E. CONRAD AND VIRGINIA BEWLEY GEESLIN, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. FELIPE C. NAVARRO, RESPONDENT.

We write this finale to the dispiriting charges filed by
complainants Francisco Ortigas, Jr. and Eulogio R. Rodriguez in Administrative
Case No. 2148^[1]
and by spouses E. Conrad and Virginia Bewley Geeslin in Administrative Case No.
2033,^[2]
seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for malpractice
and gross misconduct.

In our resolution dated May
5, 1980, issued consequent to the Report and Recommendation of the
Office of the Solicitor General submitted to this Court on April 21, 1980, we ordered the suspension of
respondent Navarro from the practice of law during the pendency of these cases.^[3]

The investigative phase was conducted by said office pursuant to
our resolutions of February 14, 1975
and September 13, 1976 in
G.R. Nos. L-39386 and L-39620-29, entitled “Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.” With commendable thoroughness and
attention to detail, two reports were submitted which, in order to vividly
portray the scope and magnitude of respondent’s operations and how he was able
to perpetrate the anomalous transactions complained of, we quote extensively
from said reports which are sustained by the evidence of record.

I.   The antecedent facts on
which Administrative Case No. 2148 is premised are reported by then Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza, as follows:

PREFATORY STATEMENT

This unnumbered administrative case against respondent Atty. Felipe
C. Navarro (hereinafter called respondent NAVARRO, for short) originally
stemmed from the letter of a certain Angelito B. Cayanan to the Honorable
Supreme Court dated January 25, 1975
which reads as follows:

x x x

“I wish to respectfully inform your
good office that I bought a few lots on installment basis from Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro of Ruby Hills Subdivision as evidenced by the attached OR Nos. 0512 and
0519 and a ‘Contract of Sale’.

“Atty. Navarro, some officials and
representative of the said company claim that although there is a pending case
No. L-39386 under Decree No. 1425 on the property being sold, the case is
almost won in their favor and are just waiting for your final decision within a
couple of months or even less.

“In this connection, I am
respectfully writing you this letter in order to bring to your attention this
transaction and to protect my rights in the event that any unfavorable
circumstances may arise in the future.”

x x x

Acting on the aforesaid letter, the Supreme Court, per Resolution
dated February 14, 1975, referred the copy of Mr. Cayanan’s letter to the
Solicitor General for “investigation of the existence of sufficient ground
to proceed with the prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (whose address     of record is No. 66 Azucena, Roxas
District, Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the office of attorney
and for appropriate action”.  The
resolution reads as follows:

“L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al.). – The court NOTED the
letter dated January 25, 1975
of Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan with its attachments (copy thereof has been
furnished Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, counsel for respondents) and RESOLVED to
instruct the Clerk of Court to inform him of the status of the cases at bar.

“It appearing from said letter that
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro has been selling the lots in litigation herein on
installment basis to the public (among them, Mr. Cayanan) as ‘absolute owner by
virtue of his contract of legal services in Civil Case No. 8321, etc. of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig’ (see Ruby Hills Subdivision Contract
of Sale), which lots are titled in the name of herein petitioner and not in
Atty. Navarro’s name and that the unwarranted claim is made on his behalf that
‘the case is almost won in their favor’ (see Mr. Cayanan’s letter), the Court
RESOLVED FURTHER to refer copy of Mr. Cayanan’s said letter with its
attachments to the Solicitor General under Rule 139, Sections 1,3,4 and 5 for
investigation of the existence of sufficient ground to proceed with the
prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro (whose address of record is No. 66
Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City) for suspension or removal from the office
of attorney and for appropriate action.

“Aside from Mr. Cayanan, the
Solicitor General is directed to communicate in the premises with Atty. Eulogio
R. Rodriguez of the law firm of Ortigas & Ortigas (with address at 10th
Floor, Ortigas Bldg. Ortigas Ave., Pasig, Rizal), who under letter of June 10,
1974 on file in Administrative Case No. 1154 has offered to make available documents
in their possession showing other sales made by Atty. Navarro of properties
titled in the name of other persons, involving a total selling price of P75
million and down payments of almost P0.6 million.”

On April 4, 1975, Assistant Solicitor General (now Justice of the
Court of Appeals) Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. wrote Mr. Angelito B. Cayanan asking
him to submit his affidavit embodying the circumstances surrounding the matters
contained in his letter dated January 25, 1975, especially the second paragraph
thereof.  The letter was sent to Mr.
Cayanan by registered mail but the same was returned unserved for the reason
that the addressee had moved to another address.

On the same date, April 4,
1975, Assistant Solicitor General Gutierrez, Jr. also wrote to Atty.
Eulogio R. Rodriguez requesting him for copies of the documents evidencing the
sales made by respondent Navarro.

On February 13, 1976, this Honorable Court issued a Resolution in
L-39386 and L-39620-29 (Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.) referring the letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13,
1976 “for investigation of the existence of sufficient grounds for the
prosecution of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro for suspension or removal from office
and for appropriate action” and directing “Mr. Ortigas, Jr., to
furnish the Office of the Solicitor General for the purpose with a copy of said
letter and all its pertinent attachments”.

The aforementioned letter of Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr. dated January 13, 1976 reads as follows:

x x x

“Dear Justice Teehankee,

“This is to apprise your Office of
the latest activities of Atty. Felipe C. Navarro who has previously been
reported to the Supreme Court as selling properties titled in the name of this
Company.

“We have just secured a new
‘subdivision plan’ of Atty. Navarro showing that the lots he is now selling to
the public include those titled in the names of the heirs of the late Don
Vicente Madrigal and this Company in Quezon City.  Atty. Navarro has thus expanded his
activities despite recent detention by the Military.  As could be seen from the attached ‘plan’,
Navarro claims to be the owner of that huge property (actually titled in the
name of the Madrigals and this Company) bounded by Ortigas Avenue, E. delos
Santos Avenue, White Plains
Road and E. Rodriguez Avenue,
comprising approximately of 260 hectares.

“As reported in our previous letters
to the Court, Navarro claims to be the owner of some 4,000 hectares of land in
the Greater Manila Area in virtue of his handling the case of some squatters on
a 1.2-hectare lot Mandaluyong, Rizal owned by Dona Florentina Nuguid Vda. de
Haberer.  He contends that whereas his
squatters-clients occupy only about a hectare, he has become, in virtue of his
‘contract of legal services’ with them, the owner of thousands of hectares of
land as these are allegedly covered by void titles.  Navarro thus started to openly sell these
properties.

“Navarro’s Ruby Hills and Bluehills
Subdivisions, for instance, cover properties already with buildings, and other
improvements.  He has nevertheless been
quite successful in selling portions thereof, as when he sold lots within the
De La Salle College, Wack-Wack Golf & Country Club, ABM
Sison Hospital,
etc.  His modus operandi is
described in this Company’s letter-complaint dated April 8, 1974 to Gen. Prospero Olivas, copy of which is
attached hereto for ready reference.

“Navarro continues to defy the
authorities, for only after a brief lull, he is now again openly selling titled
properties of other persons.  We have
provided more than sufficient documentary evidence to the Court and the
Solicitor General and we hope that formal administrative charges can now be
filed against Navarro to prevent him from further perpetrating a large-scale
fraud upon the public.”

x x x

Thereafter, hearings were conducted on various dates.

COMPLAINANTS’ EVIDENCE

The evidence for the complainants consist mainly of documents, most
of which were presented in Criminal Cases Nos. 3158 and 3159 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal and in the various civil cases before the said court
involving Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer. 
Complainants’ sole witness, Reynaldo Morallos, merely identified the
various documentary exhibits presented by the complainants.

From the evidence adduced by the complainants, it appears that a
certain Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer (hereinafter called HABERER, for
short) filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal twenty-two (22) cases for
recovery of possession of her 1.2 hectare property in Mandaluyong, Rizal titled
in her name, and to eject the twenty-two (22) families squatting thereat.  Eleven (11) of these cases were raffled to
Judge Emilio Salas, while the other eleven (11) cases were assigned to Judge
Pedro Navarro.  All the twenty-two (22)
defendants-squatters were represented by respondent NAVARRO.  On behalf of his clients, respondent NAVARRO
interposed as principal defense, the alleged nullity of the HABERER’S title,
claiming that the mother title from which it emanated actually originated from
Decree No. 1425 issued in G.L.R.O. 
Record No. 917, which he claims to be non-existent.

The two sets of cases were decided differently.  In the first set of eleven (11) cases, Judge
Salas rendered a decision on August
31, 1970 sustaining the validity of the HABERER’S title and
ordering the eviction of the defendants?squatters clients of respondent
NAVARRO (Exhibit W).  In finding for the
plaintiff, Judge Salas stated as follows:

“After due consideration of the
evidence adduced by both parties, this Court finds that most of the documentary
evidence submitted by defendants are irrelevant to the case since they pertain
to defendants claim of ownership over 10,000 hectares of land when the area of
the property subject matter of the complaint is only 12,700 square meters.  This Court also believes that the
above-mentioned claims of defendants are untenable.

“Plaintiff’s ownership over the
property in question is evidenced by the issuance in her name, since 1929, of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043. 
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein.  After
the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance of the decree of
registration upon which it is based, it becomes incontrovertible (see case of
Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, 43 Phil. 558; Reyes & Nadres vs. Borbon &
Director of Lands, 50 Phil. 791; Manuel Sy Juco, et al. vs. Luis Francisco, 53
O.G., p. 2186, April 15, 1957; Brizuela, et al. vs. Ciriaco Vda. de Vargas, 53
O.G., 2822, May 15, 1957).

“Defendants’ claim that they became
owners of the land in question by adverse possession is without merit
considering that title to land becomes non-prescriptible.  Sec. 42 of Act No. 496 provides that no title
to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Corporacion de Pp. Agustines
vs. Crisostomo, 42 Phil. 427).  A title
once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious
possession.  Registered title under the
Torrens System cannot be defeated by prescription.  The title, once registered, is notice to the
World.  All persons must take
notice.  No one can plead ignorance of
registration (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 3 Phil. 590, 595).

