DOROTEA, VIRGILIO, APOLINARIO, JR., SULPICIO & DOMINADOR, ALL SURNAMED UYGUANGCO, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE SENEN PEÑARANDA AND GRACIANO BACJAO UYGUANGCO, RESPOND…

The issue before the Court is not the status of the private respondent, who has been excluded
from the family and inheritance of the petitioners. What we are asked to decide is whether he should be allowed to
prove that he is an illegitimate child of his
claimed father, who is already dead, in the absence of the documentary
evidence required by the Civil Code.

The trial court said he could and was sustained by the respondent
Court of Appeals.^[1]
The latter court held that the trial judge had not committed any grave abuse of
discretion or acted without jurisdiction in allowing the private respondent to
prove his filiation. Moreover, the
proper remedy was an ordinary appeal and not a petition for prohibition. The petitioners ask for a reversal of these
rulings on the ground that they are not in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.

Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife,
Dorotea, four legitimate children (her co-petitioners herein), and considerable
properties which they divided among themselves.^[2]
Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having been
left out in the extrajudicial settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao
Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition against all the petitioners.^[3]

Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco
and Anastacia Bacjao and that at the age of 15 he moved to his father’s
hometown at Medina, Misamis Oriental, at the latter’s urging and also of
Dorotea and his half-brothers. Here he
received support from his father while he was studying at the Medina High
School, where he eventually graduated. He was also assigned by his father, without objection from the rest of
the family, as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store in Mananom from 1967 to 1973.^[4]

In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the
petitioners elicited an admission from Graciano that he had none of the
documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco.^[5]
These are “the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or (in) any authentic writing.” The petitioners thereupon moved
for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondent could
no longer prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provisions of the
Civil Code.^[6]

Specifically, the petitioners argued that the only evidence
allowed under Article 278 to prove the private respondent’s claim was not
available to him as he himself had admitted. Neither could he now resort to the provisions of Article 285 because he
was already an adult when his alleged father died in 1975, and his claim did
not come under the exceptions. The said
article provides as follows:

ART. 285. The action for
the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the
minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the
mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which
either or both parents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from
the finding of the document.

As earlier related, the motion to dismiss was denied, prompting
the petitioners to seek relief in vain from the respondent court. In the case now before us, the petitioners
reiterate and emphasize their position that allowing the trial to proceed would
only be a waste of time and effort. They argue that the complaint for partition is actually an action for recognition as an illegitimate child,
which, being already barred, is a clear attempt to circumvent the said
provisions. The private respondent
insists, on the other hand, that he has a right to show under Article 283 that
he is “in continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family.”

We find that this case must be decided under a new if not
entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by
events, to use the popular phrase. The
Civil Code provisions they invoke have been superseded, or at least modified,
by the corresponding articles in the Family Code, which became effective on
August 3, 1988.

Under the Family Code, it is provided that:

Art. 175. Illegitimate
children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.

The following provision is therefore also available to the
private respondent in proving his illegitimate filiation:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:

(1)   The
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2)   An
admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:

(1)   The
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2)   Any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the
documents mentioned in the first paragraph
(which are practically the same documents mentioned in Article 278 of
the Civil Code except for the “private handwritten instrument signed by
the parent himself”), he insists that he has nevertheless been “in open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,” which
is now also admissible as evidence of filiation.

Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until
1973, receiving support from him during that time; that he has been using the
surname Uyguangco without objection from his father and the petitioners as
shown in his high school diploma, a special power of attorney executed in his
favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has
shared in the profits of the copra business of the Uyguangcos, which is a
strictly family business; that he
was a director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons Development Corporation, a family corporation; and
that in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the
petitioners he was given a share in his deceased father’s estate.^[7]

It must be added that the
illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by
“any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,”
like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses,
and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.^[8]

The problem of the
private respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation
under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now
barred because of his alleged father’s death in 1975. The second paragraph of this Article 175 reads as follows:

The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent. (Emphasis
supplied.)

It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed
at this time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of
Court or special laws. The simple
reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard
on the claim of his alleged son’s illegitimate filiation.

In her Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, Justice
Alicia Sempio-Diy explains the rationale of the rule, thus: “It is a truism that unlike legitimate
children who are publicly recognized, illegitimate children are usually
begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of
their existence. Who then can be sure
of their filiation but the parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the illegitimate child of a certain
person is not really the child of the
latter? The putative parent should thus
be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he
or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.”^[9]

Finally, it must be observed that the provisions invoked by the
parties are among those affected by the following articles in the Family Code:

Art. 254. Titles III, IV,
V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise
known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18,
19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.

Art. 256. This Code shall
have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Graciano’s complaint is based on his contention that he is the
illegitimate child of Apolinario Uyguangco,
whose estate is the subject of the partition sought. If this claim
can no longer be proved in an action for recognition, with more reason should
it be rejected in the said complaint, where the issue of Graciano’s filiation
is being raised only collaterally. The
complaint is indeed a circumvention of Article 172, which allows proof of the
illegitimate child’s filiation under the second paragraph thereof only during
the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Considering that the private respondent has, as we see it,
established at least prima facie proof of his alleged
filiation, we find it regrettable that his action should be barred under the
said article. But that is the law and
we have no choice but to apply
it. Even so, the Court expresses the
hope that the parties will arrive at
some kind of rapprochement, based on fraternal and moral ties if not the
strict language of the law, that will allow the private respondent an equitable
share in the disputed
estate. Blood should tell.

WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED, and Civil Case No. 9067 in the Regional Trial Court
of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20,
is hereby DISMISSED. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Kalalo, J., ponente, with Castro-Bartolome and Lising, JJ.,
concurring. The challenged decision was
issued by Judge Senen C. Peñaranda of the Regional Trial
Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20.

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 51-60

^[3]
Records, pp. 9-11.

^[4]
TSN, September 17, 1985, pp. 22-24.

^[5]
Ibid., pp. 5, 6, 64-71.

^[6]
Records, p. 30.

^[7]
TSN, September 17, 1985, pp. 27-46, 53-54.

^[8]
Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines by Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy,
p. 246.

^[9]
Ibid., p. 250.