ANTONIO SOLIS AND ANGELA SOLIS CALIMLIM, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE SOLIS AND FLORENCIA DIOQUINO, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 
Petitioners Antonio Solis and Angela Solis Calimlim seek the
review of the decision (pp. 81-88, Rollo) of the Honorable Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. Nos. 45505-R and 45506-R dated May
12, 1977 which set aside the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. D-2039
declaring petitioner Antonio Solis the
exclusive owner of an unregistered parcel of land consisting of an area of five
hundred thirty-six (536) square meters.

In a complaint (pp. 1-8, Record on Appeal) dated May 30, 1967,
plaintiffs Antonio Solis and Angela Solis Calimlim
alleged that they are co-owners of a parcel of residential land situated at
Barrio Bued, Calasiao, Pangasinan, with an area of 1,073 square meters more or less;
that this parcel of land was inherited from their parents, Simeon Solis and Petronila Bauzon; that in 1939,
they allowed defendants Jose Solis and his wife Florencia
Dioquino to construct a house on the eastern portion
of plaintiffs’ parcel of land
(consisting of 536 square meters) with the understanding that they (defendants)
should vacate the premises as soon as their
financial conditions would permit them. 
In 1965, plaintiffs demanded that the defendants vacate the premises but
the latter refused.

The answer (pp. 8-10, Record on Appeal) of defendants raised as
affirmative defense the fact of their ownership of the property in question
having acquired the same by way of donacion propter nuptias from spouses Tomas Solis and Hermenegilda Jimenez,
way back in 1931.  They also alleged that
since 1931, they were in possession of said property openly, continuously and
adversely, to the exclusion of all others, and in the concept of owners and
that since 1931 they have paid the taxes due on the property.

On November 21, 1968,
plaintiffs filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction (pp. 11-12, Record on Appeal) praying that the defendants or their
agents be enjoined from commencing and continuing the construction of a residential
house on the land in question.  The
motion was granted in an order dated December
11, 1968.

On February 17, 1969,
plaintiffs and defendants, thru their
respective counsel, filed the following partial stipulation of facts:

“COMES NOW the plaintiffs thru their undersigned counsel, and
the defendants thru their counsel, respectfully submit the following partial stipulation of facts:

“1.     Parties know the identity of the land
in litigation as described under paragraph 11 of the complaint;

“2.     That the subject matter of the
litigation refers to the eastern side of the property described in par. 11 of
the complaint consisting of about 526 square meters;

“3.     That the defendants
has (sic) a house in the said eastern portion of the said property;

“4.     That the whole
property was previously owned by Simeon Solis;

“6.     That there exist
an alleged donation propter nuptias
executed by deceased Tomas Solis in favor of Jose Solis, the defendant over the
eastern half of the said property described in par. 11 of the complaint;

“7.     That Tomas Solis,
father of defendant Jose Solis was the nephew of Simeon Solis; that Tomas Solis
was the son of Domingo Solis; brother of Simeon Solis;

“8.     That the land in question has been declared for taxation
purposes as follows:

a.    
Before 1918 – T.D. 7659 in the name of Simeon Solis.

b.    
1918 – T.D. 21465 revised T.D. 7659 also in the name of Simeon
Solis.

c.     
1920 – T.D.
37709 revised T.D. 21465
also in the name of Simeon Solis.

d.     
1951 – T.D. 11144 revised T.D. 37709 also in the
name of Simeon Solis.

e.     
1965 – T.D. 27385 revised T.D. 11144 now in the name of Antonio
Solis.

f.       
1966 – T.D. 16147 revised T.D. 27385 also in
the name of Antonio Solis.

g.      1967
– T.D. 20097 cancels T.D. 16147 in the name
of Jose Solis.

x x x” (pp. 15-17, Record on Appeal).

The hearing of the case was conducted on a single setting on June 25, 1969 where
both parties were allowed to
present their evidence.