“Further, defendants recognized
plaintiff’s ownership over the property in question when they filed a petition
with the People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation wherein they sought the
latter’s intervention for the acquisition of the property and for the
subdividing thereof into small lots to be sold to them at nominal cost.  In said petition defendants not only named
the plaintiff as the owner of the property in question but they also indicated
therein her title to the land as Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal.  We
quote hereunder the pertinent facts and data concerning the property in
question in defendants’ petition submitted to the General Manager of the
People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation, as follows:

x    x    x    x    x    x    x    x    x    x     x    x   x   x

‘1) Location
of land:  Barrio Burol, Mandaluyong,
Rizal

2)  Name
of registered owner:  Florentina Nuguid
Vda. de Haberer

3)  Address
of owner:  1288
Burgos St., Paco, Manila,
or c/o Bausa, Ampil, & Suarez Law Offices, Madrigal Bldg., Manila

4)  Certificate
of Title No. (attach photostatic copy): 
15043

5)  Area
of land, Lot & Block & Survey Nos. 12,700 square meters’ (Exh. G).

“As regards defendants’ claim that
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued since 1929 in the name of
plaintiff is null and void, this Court is of the opinion that defendants cannot
assail the validity of said title in this proceeding, which is for recovery of
possession.  Any attack on the decree of
registration of title must be direct and not by collateral proceeding.  The title which may be issued in pursuance of
said decree cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a
collateral proceeding (Legarda, et al. vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590).  In the case of Director of Land vs. Gan Tan,
G.R. No. L-2664, May 30, 1951, our Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of
the trial court where the registered owner was considered disqualified to
acquire land under the Constitution and consequently was denied the right to
constitute his title, said:  ‘That the
disqualification raised by the Court is untenable in the light of the theory
that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked.  That issue can only be raised in an action
instituted expressly for that purpose.’ ‘(See also Ramon Chua Yu Sun, vs. The
Hon. Ceferino de los Santos, et al., G.R. No. 4347, November 23, 1951; James
(sic) G.R. No. L-4013, Dec. 29, 1951;
Samonte, et al. vs. Descallar, et al., No. L-12964, Feb. 29, 1960).

“In view of the above-mentioned
ruling of the Supreme Court, it is our opinion that there is no need to discuss
the merits of the reasons claimed by defendants why Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 15043 in the name of plaintiff is null and void.  (Exh. W, Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8322,
8323, 8327, 8370, 8375, 8374, 8382, 8691, 8693, 8696 & 8699, at pages 6-7;
9-10).”

In the second set of eleven (11) cases, Judge Pedro Navarro decided
in favor of the defendants?squatters clients of respondent NAVARRO.  In his decision dated May 26, 1971, dismissing the complaints, Judge
Navarro stated as follows:

“Plaintiff claims to be the
registered owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 12,000 square meters
situated at the corner of A. Luna, Harapin Ang Bukas and J.C. Zulueta Streets,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, which is covered by, and more particularly described in,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal and
indicated in the sketch plan attached to the complaint as Annex A.

x x x

“It likewise appears that ejectment
proceedings have been filed in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, and in the
City Court of Quezon City against several persons occupying other parcels by
Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, where decisions have been rendered in
favor of said Partnership.  In order to
forestall executions of these decisions defendants in said ejectment cases
filed class suit before this Court by the occupants of the land which was heard
and tried before Branch XV in which the Director of Lands was impleaded as a
party?defendant.  The decision of
Branch XV in said class suit is made part of the evidence of these defendants
in the herein eleven cases for whatever the same may be worth as aid in the
determination of the merits of the issues raised herein.

“As may be gleaned from said
decision of Branch XV plaintiff therein assailed the validity of Decree No.
1425 as null and void and or fictitious and the proceedings in GLRO Rec. No-
917 upon which the decree was based, as also null and void.  The Court sustained the herein plaintiff’s
claim and rendered judgment declaring (1) the proceedings in GLRO Rec. No. 917
null and void; (2) the Decree No. 1425 null and void; (3) all original
certificates of title issued by virtue of and pursuant to the judgment in GLRO
Rec. No. 917 and Decree No. 1425 utter nullities; (4) all transfer certificates
of title derived from the original certificates of title declared void under
No. 3 above, particularly but not exclusively, Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 77652 and 77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its
derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, null and void; (5) that the rightful owners of the litigated lands
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653, 126575 (or 135879)
are the herein plaintiffs x x x and so forth.

“The Court has read copy of this
decision of our Branch XV and observed findings of facts too ponderous to be
ignored.

“That case before Branch XV directly
assails the nullity of the proceedings leading to the proceedings in GLRO
Record No. 917 and, as an inevitable corollary, the nullity of Decree No. 1425
issued by virtue of such void proceedings as well as the original certificates
of title issued as consequence thereof.

“In said proceeding before Branch XV
the Court, among other things, found that while the decision in GLRO 917 was
supposedly rendered on April 25, 1905,
the survey of the property subject matter of therein application was not made
until June 16 to August 16, 1906,
or some one year after the decision.  It
found no proof of initial hearing of the application for registration being
published as required by law without which the Land
Registration Court could not have acquired
jurisdiction over the case.  Said
decision also made inference that since the survey of the property was not made
until a year after the rendition of the judgment the technical descriptions
appearing in the original certificates of title issued under GLRO Rec. No. 917
Decree No. 1425, could not have been those appearing in the notice of initial
hearing, if any.  Publication of accurate
technical description being an essential jurisdictional requirement which
cannot be dispensed with and non-compliance with this requirement renders the
proceedings and the decision and decree and titles issued arising therefrom
null and void.

“The same decision of Branch XV also
made its findings that James Ross who was said to have penned the decision in
GLRO Rec. No. 917, never was a judge of the Court of Land Registration at the
time the decision was supposedly rendered because the Gaceta Oficial for the
year 1905 does not show that James Ross was listed as Judge of the Land
Registration Court or that he was ever appointed in that capacity.  Furthermore, the Court found that while J. C.
Welson was the Clerk of Court on April
26, 1905, one A. K. Jones issued the decree and he signed it as
Clerk of Court.  The Court even found the
supposed decision in that proceedings missing and made its conclusion that since
the decree which was supposedly issued by a person who was not the Clerk of
Court at the time and which decree did not contain the description of the
property ordered in the decision to be rendered because the survey of the
property was only made some one year later and that said decree cannot now even
be found, the decision rendered therein is void for lack of jurisdiction.

“Now, as we have said, the foregoing
findings of facts are too ponderous to be ignored.  It is indeed a truism that a void original
certificate of title cannot be the source of a valid transfer certificate of
title and a void judgment is, in the eyes of the law, inexistent and cannot
give source to any legal right.

“The evidence now shows that the
plaintiffs in said Civil Case No. 7-M(10339) before Branch XV of this Court are
also the defendants in the herein eleven cases in which their properties, are
also involved.  Since the case before
Branch XV directly assails the nullity of the proceedings by virtue of which
Decree No. 1425 and the alleged title of the plaintiff over the parcels of land
occupied by the herein eleven defendants is a derivative from such decree, it
is the considered opinion of this Court that until and unless the decision of
Branch XV of this Court is reversed or set aside by final judgment, plaintiff’s
prayer to order the herein eleven defendants in these eleven cases to vacate
the parcels which they occupy and on which their respective houses are built
has become premature.  It goes without
saying that if said decision of Branch XV will be finally affirmed, or that the
same becomes final and executory, all the claims of rights to ownership and
possession of properties embraced in the decision in GLRO Rec. No. 917 and
Decree No. 1425 shall become absolute nullities.  Possessions by actual occupants of all these
properties had better be maintained until after final decision in Civil Case
No. 7-M(10339) shall have been rendered. 
(Exh. R, Decision in Civil Cases Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8369, 8379,
8383, 8385, 8386, 8387 and 8700, at pp. 2, 5-9).”

On June 21, 1971,
Judge Navarro, acting on the motion filed by respondent NAVARRO, issued an
order cancelling HABERER’s title over her property in question and directing
the issuance of a new title in lieu thereof in favor of respondent’s
clients.  Thus –

“WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaints in the above-entitled
cases (Nos. 8320, 8321, 8326, 8329, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8386, 8685, 8687 and
8700) all with costs against the plaintiff and hereby ordering the Register of
Deeds of Rizal to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal issued in favor of the plaintiff Florentina Nuguid
Vda. de Haberer and in view thereof issue new certificates of title in favor of
the defendants subject to the lien for attorney’s fees in favor of Attorney
Felipe Navarro in accordance with the terms of the “Kasunduan Hinggil sa
Serbisyo ng Abogado” which is quoted in his ex-parte motion for
clarification and/or modification of the decision.

“As so modified the decision stands
in all other respects.

“SO ORDERED.”

(Exhibit S, pp. 4-5).

On July 23, 1971,
HABERER filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order, and on September 15, 1972, Judge Navarro
issued the following order:

“In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion
to reiterate that its decision in this case was mainly predicated on the
decision of Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of title emanating
from the proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and void and plaintiff’s
title happened to be one of them.  The
Court opined that until said decision is reversed the actual occupants had
better be maintained in their possessions of the land.

“Pursuant to the same order the
motion for reconsideration and new trial was set only for reception of alleged
newly discovered evidence.

“The Court now understands that the
decision of Branch XV is now under review by order of our Appellate Court.

It has also come to the understanding of
the Court that the order of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered insofar as
it ordered the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 in favor
of the plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other persons and
entities like the Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, which- is not a
party herein, because the certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a
derivative of GLRO 917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership, derives titles over wide tracts of land.  Since Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership, is not a party in this case whatever orders or decisions are made
in this case cannot be made to affect the said company.  Decisions and orders can only affect parties to
the case.

“The Court therefore arrives at the
conclusion that the order dated June
21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the
decision of Branch XV is now being the subject of further proceedings and (2)
because it has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership, which is not even a party herein.

“WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order
dated June 21, 1971, is set
aside.  However, the decision dated May 26, 1971, insofar as it denies
the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as stated in the decision
stands.

