EDITH JUINIO ATIENZA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SERGIO PESTANO, SALVADORA ATIENZA AND MARIA BEATRIZ ATIENZA, RESPONDENTS.

The sole issue in this petition for certiorari is whether
or not litis pendentia obtains in Civil Case No. V-5456 before
the Roxas City Court and in SP Proc. No. G-52510 before the Quezon City Court.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Andres Atienza died intestate on June 26, 1987 leaving behind three
(3) heirs, namely: (1) respondent
Salvadora Atienza, his mother; (2) herein petitioner Edith Juinio Atienza, his
widow; and (3) respondent Maria Beatriz Atienza, his adopted daughter.

On September 21, 1987, respondent Salvadora Atienza and Maria
Beatriz Atienza filed before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City Civil Case
No. V-5456 for damages, accounting and partition against herein
petitioner. In their complaint,^[1]
respondents alleged that petitioner used a fake birth certificate of Ma.
Beatriz Atienza in claiming insurance, retirement and other benefits. This alleged tortious act effectively
deprived Salvadora Atienza of her share in the estate of the deceased. Accordingly, plaintiffs prayed that Edith
Juinio Atienza should be held liable for moral and exemplary damages and that
an accounting and partition be ordered.

Instead of filing an answer to the complaint, petitioner filed a
case docketed as SP. Proc. No. Q-52510 for issuance of letters of
administration of the estate before the Quezon City Court and then filed a
Motion to Dismiss the case before the Roxas City Court on the ground that there
was a pending case involving the same parties and the same action before the
Quezon City Court.

Respondent Judge Sergio Pestano denied the Motion to Dismiss and
appointed Salvadora Atienza as guardian ad litem of Maria Beatriz Atienza. Respondent judge likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner herein.

Petitioner then filed an answer to the complaint in Civil Case
No. V-5456 and later filed in the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with preliminary injunction against respondent Judge alleging
that the latter committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
abovementioned motion of herein petitioner.

Finding no grave abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeals, in
its Decision^[2]
dated August 12, 1988 dismissed the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition thereby affirming the ruling of the trial court that Civil Case No.
V-5456 could not be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution^[3]
dated October 18, 1988. She has now
elevated the matter before this Court assigning as grounds for the petition the
following:

“1. The respondent court has decided questions
of substance in the instant case in violation of and/or contrary to the express
provisions of Rule 74, Sec. 1, Rules of Court, in effect preferring an ordinary
action of partition to an administration proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Andres I. Atienza
notwithstanding the fact that the said deceased left debts. (Underscoring Supplied)

2. Respondent court has likewise decided questions of substance in
the instant case in a way not in accordance with but contrary to the rulings of
the Supreme Court in Arcillas v. Montejo, G.R.
No. L-21725, November 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 197, 201-202, and Teodoro v. Mirasol, 53 O.G. 8088.”

Petitioner argues that the trial court and appellate courts erred
in not dismissing Civil Case No. V-5456 because: (1) as provided in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, an
action for partition could not be resorted to when the decedent left debts as
in this case; and (2) SP. Proc. No. Q-52510 is the proper proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Andres I. Atienza because in such proceeding, all
the matters and issues between and among the heirs, the creditors, and the
other claimants can be finally and definitely settled.

Would the dismissal of Civil Case No. V-5456 be warranted?

Petitioner anchors her argument for the dismissal of the case on litis
pendentia, as provided in Sec.
1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which provides:

“Sec. 1. Grounds. –
Within the time for pleading a Motion to Dismiss the action may be made on any
of the following grounds:

xxx                     xxx                                      xxx

(e) That there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.”

Citing Teodoro v. Mirasol,^[4]
petitioner argues that even if the pending SP Proc. Q-52510 case was filed
later than the case sought to be dismissed, the latter may be properly
dismissed if the pending case is a more proper suit to
resolve the issues between the parties.

Petitioner’s contentions are unmeritorious.

The Court of Appeals has correctly stated in its Decision:

The lower court correctly ruled that lis pendens does
not obtain. The requisites for lis
pendens as a ground for dismissal of a complaint are (1) identity of parties
or at least such representing the same interest in both actions; (2) identity
of rights asserted as prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (3) the identity in both cases is such that the judgment may be rendered in
the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res
judicata to the other case.

Not all these requisites are present herein.

While the parties in Civil Case No. V-5456 before the Roxas City
court and in SP Proc. No. Q-52510 are the heirs of the late Andres I. Atienza –
his mother, Salvadora Atienza; his wife, Edith Juinio Atienza; and adopted
child of the decedent, Maria Beatriz Atienza, the cause of action is
different. Civil Case No. 5456 is for
damages, accounting and partition, whereas SP Proc. No. Q-52510 is a proceeding
for the intestate estate of the deceased Andres Atienza. In Civil Case No. 5456, plaintiffs seek to
recover moral damages from the defendant arising out of alleged tortious acts, and
a decision in this cause of action would not constitute res judicata
in SP Proc. No. Q-52510.”

