PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAMON MACUTO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region, Branch 77 at Quezon City finding
appellant RAMON MACUTO y TUYOGON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 4, Article II of Rep. Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended)
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 and to pay the costs.  The lower court acquitted his co-accused,
LUZVIMINDA LIBRE y DANTES of the crime charged.

The information filed against the appellant alleged:

“That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1987, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without any authority of law, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping
one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell and deliver one tea bag of dried marijuana fruiting tops,
a prohibited drug worth P10.00, Philippine Currency, to one Pat. Steeve Moore, who acted as poseur buyer, in violation of
said law.” (at p. 7, Rollo)

The prosecution’s evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt was based is narrated by the trial court as follows:

“That on or about 1:30 p.m.,
April 22, 1987, Pat. STEEVE MOORE, Pfc. EDUARDO CABUGWANG
and Pat. ENRICO CELESTIAL, all of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, Quezon
City Police Force, conducted a ‘buy-bust’ operation along Arayat St., near the corner of
V. Benitez St., Bgy. San Martin de Porres, Cubao, Quezon City.  Pat.
STEEVE MOORE was utilized as the POSEUR BUYER to a certain known marijuana pusher,
one alias ‘Asiong‘ who is a resident thereat and who
was earlier identified after a weeklong surveillance in the area.  Pat. MOORE, poseur buyer met ‘Asiong‘ and handed him two separate P5.00 bills marked
money (Exhibits B and C) in exchange of one (1) Teabag of marijuana.  ‘Asiong‘ left Pat. MOORE and came back giving and handing to said
Pat. MOORE, poseur buyer, one tea bag of marijuana (Exhibit
G).  Pat. MOORE immediately gave a pre-arranged signal
(scratching his hair) to his companions Pat. ENRICO CELESTIAL
and Pfc. EDUARDO CABUGWANG who were positioned some 7 meters away where they
could actually see and watch the sale of marijuana to Pat. MOORE.  Shortly thereafter Pat. MOORE nabbed ‘Asiong‘;
Pat. CELESTIAL and Pfc. CABUGWANG closed in on them and took custody of ‘Asiong‘ who later gave his name and identified himself as
one RAMON MACUTO Y TUYOGON.  Questioned by Pat. CELESTIAL and Pfc. CABUGWANG, MACUTO
pointed to a certain ‘Lucy’ as the supplier of the marijuana and together with
MACUTO they proceeded to the place of said ‘Lucy’ whom they invited for investigation at the office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, QCPF at Edsa, Kamuning, Q.C. after she was found in possession of the marked money.  At the office ‘Lucy’ identified herself as
one LUZVIMINDA LIBRE Y DANTES. Pat. DOMINADOR ESPIRITU, JR. testified that he
investigated this case; that when investigated and after having been appraised
of their constitutional rights, both accused chose to remain silent and
declined to give their statements; after his investigation, he referred the
matter to the Inquest Fiscal (Exh. A); he further
testified that he prepared the Joint Affidavit of the apprehending officers
Pat. ENRICO CELESTIAL and Pfc. EDUARDO CABUGWANG (Exh. I) and the affidavit of
poseur buyer, Pat. STEEVE MOORE (Exh. E); that
he requested the PC-INP, Crime Laboratory Service, Camp Crame
for laboratory examination of Exh. G,
one tea-bag of marijuana (Exh. F) and a
certificate of laboratory result (Exh. D) was issued by the Forensic Chemist showing that the
examination yielded the following results: 
positive to the test for marijuana, a prohibited drug (Exh. D-­1).

“Police Capt. LINA C.
SARMIENTO, Forensic Chemist, PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, Camp
Crame,
testified that upon request of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, QCPF (Exh. F) she examined Exh. G, a 1.77 grms.
of suspected
marijuana fruiting tops and after a qualitative examination conducted on said Exh. G, the same gave positive result to the test of
marijuana, a prohibited drug and for which she issued Chemistry Report No.
D-394?87 (Exh. H).” (Rollo, pp. 27-28)

The two accused, Ramon Macuto and Luzviminda Libre did not testify
in their defense.

The two defense witnesses, Cecilia Aventorado
and Antonio Reyes merely narrated how Macuto and Libre were
respectively picked up from a halo-halo stand and a private residence.

Appellant Macuto raised the following
assignment of errors in his appeal:

I

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING THE THEORY OF THE
DEFENSE.

II

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAMON
MACUTO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.” (Rollo, p. 58-Brief
for the Accused-Appellant)

The main issue raised by the appellant involves the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and
questions the weight given by the trial court to their testimonies.  We
have carefully reviewed the records of the case and are convinced that the
illegal sale of marijuana was committed by the appellant as narrated by the
prosecution witnesses.

We see no reason from the records why we should not apply the
rule that the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of the
witnesses’ testimonies are accorded great weight and respect on appeal because
the trial judge has the first-hand opportunity to examine and observe the
conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during the giving of their testimonies
(People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 81332 [April 25, 1989]; People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520 [February 21, 1989]; People v. Abonada, G.R. No. 50041 [January 27, 1989]; People v. Turla, G.R. No. 70270 [November 11, 1988]; and People v. Aboga, 147 SCRA 404 [1987]).