“SO ORDERED.”

(Exhibit T, at pp. 2-3).

HABERER appealed from the decision of Judge Navarro while the
defendants-clients of respondent NAVARRO appealed from the decision of Judge
Salas.  The Navarro order of June 21, 1971 was not appealed by
respondent NAVARRO’s clients.

After the rendition of the Navarro decision which made reference to
the decision rendered by Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XV, respondent NAVARRO published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 the following:

“LEGAL NOTICE TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED:

“PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF LAW
AS INTERPRETED BY OUR SUPREME COURT RESPECTING A VAST TRACT OF LAND
(LATIFUNDIO) COVERING MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY,
THE DECISION DATED MAY 26, 1971 REITERATING AND REPEATING THE DECLARATION AND
ORDER THAT ALL ORIGINAL AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE DERIVED FROM DECREE
NO. 1425 ARE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO RENDERED BY THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
RIZAL IN FAVOR OF THE MYRIAD CLIENTS OF THE UNDERSIGNED HAS AUTOMATICALLY (BY
MERE LAPSE OF THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD) BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

‘But to every possessor in good faith
there comes a time when he is considered a possessor in bad faith.  When the owner or possessor with a better
right comes along, when he becomes aware that what he had taken for granted is
at least doubtful, and when he learns the grounds in support of the adverse
contention, good faith ceases.  The
possessor may still believe that his right is more secure, because we resign
ourselves with difficulty to the sight of our vanishing hopes, but when the
final judgment of the court deprives him of the possession, all illusion
necessarily disappears.’ (Tacas vs. Robon, 53 Phil. 356, 361-362 citing Manresa
and Articles 528, 545, and 1123 of our present Civil Code).

‘He who builds, plants or sows in bad
faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without
right to indemnity.’ (Art. 449, Civil Code).

“HOWEVER, IT IS NOT THE DESIRE OF
THE UNDERSIGNED PREVAILING PARTY AND SUCCESSOR BY TITLE ACQUIRED AFTER THE
ACTIONS WERE BEGUN BY VIRTUE OF HIS CONTRACT OF LEGAL SERVICES TO DEMAND FOR
THE DEMOLITION OR REMOVAL OF THE IMPROVEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE POSSESSOR
IN BAD FAITH FOR:

‘The Civil Code confirms certain
time-honored principles of the law of property. 
One of those is the principle of accession whereby the owner of property
acquires not only that which it produces but that which it united to it either
naturally or artificially.  Whatever is
built, planted or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs
made thereon, belong to the owner of the land. 
Where, however, the planter, builder or sower has acted in good faith, a
conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to
protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of
the Land.  In view of the
impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of `forced
co-ownership’ (Vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law has provided a just and
equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the
improvements after the payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder
or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent.  It is the owner of the land who is allowed to
exercise the option because his right is older and because, by the principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.’ (Bernardo
vs. Bataclan, 66 Phil. 598, 602; see also Filipinas Colleges, Inc., vs. Garcia
Timbang, et al., 106 Phil. 247, 254).

“So caveat emptor
(buyers beware) of possessors in bad faith as we are ready to ask for the
execution of the decision pursuant to law and avoid a scire facias.  Ordinary prudence requires that those
involved may please make some kind of arrangements with the undersigned before
execution by calling through the following telephones:

x x x

“BY THE WAY, YOU ARE ALL INVITED TO
JOIN THE MOTORCADE OF OUR PEOPLE’S VICTORY WHICH WILL PASS THROUGH THE
PRINCIPAL STREETS OF MANDALUYONG, SAN JUAN, PASIG, MARIKINA, AND QUEZON CITY
FROM 9 A. M. TO 12 NOON TODAY, SUNDAY, JULY 4, 1971, THE MOTORCADE WILL BEGIN
FROM NO. 61 AMADO T. REYES STREET,
BARRIO BUROL, MANDALUYONG, RIZAL RETURNING TO THE SAME PLACE AT NOON FOR LUNCH CELEBRATING TILL MIDNIGHT.

(Sgd.) FELIPE C. NAVARRO

Counsel for the Defense

60 Azucena, Roxas District, Quezon City“

(Exhibit D, at pages 6-8).

Thereafter, respondent NAVARRO claimed ownership of properties,
originally covered by Decree 1425 including the parcels of land owned by
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (hereinafter called ORTIGAS, for
short), and started selling them.

In view of the aforementioned publication, panic ensued among the
lot buyers of ORTIGAS and among the property owners whose titles were derived
from Decree No. 1425.  As a counter
measure to allay the fears of the panicky lot buyers and owners, ORTIGAS caused
the publication in the Manila Times on July 19 and 17, 1971 the following:

“WARNING

“SO THE
PUBLIC MAY KNOW

“In reply to numerous inquiries
received by Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership with reference to an
advertisement published in the Manila Times on July 4, 1971 supposedly
affecting the validity of all original certificates of title and transfer
certificates of title derived from Decree No. 1425, Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership wishes to announce that it is not a party to ANY case
allegedly decided on May 26, 1971 by the Supreme Court or any other court and
therefore ALL ITS TITLES DERIVED FROM DECREE NO. 1425 ARE NOT IN ANY WAY
AFFECTED BY SAID DECISION.

“The public is hereby requested to
be wary of any person selling lands and/or rights to lands belonging to and in
the name of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership.

“The public is also warned to be
wary of MISLEADING advertisements and/or persons basing their rights to lands
of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership on such `decision’ of May 26,
1971 which is claimed to be `final and executory’.

ORTIGAS
& COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP” (Exhibit D, at pages 4-5).

After the publication of the foregoing notices, respondent NAVARRO
filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, two (2)
complaints for libel against the officers of ORTIGAS and the officials of the
defunct Manila Times.  Respondent NAVARRO
sought to recover in said cases damages allegedly sustained by him on account
of his failure to consummate thousands of sales by reason of the publication of
the above notice.  In support of his
allegation, respondent NAVARRO presented 169 deeds of sale over lots in his
various subdivisions, the locations of which overlap the properties owned by
ORTIGAS (marked as Exhibit F, F-1 to F-168 in the instant proceedings).

On December 13, 1971,
Judge Benjamin H. Aquino dismissed these two cases for libel for lack of merit
(Exhibit D).

Apart from the documents pertaining to the HABERER cases and the
libel cases, the complainants also presented documents relating to Civil Case
No. 7-M(10339), Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, entitled
“Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership,
et al.” and Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVI, entitled “Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro”.

In Civil Case No. 7-M (10339), the plaintiffs therein sought to
enjoin ORTIGAS from ejecting them.  Judge
Vivencio M. Ruiz decided in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that (1) there was
no publication for the Notice of Initial Hearing set in 1905; (2) there was no
survey of the property sought to be registered; (3) the judge presiding over
the defunct Court of Land Registration was fake; and (4) the Clerk of Court of
the said Court was also fake.  The
dispositive portion of the Ruiz decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, and in view of all the
foregoing, the Court hereby declares and/or orders:

“1.   That the proceedings in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917
are null and void;

“2.   That Decree No. 1425 is null and void and/or
fictitious;

“3.   That all the original certificates of title
issued by virtue of and pursuant to the judgments in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917 and
Decree No. 1425 were utter nullities;

“4.   That all transfer certificates of title
derived from the original certificates of title declared void under No. (3)
above, particularly but not exclusively, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
77652 and 77653 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and 126575 and its
derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No. 135879 of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, were and are null and void;

“5.   That the rightfully (sic) owners of the
litigated lands covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 77652, 77653,
126575 (or 135879) are the herein plaintiffs, the portions owned by them being
as indicated in Exhibit P;

“6.   That the defendant Partnership cease and
desist from molesting the plaintiffs in the enjoyment and peaceful possession
of their respective landholdings;

“7.   That the Hon. Andres Siochi, as Presiding
Judge, Municipal Court, Pasig, Rizal, and Hon. Ricardo Tensuan, as Presiding
Judge, Branch II, City Court of Quezon City, and the defendant Ortigas and
Company, Limited Partnership, their agents, representatives and any and all
persons acting in their behalves, refrain and desist absolute (sic) and
perpetually from proceeding with or taking any action on Civil Cases Nos. 1134,
II-13865, II-13869, II-13877, II-13913, and II-13921 filed by the herein
defendant Partnership against some of the herein plaintiffs;

“8.   That the case be dismissed as against
defendant Director of Lands;

“9.   That the defendant Partnership pay to the
plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees;

“10. That the defendant Partnership pay to the
plaintiffs the costs of the suit; and

“Defendant Partnership’s
counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

“SO ORDERED.”

(Exhibit EE at pages 5-6).

ORTIGAS appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court of Appeals.  On November
21, 1971, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision setting aside
the decision of Judge Ruiz and ordering a new trial to enable the petitioner to
introduce newly discovered evidence.  The
case was then remanded to the lower Court. 
On November 3, 1973,
Judge Arsenio A. Alcantara, who took the place of Judge Ruiz who was separated from
the service by the President of the Philippines,
rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the defendant, Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership,
as against the plaintiffs:

“1. Dismissing the amended complaint;

“2. Confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425,
issued in Expediente 917 and all titles emanating therefrom;

“3. Directing each of the plaintiffs to
individually pay the defendant Company:

(a) P30.00 per month as rental of the premises
occupied by them from the time of the filing of the complaint on October 20,
1967, with legal rate of interest, until they surrender the possession thereof
to defendant Company;

(b) P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

“4. Ordering plaintiff and their
successors-in-interest, agents or any person or persons acting in their behalf,
who are found to be in possession of defendant company’s land to vacate the
same and remove and demolish their improvements thereon at plaintiff’s expenses;

“5. Ordering Atty. Emilio D. Castellanes to return
the attorney’s fees in the amount of P1,030.00 he prematurely collected from defendant
company, with interest; and

“6. To pay the costs.

“SO ORDERED.”

(Exhibit DD at pages 44-45).

