KAPALARAN BUS LINE, PETITIONER, VS. ANGEL CORONADO, LOPE GRAJERA, DIONISIO SHINYO, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Kapalaran Bus Line (“Kapalaran“) seeks the reversal or modification of the
Court of Appeals’ decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 12476 and the absolution of
petitioner from all liability arising from the collision between one of
petitioner’s buses and a jeepney owned by respondent
Coronado, driven by respondent Grajera and in which jeepney respondent Shinyo was a
passenger.

The facts of this case as found by the trial court and adopted by
the Court of Appeals, are summarized in the trial court’s decision and quoted
in the Court of Appeals’ own judgment in the following terms:

“The accident happened on the National
Highway at 10:30
A.M. on August 2, 1982.  The jeepney driven
by Lope Grajera was then coming from Pila, Laguna on its way towards the direction of Sta. Cruz, traversing the old
highway.  As it reached the intersection
where there is a traffic sign
‘yield’, it stopped and cautiously treated the intersection as a ‘Thru Stop’
street, which it is not.  The KBL bus was
on its way from Sta. Cruz, Laguna, driven by its regular driver Virgilio Llamoso, on its way
towards Manila.  The
regular itinerary of the KBL bus is through the town proper of Pila, Laguna, but at times it avoids this if a bus is
already fully loaded with passengers and can no longer accommodate additional
passengers.  As the KBL bus neared the
intersection, Virgilio Llamoso
inquired from his conductor if they could still accommodate passengers and learning that they were
already full, he decided to bypass Pila and instead, to proceed along the national highway. 
Virgilio Llamoso
admitted that there was another motor vehicle ahead of him.

The general rule is that
the vehicle on the national highway has the right-of-way as against a feeder
road.  Another general rule is that the vehicle
coming from the right has the right-of-way over the vehicle coming from the
left.  The general rules on right-of-way
may be invoked only if both vehicles approach the intersection at almost the
same time.  In the case at bar, both roads
are national roads.  Also, the KBL bus
was still far from the intersection when the jeepney
reached the same.  As testified to by
Atty. Conrado L. Manicad
who was driving a Mustang car coming from the direction of Sta. Cruz and
proceeding towards the direction of Manila, he stopped at the intersection to
give way to the jeepney driven by Grajera.  Behind Manicad were
two vehicles, a car of his client and another car.  A Laguna Transit bus had just entered the
town of Pila
ahead of Atty. Manicad.

The sketch marked Exhibit
‘E’ indicates very clearly that the jeepney had
already traversed the intersection when it met the KBL bus head-on.  It is also obvious that the point of impact
was on the right lane of the highway which is the lane properly belonging to
the jeepney. 
As testified to by Lope Grajera, the
KBL bus ignored the stopped vehicles of Atty. Manicad
and the other vehicles behind Atty. Manicad and
overtook both vehicles at the intersection, therefore, causing the accident.

Judging from the testimony
of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad
and the sketch (Exhibit ‘E’), the sequence of events shows that the first
vehicle to arrive at the intersection was the jeepney.  Seeing that the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at the intersection began to move
forward, and for his part, Atty. Manicad stopped his
car at the intersection to give way to the jeepney.  At about this time, the KBL bus was
approaching the intersection and its driver was engaged in determining from his
conductor if they would still pass through the town proper of Pila.  Upon learning
that they were already full, he turned his attention to the road and found the
stopped vehicles at the intersection with the jeepney
trying to cross the intersection.  The
KBL bus had no more room within which to stop without slamming into the rear of
the vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad.  The KBL driver chose to gamble on proceeding
on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven by Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was about to cross the
center of the highway and was directly on the path of the KBL bus.  The gamble made by Llamoso
did not pay off.  The impact indicates
that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of
speed because, after the collision, it did not stop; it travelled
for another 50 meters and stopped only when it hit an electric post (pp. 3-4,
Decision; pp. 166-167, Record).”^[1]

On 14 September 1982,
Kapalaran, apparently believing that the best defense
was offense, filed a complaint for damage to property and physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against respondents Angel Coronado and Lope Grajera in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.  Respondents
answered with their own claims (counter-claims) for damages.  A third-party complaint and/or a complaint
for intervention was also filed in the same case
against Kapalaran by jeepney
passenger Dionisio Shinyo.