Petitioner insists, however, that the causes of action in the two
proceedings are similar because Civil Case No. V-5456 is principally an action for partition of
part of the estate of the late Andres I. Atienza. Suffice it to say, however, that the Court of Appeals has
correctly differentiated Civil Case No. V-5456 from SP Proc. No. Q-52510. The former is for damages arising from
wrongful acts while the latter is for the administration of the estate. Moreover, in Civil Case No. V-5456, the
prayer for order of partition of the estate is an incident of the finding of
the court that petitioner herein committed wrongful acts in order to acquire
the properties of the decedent to the prejudice of complainants, private
respondents herein. Res judicata
would not even arise between the two cases.

Petitioner has also cited the case of Teodoro v. Mirasol^[5]
to bolster her claim that the case in the
Roxas City Court should be dismissed because of litis pendentia. A scrutiny of the cited decision discloses
that the Court dismissed the first case because a claim for damages was not the
central cause of action.

The court said:

“The claim for damages is also invoked as a ground for
allowing the continuance of the action. We note that this supposed cause of action is merely an incident of the
main question of whether or not plaintiff should be allowed to continue to
lease for two years more. It is not
alleged as an independent cause of action. It is not set forth in a paragraph different from the others as the
Rules require.”

In the matter now before us, Civil Case No. V-5456 is principally for damages and is alleged as the first cause of action in the
complaint.

Hence, reliance on Teodoro v. Mirasol, is
misplaced.

Petitioner has likewise cited the case of Arcillas v. Montejo^[6]
to support her claim that respondent Judge erred in preferring an ordinary
action of partition to an administration proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Andres Atienza, notwithstanding the fact that the
deceased left debts.

However, a study of the said case only reaffirms the options
granted by law to the heirs, viz., either a special proceeding in the
extra-judicial settlement of the estate or an ordinary action of partition. It bears stressing that private respondents
herein filed an action for damages in Civil Case No. V-5456 with accounting and
partition as incidents of the principal action.

The Court notes further that SP Proceeding No. Q-52510 in Quezon
City was filed by petitioner long after Civil Case No. V-54561 was instituted
in Roxas City.

As the Court of Appeals observed:

“It did not escape our scrutiny that the SP Proc. No. 52510 in
Quezon City was filed by petitioner long after the Civil Case No. V-5456 was instituted
in Roxas City. Petitioner’s motion to
dismiss was filed after she was granted extension of time to file answer in
Civil Case No. V-5456 thus enabling her in the meantime to institute the
special proceedings in Quezon City which petitioner has used in seeking the
dismissal of the Roxas City case.

As to which of the two suits in court ought to be dismissed, the
special proceedings in Quezon City in contrast with SP Proc. No. Q-52510, is
already much in progress, a complaint, and an answer with counterclaim have
been filed, fully joining the issues. We do not deem it proper to allow petitioner to bring the issues in
Civil Case V-5456 to another court, or to withdraw them from the forum before
which they had already placed them for resolution.”

Obviously, petitioner filed SP Proceeding No. Q-52510 only as an
afterthought to evade liability for her alleged tortious acts in the event that
they be proved in Civil Case No. 5456. We cannot sanction this behavior by ordering the dismissal of Civil Case
No. V-5456.

On February 11, 1991, respondent Salvadora Atienza died and was
survived by her sole heir and daughter, Suzette Atienza del Rosario. Counsel for deceased respondent Salvadora
Atienza filed a Manifestation and Motion^[7]
praying for the substitution of Salvadora Atienza by Suzette Atienza del
Rosario. The substitution prayed for is
hereby granted.

Lastly, this Court has held, time and time again, that an order
denying a motion to dismiss being merely interlocutory, it cannot be the basis
of a petition for certiorari.^[8] We
have ruled that:

“An order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does
not end the Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously
indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is ‘interlocutory,’
e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16 of the Rules, or
granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing
amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or
production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a ‘final’ judgment or order, which is appealable, as above
pointed out, an ‘interlocutory’ order may not
be questioned on appeal except only as
part of an appeal that may eventually
be taken from the final judgment rendered
in the case.”^[9]
(Underscoring supplied)

We agree with the Court of Appeals that
the remedy in case of denial of a motion to dismiss is by appeal in due course after the case has been
decided on the merits. To allow all
interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari would,
not only delay the administration of justice, but also unduly burden the court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
respondent Court’s decision AFFIRMED in
toto with costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), Bidin, Melo, and Vitug, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex “A” of Reply; Rollo, pp. 49-55.

^[2]
Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 15-18; Decision, Atienza v.
CA, et al., CA-G.R. SP No. 14667, penned by Victor, J., concurred in by
Tensuan and Aldecoa, Jr., JJ.

^[3]
Annex “B” of Petition; Rollo, pp. 20-21.

^[4]
53 O.G. 8088.

^[5]
(L-8934 53 O.G. 8088, May 18, 1956) L-8934, May 18, 1956 99 Phil 150.

^[6]
26 SCRA 197.

^[7]
Rollo, p. 111.

^[8]
Day v. RTC of Zamboanga City, Br. XIII, G.R. No. 79119, November 22,
1990; Prudential Bank and Trust Co. v. Macadaez, et al., No. L-10454,
May 25, 1957; People of the Phil. v. CA, et al., L-51635, December 14,
1982, 119 SCRA 162.

^[9]
Denso (Phils.) Inc. v. The Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
L-75000, February 27, 1987.