HERMINIA MONTINOLA, FRITZ LORING, ERNESTO A. KRAMER, AND SPOUSES ESTER H. JAMORA AND JUAN JAMORA, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. CARLOS Y. GONZALES, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INST…

On June 4, 1965, the petitioners filed a complaint against the
City of Iloilo and the City Assessor Noe Gregorio
(Civil Case No. 6793, Iloilo CFI) to annul the revised assessment of their
landholdings in Iloilo City for illegality on the ground that the City Assessor
failed to comply with the provisions of the Iloilo City Charter (Commonwealth
Act No. 158, Sec. 33).  They alleged that
in 1964, the assessed values of their lands were raised several times over the
previous assessments, such that:

(a)  HERMINIA MONTINOLA:

(b)  ERNESTO KRAMER, JR.:

(c)  FRITZ
LORING:

(d)  ESTER
JABANA DE JAMORA:

(e)  ESTER
HABANA DE JAMORA

Petitioners further alleged that these re­-assessments were made by
the City Assessor in utter disregard of the requirement of Section 33 of
Commonwealth Act No. 158, the Iloilo City Charter, that the new assessment be
made within the first fifteen (15) days of December, and that notice thereof be
given the property owners, ten days prior to December 1, 1963, by means of
announcements, and in writing.

Commonwealth Act No. 158, Section 33, the Iloilo City Charter reads:

“The City Assessor
shall during the first fifteen (15) days of December of each year, add to his
list of taxable real estate in the City
the value of the improvements placed upon such property during the
proceeding year, and any property which is taxable and which has therefore
escaped taxation.  He may during the same
period revise and correct the assessed value of any or all parcels of real
estate in the City which are not assessed at their true money value, by
reducing or increasing the existing assessments as the case may be.  He shall give notice for all ten days prior to December 1 on the
bulletin boards of the City Hall and
in the Provincial Building of
Iloilo, by means of an announcement in
English and another
in Spanish, that
he will be present in his Office for that purpose on said days, and he shall
further notify in writing each person the amount of whose tax will be
changed by delivering or mailing such notification to such person or his authorized agent at the last known address of such
owner or agent in the premises, sometimes in the month of November.” (pp. 13-14, Rollo.)

Petitioners paid under protest the increased taxes based on the
new assessment and thereafter filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a
complaint for the refund of the excess tax on the ground that the new assessments were invalid for having been
made in violation of Section 33
of Commonwealth Act No. 158.

On April 28, 1971, the trial Judge Emigdio
V. Nietes rendered judgment for the petitioners, thus:

“WHEREFORE, it
is the judgment of this COURT that the new assessments made by the defendant City Assessor Noe
Gregorio on the properties of the plaintiffs Herminia
Montinola, Ernesto A. Kramer, Jr., Fritz Loring, and Ester Habana de Jamora, in the year 1964, were done, with respect to the plaintiffs alone,
and none other without following the requirements prescribed by Sec. 33, of Commonwealth Act No. 158,
regarding notice and hearing in the Office of the City Assessor, and hence unenforceable
and void as regards said plaintiffs only. 
Let the old assessment enforce in 1963 continue in force and effect on
all the properties of the plaintiffs within the City of Iloilo from 1964 and
thereafter until the City Assessor
of Iloilo reassess said
properties again in conformity
with the provisions of the law.  All
taxes paid and collected on the basis of the new assessments shall either be
refunded or applied and or credited to subsequent years taxes until the
reassessment provided herein.  No
pronouncement as to costs.” (p. 232, Rollo.)

Because the respondents
refused to comply with the decision, the petitioners filed two motions to declare
them in contempt of court.

