DR. OFELIA P. TRISTE, PETITIONER, VS. LEYTE STATE COLLEGE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, NAMELY: HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS AND…

Triste versus Leyte State College Board of Trustees

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Dr. Ofelia P. Triste against the Board of Trustees of the Leyte State College and its officers, including the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, the college president, and Dr. Crescencia Chan-Gonzaga as private respondent. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Trustees ousting her and replacing her as Vice-President of the college, as well as the resolution of the Review Committee under Executive Order Number 17 dismissing her appeal. The case matters because it settles the nature of a vice-presidency in a chartered state college — whether it is a permanent appointment protected by security of tenure or a mere designation held at the pleasure of the appointing power — and it applies the grounds for separation under Executive Order Number 17.

Procedural History

After the Board of Trustees approved the designation of Dr. Gonzaga as vice-president, Dr. Triste filed a petition for reconsideration before the Board, asserting her constitutional and legal right to security of tenure. The Board, through its secretary, informed her counsel that her petition was noted and discussed, and that the members present reached a consensus that the position of vice-president was honorific and co-terminous with that of the president, so that her services were in effect terminated upon the Board's approval of Dr. Gonzaga's appointment. Her counsel wrote several letters requesting official copies of the board resolutions, but these were unheeded. She then appealed to the Review Committee of the Ministry of Justice organized to implement Executive Order Number 17. The Review Committee dismissed her appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the ten-day period provided in Section 6 of Executive Order Number 17, and a copy of the resolution was furnished her only later by mail. After her requests for certified copies of the designation of Dr. Gonzaga and the board resolution denying her petition remained unacted upon, she filed this petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Facts

The Leyte State College, formerly the Leyte Normal School, became a chartered state college by virtue of Presidential Decree Number 944 dated June 14, 1976. Section 4 of the decree vests the governance and administration of the college and the exercise of its corporate powers exclusively in the Board of Trustees and in the President of the College insofar as authorized by the Board. Section 6 provides that the Board shall have the power and duty to appoint, on recommendation of the President, a Vice-President for Academic Affairs and Development with a position next in rank to the President, who shall assist in the administration and supervision of the College and who shall automatically assume the presidency in an acting capacity in the absence of the President or when the office of the president is vacant. Presidential Decree Number 1437, promulgated on June 10, 1978, defines the composition and powers of governing boards of chartered state universities and colleges, and one of the Board's specific powers is to confirm appointments of vice-presidents and to remove them for cause after investigation and hearing.

On February 3, 1984, the Board took up the matter of the designation of the petitioner as vice-president with a basic salary of 39,288 pesos plus representation and transportation allowances, and passed a resolution confirming her designation. The acting chairman of the Board issued a document designating her as Vice-President for Academic Affairs and Development. As she was then holding an appointment as Professor 6, the president of the college sought clarification from the Minister of the Budget, who opined that a vice-president may be designated in lieu of a permanent plantilla position, provided that the designee's basic salary plus honorarium shall not exceed the salary prescribed for a permanently appointed vice-president. The position of vice-president did not appear in the personnel services itemization for 1984, but in the college's plantilla of personnel for that year, her position was designated and classified as Professor 6 (Vice-President), receiving an actual salary of 54,600 pesos as of June 30, 1984, adjusted to 55,644 pesos effective July 1, 1984. On December 27, 1985, she was extended an appointment as Professor 6 with compensation at the rate of 55,644 pesos per annum effective July 1, 1984, issued by authority of the Board of Trustees and approved by the Civil Service Commission as permanent.

For more than two years, the petitioner discharged her duties and functions as vice-president. In February 1986, there was a total revamp in the composition of the Board of Trustees. Dr. Purificacion M. Flores was designated officer-in-charge and later appointed as the new College President, replacing the retired president. Anticipating moves to replace her, on July 18, 1986, the petitioner submitted a position paper asserting that the Board could not appoint a vice-president because the position was not vacant, that the vice-president's term was not co-terminous with that of the recommending president who had retired, and that the incumbent was not replaceable at the pleasure of the Board. On August 21, 1986, she received a letter assigning her the job of director of the college's research program. On August 29, 1986, she received another letter informing her that Resolution Number 42, series of 1986, approved the designation of Dr. Cres Gonzaga as Vice-President effective August 19, 1986. Alleging that the appointment of Dr. Gonzaga in effect eased her out of the position, she filed a petition for reconsideration before the Board, contending that her constitutional and legal rights to security of tenure had been violated.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioner was illegally ousted from her position as vice-president of the Leyte State College.
• Whether or not the petitioner was merely designated and not appointed to the college vice-presidency, such that her term was co-terminous with that of the retired college president.
• Whether or not the petitioner may avail herself of the remedy of certiorari despite not having exhausted all administrative remedies.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6, paragraph (c) of Presidential Decree Number 944 provides:

To appoint, on recommendation of the President of each College, a Vice-President for Academic Affairs and Development with a position next in rank to the President of the College who shall assist in the administration and supervision of the College and who shall automatically assume the presidency of the College in an acting capacity, with full powers and duties, in the absence of the President or when the office of the president is vacant.