The aforesaid decision was appealed.  During the pendency of the approval of the
record on appeal, ORTIGAS filed a motion for immediate execution of
judgment.  After exchange of pleadings by
the parties, the trial court presided by Judge Alcantara granted the motion and
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution in favor’ of Ortigas upon filing a
bond in the amount of P250,000.00.  Del
Rosario, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order.  Despite opposition by Ortigas, Judge
Florellana Castro-­Bartolome, who was appointed to Branch XV vice Judge
Alcantara, granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside the order of
Judge Alcantara.  Ortigas contested the
order of Judge Bartolome through a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-04060.

On September 1, 1975,
the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid case, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari
is granted.  The order of the respondent
Judge dated February 25, 1975,
is hereby annulled and set aside and the order of Judge Arsenio Alcantara,
granting immediate execution, is hereby revived, with instructions to the
respondent judge to fully implement the latter order, including the approval of
the petitioner’s bond and the issuance of the necessary writ or writs of
execution.  The restraining order issued
at the inception of this action is hereby (sic) permanent.

“No costs.

“SO ORDERED.”

(Exhibit EE at pages 50-51).

This decision was the subject of a petition for review filed by
respondents Del Rosario, at al., but the same was denied.  So also with the motion for reconsideration
filed with the Supreme Court (Annex “A” of Exhibit FF).

In order to stop respondent NAVARRO from selling its titled
properties, ORTIGAS also filed Civil Case No. Q-16265, Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVI, entitled “Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership vs. Felipe C. Navarro.

On December 16, 1972,
Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol rendered a decision in favor of Ortigas as follows:

x x x                          x x x                             x xx

“It having been found that defendant
was guilty of bad faith and fraud in claiming and selling plaintiff’s land,
plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees. 
This court finds the amount of attorney’s fees in the sum of P50,000.00
to be fair and reasonable considering the extent and value of the property
involved and the nature of the case.

“Defendant, in his answer and motion
to dismiss, alleged that as a result of the issuance of the restraining order,
he suffered damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 daily.

“Firstly, the same was not raised as
a counterclaim.  Therefore, this court
can only treat it as an affirmative defense.

“Secondly, no evidence was submitted
to prove this claim of damages.  Under
the same authorities cited in support of the denial of plaintiff’s claim for
damages, therefore, he has failed to establish what damages he had suffered.

“Lastly, the court has found that
plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for.  It follows, therefore, that the issuance of
the restraining order was proper and, hence, can not be the basis for a claim
for damages.

“This court cannot help but end this
decision with a note of admonition and hope. 
The people who will ultimately suffer the most from defendant’s acts in
question are his buyers, who in all probability are middle class people who
themselves wanted to make money out of the apparent sad predicament that
defendant had brought upon the plaintiff. 
It is the fervent hope of this court, therefore, that with the advent of
the NEW SOCIETY defendant will turn a new page and make a fresh start in life.

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered:

“1. Upholding the validity and indefeasibility of
plaintiff’s Transfer Certificates of Title over the land in question;

“2. As a consequence thereof, forever enjoining and
barring the defendant, his successors-in-interest, assigns, agents or any
person or persons acting for or in his behalf, from selling and advertising, verbally,
or in writing, the sale of the lands in question and from asserting any claim
or dominion or possession whatsoever on or over the said property, directly or
indirectly, adverse to the plaintiff; and

“3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney’s fees
in the sum of P50,000.00 plus cost of suit.

“SO ORDERED.”

(Exhibit   II-I-a, at pages 409-411 of Exhibit II).

The afore-quoted decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 53125-R.

On December 13, 1978,
the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision in the aforesaid case affirming the
decision of Judge Apostol.

Respondent NAVARRO elevated the case to this Honorable Tribunal
(G.R. No. L-50156).  Again, his petition
was denied for lack of merit.  His
subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied.  Consequently, the issue brought forth in the
sala of Judge Apostol has now been laid to rest.

EVIDENCE FOR THE RESPONDENT

Respondent NAVARRO presented both testimonial and documentary
evidence.  His testimonial evidence
consist of his testimony and those of Atty. Eulogio R. Rodriguez, one of the
complainants; and Arsenio de Guzman, Chief of Section of the Bureau of
Lands.  His documentary evidence consist
of Exhibits 1 to 13, inclusive.

On direct examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that the
present charges are the same as the charges in administrative Case No. 1154,
entitled, “In Re:  Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro, respondent”, which was referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation.  He further
declared that this Honorable Court deferred action on the said administrative
case until such time that G.R. Nos. L-42699-42709, the heirs of the late
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, et al. is
terminated.  Respondent’s direct
testimony dwelt only on these two matters and on the identification of his
Exhibits 1 to 9.

On cross-examination, respondent NAVARRO testified that he is the
counsel for the defendants in the twenty-two (22) cases before Judge Pedro
Navarro and Judge Emilio Salas of the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that he
became the owner of the lands not occupied by his clients by virtue of his
contract of legal services signed by them (pp. 76-78, t.s.n., July 7, 1977; pp.
7-10, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977).  Said
contract, for legal services, which appears on pages 224-232 of Exhibit
“1”, reads as follows:

“KASUNDUAN HINGGIL SA SERBISYO NG
ABOGADO SA MGA KINAUUKULAN NA ANG MGA BAGAY NA ITO AY MALAMAN AT MAKARATING

“Itong kasulatan na ito ay
nagpapatibay at nagbibigay-bisa hinggil sa serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro
tungkol sa aming karapatan sa lupaing nasasakop ng diumano’y Kautusan Blg. 1425
(Decree No. 1425) sa diumano’y Usapin Blg. 699, 875, 917, aip. (Cases Nos. 699,
875, 917, etc.) sa dating Hukuman ng Pagpapatala ng Lupain (defunct Court of Land
Registration) na ang nasabing di-umano’y Kautusan Blg. 1425 na siyang
pinagbatayan ng ipinapatalang gawa-gawang dalawanpu’t anim (26) ng mga Original
Certificates of Title ng Register of Deeds ng Pasig at nagbunga ito ng maraming
Transfer Certificates of Title na sa kasalukuyan iginigiit ng mga mayhawak
ngunit yan ay `wala namang bisa at katuturan (Viz., City of Manila vs. Lack, 19
Phil. 324, 340)’ dahil sa kapaltosan ng nasabing di-umano’y Kautusan Blg. 1425
na sa mula’t sapul magpahanggang ngayon sa kasalukuyan ay iginigiit sa mga
nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito kasama na rin ang mga dati at ibang mga
kliyente ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ngayon ay siyang nararapat maging
kalahok sa animnapung usapin na sa kasalukuyang hawak ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro
(Civil Cases Nos. 8322, etc. of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branches
I, II, and VI contesting the genuineness and due execution of Decree No. 1425
of the defunct Court of Land Registration) upang mabigyan ang mga nakalagda sa
ibaba ng mga kanikaniyang katibayan o kung sila man ay mayhawak ng titulo na
sakup ng di-umano’y Kautusan Blg. 1425 ay babagohin iyan o mapapalitan ng
maybisa galing sa Hukuman upang matahimik at mapayapa ang kanilang paninirahan
dahilan mula’t sapul ay kanila nang pinamamayanan sa buong kaalaman ng
sambayanan at walang paglilihim ng kanilang mapayapang pagmamay-ari ng mga
lupain na sa mula’t sapul ay pinaninirahan ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito at ng kanilang ninuno o nagpamana (predecessors-in-interest) na
siyang mga pangyayari ay sapat na upang maigawad ang mabisang titulo sapagka’t
and nasabing lupain kailanma’y di naging pambayan kungdi pribado o di kaya’y
sariling pag-aari ng nakalagdang may-ari sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito, dahil sa
mga nabanggit ng mga pangyayari na ‘natamo sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay-bisa ng
batas di lamang ng karapatan sa pag-aangkin ng lupain kungdi maging ang
karapatang ipinagkaloob sa kanila ng pamahalaan ay nagsasaad na ang aktuwal na
pagkakaloob sa kanila ng pamahalaan ng titulo ay di na kinakailangan upang ang
nasabing karapatan ay di kilanlin o pagtibayin ng Hukuman (Susi vs. Razon and
Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 424; Director of Lands vs. Abaldonado CA-G.R. No.
177-R, Jan. 12, 1948, 45 Off. Gaz. 2188).’ 
Nguni’t sa dahilang mayroon huwad na titulo ang mga nag-aangkin ng mga
lupain at nararapat iharap sa Hukuman ang bagay na ito upang ang Hukuman
magpatibay at magbigay-bisa ng mga titulo sa mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng
kasunduang ito ayon sa Section 10 ng Rule 39 ng Rules of Court.  ‘Sapagka’t ang pamumusisyon sa isang bagay
ang batayang di mapagtatalunan hinggil sa kalaunan ng pagmamay-ari nito ng
makalipas ang mahabang panahong takda ng batas, maging ito man ay walang
karampatang titulo o mabuting hangarin ay nagpapahina at sumisira sa
saklaw-bisa at halaga ng pinakamahusay na titulo na maaring nasa bagay na iyon
na pinanghahawakan ng taong hindi nagmamay-ari. 
Bunga nito, ang pamumusisyon ng mahigit sa tatlumpung (30) taon na
tinatamasa ng isang tao bilang may-ari kahit na walang karampatang titulo o
mabuting hangarin ay gumaganap ng sapat na titulo upang makuha ang pag-aari ng
lupain tangan sapagka’t ang lampas-bisa o ang panahong itinakda ng batas sa
pamamagitan ng pamumusisyon ng mahigit na tatlumpung (30) taon ay tiyakang
hadlang na maging ang pinakamahusay na titulo na kinikilala ng batas ay hindi
makatitinag o makapangingibabaw (Kincaid vs. Cabututan, 35 Phil. 383).’ Hindi
maaring sabihin o ipagmalakdan ng mga nangamkam na sa pamamagitan ng kanilang
huwad na titulo ay naangkin na nila ang lupain o di kaya’y gawing batayan ang
kanilang huwad na titulo upang masabing sila ay nagmamay-ari ng lupa.  Hindi ito maaring maganap sapagka’t ang
krimen at panlilinlang hindi maaring maging batayan ng panimula ng isang tunay
at mabisang titulo kahit na ipinagbili at nabili sa isang mabuti ang hangarin
ng bumili ng karampatang halaga ng lupain (Levin vs. Bass, 91 Phil. 419,
439).  Dahil sa itinuring ng batas na
sila ay `constructive trustees’, lamang kaya hindi maganap ang lampas-bisa
(Gayndato vs. Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 49 Phil. 244-249).  Subali’t dahilan sa ilang katiwalian ng
katotohanan na di nabatid ng mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na di
umano’y siyang naganap na pangyayari nguni’t ang tunay na katotohanan ay di
naman ito naganap at naliligaw sa paniniwalang nararapat silang nagbayad ng
rentas o alkila at ang Ilan ay binili ang lupain gayong ang katotohanan ay sila
ang nararapat at tunay na may-ari sa di­umano’y Kautusan Blg. 1425 (Decree No.
1425) ng defunct Court of Land Registration na nagbunga ng gawa-gawang titulo
na sumasakop sa buong kalawakan ng humigit kumulang ng 4,000 hectares na sa
makatuwid ay apatnapung (40) milyong metro kuwadrado ng lupaing ngayon ay
matatagpuan sa buong bayan ng Mandaluyong, ang buong bayan ng San Juan
sapagka’t sakop ito noon ng bayan San Felipe Neri ayon sa Act No. 942, ang
bahagi ng Punta sa Maynila sapagka’t sakop ito noon ng Mandaluyong na ngayon,
kalahati ng bayan ng Pasig, kalahati ng bayang Mariquina, at kalahati ng
Lungsod ng Quezon sapagka’t pinilas lamang ito buhat sa bayan ng Mariquina,
Pasig, San Juan at Mandaluyong sa pamamagitan ng Commonwealth Act No. 502 na
pinagtibay noong Oktubre 12, 1939 at sang-ayon sa mga paglalarawan ng
di-umano’y pagsusukat o survey nagsimula sa Maytunas creek patungong ilog ng
San Juan patungong dakong ibaba ng agos ng ilog ng San Juan hanggang sa
bahaging matatagpuan ang ilog ng Pasig sa Punta, Maynila at lumilisya sa
patungong itaas ng agos ng ilog Pasig na nababanggit ang sapa ng Buayang Bato sa
Namayan, Mandaluyong pagkatapos ay pabalik sa ilog Pasig sa dakong pataas ng
agos ng ilog hanggang sa ilog ng Mariquina at pagsunod sa dakong pataas ng agos
ng ilog ng Mariquina hanggang sa sapa ng Pinagpatayang Buaya at lumalakdaw
hanggang sa pinagmulan ng sapa ng Diliman na umaagos ng pababa patungong ilog
ng San Juan at pabalik sa sapa ng Maytunas na ang nasabing baybay-sukat o
survey sa abot makakaya ng sinumang may sapat ng kakayahang agrimensor
(surveyor) ay di makabuo, ng ni isa man lamang maramihang-gilid na hugis o anyo
(polygon).