On 15 October 1986,
after trial, the trial court rendered a judgment in favor of private
respondents and ordering Kapalaran

“(a)    to pay Angel Coronado the sum of P40,000.00 as compensation for the totally wrecked jeepney, plus the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses, and

(b)     to Dionisio
Shinyo the sum of P35,000.00 representing the
expenses incurred by said intervenor for his
treatment including his car–hire, the further sum of P30,000.00 representing
the expenses said defendant will incur for his second operation to remove the intramedulary nail from his femur, the additional sum of
P50,000.00 to serve as moral damages for the pain and suffering inflicted on
said defendant, plus the sum of P10,000.00 in the concept of exemplary damages
to serve as a deterrent to others who, like the plaintiff, may be minded to
induce accident victims to perjure themselves in a sworn statement, and the sum
of P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.”

From the above judgment, Kapalaran
appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing the trial court’s findings on the
issue of fault and the award of damages. 
The Court of Appeals, on 28
June 1988, affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified
the award of damages by setting aside the grant of exemplary damages as well as
the award of attorney’s fee and litigation expenses made to Dionisio
Shinyo.^[2]

This decision of the Court of Appeals is now before us on a Petition for Review, a motion for
reconsideration by Kapalaran having been denied by
that court on 13 October 1988.

Kapalaran assails the findings of fact
of the Regional Trial Court and of the Court of Appeals, and insists before
this Court that respondent Grajera, driver of the jeepney, was at fault and not the driver of Kapalaran’s bus.  It
must be remembered that it is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh evidence presented
by the parties all over again and that our jurisdiction is in principle limited
to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the Court of
Appeals.  Kapalaran
has made no compelling showing of any misapprehension of facts on the part of
the Court of Appeals that would require us to review and overturn the factual
findings of that court.  On the contrary,
examination of the record shows that not only are the conclusions of fact of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court on who — the bus driver or the jeepney driver —
had acted negligently and was at fault in the collision of their vehicles,
amply supported by the evidence of record, but also that Kapalaran’s
bus driver was grossly negligent and had acted wantonly and in obvious
disregard of the applicable rules on safety on the highway.

Kapalaran’s driver had become aware
that some vehicles ahead of the bus and travelling in
the same direction had already stopped at the intersection obviously to give
way either to pedestrians or to
another vehicle about to enter the intersection.  The bus driver, who was driving at a speed
too high to be safe and proper at or near an intersection on the highway, and
in any case too high to be able to slow down and stop behind the cars which had
preceded it and which had stopped at the intersection, chose to swerve to the left lane and overtake
such preceding vehicles, entered the inter­section and directly smashed into
the jeepney within the intersection.  Immediately before the collision, the bus
driver was actually violating the following traffic rules and regulations, among others, in the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act
No. 4136, as amended:

“Sec. 35.  Restriction as to speed.  — (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on
a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor
less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the
width of the highway, and or any other condition then and
there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway
at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at
a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the
assured clear distance ahead.

x x
x              x
x x                 x x x

Sec. 41. 
Restrictions on overtaking and passing.
— (a) The driver of a vehicle
shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking
or passing another vehicle, proceeding in the same direction, unless such left
side is clearly visible, and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient
distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.

x x
x              x
x x                 x x x

(c) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass any other
vehicle proceeding in the same direction, at any railway grade crossing, or
at any intersection of highways, unless such intersection or crossing is
controlled by traffic signal, or unless permitted to do so by a watchman or
a peace officer, except on a highway
having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction where the
driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to
prohibit a driver overtaking or passing, upon the right, another vehicle which
is making or about to make a left turn.

x x x              x x x                 x x x.”

(Underscoring supplied)

Thus,
a legal presumption arose that the bus driver was negligent,^[3]
a presumption Kapalaran was unable to overthrow.

