DR. OFELIA P. TRISTE, PETITIONER, VS. LEYTE STATE COLLEGE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, NAMELY: HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS AND…

The instant petition for certiorari
focuses on the vice-presidency of the Leyte State
College in Tacloban
City.  It seeks to annul and set aside the decision
of the Board of Trustees of said College ousting and replacing herein petitioner with private
respondent as Vice-President thereof, as well as the resolution of the Review
Committee under Executive Order No. 17 dismissing petitioner’s appeal thereto.

The Leyte
State College, formerly the Leyte Normal School, one
of the eight normal schools established in the Philippines as a
teacher-training institution serving Eastern Visayas,
Masbate and Surigao, became
a chartered state college by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 944 dated June
14, 1976 (72 O.G. 7207).  Section 4 of
the decree provides that “the governance and administration of each
College and the exercise of its corporate powers shall be vested exclusively in
the Board of Trustees and in the President of the College insofar as authorized
by said Board”.  In addition to its general powers of administration,
Section 6 provides that the Board shall have the power and duty:

“(c)  To appoint, on recommendation of the President of
each College, a Vice-President for
Academic Affairs and Development with a position next in rank to the
President of the College who shall assist in the administration and supervision
of the College and who shall automatically assume the presidency of the College
in an acting capacity, with full powers and duties, in the absence of the
President or when the office of the president is vacant.” (Underscoring
supplied.)

Under Section 9 of the same decree,
the vice-president for academic affairs shall also be a member of the College
Council which is vested with the powers to prescribe the curricula and the rules of discipline subject to
the approval of the Board of
Trustees; to fix the requirements for admission to the college as well as for
graduation and the receiving of a degree; to recommend students or others to be
the recipients of degree or honors; and, through its president or committee, to have disciplinary control over the
students within the prescribed rules of
discipline approved by the
Board of Trustees.

Two years later or on June 10, 1978, Presidential Decree
No. 1437 (74 O.G. 5733-LLLLL
Supp.) was promulgated to define the composition and powers of the governing
boards of chartered state universities and colleges and the term of office of
the presidents thereof.  Said governing
boards shall be composed of the
Secretary of Education and Culture
as chairman, the president of the university or college as vice-chairman, and a representative of the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) and two (2) prominent citizens as members.

One of the governing board’s specific
powers as laid out in Section 3 of P.D. 1437 is the following:

“f. 
To confirm appointments of vice-presidents, deans, directors,
registrars, heads of departments, professors, and other officials and employees of the university or college made by the president, to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such
other duties and conditions as the governing boards may promulgate, in accordance with the
provisions of existing laws; to remove
them for cause after investigation and hearing.” (Underscoring supplied.)

Under the foregoing legal milieu, on February 3, 1984, the Leyte State College Board or Trustees (hereinafter referred
to as the Board) took up the matter of the designation of herein
petitioner as vice-president of the college with a basic salary of P39,288 plus
representation and transportation allowances. 
It passed Resolution No. 53 “confirming the designation of Professor Ofelia Triste
as vice-president of LSC to include allowances normally extended to the office
of vice-president subject to the usual
auditing and accounting regulations”.^[1] Accordingly, the acting chairman of the
Board issued the following document:

“Republic
of the Philippines

MINISTRY
OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS

Metro
Manila

February 3, 1984

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

Pursuant to Section 6, paragraph
“C” of PD 944 known as the LSC Charter, DR. OFELIA P. TRISTE is
hereby designated/appointed Vice-President for Academic Affairs and Development
of the Leyte State College, Tacloban City, Philippines.