“Dahilan sa mga nabanggit na
pangyayari, ang mga nakalagda sa ibaba ng Kasunduang ito ay sumasang-ayon na
kasunduin ang paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro ng No. 66 Azucena, Roxas
District, Quezon City upang gumawa ng karampatang hakbang sa Hukuman ng Unang
Dulugan ng Rizal pati Quezon City hanggang sa Corte Suprema kung kinakailangan
at gawin ang anumang paraang isinasaisip niyang tumpak at nararapat gawin
sang-ayon sa batas upang matamo ng mga makalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ang
kani-kaniyang titulo ayon sa paraang minamarapat ng batas at kaming mga
nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito ay nagkakaloob ng buong kapangyarihan kay
Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ilagay sa kanyang pangalan at kung sa kanino man
niya naising ipagkaloob ang ibang bahagi ng lupain na aming minana o
pinagsundan (predecessors-in-interest) nguni’t ipinaubaya na namin sa kay Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro bilang bahagi ng buong kabayaran ng kanyang serbisyo at
karapatang maangkin niya sangayon sa mga inilalahad ng kasunduang ito maliban
na lamang doon sa bahagi ng lupaing nais naming mapatituluhan sa ilalim ng
aming kani-kaniyang pangalan at sumasang-ayon kami sa pagbabayad ng karampatang
halaga sa paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro nang naayon sa isinasaad ng
kasunduang ito.  Na sa bawa’t kilos na
magaganap sa pagpapatitulo ng aming mga ari-arian, ang mamamahala sa mga gastos
o kabayaran ay si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang ibig sabihin na mula sa
pagpapasukat (survey) ng mga ari-arian hanggang sa pagbibigay ng mga plano ng
mga sukat upang mapagtibay ito ng Kagawaran ng Lupain (Bureau of Lands),
paghahanda at pagnonotaryo ng mga ‘affidavit’ ng pagmay-ari, pagkuha ng mga
katibayan ng pagkamay-ari, bayad sa pagpasok sa husgado (filing fees),
pagpapatala (registration), paggawa ng mga kasulatan (documentation), pagsalin
ng mga rekord (transcripts), pagpapatunay (certifi­cations) at iba pang mga
kinakailangang bayaran at pagkagastusan ay nasa kalayaan na ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro na pagpasiyahan ng naa-ayon sa kaniyang sariling kagustuhan na ang
nilalayon sa bandang huli at ang tunay na hangarin ay ang mapatituluhan ng ayon
sa batas ang aming kani-kaniyang mga lupain sa aming kani-kaniyang pangalan
nasa pamamagitan ng mga tungkuling iniatang namin kay Atty. Felipe C. Navarro
sa pamamagitan ng kasunduang ito, sumasang-ayon kami at natatalian
nabibigkisang ng kasunduang ito na magbayad ng halagang Dalawampu’t-Limang Piso
(P25.00) sa bawat metro kuwadrado ng lupaing matitituluhan sa aming pangalan
bilang kabayaran sa serbisyo o paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro; ang
halagang Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawa’t metro kuwadrado ay aming magiging
paunang-bayad upang ang proyektong ito ay mapanimulan kaagad sa lalong madaling
panahon at ang matitirang dapat bayarang halaga na Labing-Limang Piso (P15.00)
bawa’t metro kuwadrado ay aming babayaran kapag naipagkaloob na ang titulo ng
lupa sa amin sa kasunduang kapag buhat sa isang taon mula sa petsang
ipinagkaloob ang titulo ng lupa ay hindi kami nakababayad ng buo sa halagang
natitira o balanse na Labing­limang Piso (P15.00) sa bawa’t metro kuwadrado,
ang titulo ng lupain ay mapupunta sa pangalan ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro
nguni’t ang kasunduang ito na isang taong pagbibigay-palugit ni Atty. Felipe C.
Navarro upang siya ay mabigyan ng kabuuang kabayaran sa kanyang mga
paglilingkod sa usaping ito at sumasang­ayon si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kami
ay pahintulutang isangla ang aming mga ari-ariang may karampatang titulo na di
huwad at pinagtibay ng batas sa alinmang bangko upang ito ang magsilbing bayad
sa mga paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro sa usaping ito at iyon lamang
ang natatanging sandali o panahong kami ay mawawalan na ng obligasyon o
tungkuling bayaran ang Dalawampu’t Limang Piso (P25.00) sa bawa’t metro kuwadrado
ng lupaing ikinasundo namin ang serbisyo ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro upang
matituluhan nang naayon sa batas. 
Sumasang-ayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na ang sinuman sa aming
nakalagda sa ibaba ng kasunduang ito na hindi kayang magbayad ng paunang-halaga
na Sampung Piso (P10.00) sa bawa’t metro kuwadrado ay bibigyan ng karampatang
magbayad ng makahalintulad na halaga sa bawa’t buwan sa loob ng sampu (10) o
dalawanpung (20) taon sang-ayon sa mga hinihingi ng pangyayari, ang titulo ng
lupain ay ipagkakaloob lamang sa nagnanais umangkin nito kung mababayaran na
ang kabuuan ng paglilingkod ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro kasama na ang ‘legal
interest’ at ang amortization nito nguni’t kinakailangan magbigay sila ng
paunang bayad na Limangpung Piso (P50.00) upang panimulan ang pagbabayad
buwan-buwan (monthly installment condition) at magiging mabisa lamang ito kung
matutupad ng buong katapatan ang pagbabayad ng hulugang buwan-buwan (monthly
installment) na maaring magbuhat sa halagang Limang Piso (P5.00) hanggang
Limangpung Piso (P50.00) sa bawa’t buwan nang naayon sa laki o kalawakan ng
lupaing nararapat na mapasa-amin ayon sa batas. 
Sa dahilang ang buhay ng tao ay walang katiyakang magtatagal na habang
panahon ay isinasalin namin ang aming mga karapatan at tungkulin sa aming
tagapagmana lamang at gayon din si Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na maaring manahin
ang kanyang karapatan sa kasunduang ito sa mga tagapagmana lamang niya upang
itaguyod nila ang paglilingkod sa anumang paraan ayon sa batas.

“SA KATUNAYAN AT KATIBAYAN NG LAHAT
NG NABANGGIT NA KASUNDUAN ITO:

ay lumalagda kami sa
kasunduang ito na aming tutuparin ang lahat ng isinasaad sa kasunduang ito na
sinasang-ayunan din ni Atty. Felipe C. Navarro na kanyang tuparin ang kanyang
tungkulin bilang manananggol na tutulong sa aming upang kami ay mapagkalooban
ng Hukuman ng titulo sa aming kani-kaniyang lupain ng naayon sa batas at siyang
isinasaad din ng kasunduang ito at kasama ng paglagda ng aming mga pangalan na
siyang nais naming pangalang lumitaw sa titulo, ang aming kani-kaniyang
tirahan, kalawakan ng lupain, paraang pagbabayad at petsa na kami lumagda sa
kasunduang ito bilang pagpapatunay na aming taos-pusong pagsang-ayon at
hangarin tumupad sa lahat ng napapaloob sa KASULATANG ITO.”