After presentation of
evidence, oral and documentary, the trial court found that indeed, herein
private respondents spouses Jose Solis and Florencia Dioquino were in
possession of the eastern half portion of the property described in
the complaint for more than thirty years. 
However, it ruled that such possession cannot be held adversely against
the plaintiffs who had shown a better title thereto.  The pertinent portion of the decision of the
trial court dated July 17, 1969 reads:

“The court rules that while the defendants had possessed the
eastern portion of the land in question for more than 30 years, such possession
cannot be held adversely against the plaintiffs who had shown a better title
thereof.  Hence, prescription does not
lie in this case.

“From the partial stipulation submitted by the parties, it was
shown that the whole property was previously owned by Simeon Solis, father of
herein plaintiffs, and that the
same land had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Simeon Solis
from 1918 to 1951.”

“While the defendants exhibited the deed
donation propter nuptias (Exh. 1) executed in their favor by Tomas Solis and Hermenegilda Jimenez, they have however, failed to present
proof that Simeon Solis who previously owned the whole land in question had
conveyed the eastern portion thereof consisting of 536 square meters to his
brother Tomas Solis.  The situation shows
in effect, that Tomas Solis had no
title to the property he donated to his children, the defendants, and therefore the latter acquired no right over the subject property.

“There is evidence of the plaintiffs to the effect that Angela
Solis Calimlim had already renounced her right and
interest over the land in question
in favor of Antonio Solis.

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court hereby renders judgment 1) declaring the plaintiff Antonio Solis the exclusive owner of the land in question; 2) ordering the defendants
to vacate the eastern portion of the land in question; 3) ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum
of P800.00 for attorney’s fees; and 4) to pay the cost of the suit.

“SO ORDERED”.  (pp. 27-29, Record on Appeal)

Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, spouses Jose Solis and Florencia
Dioquino appealed to the Court of Appeals.  In a decision (pp.
81-88, Rollo) dated May 12, 1977, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court and declared the appellants the lawful owners of the eastern
half of the parcel of land described in the complaint.

The pertinent portion of
the decision reads:

“In the present case, there
is no question that the actual possession by the appellants of the disputed portion of the land
dates back to 1933 and since then appellants have been in the adverse, continuous, open,
public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the disputed property in the
concept of an owner until this case was filed in court on May 30, 1967.

“x x x.

“x x x.  If
we have said it before, we repeat it here for emphasis that the appellants took
possession of the disputed eastern portion of the land as owners by virtue of a donation executed in their favor in
1933.  Since then, they have exercised
various acts of dominion over the disputed property such as constructing their
house thereon enjoying its fruits to the exclusion of all others and paying
realty taxes corresponding to the disputed one-half portion of the land.  Even the plaintiffs acknowledge this fact by
their own evidence that they, for their own part, also paid half of the realty
taxes for the western portion of the land (Exhibits C, C-1 to C-6; tsn., June 25, 1969, p. 39).

“x x x.

“x x x.  By the
plaintiffs’ own evidence, they paid realty taxes only for the other half of the
property (Exhibits C, C-1 to C-6; tsn., June 25,
1969, p. 39).  This is strongly
indicative of the fact that the defendants are the owners of the eastern half
of the land over which they, in turn, paid the corresponding half of the realty
taxes from 1934 (Exhibits 2, 2-A to 2-S). 
Further, the circumstance that neither the appellants nor their donors
have declared the disputed portion in their names prior to 1967 is not sufficient
to overcome the undisputed possession for more than 30 years of the property in
question by the appellants.  (See Vigor
vs. Director of Lands, CA 57 O.G. 5888).

“WHEREFORE, finding the Appeal to be meritorious, the judgment
appealed from is hereby set aside, and another one entered dismissing the
complaint and declaring the appellants as the lawful owners of the eastern half
of the parcel of land described in the complaint without costs.

“SO ORDERED.” (pp. 84-88, Rollo)

The Motion for
Reconsideration filed thereat was denied on August 3, 1977.

