PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARCELINO YAP AND ROBERTO MENDOZA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Resolving this appeal, we affirm the judgment, dated 11 March
1988, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, National Capital Judicial Region,
Metro Manila,^[1]
finding, after joint trial, accused Marcelino Yap guilty of illegal sale of marijuana
in Criminal Case No. 23814, and accused Roberto Mendoza of illegal possession
of the same drug in Criminal Case No. 23815, pursuant to the Dangerous Drugs
Act (RA No. 6425, as amended).

The evidence for the prosecution substantially discloses:

Both accused herein are inmates of the Makati
Municipal Jail.

On 1 May 1986,
at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Appellant YAP, who was
detained at the “brigada” of the Makati
Municipal Jail, went to the “isolation room” where Appellant MENDOZA was
detained and sold to the latter for P20.00 six (6) sticks of marijuana
cigarettes.  Unknown to them, Patrolman
Reynaldo Agarao and Patrolman Conrado
Muy, then on duty as jail guards, personally
witnessed their movements from a distance of ten (10) meters away (TSN, 16
December 1987, p. 10).  They saw
Appellant YAP holding something in his right hand and when he approached
Appellant MENDOZA, each exchanged something with the other.  The guards immediately accosted the two (2)
accused and found in the hands of Appellant MENDOZA six (6) sticks of handrolled cigarettes (Exhibit “A”), and in the hand of
Appellant YAP they found a P20.00 bill (Exhibit “G”).  Arrested, and thereafter taken to the
Investigation Room and frisked therein, one (1) more stick of marijuana cigarette was found in the pocket of Appellant YAP’s pants.

Upon investigation by Pat. Emeterio Malanyaon, Jr., of the
Anti-Narcotics Division that same evening, Appellant YAP refused to give any
written statement.  Appellant MENDOZA
did so, however, wherein he admitted the sale to him by Appellant YAP of the
six (6) sticks of marijuana cigarettes for P20.00.  At the lower left-hand corner of the second
page of said sworn statement appears the following annotation:  “Assisted by Atty. Romeo de Belen – CLAO.”
The Statement was signed and sworn to before the Fiscal on 5 May 1986, as shown on the left-hand margin of
the same page.  In its Decision, the
Trial Court observed that this particular document was not objected to by the in defense when presented and when
offered in evidence by the prosecution (At p. 5; TSN 16 December 1987, p. 150).

The six (6) sticks of marijuana were sent to the NBI for
laboratory examination and were found positive for marijuana (Exhibits “C”
& “C-1”).

Appellant YAP’s version, on the other hand, is that the only reason why
Pat. Muy caused him to be charged for drug pushing
was because he had refused to cooperate and point to one Eduardo Lastico, a designated “mayor” in the Makati
Jail, as the mastermind of drug pushing within the prison premises.  When he refused to do so, he was beaten up
and a firearm was discharged near his ear, after which he lost
consciousness.  When he regained his
senses, he was already at the Narcotics Division.  He further claims that he saw the P20-bill
(Exhibit “G”) for the first time when Pat. Muy
testified in Court and that he was not really investigated but confined in the
Investigation Room where he remained isolated.

Mario Mangampo, another inmate and
Appellant YAP’s co-accused in a Robbery with Homicide
case, tended to substantiate Appellant YAP’s version
when he testified that in the evening of the incident Pat. Muy
had caused a commotion when he fired a gun. 
Thereafter, he saw Appellant YAP taken out of the “brigada” and sent to the
Investigation Room.            In other
words, what he wanted to convey was that there was no incident of any previous
exchange between the two Appellants.

For his part, Appellant MENDOZA maintains that he was threatened
and coerced by Pat. Muy to execute his Affidavit. 
His version, given during the trial, is that in the evening of 1 May 1986, he was awakened by defense
witness, Mario Mangampo, and told that he was being
summoned by Pat. Muy and told to testify against
Appellant YAP, which he refused to do because he knew nothing against him.

After assessment of the evidence before it, the Trial Court
rejected Appellant YAP’s version for being incredible
and refused to give credence to Appellant MENDOZA’s
assertion that he was merely threatened into executing his Affidavit (Exhibit
“D”).  The Trial Court opined that,
considering their position and responsibilities as law officers, neither Pat. Muy nor Pat. Agarao
would maliciously fabricate such serious charges against both
Appellants nor employ force and intimidation against either of
them.  Hence, the judgment of conviction
that it meted out and the sentence that it imposed, adjudging:

“WHEREFORE, finding accused Marcelino Yap
in Criminal Case No. 23814 guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, he is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000.00).

“Finding accused Roberto Mendoza in Crim.
Case No. 23815 guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 8, Par.
2, of Republic Act No. 6425, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to eight (8) years and to pay a
fine of eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00).

“After finality of this decision, the marijuana
cigarettes (Exhs. A, A-1 to A-6), shall have
to be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition in
accordance with law.

“SO ORDERED.

“Makati,
Metro Manila, November 3, 1988.”

Hence, this appeal.

Required to submit Briefs, the last one was submitted by the
People on 13 December 1989
(p. 75, Rollo).  The Court dispensed with Appellants’ Reply
Brief in its Resolution of 14 March
1990 (p. 80, ibid.), and therafter the
case was deemed submitted for deliberation.

Appellants, represented by the CLAO (changed to the Public
Attorney’s Office [PAO]), now interpose the following

Assigned Errors

“I.       The trial court erred in believing that the prosecution has
adequately substantiated the respective offenses charged against both accused.

“II.      The trial court erred in admitting the
extra-judicial confession of accused Roberto Mendoza although it was taken in
violation of his constitutional rights.

“III.     The trial court erred in convicting both
accused-appellants despite the fact that their guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.”