Petitioner’s contention that the jeepney
should have stopped before entering the “Y-intersection” because of
the possibility that another vehicle behind the cars which had stopped might not similarly stop and might
swerve to the left to proceed to the highway en route to Manila,
is more ingenious than substantial.  It
also offers illustration of the familiar litigation tactic of shifting blame
from one’s own shoulders to those of the other party.  But the jeepney
driver, seeing the cars closest to the intersection on the opposite side of the highway come to a
stop to give way to him, had the right to assume that other vehicles further
away and behind the stopped cars would similarly come to a stop and not seek
illegally to overtake the stopped vehicles and come careening into the
intersection at an unsafe speed.^[4]
Petitioner’s bus was still relatively far away from the intersection when the jeepney entered the same; the bus collided head-on into the
jeepney because the bus had been going at an
excessively high velocity immediately before and at the time of overtaking the
stopped cars, and so caught the jeepney within the
intersection.  It was also the
responsibility of the bus driver to see to it, when it overtook the two (2)
cars ahead which had stopped at the intersection, that the left lane of the
road within the intersection and beyond was clear.  The point of impact was on the left side of
the intersection (the right lane so far as concerns
the jeepney coming from the opposite side), which was
precisely the lane or side on which the jeepney had a
right to be.

Petitioner Kapalaran also assails the
award of moral damages against itself, upon the ground that its own bus driver,
third-party defendant, was apparently not held liable by the trial court.^[5]
Hence, Kapalaran argues that there was no
justification for holding it, the employer, liable for damages, considering
that such liability was premised upon the bus driver’s negligence, and that petitioner
“as mere employer” was not guilty of such negligence or imprudence.^[6]
This contention is thoroughly unpersuasive. 
The patent and gross negligence on the part of petitioner Kapalaran’s driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence either in
the selection or in the supervision of its bus drivers.^[7]
Where the employer is held liable for damages, it has of course a right of
recourse against its own
negligent employee.  If petitioner Kapalaran was interested in maintaining its right of
recourse against or reimbursement from its own driver,^[8]
it should have appealed from that portion of the trial court’s decision which
had failed to hold the bus driver responsible for any damage.  Contrary to Kapalaran’s
pretense, its liability for the acts and negligence of its bus driver is not
“merely subsidiary”, and is not limited to cases where the employee
“cannot pay his liability”, nor are private respondents compelled
first to proceed against the bus driver. 
The liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
direct and immediate:  it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee.^[9]
So far as the record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was
unable to rebut the presumption of negligence on its own part.  The award of moral damages against petitioner
Kapalaran is not only entirely in order:  it is also quite modest considering Dionisio Shinyo’s death during
the pendency of this petition, a death hastened by,
if not directly due to, the grievous injuries sustained by him in the violent
collision.

