DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ABRA, SECOND JUDICIAL D…

The center of controversy in the instant petition for review on certiorari
is a limestone-rich 70-hectare land in Bucay, Abra 66 hectares of which are, according to petitioners,
within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve.

Private respondent Abra Industrial Corporation (AIC for brevity), a duly
registered corporation established for the purpose of setting up a cement
factory, claims on the other hand, to be the owner in fee simple of the whole
70-hectare area indicat­ed in survey plans PSU-217518, PSU-217519 and
PSU-217520 with a total assessed value of P6,724.48.  Thus, on September 23, 1965, it filed in the
then Court of First Instance of Abra an application
for registration in its name of said
parcels of land under the Land Registration Act or, in the alternative, under
Sec. 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141^[1]
as amended by Republic Act No. 1942 inasmuch as its predecessors-in-interest
had allegedly been in possession thereof since July 26, 1894.^[2]

The requisite publication and posting of notice having been
complied with, the application was set for hearing.  Except for the Director of Lands, nobody
appeared to oppose the application.  Hence, the court issued an order of default
against the whole world except the Director of Lands.

After the applicant had rested its case, the provincial fiscal,
appearing for the Director of Lands, submitted evidence supporting the
opposition filed by the Solicitor General to the effect that AIC had no registerable title and that the highly mineralized parcels
of land applied for were within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve which had
not yet been released as alienable and disposable land pursuant to the Public
Land Law.

On July 22, 1966, the lower court^[3]
favorably acted on the application and ordered the registration of the parcels
of land under the Land Registration Act. 
It ruled that although said land was within the forest zone, the
opposition of the Director of Lands was not well-taken because the Bureau of
Forestry, thru the District Forester of Abra,
“offered no objection to exclude the same area from the forest reserve.”^[4]
It found that the parcels of land had been acquired by purchase and AIC’s possession thereof, including that of its
predecessors-in-interest, had been for forty-nine (49) years.

The Director of Lands, through the provincial fiscal, filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision asserting that except for a
4-hectare area, the land covered by PSU-217518, 217519 and 217520 fell within
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929; that although it had been denuded, it was covered with
massive, corraline, tufaceous
limestone estimated to yield 200,000,000 metric tons about a fifth of which was
suitable for the manufac­ture of high grade portland
cement type and that the limestone, being 250 meters thick, could yield 10,000
bags of cement a day for 1,000 years.^[5]
He contended that, while the land could be reclassified as mineral land under
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mines, the process of exclusion from the CordiIlera Forest Reserve had not yet been undertaken
pursuant to Sec. 1826 of Republic Act No. 3092 and therefore it was still part
of the forest zone which was inalienable under the 1935 Constitution.

AIC having filed its opposition to the motion for
reconsideration, the lower court denied it on September 28, 1967 holding that
the grounds raised therein were relevant and proper only if the Bureau of
Forestry and the Bureau of Mines were parties to the case.  It added that the motion for intervention
filed by the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Mines was improper in land
registration cases.^[6]

The Director of Lands filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed for having been filed out of
time^[7]
Hence, on December 22, 1967, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued
Decrees Nos. 118198, 118199 and 118200 for the registration of the subject parcels
of land in the name of AIC.

Within one year from the issuance of said decrees or on May 22,
1968, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, invoking
Section 38 of Act No. 496, filed in the Court of First Instance of Abra a petition for review of the decrees of registration
and the lower court’s decision of July 22, 1966.  The Solicitor General alleged that although
the evidence presented by AIC showed that it had purchased from individual owners
only a total area of 24
hectares, the application included 46 hectares of the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve and therefore AIC “employed
actual fraud” which misled the court “to error in finding the
applicant to have a registerable title over the
parcels of land subject of the application.”^[8]

On November 27, 1969, the lower court^[9]
denied the petition on the ground that
if, as alleged by the Solicitor General, then presiding Judge Macario M. Ofilada was mistaken
in appreciating the evidence presented, judicial error was “not synonymous
with actual fraud.”^[10]

Without asking for a
reconsideration of said order, on February 25, 1970, the Solicitor General,
representing the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and the Republic
of the Philippines, filed the present petition for review on certiorari
under Republic Act No. 5440.