This provision establishes that the vice-president is a duly appointed official next in rank to the president, which bears on whether the petitioner held a permanent position.

Section 3, paragraph (f) of Presidential Decree Number 1437 provides:

To confirm appointments of vice-presidents, deans, directors, registrars, heads of departments, professors, and other officials and employees of the university or college made by the president, to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as the governing boards may promulgate, in accordance with the provisions of existing laws; to remove them for cause after investigation and hearing.

This provision requires that removal of a vice-president be for cause after investigation and hearing, which bears on the legality of the petitioner's replacement.

Section 2 of Executive Order Number 17 provides:

The Ministry Head concerned, on the basis of such review and assessment, shall determine who shall be separated from the service. Thereafter, he shall issue to the official or employee concerned a notice of separation which shall indicate therein the reason or reasons or ground or grounds for such separation and the fact that the separated official or employee has the right to file a petition for reconsideration pursuant to this Order. Separation from the service shall be effective upon receipt of such notice, either personally by the official or employee concerned or on his behalf by a person of sufficient discretion.

This provision requires a notice of separation stating the grounds, which bears on whether the petitioner was validly separated.

Section 3 of Executive Order Number 17 provides:

The following shall be the grounds for separation or replacement of personnel: 1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law; 2. Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned; 3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions; 4. Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes; 5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his separation or replacement is in the interest of the service.

This provision enumerates the only grounds for separation, which bears on whether the petitioner's replacement was justified.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petitioner was illegally ousted from her position as vice-president. The resolution of the issue hinges on the determination of her status as such official. The Court found that while initially she was discharging the powers and functions of vice-president upon a designation made on February 3, 1984, by July 1 of the same year she was doing so by virtue of an appointment. For while her appointment paper mentioned only Professor 6 as the position to which she was being appointed, the clear intent to appoint her Professor 6 (Vice-President), as distinguished from the other Professor 6 items, is manifest from the rate of compensation and item number specifically given in the appointment paper. The only plausible explanation is that it was an appointment to a new item of vice-president, and said appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission as permanent.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petitioner was not merely designated but appointed to the vice-presidency. Although under Section 8 of Presidential Decree Number 1437 the term of a state college president is six years, the same law is silent as to that of the vice-president. Such silence should not be interpreted to mean that the law intends to give the vice-president the same term as that of a president. On the contrary, there are indications in the decrees themselves that the vice-president is a career official whose term of office may outlast that of the president. Under Section 6(c) of Presidential Decree Number 944, the vice-president is next in rank to the president, shall assist the president in the administration and supervision of the college, and shall assume the presidency in an acting capacity in the absence or when the office of the president is vacant. Whoever is holding the position of vice-president shall remain as such until, under Section 3(f) of Presidential Decree Number 1437, the Board finds a reason or reasons to remove him for cause after investigation and hearing. The contention that the petitioner was not a permanently appointed vice-president since she was merely receiving an honorarium is without merit, because under the same Section 3(f) the Board has the power to fix the compensation of the vice-president, and her compensation as Professor 6 (Vice-President) was specifically stated in her appointment paper. The Court distinguished this case from Laxamana versus Borlaza, where the petitioner was legally removed because she was merely designated and there was no position in the college plantilla to which a permanent appointment could be made; here, the position of vice-president is based on a presidential decree which has the force and effect of law.

On the third issue, the Court held that the petitioner may avail herself of the remedy of certiorari despite not having exhausted all administrative remedies. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an iron-clad rule. It is not necessary when, from the facts of the case, the petitioner has to look to the courts for speedy relief; when the question presented is purely a legal one, the controverted act is patently illegal and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done; and when the petitioner was denied due process. Each of these exceptions may exempt the petitioner from the rule, and all these exceptions are present in this case. Although the petition is captioned as a petition for review on certiorari, the Court considered it as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it having been alleged that the respondents abused their discretion in their questioned actions.

Doctrine

A vice-president of a chartered state college who is appointed by the Board of Trustees, with compensation fixed by the Board, and whose appointment is approved by the Civil Service Commission as permanent, holds a permanent position protected by security of tenure. The vice-president is a career official whose term of office may outlast that of the president, and may be removed only for cause after investigation and hearing, as required by Section 3, paragraph (f) of Presidential Decree Number 1437. The word designate, when used by the appointing power in making an appointment to office, is equivalent to the word appoint; but common usage distinguishes appointment as connoting permanency and designation as implying temporariness. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an iron-clad rule and is not required when the question is purely legal, the act is patently illegal, or the petitioner was denied due process.

Disposition

The Court granted the petition, annulled and set aside the decision of the Board of Trustees ousting the petitioner and the resolution of the Review Committee dismissing her appeal, and ordered her reinstatement as vice-president of the Leyte State College.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that a vice-president of a chartered state college appointed by the Board with a permanent appointment approved by the Civil Service Commission cannot be removed except for cause after investigation and hearing. Examiners like to use this case to test the distinction between appointment and designation, and the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.