In the course of the proceedings, respondent NAVARRO admitted that
he has sold, and is still selling, properties covered by Torrens titles in the
names of ORTIGAS & CO., Madrigal, and others, but he claims that the titles
of said parties are null and void because they emanated from Decree No. 1425;
that he has no title over the properties sold by him except the contract of
legal services which his clients allegedly signed; that he has no approved
plans for the various subdivisions allegedly owned by him; that he has not
obtained any certificate of registration or license to sell from the National
Housing Authority; that he has not declared for taxation purposes the thousands
of hectares of prime lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Quezon City and
Marikina, allegedly owned by him; and that he has not filed any case directly
attacking the title of ORTIGAS and others (pp. 7-33, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977;
Exhibit J).

Respondent NAVARRO also admits that he is the defendant in the
“25-Billion-peso-case” before Judge Sergio Apostol, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q­-16265, entitled “Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs.
Felipe C. Navarro’s Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City;
that said case covers lands in Mandaluyong, San Juan, Pasig, Marikina and
Quezon City including those involved in the present case (pp. 8-21, t.s.n. July
7, 1977; Exhibits F, F-I to F-168).

Despite the decision of Judge Apostol upholding the validity of the
Ortigas Transfer Certificate of Title and enjoining respondent NAVARRO from
selling lots covered by said title, NAVARRO still continued selling properties
covered by the injunction claiming that the said decision is ineffectual
because the same has been appealed.  (pp.
33-34, t.s.n., Sept. 9, 1977).^[4]

On the basis of the foregoing report, the Solicitor General filed
a complaint with Francisco Ortigas, Jr. as complainant, praying that respondent
Navarro be disbarred, that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys, and
that his certificate of admission to the bar be recalled.

On May 23, 1980, respondent Navarro filed his answer with prayer
to lift the Order of suspension.^[5]
Complainant Ortigas, Jr. filed an opposition to said motion to lift suspension.^[6]
Respondent Navarro reiterated his plea in his manifestation dated August 8,
1980.^[7]
In a resolution dated September 2, 1980, this Court denied the motion to lift
the order of suspension.^[8]

On October 29, 1980, respondent Navarro filed an urgent ex
parte motion praying for the lifting of the order of suspension^[9]
which, was denied by this Court on November 13, 1980.^[10]
He reiterated his prayer in another motion filed on January 5,1981^[11]
but the same was likewise denied in our resolution of January 22, 1981.^[12]

II.  Administrative Case No.
2033 arose from a letter-complaint, dated March 13, 1979, filed by the spouses E. Conrad and
Virginia Geeslin with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
charging respondent Navarro with deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in
office, and blatant violation of the Attorney’s Oath.  Said letter was thereafter referred to this
Court by Integrated Bar of the Philippines President (now Chief Justice)
Marcelo. B. Fernan for appropriate action.^[13]

Pursuant to our resolution of June 4, 1979,^[14]
respondent Navarro filed his answer with motion to dismiss on June 29, 1979.^[15]
The corresponding reply^[16]
and rejoinder,^[17]
were subsequently filed.  In a resolution
of this Court dated October 1, 1985, the case was referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.^[18]

On August 28, 1989, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted
its report, with the following findings and recommendation:

CHARGES

In their Complaint dated March 13, 1979, complainants charged
respondent with deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office, and blatant
violation of the Attorney’s Oath, for having deliberately misrepresented the
facts and the law while acting as counsel for the defendants in the following
civil cases:

“a.   His insistence that our clients are no longer
owners of the land subject of the cases mentioned above; he falsely alleged
that to his personal knowledge the title to the land is in the name of one
Leopoldo Cojuangco.  This false
allegation was made despite the final decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch XVII, in Civil Case No. Q­-18221 entitled ‘E. Conrad and
Virginia B. Geeslin vs. Leopoldo Cojuangco, et al.’:  (1) declaring the transfer of the lot to
Leopoldo Cojuangco was fraudulent and had been effected thru falsification;
and, (2) ordering the cancellation of the title issued to Cojuangco and the
reversion of the title to our clients. 
Copies of the Complaint and the Decision in said case are hereto
attached as Annexes ‘B’ and ‘C’, respectively.

“b.   Mr. Navarro persisted and still persists in
representing that our clients’ title was rendered null and void by virtue of
the expiration of the Parity Amendment and the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of Quasha vs. Republic, 46 SCRA 160. 
Our clients’ title to the aforesaid property was acquired by hereditary
succession from the late Dr. Luther Bewley who acquired said land         in 1925.  ‘The ownership therefore of our clients is
protected both under the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions.  Any lawyer, even a law student, knows that
the Parity Amendment and the decision in the Quasha case, supra, covers
cases where property was acquired by virtue of the Parity Amendment.  Mr. Navarro is either guilty of abysmal
ignorance of the law or of complete and unabashed contempt for facts, the law
of the land and for the Courts.

“c.   Mr. Navarro persists in misrepresenting to
the Court that the title covering the land subject of the above cases had been
declared null and void in the ‘final and executory’
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II.  He deliberately omits to give the title of
the case and its docket number for the obvious and malicious reason that the
case he relies upon (Heirs of Nuguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42699-­42709)
is still pending resolution before the Supreme Court and hence cannot be `final
and executory’.

“d.   He misrepresents to the Court that the land
subject of the cases heretofore enumerated is not within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Quezon City Court
and hence the court has no jurisdiction. 
Further, that title thereto having described the land to be part of the
Municipality of San Juan del Monte, is void. 
He cannot disclaim knowledge however of the fact that the area in the
vicinity of Santolan Road in Quezon City was originally part of the
Municipality of San Juan del Monte territory of Quezon City when the latter was
created on 14 June 1950.  In the light of
this fact, Mr. Navarro’s representation is false and malicious.

“e.   Mr. Navarro has shown a complete and total
disregard for basic norms of honesty and decency in that having prejudiced the
interest of his clients because of his gross neglect to appeal in a timely
manner from the decision of the court and having adopted the wrong remedy, in
complete ignorance of the law, he had influenced his clients into commencing a
case before the Tanod Bayan against the Presiding Judge of the City Court of
Quezon City, Branch I, and Hon. Minerva Genovea.  The case is obviously calculated to harrass
and coerce the Honorable Presiding Judge. 
Mr. Navarro’s conduct speaks ill of his respect for the law and the
courts.

“f.    The penchant of Mr. Navarro to misrepresent
and deceive did not stop before the City Court of Quezon City.  He continues to do so in the petition he
filed before the Honorable Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. S.P. 08928
entitled ‘Adolfo Corpus, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva Genovea, et al.’ Copies of the
Petition and the undersigned attorney’s Comments thereto are hereto attached as
Annexes ‘D’ and ‘E’, respectively.” (pp. 2-4, Record)

RESPONDENT’S ANSWER

In his Answer dated June 29, 1979, respondent averred:

“1.   From the face of the Resolution itself
showing that the undersigned respondent was never furnished with a copy of the
complaint, it can be gathered therefrom that the complaint is clearly intended
to prevent the undersigned respondent to proceed in defending his clients’
cause in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 (Adolfo M. Corpuz, et al. vs. Hon. Minerva C.
Genovea, the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia Bewley Geeslin, et al.)
still pending at this writing before Court of Appeals.  To allow complainants to harass respondent
while the case (is) still pending in our courts of justice is an act in
contempt of court for which complainants and their counsel is (sic) liable.

“2.   Undersigned respondent as counsel for the
defendants Adolfo Corpuz, et al., gave his entire devotion to the interest of
his clients, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
be withheld from his clients, save by the rules of law, legally applied; for
his clients are entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
that is authorized by law as was done by the undersigned respondent in the
`ejectment case’ filed by the complainants Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia B.
Geeslin against the several clients of the undersigned.” (pp. 42-43,
Record)

After complainants filed a Reply dated July 17, 1979 pointing out that respondent’s
Answer does not deny any of the six (6) counts of charges specified in the
Complaint, respondent filed a Rejoinder dated September 7, 1979, wherein he averred:

“1.   The complainants alien spouses Conrad E.
Geeslin and Virginia B. Geeslin who are citizens of the United States of
America held TCT No. 153657 which was cancelled on December 31, 1970 by TCT No.
180231 issued in the name of Leopoldo A. Cojuangco both of which TCTs are
described to be located at Santolan Road, Municipality of San Juan, Province of
Rizal (now part of Metro-Manila) filed ejectment proceedings before the City
Court of Quezon City against my clients Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and
twenty others in Civil Case Nos. I-29872 to I-29931 which later were elevated
to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-08928 entitled Adolfo M. Corpuz, et
al. vs. Hon. Minerva C. Genovea, the Spouses Conrad E. Geeslin and Virginia
Bewley Geeslin, et al.

“2.   Undersigned respondent being retained as
counsel for the defendants Victorino Manaois and Adolfo Corpuz and the twenty
(20) other defendants did his bounden duty in defense of their rights and
exerted his utmost learning and ability within what the law allows that at this
stage, the controversy is still under litigation before the courts as stated
above.

“3.   Under the foregoing circumstances, the
administrative action must have been resorted to by the complainants at the
instigation of their counsel who failed in wanting to defeat the defendants of
their God-given rights to the land in litigation that there can be no other
conclusion left but that the administrative complaint against the respondent is
`pure’ harassment.” (pp. 53-54, Record)

FINDINGS

When the case was set for hearing by the Office of the Solicitor
General, the parties agreed that there is no dispute as to the facts of the
case.  Hence, they were granted a period
of thirty (30) days within which to file their respective memoranda, if they so
desire, after which the case will be considered submitted for resolution.

Since respondent did not deny the allegations of the Complaint, and
in fact admitted during the hearing of the case set by the Office of the
Solicitor General that there is no dispute as to the facts of this case, it
follows that the specifications of the charges against him, which are duly
supported by documents, are deemed sufficiently proven.

