DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA, BISNAR AND AMELIA BISNAR, RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General,
seeks a review of the decision dated May 27, 1988, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 66426, entitled
“Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands,” affirming in toto the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private
respondents’ application for confirmation and registration of their title to
two (2) parcels of land in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256.

In their joint application for registration of title to two (2)
parcels of land filed on July 20, 1976, the applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar
claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastra, Plan AP-06-000869,
respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq.m.) and 34 hectares
(345,385 sq.m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited
those parcels of land (p. 41, Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes
thereon (p. 40, Rollo).

On December 16, 1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of
the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the application on the grounds that:

“1.  Neither
the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient
title to acquire ownership in fee
simple of the land or lots applied
for, the same not having been acquired by any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish Government, such as, (1) ‘titulo real’ or royal grant,
(2) the ‘concession especial’ or special grant, (3) the ‘composicion con el
estado titulo’ or adjustment title, (4) the ‘titulo de compra’ or title by purchase, and (5) the ‘informacion possessoria’ or possessory information under the Royal Decree of
13 February 1984, or any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over
realty under pertinent applicable laws.

“2. Neither the applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the
filing of the application.

“3. The properties in question are a portion of
the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, not subject to
private appropriation. (pp. 17-19, Record on Appeal).“ (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)

On February 24, 1977, the applicants filed an amended
application, which was approved on March 14, 1977, and included the following allegation:

“Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable
to the case, they hereby apply for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act
141, as amended, as they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the land as owners for more
than fifty (50) years.”
(p. 16, Rollo.)

After hearing, the
trial court ordered the
registration of the title of the lots in the names of the applicants, herein
private respondents. It found that
applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public,
continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land
under bona fide claims of ownership for more
than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the application for
registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts,
bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive
fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).

On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s
decision. It held that the
classification of the lots as
timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof
that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural
land, citing as authority the
case of Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (40 Phil.
10). In this petition, the government alleges that:

1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable agricultural land, mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of
the courts;

2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership; and

3. that an applicant for registration of title has
the burden of proving
that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as
amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)

The principal issue in this
appeal is whether the lots in
question may be registered under Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended.

The petition is impressed with merit.

In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA
351, we ruled:

“As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act
2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is
not the court
which determines the
classification of lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion for
respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area
is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest
purposes.” (pp. 21­-22, Rollo.)

It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which
is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA
499). Unless and until the land
classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply (Amunategui vs. Director of Foresty, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
151 SCRA 679).

Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs. Government,
41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401
[1960]). A parcel of forest land is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the
power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens
System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA
210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).

Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies
exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered
with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling in Amunategui
that:

“In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant
shoulders the burden of proving that
he meets the requirements
of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is
part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old spanish grants or that he has had
continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years
preceding the filing of his application.” (Heirs of Amunategui vs.
Director of Forestry, 126
SCRA 69.)

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set
aside. The application for registration
in LRC
Cad Rec. 1256 of the former Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed
without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.