Additionally, the defense argues that inasmuch as both Appellants
are detention prisoners it is most unlikely that they would have been buying
and selling marijuana openly and casually instead of discreetly and
clandestinely, and that Appellant YAP could not have come into possession of
the prohibited drugs owing to the strict measures employed in the Makati jail on the screening of visitors of inmates.

After a review of the oral and documentary evidence, we find the
defense submissions unconvincing.  Patrolmen
Agarao and Muy witnessed
the marijuana cigarettes and the payment therefor
exchange hands between Appellants.  When
the latter were frisked, the goods were found on both of them plus an
additional marijuana stick in the pocket of Appellant YAP’s
pants.  The motives of the said jail
guards in testifying the way they did cannot be questioned.  They are officers of the law entitled to the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties (Sec.
5(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court; People vs. de Jesus, Nos. 71942-43, 13 November
1986, 145 SCRA 521).  They could have had
no other motive to testify the way they did except to enforce the laws,
particularly, the Dangerous Drugs Act, as is their bounden duty.

Appellants’ argument that with restricted visits to inmates, they
have no way of possessing the
marijuana, as charged, overlooks the resourcefulness with which even jailbreaks
have been staged with the use of crude gadgets fashioned from even the most
innocuous of utensils and materials. 
Besides, by their very nature, marijuana in the form of cigarettes can
easily be hidden and carried from place to place unobtrusively.

Appellant YAP’s posture that he was
charged only because of his refusal to cooperate with prison authorities in
pinpointing Eduardo Lastico as the mastermind of the
marijuana traffic in the municipal jail is tantamount to accusing the jailguards of maliciously fabricating the charges against
them.  Aside from the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties, Appellant YAP’s
assumptions are pure speculation. 
Notably, after the patrolmen concerned had spotted something awry going
on between Appellants, they immediately accosted them, frisked them, and lost
no time in causing their investigation that very same evening.  Further, Appellant YAP’s contention that a firearm was discharged near his ear
inside the Investigation Room to cow him to submission strains credulity,
indeed.

Similarly, Mangampo’s
statement that the investigation of Appellants was triggered only by the shot
that Pat. Muy had fired before the incident
deserves no credence for being without any basis whatsoever.

Coming now to Appellant MENDOZA, his denials that he was assisted
by counsel and accorded his constitutional rights when he gave his extrajudicial
confession, are belied by the records.  Surely, the CLAO attorney would not have
affixed his signature had Pat. Muy, as alleged, threatened and coerced Appellant MENDOZA into giving
his sworn statement. 
Significantly, too, if Appellant YAP was not forced to sign any
statement when he refused to do so, there is no reason why Appellant MENDOZA
would not have been similarly treated. 
Moreover, it bears repeating that said Affidavit was not objected to by
the defense when it was offered in evidence by the prosecution.

At any rate, even without
such confession, the prosecution evidence can easily stand on its own.

In the last analysis, Appellants’ denials, as well as
submissions, cannot overcome the positive and categorical testimonies of the
two jail guards, which are entitled to full faith and credence in the absence
of any contrary indication.

We now consider the penalties imposed.

In the People’s Brief, the Solicitor General submits that the
fine of P25,000.00 imposed on Appellant YAP by the
Trial Court should be reduced to P20,000.00 since that amount is the maximum
allowable under Section 4 of RA
No. 6425 or the Dangerious
Drugs Act.  That was the old
provision.  It has been amended since by
PD No. 1675, which took effect on 17
February 1980 and, therefore, brings the present crime, committed
on 1 May 1986, within its
coverage.  The amended provision reads:

“Sec. 4. 
Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs.  – The penalty
of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug,
or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.  x x x ”

Considering the foregoing amendatory provision, therefore, the
fine of P25,000.00 imposed by the Trial Court is
proper.

In so far as
Appellant MENDOZA is concerned, the Trial Court found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 8, paragraph 2, of RA No. 6425 and sentenced him

“x x x to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment
of six (6) months and one (1) day to eight (8) years and to pay a fine
of eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00).”

The Solicitor General now avers that the penalty that should be imposed is not that provided for in
paragraph 2 Section 8 of RA No. 6425, but that provided in paragraph 1
thereof because Appellant MENDOZA “was not convicted of possessing Indian
hemp.” Hence, according to the Solicitor General, the indeterminate penalty to
be imposed should be not less than six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum,
to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and a fine ranging from six (6) thousand to
twelve (12) thousand pesos.

This is only half accurate. 
The law specifically states that “Indian hemp” is also otherwise known
as “marijuana” (Section 2(i), RA No. 6425; Section 1,
(1)[i], BP Blg. 179).  Also, the
crime was committed on 1 May 1986
so that the latest amendment to Section 8 is applicable, that is, BP Blg.
179, which took effect on 2 March 1982, providing
that:

“Sec. 8. 
Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. 
– The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve years and one day to
twenty years and a fine ranging from twelve thousand to twenty thousand pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess
or use any prohibited drug except Indian hemp in regard to which the next
following paragraph shall apply.

“The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to
twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess
or use Indian hemp.”

While the penalty recommended by the Solicitor General tallies with
that provided for in the aforequoted second
paragraph, Appellant MENDOZA’s conviction should be for violation of Section 8, paragraph 2
of RA No. 6425, as amended, as held by the Trial Court, and not
paragraph 1 thereof, as the Solicitor General opines.

WHEREFORE, we affirm
the judgment appealed from, with the modification that
accused-appellant, Roberto Mendoza, is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years.  The fine, payable by him, remains at P8,000.00.  Each
accused-appellant shall pay one-half (1/2) of the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento,
and Regalado, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Judge Nemesio S. Felix.