Aggrieved, Antonio Solis and Angela Solis Calimlim
filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari on September 19, 1977.  The
herein petitioners manifested in their petition that they admit the findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals as embodied in its decision, but they take
exception to the conclusions drawn by the appellate court from the undisputed
findings (p. 17, Rollo).  The following arguments (pp. 23-24, Rollo) were presented in support of their petition:

“1.     The Court of
Appeals was not justified in concluding that the possession by private
respondents over the disputed property was adverse and in the concept of owner,
because such possession was merely tolerated by the petitioners.

“2.     The Court of
Appeals erred in recognizing the validity and effect of the donation propter nuptias as
sufficient to create or establish the just title of private respondents, as donees in said donation, although the alleged donor or
grantor Tomas Solis, had no right or title whatsoever over the property in
question.

“3.     The Court of
Appeals, in deciding that petitioner’s cause of action had prescribed,
overlooked the importance of determining when such cause of action
accrued.”

On November
3, 1977, We required the respondents to comment on the petition (p.
106, Rollo). 
After private respondents’ comment and petitioners’ reply were
submitted, We gave
due course to the petition on November 27, 1978 (p. 152, Rollo).  Petitioners filed their brief on November
21, 1979 (p. 164, Rollo).  Private
respondents failed to file their brief within the required period.  On March 12, 1980, We resolved to
consider the petition submitted for decision without respondents’ brief (p.
169, Rollo).

The land in question is
not registered under the Torrens System. 
It consists of an area of 536 square meters and is located at the
eastern portion of the land described under paragraph 11 of the complaint.  It is admitted that the land described in
paragraph 11 was originally owned by Simeon Solis, father of petitioner Antonio
Solis.

It is the contention of petitioners that the Court
of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents’ possession of the land was adverse and in the
concept of an owner because such possession
was merely tolerated by petitioners.

The trial court found that indeed, private
respondents were in possession of the property for more than
thirty (30) years.  Noteworthy, however,
is the fact that it did not state that
such possession was merely tolerated by petitioners.  It only held that such
possession cannot be held adversely against petitioners who had shown a better
title thereto, in view of private respondent’s failure to present any
evidence showing how title passed
from Simeon Solis, petitioners’
father, to Tomas Solis, private respondents’ father.

On the other hand, the
appellate court, on the basis of the records of this case found that private
respondents’ possession of the premises way back in 1933 was adverse,
continuous, open, public, peaceful and uninterrupted in the concept of an owner
until this case was filed on May 30, 1967.  It
pointed out that private respondents exercised various
acts of dominion over the disputed property, such as constructing their
house thereon, enjoying its fruits to the exclusion of all others, and paying
realty taxes corresponding to the disputed one-half portion of the land.  It likewise gave due significance to the fact
that petitioners acknowledged the ownership of the private respondents
of one-half portion of the land when they also paid half of the realty taxes for the western portion of the land.

It is firmly settled that findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are final and binding upon this Court, if borne out by the evidence on
record.  There are of course certain
recognized exceptions none of which, however, find any
application here (Tan v. CA, et al., L-48619, June 20, 1988).  In fact, in the preliminary statement of
their petition (p. 17, Rollo), petitioners
manifested their admission of the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners also contend that since no competent proof was
adduced by private respondents to show how Simeon Solis, the previous owner,
transferred ownership of the disputed premises to Tomas Solis, father of Jose
Solis, the donacion propter nuptias executed
by Tomas is not sufficient to
create or establish the just title of private respondents as donees.