The appellant contends that the material inconsistency noted by
the trial court in the testimonies of Pat. Steeve Moore and of Pat. Enrico Celestial constitutes a grave contradiction
sufficient to cast serious doubt on the truthfulness of the entire
prosecution’s evidence.  Pat. Moore
testified that the marked money used in the buy-bust operation was recovered by
him from the person of the accused appellant during the arrest while, Pat.
Celestial narrated that it was taken from “Lucy”, whom the appellant
earlier implicated but who was later on acquitted on the basis of the stated
discrepancy.

The commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana
requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction whereby, as in this
case, the accused handed over the tea bag of marijuana upon the agreement with
the poseur buyer to exchange it for money. 
By itself, how the marked money was recovered is of no great
significance for us in establishing the guilt of the appellant (People v. Marco
Polo, 147 SCRA 551 [1977]).  What is
important is the fact that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the
appellant and that the contents were presented as evidence in court.  Proof of the transaction suffices.  The identity of the tea bag of marijuana which
constitutes the corpus delicti was established before
the court.  This being so, the
conflicting testimonies for the prosecution regarding the recovery of the
marked money did not discredit the whole of the prosecution evidence as being
inconclusive (People v. Tejada, supra).  The rule that the
testimony of a prosecution witness may be disbelieved in some facts but may be
believed in other facts is applicable to this case (People v. Pacada, 142 SCRA 427 [1986]).

The defense evidence upon which the appellant relies,
namely:  (1) that the appellant could not
have been selling marijuana because he was merely buying halo-halo at the
alleged scene of the crime; and (2) that the appellant’s co-accused (Lucy) was
suddenly arrested by three men while she was having snacks in a friend’s house,
do not overthrow the positive identification made by the police officers that
he committed the offense.  These are
statements made by witnesses other than the appellant himself which the trial
court deemed not deserving of positive consideration.  Besides, if the appellant had meritorious
defenses, he should have himself taken the witness stand so he could have met
the charges squarely and refuted the accusations outright.  He cannot now allege that no buy and sell
transaction occurred simply on the basis of the discredited testimony of his
witness that he was buying something else instead of selling prohibited drugs.

The appellant also contends that it is unbelievable and contrary
to human experience for one to sell a prohibited
drug fearlessly to a stranger.  This
contention is without merit.  The Court
ruled in People v. Tejada, supra, that “what matters is not
an existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement and
the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves.”

The Court does not find as credible the allegation that the
police officers framed-up the appellant through the buy-bust operation by
planting evidence for the purpose of extorting money and filing charges in
court.  This defense requires stronger
proof to overcome the finding of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses
were the ones who made truthful statements. 
(People v. Rualo, 152 SCRA
635 [1987]).  Since no such proofs
of ill-motives on the part of the policemen to extort money and to impute a
serious offense appear in the records, the presumption that there was regular
performance of public duty by public officers was not overthrown (People v.
Alvarez, G.R. No. 70446, January 31,1989; People v. Tejada, supra; People v. Rodriguez, supra).  Underlying said presumption is the general
rule that credence is usually accorded to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who are law enforcers (People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 [1988]).

Hence, the reversal of the judgment of conviction now being sought for on the basis of the
pronouncement in People v. Ale (145 SCRA 50 [1986]),
re:  the possibility of abuse in
anti-narcotics operations, cannot be granted.  In People v. Ale, there
were factual circumstances which showed that the entire prosecution evidence
was patently shaky.  For instance, this
Court noted that the police informant who was also the poseur buyer in the
operation was not presented as a witness.  His non-appearance in court was held
to be fatal to the prosecution of
Ale on the ground that evidence willfully suppressed is presumed to be adverse
if not produced.  There were material
contradictions between the two prosecution witnesses regarding, among others,
the identity of the poseur buyer.  This
Court in that case found unbelievable the testimonies of the two police
officers that they were able to discern the identity of the alleged marijuana
cigarettes while they were positioned about 10 to 15 meters away from the
alleged sale.  Moreover, the testimony of
Ale that the reason for his arrest was because there was a time when one of the
arresting officers threatened to make a revenge was
not contradicted by the prosecution.  The
facts of the present case are radically different so the pronouncement in People
v. Ale does not apply.

The following explanation made in People v. Agapito 154 SCRA 694, 700 (1987) justifies our
conclusion:

“In cases involving persons accused of being drug pushers or sellers, almost always the defense is
that the accused was framed by the apprehending police officers.  We realize the disastrous consequence on the
enforcement of law and order, not to
mention the well-­being of society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the
policemen’s alleged rotten reputation, accept in every instance this form of
defense which can be so easily fabricated. 
It is precisely for this reason that the legal presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed, exists.”

There is no question from the records
that the denials put forth by the appellant did not satisfactorily defeat the presumption
that the police officers regularly performed their duty, that the appellant was
positively identified as a seller of prohibited drugs and that the tea bag
taken from him actually contained marijuana fruiting tops.  We find that the guilt of appellant MACUTO
has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case
No. Q-51210 for the sale of prohibited drugs is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.