The only justification invoked by respondent is that he “gave
his entire devotion to the interest of his clients” and that he “did
his bounden duty in defense of their rights and exerted his utmost learning and
ability.”

Consequently, respondent is deemed to have committed the
misrepresentations specified by complainants, as quoted above.

RECOMMENDATION

Respondent was also charged in Administrative Case No. 2148
entitled Ortigas vs. Navarro and has been suspended from
the practice of law since May 5, 1980. 
His suspension is still in effect.

The acts complained of in the present case also warrant the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty.
Felipe C. Navarro be likewise suspended from the practice of law.

Makati, for Manila, August 17, 1989.^[19]

No justiciable issue was raised in Administrative Case No. 2033
as respondent Navarro failed to deny the material allegations in the complaint
of the spouses E. Conrad and Virginia B. Geeslin.

The two main issues raised by the Solicitor General in
Administrative Case No. 2148 are:

1.  Whether or not
respondent Navarro sold properties titled in the names of other persons without
the consent of the latter; and

2.  If in the affirmative,
whether or not such act constitute sufficient grounds for suspension or
disbarment.

Respondent reiterated in his answer that the transfer
certificates of title of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer were declared null and void in the decision
dated March 31, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, in
Civil Case No. 7-M (10339) entitled “Pedro del Rosario, et al. vs. Ortigas
& Co., Ltd. Partnership, et al.,” and in the order dated June 21, 1971
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Cases Nos. 8320,
8321, 8326, 8369, 8376, 8379, 8383, 8685, 8686, 8687 and 8700 entitled
“Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer vs. Federico Martinez, et al.”
Respondent likewise reiterated his claim of ownership over all parcels of land
(including those of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and Florentina
Nuguid Vda. de Haberer) covered by Decree No. 1425, G.L.R.O Record No. 917,
which was declared null and void in the decision dated March 31, 1970 of Branch
XV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.^[20]
Furthermore, he asserts ownership over the subject properties as payment for
his legal services rendered in the ejectment cases filed against his clients in
Branches I and II of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal.

1. To clarify, Civil Case
No. 7-M (10339) filed before Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal directly assailed the nullity of the proceedings in G.L.R.O Record No.
917 by virtue of which Decree No. 1425 was issued, as well as the original
certificates of title issued as a consequence thereof.  These original certificates of title include
the properties belonging to Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership and
Florentina Nuguid Vda. de Haberer.  On
March 31, 1970, Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz then presiding over said Branch XV
rendered a decision declaring Decree No. 1425, as well as the original
certificates of title issued pursuant thereto, null and void.  Ortigas appealed the Ruiz decision to the Court
of Appeals which set the same aside and remanded the case to Branch XV for new
trial.  On November 3, 1973, Judge
Arsenio A. Alcantara, who replaced Judge Ruiz, rendered a decision confirming
the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles emanating therefrom.  The said decision was pending appeal with the
Court of Appeals when the investigation of respondent by the Solicitor General
was conducted.

We take judicial notice of the fact that on December 29, 1983, the Court of Appeals rendered
a decision affirming in toto the November 3, 1973 decision of Judge Alcantara, which
became final and executory on May 25,
1984 insofar as plaintiffs-appellants Pascual Santos, et al. are
concerned.  The plaintiffs-appellants
Pedro del Rosario, et al. appealed to the Supreme Court in a petition for
review on certiorari which was, however, denied on February 18,
1985.  The denial became final and
executory on April 10, 1985.  Thereafter,
the records of the case were remanded to Branch XV of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal for execution.

The records further show that the March 31, 1970 decision of
Branch XV in Civil Case No.7-M(10339) became the basis of the decision rendered
by Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II on May 21, 1971 which dismissed the
complaint for ejectment filed by Haberer against the clients of respondent
Navarro.  However, Judge Navarro in his
decision, categorically stated that “it is the considered opinion of this court
that until and unless the decision of Branch XV of this court is reversed or
set aside by final judgment, plaintiff’s prayer to order the herein eleven
defendants in these eleven cases to vacate the parcels which they occupy and on
which their respective houses are built has become premature.” This
condition was reiterated in Judge Navarro’s order of September 15, 1972 wherein
he stated that:

In the order dated July 17, 1971, the Court had occasion to
reiterate that its decision in this case was mainly predicated on the decision
of Branch XV of this Court that the certificate of title emanating from the
proceedings in GLRO Record No. 917 were null and void and plaintiff’s title
happened to be one of them.  The Court
opined that until said decision is reversed the actual occupants had better be
maintained in their possessions of the land.^[21]

However, to repeat, the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV was
set aside by the Court of Appeals which remanded the case for new trial and
another one was rendered, this time by a different judge on November 3, 1973
upholding the validity of Decree No. 1425 and all titles issued as a
consequence thereof.  Respondent cannot
feign ignorance of the November 3, 1973 decision, which superseded the March
31, 1970 decision, for the simple reason that it was his clients who appealed
the former decision to the Court of Appeals. 
In spite thereof and indicative of his bad faith, he stubbornly
continues to invoke the decision of March 31,1970 as the source of his alleged
ownership rights over the Ortigas properties.

2.  In the order of June
21, 1971, Judge Pedro Navarro of Branch II ordered the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15043 issued in the name of Haberer and the issuance
of new titles in the name of the defendants, subject to the lien for attorney’s
fees in favor of respondent pursuant to the terms of the contract for his legal
services.  However, the same judge issued
an amendatory order dated September
15, 1972, which provides in part that:

It has also come to the understanding of the Court that the order
of June 21, 1971, sought to be reconsidered insofar as it ordered the
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.15043 in favor of the
plaintiff, also adversely affects the interests of other persons and entities
like the Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership, which is not a party herein,
because the certificate of title of the plaintiff is also a derivative of GLRO
917 and Decree No. 1425 from which Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership,
derives titles over wide tracts of land. 
Since Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, is not a party in this
case whatever orders of decisions are made in this case cannot be made
to affect the said company.  Decisions
and orders can only affect parties to the case.

The Court therefore arrives at the conclusion that the order dated
June 21, 1971, must be reconsidered on two grounds (1) because the decision of
Branch XV is now being the subject of further proceedings and (2) because it
has the effect of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership, which is not even a party herein.

WHEREFORE, as prayed, the order dated June 21, 1971, is set aside.  However, the decision dated May 26, 1971,
insofar as it denies the ejectment of the present occupants of the land as
stated in the decision stands.” (Emphasis supplied)^[22]

It is apparent, therefore, that since the order of June 21, 1971,
was set aside, the inescapable conclusion is that Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 15043 stands and remains in the name of Florentina Nuguid. Vda. de
Haberer.  Consequently, the defendants
therein never acquired title to the property covered by the title of
Haberer.  And, since respondent Navarro
merely derives his supposed title to the properties as a mere transferee, with
more reason can he not validly become the owner of the above properties.

3.  Respondent
intransigently relies on his contract for legal services executed with his
clients, the defendants in the Haberer case, as another basis of his claim of
ownership over the entire property covered by Decree No. 1425.  It must be noted that the said contract was
executed pursuant to the ejectment cases filed against respondent.  Navarro’s clients which involve only the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15043 containing an
aggregate area of 12,700 square meters, more or less.  It appears that the defendants assigned
rights to respondent Navarro over properties which they did not actually occupy
and which virtually extended to all the properties covered by titles issued
under Decree No. 1425.  As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, said defendants have not presented any
document evidencing their ownership of the parcels of land they assigned to
their lawyer.

From the foregoing considerations, it is incontrovertible that
respondent’s pretended ownership rights over the parcels of land covered by
Decree No. 1425 have no bases whatsoever, either in fact or in law, and it is
an assault on credulity to assume that he was not aware of the vacuity of his
pretensions and misrepresentations.

In resolving this disbarment case, we must perforce initially
focus on the degree of integrity and respectability required and expected of
the law profession.  There is no denying
that membership in the legal profession is achieved only after a long and laborious
study.  By years of patience, zeal and
ability the attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his
family.  This is not to say, however,
that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on
the social prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and
attached to the same by reason of the fact that everyone is deemed an officer
of the court.^[23]

The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has
been judiciously stated by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme
Court in this wise:

On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to
an individual and the prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise.  The right to exercise it ought not to be
lightly or capriciously taken from him. 
On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability of
the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be
preserved.  For these objects, some
controlling power, some discretion, ought to be exercised with great moderation
and judgment, but it must be exercised.^[24]

In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed
that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an
attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts
and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure
the proper administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence.^[25]
Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his
client and to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proven
him unfit for the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney.^[26]

As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is
innocent of the charges until the contrary is proved, and that, as an officer
of the court, he has performed his duty in accordance with his oath.^[27]
Therefore, in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant,^[28]
and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.^[29]

We have painstakingly scrutinized and evaluated the records of these
two administrative cases and we cannot but find that strong and unassailable
evidence exist to render it our irremissible duty to impose the ultimate
sanction of disbarment on respondent.

Respondent’s defense is anchored primarily on the contract for legal
services, executed by his clients whom he represented in the twenty-two
ejectment cases filed before Branches I and II of the former Court of First
Instance of Rizal, and quoted in full in the earlier part of this discussion.

It is extremely relevant to note that both of the aforesaid two
branches of the trial court made no finding as to the validity of the claim of
ownership favorable to the defendants therein. 
On the contrary, Judge Salas of Branch I found for the plaintiff and
ordered the defendants, clients of respondent, to vacate the premises.

In the case before Judge Navarro of Branch II, the complaint was
dismissed merely on the ground that “since the evidence is uncontroverted
that the defendants in all these eleven cases have been in open, continuous,
and adverse possession of their respective parcels dating back since their
predecessors in interest, their possession must be maintained and
respected.”^[30]

Thereafter, on June 21, 1971, the aforesaid judgment of dismissal
dated May 26, 1971 was modified, and the Register of Deeds was thereafter
ordered to cancel the transfer certificate of title issued in favor of
plaintiff and to issue new titles in the name of defendants subject to the lien
for attorney’s fees in favor of herein respondent in accordance with the
contract for legal services hereinbefore discussed.