This contention of petitioners is not meritorious.  Suffice it to state that even a void donation
may be the basis of claim of ownership which may ripen into title by
prescription (Pensador vs. Pensador,
47 Phil 959, 961).  It is the essence of
the statute of limitations that, whether the party had a right to the
possession or not, if he entered
under the claim of such right and remained in possession for the period (ten
years) named in the statute of limitations, the right of action of the
plaintiff who had the better title is
barred by that adverse possession.  The
right given by the statute of limitations does not depend upon, and has
no necessary connection, (with) the validity of the claim under which the
possession is held.  x x x” (Vda.
de Lima vs. Tio, L-27181, April 30, 1970, citing Conspecto v. Fruto, 129 US 182
(1889)).  The “just
title” required for acquisitive prescription to set in is not “titulo verdadero y
valido“- or such title which by itself is
sufficient to transfer ownership without necessity of letting the prescriptive
period elapse but only “titulo colorado” – or such title where, although there
was a mode of transferring ownership, still something is wrong because the
grantor is not the owner (See Doliendo vs. Biarnesa, 7 Phil. 232).

The donacion
was made in 1931 and spouses Jose Solis and Florencia
Dioquino took possession of the land in 1933 by
virtue of the donacion.  It was the Code of Civil Procedure
which was then in force.  Under the Code of Civil Procedure, ten years of
adverse possession by a person claiming to be the owner, in whatever way such occupancy may
have commenced shall vest in every actual
possessor of such land a full complete
title.  In Ongsiaco
vs. Dallo, (27 SCRA 161) the Supreme Court said:  ‘Under the Code of Civil Procedure formerly
in force, good or bad faith was immaterial
for purposes of acquisitive prescription.  Adverse possession in either character
ripened into ownership after the lapse of ten years (Miraflor
vs. CA, L-40151-52, April 8, 1986, 142 SCRA 18, 29).

Finally, petitioners
assail respondent appellate court’s holding that their cause of action had prescribed, overlooking the importance
of determining when such cause of action accrued.  In its findings of fact, the appellate court
said that the record shows that
Tomas Solis (private respondent’s predecessor) was already in possession of the
eastern portion in question before 1927 (t.s.n., June
25, 1969, pp. 41, 42, 47; p. 2, CA decision). 
However, no evidence was presented to show that Tomas Solis’ possession
thereof was adverse, exclusive or in the concept of an owner.  Thus, the appellate court concluded that
private respondents possession have been actual, adverse, continuous, open,
public, notorious, peaceful and uninterrupted only in 1933, when they took
possession of the property by virtue of the donacion
propter nuptias.  The respondent court, therefore, found and We agree that it was in 1933 when petitioners’ cause of
action accrued.

Even if we were to admit, as contended by petitioners, that their
cause of action accrued only in 1941 (p. 3 of Reply; p. 148, Rollo), the first time that private respondents can
be considered as having repudiated petitioners’
ownership of the premises by paying the tax on the property in the name of
respondent Jose Solis, the same conclusion would be obtained.  The lapse of more than twenty (20) years of
adverse possession by private respondents is sufficient to confer ownership on
them of the disputed portion under the Old Civil Code which requires only ten
(10) years of adverse possession. 
Article 41 of the Old Civil Code provides:

“Sec. 41.  Title to land by prescription.- Ten years of adverse
possession by any person claiming to be
the owner for that time of any land or interest in land,
uninterruptedly, continuously for ten
years by occupancy, descent, grants or otherwise, in whatever way such
occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual possessor
of such land a full complete title, saving to the person under disabilities the
rights, secured by the next Section.”

Although petitioners’ action for quieting of title was filed in
May 30, 1967 when the New Civil Code was already in effect, Article 1116 of the
New Civil Code provides that “prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code (August 30, 1950) shall be
governed by laws previously in force; x x x” which in this case is the aforequoted Section
41 of the Old Civil Code.

Therefore, whatever claim petitioners had over the disputed
property had prescribed in view of private respondents’ open, actual, peaceful,
continuous and adverse possession of the same property for more than thirty
years or at the least, for more than twenty (20) years.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED.  The decision dated May 12, 1977 of the Court of Appeals dismissing
the complaint and declaring private respondents Jose Solis and Florencia Dioquino Solis the
lawful owners of the eastern portion of the lot described under paragraph 11 of
the complaint is hereby AFFIRMED.  No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.