The
Board of Trustees

Leyte State
College

Tacloban City

By:  (SGD.) VEDASTO G. SUAREZ

Acting
Chairman”^[2]

As petitioner was then holding an
appointment of Professor 6, the president of the college sought clarification
from the Minister of the Budget on the total compensation of the
vice-president.  The then Minister of
Budget, Manuel S. Alba, in a letter dated June 22, 1984, opined that “(p)ursuant to Sections 4.1 and 4.4 of NCC No. 12-B, a Vice-President may be designated in
lieu of a permanent plantilla position, provided that
the designee’s basic salary plus honorarium shall not exceed the salary
prescribed for a permanently appointed Vice-President, as specified by NCC No. 12″.  Hence, the total compensation of petitioner
should consist of the basic salary of P41,292 and an honorarium of P4,548 or the
total amount of P45,840.  In addition to
that amount, the vice-president was authorized to receive commutable
transportation and representation allowances of P475 per month subject to
conditions stated therein.^[3]

In October, 1984, the Office of
Compensation and Position Classification furnished the then President of the
college, Magdalena S. Ramo, with an advance copy of
the personnel services itemization of the college which would be the basis for
the preparation of its plantilla of personnel for calendar year 1984.^[4] The position of vice-president does not
appear in said itemization.^[5] However, per the college’s plantilla of personnel for 1984, petitioner’s position
was designated and classified as “Professor 6 (Vice-Pres.)” receiving
an actual salary of P54,600 as of June 30, 1984 but which salary was adjusted
to P55,644 effective July 1, 1984.^[6]

For more than two years, petitioner
discharged her duties and functions as vice-president of the college.

In February 1986, there was a total
revamp in the composition of the Board of Trustees of the Leyte
State College.  Among others, Dr. Purificacion M. Flores was designated officer-in-charge and
later appointed as the new College President vice Magdalena S. Remo who
retired as president of the college on May
1, 1986.

Anticipating moves to replace her as
vice-president, on July 18, 1986, petitioner submitted to the Board of Trustees
a position paper* asserting that the Board could
not appoint a vice-president because the position was not vacant, the
vice-president’s term was not co-terminous with that
of the recommending president who had retired, and the incumbent was not
replaceable at the pleasure of the Board. 
In fact, she stated
therein that she is qualified for the college presidency.^[7]

Petitioner’s apprehensions were proved right by later developments.  She was not named to any of the committees
formed by Dr. Flores when the latter
became the officer-in-charge
of the office of the president.^[8]
On August 21, 1986,
petitioner received a letter from
President Flores assigning her the job of director of the college’s research program.^[9] A week later, petitioner received another letter from President
Flores.  It states:

August 29, 1986

Dr. Ofelia P. Triste

Leyte State College

Tacloban City

Dear Dr. Triste:

This is to inform you that Resolution
No. 42, s. 1986 was approved by the Board of Trustees of the College at its
Board Meeting last August 19, 1986 at MECS, Manila
and confirmed August 27, 1986,
to wit:

RES. NO. 42, s. 1986

APPROVING THE DESIGNATION OF DR. CRES GONZAGA
AS VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE LEYTE STATE COLLEGE
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 19, 1986.

      
APPROVED

This information is intended to clarify
actions taken by this office on designations.

    Very truly yours,

(SGD.)

PURIFICACION M.
FLORES

          President”^[10]

Alleging that the appointment of Dr. Crescencia (Cres) V. Chan-Gonzaga to the position of vice-president in effect eased
her out of said position,
petitioner filed before the Board a petition for reconsideration.  She contended that her constitutional and legal rights to security of tenure
had been violated.^[11]
In response thereto, the Board Secretary informed petitioner’s counsel through
a letter dated October 29, 1986 that her petition was “noted and discussed” by the Board but that the
members present at the meeting, namely, Dr. Minda Sutaria, Dr. Flores and
Director Venancio Baclagon,
arrived at the consensus that the position of vice-president being
“honorific”, the incumbent president of the college had the
prerogative to recommend for the vice-presidency the nominee of the executive
council.  The letter added that the
position being “considered co-terminous with
that of the President of the college”, pursuant to Executive Order No. 17,
petitioner’s services as vice-president were in effect terminated with the
Board’s approval of the appointment of Dr. Gonzaga to
said position.^[12]

From November 26, 1986 to January 7,
1987, petitioner’s counsel wrote three letters to the secretary of the Board
and a letter to President Flores herself, all requesting for official copies of
the board resolution terminating the services of petitioner as college
vice-president, the board resolution appointing Dr. Gonzaga
as vice-president, and the board resolution or decision denying petitioner’s
petition for reconsideration, for the purpose of filing an appeal to the Minister of
Justice.^[13]
Said letter-requests were unheeded.