On January 4, 1973, Judge
Carlos Y. Gonzales, who succeeded Judge Nietes as
presiding judge of Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, denied the contempt motions and declared the
decision of his predecessor null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the suit.  The
pertinent observations of respondent Judge read as follows:

“After analyzing cautiously the allegations advanced by the
parties in support of their respective
contentions, this Court has arrived at a carefully considered finding that herein defendant could not be held in contempt because on the light of the ruling
laid down by the Supreme
Court in the case above-cited, this Court, presided by then Presiding Judge Emigdio
V. Nietes has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case hence the judgment rendered herein is null and void ab initio.  Since the judgment is null and void, no
contumacious act was committed by the defendant
because as ruled in the cases of Banco Español vs. Palanca, 37 Phil.
921, 949; Lipana vs. Court of First Instance of Cavite, 40 Off. Gaz. (Supp.), 198; 74 Phil. 18, when a judgment is void for
lack of jurisdiction, and its nullity is shown by virtue of its own recitals, ‘it may be said to be lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.’ Hence, even if in the
case at bar, nullity of the judgment is attacked not directly but collaterally
in this incident of contempt, the same is of no moment for it was ruled in the
case of Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717 that a
void judgment is of no effect;
in the contemplation of
the law it is non-existent and may be wholly
disregarded.  The fact that it is void may therefore be urged in collateral
proceedings.” (p. 27, Rollo.)

The petition is bereft of
merit.  Section 35 of Commonwealth Act
No. 158, clearly provides the remedy of a party aggrieved by the City
Assessor’s appraisal or assessment of his property, thus:

“Sec. 35.  Time and manner
of appealing to Board of Tax Appeals.  – In case any owner of real estate or his
authorized agent, shall feel aggrieved by any decision of the city assessor
under the preceding sections of this article, such owner or agent may, within
ten days after the entry of such decision,
appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals.  The
appeal shall be perfected by filing a written notice of the same with the city assessor and it shall be the duty of that officer forthwith to transmit the appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals with all written
evidence in his possession relating to such assessment and
valuation.”

We ruled in Spouses Ramon A. Gonzales and Lilia Yusay vs. Province of Iloilo, 38 SCRA 209, that:

“If no appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals is made by the property owner within the statutory period, the assessment
becomes final and unappealable.  The owner cannot go to court to question any
error in the assessment and to seek refund of the realty taxes paid, since, as
held in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of Tax
Appeals, 22 SCRA 1008.  ‘By the doctrine
of primacy of administrative remedy, the Provincial Board of Assessment appeals had jurisdiction over the
dispute to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance,’ and the
party’s resort to the Court of First Instance instead of appealing to the Board
of Assessment Appeals was held fatal to his claim for refund.”

The petitioners’ argument that the trial court could hear and
decide the case for “no question of assessment was directly involved but
(only) the failure of the City Assessor to give the landowners a hearing in his
office as provided by the Iloilo City Charter which amounted to a deprivation
to the landowners of their (right to) due process and the omission can be
ordered done, and what had been done illegally can be undone” (p. 8, Rollo) is specious, for it is quite clear that they were
protesting the allegedly exorbitant assessment of their landholdings (2 to 14
times their former assessment) which were allegedly made without due
process.  Their grievances were within
the competence of the Board of Assessment Appeals to hear and decide.

Petitioners’ contention that the decision of April 28, 1971, in
Civil Case No. 6793, may not be annulled after it had become final is not
well-taken, for a void judgment is like an outlaw which may be slain at sight
wherever or whenever it exhibits its head. 
“. . . the proper remedy in such case, after the time for appeal or
review has passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an action to enjoin the
judgment . . . In every situation of this character an appropriate remedy is at
hand . . . We accordingly held that, assuming the judgment to have been void as
alleged by the proponent of this motion, the proper remedy was by an original
proceeding and not by motion in the cause” (Banco
Español vs. Palanca, 37
Phil. 921; p. 5, Rollo).  “A final judgment may be annulled on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, fraud, or that it is contrary to law” (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA 307).

Respondents correctly pointed out in their memorandum that:  The judgment being null and void, the refusal
or resistance of the public defendants to comply with what was decreed or
adjudged therein was not contemptuous (Segarro vs. Maronilla, G.R. No. L-14428, July 26, 1960).  Respondent Judge committed no error nor grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners’ motion for contempt (Annex B,
Petition).

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari with mandamus is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.