Eventually, however, this subsequent order was reconsidered and
set aside in the order of September 15, 1972, “because it has the effect
of adversely affecting the interest of Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership,
which is not even a party herein,” but it reinstated the decision of May
26, 1971 insofar as it denied the ejectment of the present occupants.

As earlier noted, there is nothing in the records to show that
the defendants in the ejectment cases were declared the true owners of the land
subject of said cases.  Only the fact of
possession was ruled upon, and what the courts recognized was merely the
defendants’ right of possession.  They,
therefore, never became the owners of the subject lots in any sense of the word
in the absence of any declaration to that effect, by reason of which they could
not have legally transmitted any ownership rights or interests to herein
respondent.  Furthermore, we have seen
that any further claim of ownership on their part was finally settled by the
order of September 15, 1972, setting aside the order of June 21, 1971, wherein
the trial court correctly held that the earlier order unjustifiedly affected
adversely the rights of Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership.  In addition, said court specifically excluded
the title of said partnership from the effects of its decision.

Pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the
defendants-clients agreed to convey to respondent whatever properties may be
adjudicated in their favor in the event of their failure to pay the attorney’s
fees agreed upon.  As hereinbefore
stated, there was nothing awarded to the said defendants except the right to
possess for the nonce the lots they were occupying, nothing more.  That respondent acquired no better right than
the defendants from whom he supposedly derived his claim is further confirmed
in the order of Judge Navarro, dated June 21, 1971, denying the issuance of new
certificates of title to herein respondent who, to further stress the obvious,
was not even a party but only a lawyer of the defendants therein.  It follows that his act of selling the
Ortigas properties is patently and indisputably illegal.

Respondent admits that he has no Torrens title but insists on the
puerile theory that his title is his contract of legal services.^[31]
Considering that the effectivity of the provisions of that contract is squarely
premised on the award of said properties to the therein defendants, and since
there was no such adjudication, respondent’s pretense is unmasked as an
unmitigated deception.  Furthermore, it
will be recalled that the land involved in the two ejectment cases consists of
only 1.2 hectares whereas respondent is claiming ownership over thousands of
hectares of land, the sheer absurdity of which he could not be unaware.

Respondent further admits that he has been and is continuously
selling, up to the present, the entirety of the land covered by Decree No.
1425,^[32]
pursuant to the decision of Branch XV of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, dated March 31, 1970, declaring the said decree null and void as well as
the titles derived therefrom.

It must nonetheless be remembered that the decision of Judge
Navarro recognizing the defendants’ right of possession is subject to the final
outcome of the March 31, 1970 decision of Branch XV which nullified Decree No.
1425.  The latter decision, at the time
the decision of Judge Navarro was rendered, was pending appeal.  This is precisely the reason why Judge
Navarro had to amend his decision a third time by setting aside the order of
registration of the land in the name of the defendants.  He could not properly rule on the ownership
rights of defendants therein pending a final determination of the validity of
said decree, which thus prompted him to find merely on the fact of
possession.  Besides, a mere declaration
of nullity cannot, per se, justify the performance of any act of
ownership over lands titled in the name of other persons pursuant to said
decree.  To cap it all, as earlier
discussed, that decision dated March 31, 1970 has been reversed and set aside,
and a new one entered confirming the validity of Decree No. 1425, which latter
decision has long become final and executory.

In Civil Case No. Q-16265, entitled “Ortigas and Co., Ltd.
Partnership vs. Navarro,” herein respondent was enjoined from selling,
offering for sale and advertising properties of the plaintiff therein.  We have seen that a decision was subsequently
rendered therein on December 16, 1972 by Branch XVI of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal upholding the validity of the transfer certificates of title
issued in the name of Ortigas and Co., Limited Partnership which became final
and executory after respondent’s petition for review was denied by this
Court.  However, respondent continued to
sell properties belonging to Ortigas in blatant disregard of said
decision.  This was categorically
admitted by respondent himself during the investigation conducted, by the
Solicitor General.^[33]

Respondent avers that the said decision cannot be enforced during
the pendency of the appeal therefrom. 
Even if this were true, the fact that respondent was enjoined by the
court from selling portions of the Ortigas properties is compelling reason
enough for him to desist from continuing with his illegal transactions.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General:

Respondent Navarro knew that the decision of Judge Vivencio Ruiz
declaring as null and void certificates of titles emanating from Decree No.
1425 was reversed and set aside.  He knew
that Judge Pedro Navarro of the Rizal Court of First Instance exempted Ortigas
& Company from the effects of his decision. 
He also knew that Judge Sergio Apostol of the Rizal Court of First
Instance in Quezon City had upheld the validity of the certificates of title of
Ortigas & Company.  Despite all these
pronouncements and his awareness thereof, respondent NAVARRO still continued to
sell properties titled in the name of Ortigas & Company and the Madrigals.^[34]

Lastly, the motion to dismiss filed by respondent, should be, as
it is hereby, denied for lack of merit. 
Respondent inexplicably posits that the charges against him should be
dismissed on the ground that his suspension was automatically lifted by virtue
of our resolution, dated June 30, 1980,
which merely reads:

The manifestation of counsel for respondent stating among other
things that the complaint against respondent could not prosper if respondent’s
manifestation dated March 3, 1980 in G.R. No. 42699-42709 and his request for
certification by the Chief Justice to the effect that the petition in G.R. Nos.
42699-42709 is deemed dismissed pursuant to Sec. 11(2) of Art. X of the
Constitution are granted, are NOTED.

There is absolutely nothing in the resolution to support
respondent’s typical distortion of facts. 
On the contrary, our resolutions dated September 2, 1980, November 8,
1980, and January 22, 1981 repeatedly denied respondent’s motions for the
lifting of his suspension.

It further bears mention at this juncture that despite the suspension
of respondent Navarro from the practice of law, he continues to do so in clear
violation and open defiance of the original resolution of suspension and the
aforestated resolutions reiterating and maintaining the same.  Thus, the records of this Court disclose that
in G.R. No. 78103, entitled “Jose de Leon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.,” a Second Division case filed on April 25, 1987, counsel for private
respondents therein questioned herein respondent Navarro’s personality to intervene
in the case since he was under suspension, to which respondent Navarro rejoined
by insisting that his suspension had allegedly been lifted already.  In G.R. No. 85973, entitled “Hilario
Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,” the petition wherein was filed on December
2, 1988 and assigned to the First Division, respondent Navarro also appeared as
counsel for therein petitioner.  Said
petition was denied since the same was prepared, signed and-verified by
respondent Navarro, a suspended member of the Philippine Bar.  Over his expostulation that his suspension
had already been lifted, the Court directed the Bar Confidant to take
appropriate action to enforce the same. 
Again, in G.R. No. 90873, entitled “Matilde Cabugwang, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.,” the Second Division, in a resolution dated
January 31, 1990, imposed a fine of P1,000.00 upon said respondent for
appearing therein as counsel for petitioner which fine he paid on February 5,
1990.

In at least three (3) other cases in the Second Division, respondent
Navarro appeared before the Court as counsel for petitioners therein, viz:  (1) G.R. No. 74792 (Lorenzo Valdez, et al.
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.), filed on June 11, 1986 and decided
on December 7, 1986; (2) G.R. No. 76589 (Atty. Felipe C. Navarro, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al.), filed on November 28, 1986 and decided on May 4,
1987; and (3) G.R. No. 81482 (Ricardo Rasalan vs. Flaviano Pascua, et al.),
filed on January 30, 1988 and decided on February 15, 1988.  The rollos in said cases show that he also
appeared as counsel for the petitioners in the Court of Appeals, but since the
lower courts’ original records were not forwarded to this Court, said rollos do
not reflect whether he also appeared before the different courts a quo.

Such acts of respondent are evidential of flouting resistance to
lawful orders of constituted authority and illustrate his incorrigible
despiciency for an attorney’s duty to society. 
Verily, respondent has proven himself unworthy of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by law and by this Court, through his deliberate
rejection of his oath as an officer of the court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Felipe C. Navarro is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.  Let a copy of this resolution be furnished to
the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the
personal records of respondent.  This
resolution is immediately executory.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and
Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., no part. Related to counsel for complainants.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., no part. Because of prior participation in the OSG.

Padilla, J., no part, in view
of financial interest in Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership.

Gancayco, J., on leave.

---

^[1] Rollo,
Adm. Case No. 2148, 57.

^[2] Ibid.,
Adm. Case No. 2033, 2.

^[3] Ibid.,
Adm. Case No. 2148, 60.

^[4] Ibid.,
4-32.

^[5] Ibid.,
61.

^[6] Ibid.,
122.

^[7] Ibid.,
146.

^[8] Ibid.,
169.

^[9] Ibid.,
182.

^[10] Ibid.,
187.

^[11] Ibid.,
191.

^[12] Ibid.,
194.

^[13] Ibid.,
Adm. Case No. 2033, I.

^[14] Ibid.,
41.

^[15] Ibid.,
42.

^[16] Ibid.,
45.

^[17] Ibid.,
53.

^[18] Ibid.,
166.

^[19] Ibid.,
168-177.

^[20] Ibid.,
Adm. Case. No. 2148, 135-136.

^[21] Ibid.,
14.

^[22] Ibid.,
15.

^[23]
Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293 (1983).

^[24] Id.,
citing Ex Parte Burr, 9 Wheat 529.

^[25]
Diaz vs. Gerong, 141 SCRA 46 (1986).

^[26]
Daroy, et al. vs. Legaspi, 65 SCRA 304 (1975).

^[27]
Atienza vs. Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338 (1977).

^[28]
Hernandez vs. Villareal, 107 SCRA 633 (1981).

^[29]
Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978).

^[30] Ibid.,
Adm. Case No. 2148, 408.

^[31] Ibid.,
257.

^[32] Ibid.,
47.

^[33] Ibid.,
262-263.

^[34] Ibid.,
271-272.