On January 12, 1987, petitioner interposed an appeal
despite non-receipt of the requested documents, to the Review Committee of the
Ministry of Justice which was organized to implement Executive Order No. 17
prescribing rules and regulations for the implementation of Section 2, Article
III of the Freedom Constitution.  She
alleged therein that since her ouster as vice-president, she had been demoted
to the position of Director of Research and that the 20% salary increase
granted to all academic personnel of government schools was not given to her because under the plantilla approved by the Office of Budget and Management,
her salary was reduced by one step since she was no longer the college
vice-president.  She argued that she was terminated and stripped of her
rank and status without legal cause and due
process; that the Board’s claim that the position of vice-president is
“honorific” is not supported by law; that said position is not co-terminous with the position of president not only because the charter is silent on the matter but also
because the charter provides that a vice-president
automatically assumes the presidency when it is vacant; and that the Board may not designate or appoint anyone to
position of vice-president as the same was not vacant.

The therein respondent Board not
having filed any responsive pleading to the brief filed by petitioner before the Review Committee, she filed three
successive motions for judgment on the pleadings.  It turned out, however, that on January 23, 1987, the Review Committee* had issued a resolution on petitioner‘s appeal but a copy of the same was furnished her through the mail only on
March
31, 1987.^[14]

In said resolution, the Review Committee dismissed petitioner’s
petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 10-day period provided for in Section 6 of Executive Order No.
17.^[15]

After her requests for certified
copies of the designation of Dr. Gonzaga as
vice-president and the board resolution denying her petition for
reconsideration remained unacted upon, Dr. Ofelia P. Triste filed the instant petition for certiorari.

A preliminary point to consider is the propriety of the instant
petition.  Private respondent Gonzaga asserts that petitioner, not having
appealed to the President, had not exhausted all administrative remedies available to her before she filed the instant judicial remedy.

As we earlier held, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an
iron-clad rule.  It is not necessary
when, from the facts of the case, petitioner has to look to the courts for speedy relief; when the question presented is “purely a legal one”, the controverted
act is “patently illegal”
and “nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done;” and when petitioner was
denied due process.^[16] Each of these exceptions may exempt
the petitioner from the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies before
filing a court action.  Considering that
all these exceptions are present in this case, petitioner may avail herself of the instant remedy.

Although the petition is captioned
“petition for review on certiorari“^[17]
thereby creating the impression that the same was filed under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, we shall consider it as one for certiorari under Rule 65
it having been alleged that the
respondents have abused their discretion in their questioned actions.^[18]

The resolution of the issue on whether petitioner was illegally
ousted from her position as vice-president of the Leyte
State College hinges on the determination
of her status as such official. 
Private respondent Dr. Gonzaga and public
respondent Dr. Flores* contend
that petitioner was merely
“designated” and not “appointed” to the college
vice-presidency.  They aver, that petitioner’s
“designation” to said position was “purely an internal
arrangement which does not require the approval or confirmation by the Civil
Service Commission”.^[19]
They maintain that petitioner’s term of office being co-terminous
with that of the retired college president, petitioner may not complain that
she was illegally
dismissed from the vice-presidency. 
On the other hand, petitioner asserts that she was the duly appointed
vice-president of the college and hence, her right to security of tenure may not
be unceremoniously abridged.

In Borromeo
v. Mariano,^[20] this Court, through Justice Malcolm,
noted that “(a)ll authorities unite in saying
that the term ‘appoint’ is well-known and whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary
acceptation, is applied to the nomination or designation of an
individual.” We defined “appointment” in Aparri
v. Court of Appeals^[21]
as the “act of designation by the executive officer, board or body, to
whom that power has been delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office.” On the other hand, there is jurisprudence to
the effect that the word “designate”, when used by the appointing
power in making an appointment to office, is equivalent to the word
“appoint”.^[22]

Common usage, however, oftentimes
puts a distinction between the terms “appointment” and
“designation”.  Perhaps, the
reason for this is that the word “appointment” connotes permanency while
“designation” implies temporariness. 
Thus, to “designate” a public office to another position may
mean to vest him with additional duties while he performs the functions of his
permanent office.  Or, in some cases, a public officer may be
“designated” to a position in an acting capacity as when an
Undersecretary is designated to discharge the functions of a Secretary pending
the appointment of a permanent
Secretary.