The Court of Appeals deleted the award of exemplary damages which
the trial court had granted in order “to serve as a deterrent to others
who, like the plaintiff [Kapalaran], may be minded to
induce accident victims to perjure themselves in a sworn statement.” The
Court of Appeals held that there was no basis for this award of exemplary
damages, stating that it was not “such a reprehensible act to try to
gather witnesses for one’s cause” and that there was no evidence of use of
“pressure or influence” to induce the accident victims to perjure
themselves.  While that might have been
so, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals overlooked another and far
more compelling basis for the award of exemplary damages against petitioner Kapalaran in this case. 
There is no question that petitioner’s bus driver was grossly and very
probably criminally negligent in his reckless disregard of the rights of other
vehicles and their passengers and of pedestrians as well.  The Court is entitled to take judicial notice
of the gross negligence and the appalling disregard of the physical safety and
property of others so commonly exhibited today by the drivers of passenger
buses and similar vehicles on our highways. 
The law requires petitioner as common carrier to exercise extraordinary
diligence in carrying and transporting their passengers safely “as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.”^[10]
In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and
creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb
the recklessness of their drivers.^[11]
While the immediate beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary diligence
are, of course, the passengers and owners of cargo carried by a common carrier,
they are not the only persons that the law seeks to benefit.  For if common carriers
carefully observed the statutory standard of extraordinary diligence in respect
of their own passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously benefit
pedestrians and the owners and passengers of other vehicles who are equally
entitled to the safe and convenient use of our roads and highways.^[12] The law seeks to stop and
prevent the slaughter and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) and the
destruction of property (whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the
very size and power of which seem often to inflame the minds of their
drivers.  Article 2231 of the Civil Code
explicitly authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages in cases of quasi-delicts “if the defendant acted with gross
negligence”.  Thus we believe that
the award of exemplary damages by the trial court was quite proper, although
granted for the wrong reason, and should not only be restored but augmented in
the present case.  The Court is aware
that respondent Shinyo did not file a separate petition for review to
set aside that portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision which deleted the
grant by the trial court of exemplary damages. 
It is settled, however, that issues which must be resolved if
substantial justice is to be rendered to the parties, may and should be
considered and decided by this Court
even if those issues had not been explicitly raised by the party affected.^[13] In the instant case, it is not only the
demands of substantial justice but also the compelling considerations of public
policy noted above, which impel us to the conclusion that the trial court’s
award of exemplary damages was erroneously deleted and must be restored and
brought more nearly to the level which public policy and substantial justice
require.

In much the same vein, we
believe that the award by the trial court of P15,000.00 as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses, deleted by
the Court of Appeals, should similarly be restored, being both authorized by
law^[14] and demanded by substantial justice in the
instant case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED, except (1) that the award of exemplary damages to Dionisio
Shinyo shall be restored and increased from P10,000.00 to P25,000.00, and (2) that the grant of attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses in the sum
of P15,000.00 to Dionisio Shinyo
shall similarly be restored.  Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Gutierrez,
Jr., Bidin, and
Cortes, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Record, pp. 63-65.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 34.

^[3]
Article 2185, Civil Code.

^[4]
Section 42 (a) of Republic Act No. 4136, as
amended:

“Sec. 42.  Right of way.  — (a) When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the
same time, the driver of the vehicle on
the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right,
except as otherwise hereinafter provided. 
The driver of any vehicle traveling at any unlawful speed shall
forfeit any right of way which he might otherwise have hereunder.”
(Underscoring supplied)

^[5]
The other grounds adduced by Kapalaran in its
petition for review of the Court of Appeals’ decision are clearly insubstantial
and require no discussion.

^[6]
Petition for Review, p. 15; Rollo, p. 16.

^[7]
Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 148 SCRA 370 (1987); Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 202 (1979); Umali
v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 (1976).

^[8]
Article 2181, Civil Code.

^[9]
Bienvenido
Galisan v. Benito Alday,
154 SCRA 388 (1987); Rufo Mauricio Construction v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 713 (1987); Malipol
v. Tan, 55 SCRA 214 (1974).

^[10]
Article 1255, Civil Code.

^[11]
Nucom v.
Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, 30 SCRA 69 (1969).

^[12]
Under Executive Order No. 202, dated 19
June 1987 (83 Official Gazette No. 27, p. 3122-B [6 July 1987]), the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board is authorized, among other things,

“k. To formulate, promulgate,
administer, implement and enforce rules and regulations on land transportation, public utilities,
standards of measurements and/or design and rules and regulations requiring
operators of any public land
transportation service to equip, install and provide in their utilities and in
their stations such devices, equipment, facilities and operating procedures
and techniques as may promote safety, protection, comfort and convenience
to persons and property in their charges as well as safety of  persons and property within their areas
of  operations;

x x x                             x
x x                             x x x”

(Underscoring supplied)

^[13]
Heirs of Enrique Zambales v. Court of Appeals,
120 SCRA 897 (1983); Miguel v. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 760 (1969); Saura Import and Export Co., Inc. v. Philippine
International Surety Co., Inc., 8 SCRA 148 (1963).

^[14]
Article 2208 (1), (2) and (5), Civil Code.