The petition was
forthwith given due course by the Court^[11] but inasmuch as no action was taken on their
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the petitioners filed
a motion reiterating said prayer.  Finding
the motion meritorious, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the private respondent and its agents and representatives “from
further acts of possession and disposition to innocent purchasers for
value of the parcels of land involved” in this case.^[12]

AIC filed a motion to
dismiss the instant petition on the grounds that it raises “unsubstantial”
issues and that it was filed out of time.  The motion was denied by the Court^[13]
but it bears pointing out that AIC’s second ground
for dismissal, which is premised on its perception that a motion for
reconsideration of the order of November 27, 1969 is necessary before the
filing of the instant petition, is incorrect.

A motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a prerequisite
to an appeal, petition for review or a petition for review on certiorari.^[14]
The reglementary period for filing the petition for
review on certiorari in the instant case was thirty (30) days from
notice of the order or judgment subject of review^[15]
which period, parenthetically, is now fifteen (15) days pursuant to Section 39
of the Judiciary Act of 1980.^[16]
Petitioners having been granted a total of sixty (60) days^[17]
within which to file the petition, the same was timely filed.

Petitioners herein contend that the lower court erred in granting
the application for registration of the parcels of land notwithstanding its
finding that they are within the forest zone. 
The District Forester’s failure to object to the exclusion of the area
sought to be registered from the forest reserve was not enough justification
for registration because under Commonwealth Act No. 141, the power to exclude
an area from the forest zone belongs to the President of the Philippines, upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and
not the District Forester or even the Director of Forestry.

Petitioners also contend that the lower court erred in denying
the petition for review based on actual fraud because under Section 38 of Act
No. 496, a decree of registration may be reviewed not only by reason of actual
fraud but also for a fatal infirmity of the decision upon which the decree is
based, provid­ed no innocent purchaser for value will be prejudiced.

We find the petition to be meritorious.  Once again, we reiterate the rule enunciated
by this Court in Director of Forestry vs. Munoz^[18]
and consistently adhered to in a long line of cases^[19]
the more recent of which is Republic vs. Court of Appeals,^[20]
that forest lands or forest reserves are incapable of private appropriation and
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private
properties.  This ruling is premised on the regalian
doctrine enshrined not only in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
but also in the 1987 Constitution Article XIII of which provides that:

“Sec. 2.  All lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal x x
x, forests or timber, x x x and
other natural resources are owned by the State. 
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated.”

Pursuant to this
constitutional provision, the land must first be released from its
classification as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land in
accordance with the certification issued by the Director of Forestry as
provided for by Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.^[21]
This is because the classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the
government and not of the courts.^[22]
Moreover, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes.^[23]

Being the interested party, an applicant for registration of a
parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming
the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain.^[24]
In this case, AIC asserts that
the land in dispute is no longer part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve because
the communal forest in Bucay, Abra
which had been established in 1909 by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order
No. 2-298, had been “cancelled and de-established” by Forestry Administrative
Order No. 2-622 dated October 1, 1965 and issued by then Acting Secre­tary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources Jose Y. Feliciano.^[25]
AIC therefore tries to impress upon the Court the fact that as there was no
longer a forested area, the same
area had become alienable more so because its actual occupants, who had been
devoting it to agriculture, had relinquished their rights over it in favor of
AIC “to give way for greater economic benefits for the people in the
locality.”^[26]
It should be emphasized,
however, that the classification of the land as forest land is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like.^[27]
Hence, the fact that the contested parcels of land have long been denuded and
actually contains rich limestone deposits does pot in any way affect its
present classification as forest land.