The provisions of Presidential
Decrees Nos. 944 and 1437, specifically the aforequoted
sections, contemplate of a duly appointed vice-president by the Board of
Trustees, who would be a working vice-president with full powers and duties and
whose compensation, hours of service and other duties and conditions of
employment should be set by said Board.

Thus, P.D. 1437 specifically provides
among others, the following:

“Section 3 x x
x the governing board shall have the following
specific powers and duties:

xxx    xxx       xxx

f. 
to confirm the appointments of vice-presidents, x x
x in accordance with the provisions of existing laws;
to remove them for cause  after
investigation and hearing.”

It appears that these provisions of
law notwithstanding, it was not until February
3, 1984 that a Vice-President for Leyte
State College was named with the designation of herein petitioner to said
position.  The mode of authorization was
by “designation” inasmuch as the position of Vice-President did not
appear in the College’s Personnel Services Itemization for the year 1984.^[23]
This omission was, however, corrected in the Plantilla
of Personnel and Salary Adjustment Form of the Leyte
State College for the same calendar year 1984, which listed as Item No. 2-1 the
position of “Professor 6 (Vic-President)”.  Herein petitioner was listed as the incumbent with an actual salary as of June 30, 1984 of P45,600.00 per annum
and an adjusted salary effective July
1, 1984 per NCC #33 of P55,644.00 per annum.  It is to be noted that the College Plantilla carried
other Professor 6 items, i.e.  Items Nos.
2-2, 2-4 and 2-5, with an actual salary of P43,392.00 per annum as of June 30, 1984 and an adjusted salary
of P52,944.00 as of July 1, 1984.”^[24]

Thereafter, on December 27, 1985,
herein petitioner was extended an appointment as “Professor 6” x x x “with compensation at the rate of FIFTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY FOUR (P55,644) ONLY pesos per annum effective July 01, 1984.” The position to be
filled was listed as “Old Item No. 2-1 Page 1 Approp.
Act 230 Page CY 1983, New Item No. 2-1 Page 1 Approp.
Act (Illegible) CY 1984″, which is equivalent to the item designated as
“Professor 6 (Vice-President)”
in the Plantilla of Personnel for 1984.  Said appointment was issued “By
authority of the Board of
Trustees” and approved by the Civil Service Commission as permanent.^[25]

From the foregoing, it becomes clear
that while initially petitioner was discharging the powers and functions of
Vice-President upon a designation made
on February 3, 1984,
by July 1 of the same year, she
was doing so by virtue of an appointment.  For while her appointment paper mentioned
only “Professor 6” as the position to which she was being
appointed, the clear intent to
appoint her “Professor 6 (Vice-President)”, as distinguished from the other Professor 6 items is manifest
from the rate of compensation and Item Number specifically given in the
appointment paper.  Moreover, there
appears no reason why she should be given
another appointment to the position of Professor 6 if the intention was
for her to remain merely as Professor 6. 
The only plausible explanation is that it was an appointment to a new item of Vice-President.  And as adverted to earlier, said appointment
was approved by the Civil Service Commission
as permanent.

Although under Section 8 of P.D. 1437, the term of a state
college president is six (6)
years, the same law is silent as to that of the vice-president.  Such silence, however, should not be
interpreted to mean that the law intends to give the vice-president the same term as that of
a president.  On the contrary, there are
indications in the decrees themselves that the vice-president is a career official
whose term of office may outlast that of the president.  Thus, under Section 6(c) of P.D. 944, the
vice-president is next in rank to the president.  He or she shall assist the president in the
administration and supervision of the college. 
He or she shall
“assume the presidency of the College in an acting capacity, with full
powers and duties in the absence or when the
office of the president is vacant”. 
Whoever is holding the position of vice?president shall remain as such until, under
Section 3(f) of P.D. 1437 above-quoted, the Board finds a reason or reasons to
remove him “for cause after investigation and hearing”.

