his family were the
only ones occupying the same.

What evidently happened here is that private respondent, to
subserve his desire for continued occupancy of the lot, capitalized upon the mistake
on his real first name as a cloak on
which to weave the technicality of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over
his person.  What is likewise obvious,
however, is that there was only an error on his first name but not as to the
physical and legal identity of the person involved, that is, the private
respondent in this petition now unnecessarily forced upon us.  As the maxim goes, error nominis
nunquam nocet, si de identitate rei
constat.  A mistake in the name is never prejudicial where the identity or the
person intended is certainly known.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 171, in Civil Case No. 2716-V-87 is hereby REINSTATED,
with double costs against private respondent. 
This judgment is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Justice Fidel P. Purisima, ponente, concurred in by Justice Segundino G.
Chua and Nicolas P. Lapeña, Jr.; Petition, Annex L, Rollo, 85.

^[2]
Petition, Annexes A-1 & A-2; Rollo, 22, 23.

^[3]
Id., Annex A-3; ibid., 24.

^[4]
Id., Annex A; ibid.,
19.

^[5]
Id., Annex B; ibid., 25.

^[6]
Id., Annex D; ibid.,
30.

^[7]
Id., Annex C; ibid., 26.

^[8]
Id., Annex D; ibid., 29.

^[9]
Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Floro P. Alejo; Petition, Annex G; Rollo,
46-51.

^[10]
Petition, Annex I; Rollo, 60.

^[11] Rollo, 93.

^[12]
Ibid., 90.

^[13]
Sec. 2, Rule 70, Rules of Court.

^[14]
Sec. 14, Rule 3, id.