While it is true that under Section 1839 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the
Department Head, may change the location of a communal forest, such executive
action does not amount to a declassification
of a forest reserve into an
alienable or disposable land.  Under
Commonwealth Act No. 141,^[28]
it is no less than the President, upon the recommendation of the proper
department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.^[29]
The President shall also declare from
time to time what lands are open to disposition or concession.^[30]
AIC therefore, should prove first of all
that the lands it claims for registration are
alienable or disposable lands.  As it is,
AIC has not only failed to prove that it has a registerable
title but more importantly, it failed to show that the lands are no longer a
part of the public domain.

The petitioners therefore validly insisted on the review of the
decision ordering the issuance of the decree of registration in view of its
patent infirmity.  The lower court closed
its eyes to a basic doctrine in land registration cases that the inclusion in a title of a part of the public
domain nullifies the title.^[31]
Its decision to order the registration of an inalienable land in favor of AIC
under the misconception that it is imperative for the Director of Forestry to
object to its exclusion from the forest reserve even in the face of its finding
that indeed a sizable portion of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve is
involved, cannot be allowed to stay unreversed.  It betrays an inherent infirmity which must
be corrected.

WHEREFORE, the order of November 27, 1969 denying the
petition for review under Section 38 of Act No. 496 and the decision of July 22,
1966 insofar as it orders the registration of land within the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve are hereby REVERSE AND SET ASIDE.  The temporary restraining order issued on April 7, 1970 is hereby made
permanent.  Costs against the private
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1]
Public Land
Law.

^[2]
LRC Case No. N-67; LRC REG No. N-28993.

^[3]
Presided by Judge Macario M. Ofilada.

^[4]
Rollo, pp. 23-24.

^[5]
Rollo, p. 27.

^[6]
Rollo, p. 33.

^[7]
Rollo, pp. 97-99.

^[8]
Rollo, p. 40.

^[9]
Presided by Judge Juan P. Aquino.

^[10]
Rollo, p. 73.

^[11]
Rollo, p. 75.

^[12]
Rollo, p. 80.

^[13]
Rollo, p.
109.

^[14]
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership vs.
Ruiz, L-33952, March 9, 1987, 148 SCRA 326, 340-341 citing Habaluyas
Enter­prises, Inc. vs. Japson, G.R. No. 70895,
May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 208.

^[15]
Mania vs. Vda. de Seguerra,
L-48257, August 24, 1984,
131 SCRA 330, 341.

^[16]
See:  Lacsamana
vs. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986,
143 SCRA 643, 650.

^[17]
Pursuant to the En Banc resolution of this Court on April 7,
1988, as a matter of policy, no extensions of time to file petitions for review
of the decisions of the Court of Appeals and other lower courts shall be
granted for more than thirty (30) days except on compelling grounds towards the
ends of substantial justice and avoiding a miscarriage of justice.

^[18]
L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183.

^[19]
Vano vs. Government of P.I., 41 Phil. 161;
Adorable vs. Direc­tor of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Republic vs.
De la Cruz, L-35644, September 30, 1975, 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands vs.
Reyes & Alinsunurin, L-27594, November 28, 1975,
68 SCRA 177; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89
SCRA 648; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50340,
December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 701.

^[20]
G.R. No. 56948, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 476.

^[21]
Director of Forestry vs. Villareal, L-32266,
February 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 598, 608-609.

^[22]
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58867, June 22, 1984,
129 SCRA 689, 692.

^[23]
Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry,
L-30035, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69.

^[24]
Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, G.R. No.
68533, May 23, 1986, 142 SCRA 57.

^[25]
Rollo, p. 94.

^[26]
Rollo, p. 85.

^[27]
Heirs of Amunetegui vs. Director of Forestry, supra.

^[28]
Public Land Law.

^[29]
Section 6.

^[30]
Section 7.

^[31]
Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74957, June 30,
1987, 151 SCRA 679, 693.