The contention of respondents Gonzaga and Flores
that petitioner was not a permanently appointed vice-president since she was
merely receiving an honorarium
for the job, is likewise without merit. 
Under the same Section 3(f) of P.D. 1437, the Board has the power to fix
the compensation of the vice-president. 
Accordingly, during its meeting on February 3, 1984, the Board set petitioner’s basic salary as vice-president at P39,288
plus representation and transportation allowances.  However, since petitioner was then holding an
appointment as Professor 6, the then college president sought the aforestated opinion of the Minister of Budget granting
petitioner an honorarium of P4,548.  Such
inquiry, it must be noted, was done in connection
with Resolution No. 5, s. 1984, or while petitioner
was discharging the functions of Vice-President upon a designation.  In contrast, her compensation as Professor 6 (Vice-President) was specifically
stated in her appointment paper.  The
allegation of private respondents that petitioner was receiving only an
honorarium and not a regular salary as Vice-President is therefore true only
for the period February 3 to
June 30, 1984.  Thereafter, by virtue of
her appointment, petitioner began receiving a compensation of P55,644.00 per
annum as Professor 6 (Vice-President).

Mechem
states that “(l)ike the requirement of an oath,
the fact of the payment of a salary and/or fees may aid in determining the nature of a
position, but it is not conclusive, for while a salary or fees are usually
annexed to the office, it is not necessarily so.  As in the case of the
oath, the salary or fees are mere incidents and form no
part of the office.  Where a salary or
fees are annexed, the office is often said to be ‘coupled with an interest’;
where neither is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the
public good.”^[26]

In the case at bar, petitioner having
been given the compensation attached to the Item Professor 6 (Vice-President)
as distinguished from the other Professor 6 items which carried a lower salary,
we hold that her appointment dated December 27, 1985, but retroactive to July
1, 1984 was in truth and in fact to the position of Vice-President, rather than
to the position of Professor 6.

This case should be distinguished from Laxamana v. Borlaza^[27] wherein we held that petitioner was
legally removed because she was merely designated as Director of Publications
and not by permanent appointment since there was no position in the college plantilla to which a
permanent appointment could be made. 
In said case, there was no statutory basis for the inclusion of the position of Director of Publications in the plantilla of the college as it was merely created by the Board.  In the instant case, the position of
vice-president is based on a presidential decree which has the force and effect
of law.  But because said position was
omitted in the personnel services itemization, the college could do no more
than classify petitioner’s petition as “Professor 6 (Vice-Pres.)”.

The nature of petitioner’s
appointment having been established, we now consider the legality of her
replacement as vice-president of the Leyte State
College.

Executive Order No. 17 was issued by the President on May 28, 1986 “to obviate
unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the deserving officials and
employees, particularly in the career civil service” (82 O.G.
2423-2424).  Section 1 thereof provides
that separation or replacement of officers and employees
shall be made “only for justifiable
reasons”.  For its purposes, a state
college is considered a ministry. 
Pertinent provisions of the Order state:

“SEC. 2.  The Ministry Head concerned, on the basis of
such review and assessment, shall determine who shall be separated from the
service.  Thereafter, he shall issue to
the official or employee concerned a notice of separation which shall
indicate therein the reason/s or
ground/s for such separation and the fact that the separated official or
employee has the right to file a petition for reconsideration pursuant to this
Order.  Separation from the service shall be
effective upon receipt of such notice, either personally by the official or
employee concerned or on his behalf by a person of sufficient discretion.

“SEC. 3.  The following shall be the grounds for
separation/replacement of personnel:

1) 
Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the
Civil Service Law;

2) 
Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act as determined by
the Ministry Head concerned;

3) 
Gross incompetence or ineffi­ciency in the discharge of functions;

4) 
Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;

5)  Any other analogous ground showing that the
incumbent is unfit to remain in the
service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.”

(Underscoring
supplied).

Petitioner learned of her removal as
vice-president when it was already a fait accompli.  Hence, all she could do under the
circumstances was to petition for the reconsideration of the Board resolution
designating respondent Gonzaga as her replacement and
at the same time asserting her constitutional
right to security of tenure.

The Board’s “noting” of her
petition is not a valid exercise of its power.^[28]
Although the Board Secretary’s
letter stating that the petition for reconsideration was noted and discussed by
the Board, the latter’s reason for replacing petitioner, to wit, the position
of vice-president is “honorific” and co-terminous
with that of the college president is not within the purview of Section 3 aforequoted.

Furthermore, respondent Flores and
the Board had not complied with the procedure set forth in Section 2 of
Executive Order No. 17.  They did not
serve the notice of separation specified therein.  In fact, the cavalier manner by which
petitioner was dislodged from the vice-presidency was matched by the college
officials’ refusal to furnish petitioner
with copies of the documents
pertinent to her appeal.  Even if
respondent Gonzaga’s unsubstantial allegations on
petitioner’s association with the Romualdezes of Leyte^[29]
were true, certainly, it is not
within the spirit of Executive Order No. 17 to brush aside its due process
requirements just to implement its ultimate purpose which is to rid the
government of misfits.

On top of these, the review committee
seems to have been too technical in treating petitioner’s appeal.  Its denial of petitioner’s plea for
reconsideration on the ground that the 10-day period specified in Section 6 of
said order had lapsed is tantamount to abuse of discretion it appearing that
said period had not commenced to run.  We
agree with the Solicitor General that the letters embodying the resolutions
replacing petitioner as vice-president, do not, in legal contemplation,
constitute the notice of separation from
which an appeal could be made.^[30]
The existence of said resolutions should have been established by official or
certified true copies but unfortunately, respondent Flores herself and the
Board secretary failed to heed petitioner’s requests for them.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari
is GRANTED and the IMMEDIATE REINSTATEMENT of petitioner with backwages to the position of vice-president of the Leyte State College is hereby ordered.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

---

^[1]
Rollo, p. 38.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 39.

^[3]
Rollo, pp. 212 and 232.

^[4]
Rollo, pp. 208 and 229.

^[5]
Rollo, pp. 209 and 228.

^[6]
Rollo, p. 40.

* Aside from the members of the
Board of Trustees, Education Assistant Minister Tomas Santos, Consultant Vedasto Suarez and Education Regional Director Servillano de la Cruz were also served by petitioner with
copies of her position paper (Rollo, pp.
132-138).

^[7]
Rollo, pp. 123-131.

^[8]
Rollo, pp. 139-142.

^[9]
Rollo, p. 143.

^[10]
Rollo, p. 41.

^[11]
Rollo, pp. 42-43.

^[12]
Rollo, p. 44.

^[13]
Rollo, pp. 45-48.

* Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales, Chairman, and Manuel B. Gaite, Edcel C. Lagman, Eufemio C. Domingo,
Alfredo B. Deza and Honesto
V. Bonnevie, Members.

^[14]
Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 21.

^[15]
Rollo, pp. 63-64.

^[16]
Reyes v. Subido, L-27916, August 21, 1975, 66 SCRA 203 citing Abaya v. Villegas, L-25641, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1034.

^[17]
Rollo, p. 6.

^[18]
Rollo, p. 23.

* Dr. Flores filed her own
memorandum through the counsel of Dr. Gonzaga after
the Solicitor General, in his comment-memorandum, adopted the view that
petitioner’s replacement was illegal.

^[19]
Rollo, p. 81.

^[20]
41 Phil. 322, 326.

^[21]
L-30057, January 31, 1984,
127 SCRA 231, 238 citing Mechem, A Treatise on the
Law of Public Offices and Officers, p. 42.

^[22]
12 Words and Phrases 414 citing People v. Fitzsimmons, 68 N.Y.S. 514,
519.

^[23]
Rollo, p. 207.

^[24]
Rollo, p. 40.

^[25]
Rollo, p. 211.

^[26]
supra, p. 6.

^[27]
L-26965, September 20, 1972,
47 SCRA 29.

^[28]
See:  Sichangco
vs. Board of Commissioners of Immigration, L-23545, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 61.

^[29]
Rollo, p. 81.

^[30]
Rollo, p. 178.