G.R. No. 76884. May 28, 1990
PEDRO M. ESTELLA AND FE K. ESTELLA, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, HON. CORONA IBAY SOMERA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH XXVI, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF M…
FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioner-spouses Pedro and Fe Estella pray that this Court overturn the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated September
12, 1986 in C.A.-G.R. No. 10255-UDK
which dismissed petitioners’ appeal for failure to prosecute.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Rosario N. Concepcion was the original
owner of the disputed residential land with a three-door apartment thereon,
situated in Sta. Cruz, Manila,
covered by TCT No. 80786 and declared under Tax
Declaration No. 2048. On May 6, 1970, Concepcion sold the property to
herein petitioners who registered the sale with the Register of Deeds of Manila
which then issued TCT No. 100990 in their favor. However, petitioners failed to secure a new tax declaration or assessment in
their name, for which reason said property remained for taxation purposes in
the name of vendor Concepcion.[1]
Seven years after, or on April
11, 1977, the City Treasurer of Manila, Jesus Calleja,
sent to the declared owner on record, meaning Concepcion, a first notice of tax
delinquency covering the second and fourth quarters of 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976. Since
no payment was made after the first notice, a final notice which included her 1977 tax delinquency was sent on April 28, 1978 to Concepcion,
giving her another ten (10) days to
settle her account. Despite the final
notice sent, no payment was made.
Consequently, as a warning, the City
Treasurer sent Concepcion a notice of
publication dated June 7, 1978 stating therein that the notice would be
published in the Times Journal and
Balita on July 15, 22, and 29, 1978, after which if said property
still remained delinquent of taxes, it would be sold at public auction on
August 29, 1978.[2]
In the public auction held on August 29, 1978, the Sta. Cruz property was awarded to
herein private respondent Ricardo Perez as the highest bidder for
P6,100.00. After the auction sale,
another notice was sent to delinquent taxpayer Concepcion
informing her of her right to redeem the property pursuant to Section 78 of
P.D. 464 (Real Property Tax Code). The
one-year period having lapsed without any
redemption, Perez registered the certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds
of Manila on September 25, 1979
and had it annotated at the back of TCT No. 100990.
In a letter dated September
27, 1979, the Register of Deeds of Manila advised petitioner Fe
Estella to surrender their TCT No. 100990 for the purpose of annotating the
certificate of sale in favor of
Perez. Petitioner-spouses replied that
the tax sale was without legal basis and that they were never delinquent in the
payment of the realty taxes.
On September 20, 1979
and October 11, 1979,
petitioners paid their real estate taxes for the years 1970-1978.[3]
For his part, Perez, after one year from the auction sale, applied for the final deed of sale and updated his
realty taxes for 1978, 1979 and 1980.
The final deed of sale was executed on December 1, 1980.[4]
On December 22, 1980,
petitioners sued private respondents, City Treasurer Calleja, the members of the Auction
Bidding Committee and the Register of Deeds of Manila for quieting of title,
annulment of public auction sale, certificate of bill of sale, transfer certificate of title, damages, with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order.[5]
On February 11, 1985,
the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 26, presided by respondent Judge Corona Ibay Somera, rendered judgment against the petitioners.
The dispositive part states:
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered
against the plaintiffs, dismissing
the complaint against all the defendants, declaring the auction tax sale dated
August 29, 1979 and the final deed of sale dated December 1, 1980 valid;
declaring defendant Ricardo M. Perez and Lolita Diaz absolute owners of Lot No.
2-E, Block 59, at 2559 BC. L. Rivera, San Lazaro II
covered by TCT No. 100990; ordering the plaintiffs to surrender TCT No. 100990
to the Register of Deeds, Manila, to register the final deed of sale executed
by the City Treasurer in favor of Ricardo M. Perez and a new Certificate of
Title be issued in the names of defendant spouses Ricardo M. Perez and Lolita Diaz; orders the plaintiffs
to pay the defendant spouses Ricardo M. Perez and Lolita Diaz the amount of
P10,000.00 as moral damages, P2,500.00 as Attorney’s Fees and to pay the costs of the proceedings.”[6]
Petitioners received a copy
of the decision on March 25, 1985 and filed a notice of
appeal on March 29, 1985.[7]
On April 11, 1985, the
trial court ordered the records of the case forwarded to the Intermediate Appellate Court.[8] But up to the time when private respondent
Perez filed his motion to dismiss the appeal of
petitioners on June 3, 1986 or after a period of one (1) year, one (1)
month and twenty-two (22) days from April 11, 1985, no records were received by the appellate
court.[9] As a matter of fact, the expediente
was actually transmitted to the appellate court on October 13, 1986 as attested by Atty. Cesar P. Javier, the
branch clerk of court.[10]
In the assailed resolution of September 12, 1986, the Court of Appeals granted
respondents’ motion to dismiss appeal for failure of the appellants
(petitioners) to prosecute.[11]
Hence, this recourse.
One preliminary point.
While petitioners have raised as a principal issue the propriety of the
appellate court’s summary dismissal of their appeal, they have also asked the
Court, in the alternative, to rule on the legality of the auction sale which
deprived them of their property allegedly without due process of law. Considering that there are sufficient records
available before us for an adjudication on the merits, we have acceded to
petitioners’ request.
On the matter of the disallowance of the appeal, the Court of
Appeals anchored its ruling on the following provisions of the Revised Rules of
Court, to wit:
“Section 1. Grounds for
dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be
dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
“xxx xxx xxx
“c) Failure of the appellant to prosecute his appeal under
Section 3 of Rule 46;
“xxx xxx xxx” (Rule 50)
“Section 3. Order of
transmittal of record. – If the record
on appeal is not received by the Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days
after the approval thereof, the appellee may, upon
notice to the appellant, move the court to grant an order directing the clerk
of the lower court forthwith to transmit such record on appeal or to declare the same abandoned for
failure to prosecute.” (Rule 46; underscoring supplied.)
This is error. The record
on appeal as a requisite for the perfection of an appeal has been eliminated
under Section 39 of BP Blg. 129 (Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980) and Sections 18, 19 and 20 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines which were already
in force when respondent appellate
court handed down its dismissal resolution
on September 12, 1986. Thus:
“Sec. 39. Appeals. – x x x. No record on
appeal shall be required to take an appeal.
In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted. x x x.” (BP Blg. 129)
“18. Elimination of
record on appeal and appeal bond. – The
filing of a record on appeal shall be dispensed with, except in the cases
referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 19 hereof.
“No appeal bond shall be required for an appeal.”
(Interim Rules and Guidelines)
“19. Period of Appeal. —
“(a) all appeals except in habeas corpus cases and in the
cases referred to paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or award appealed from.
“(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule
109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed,
the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being
required.” (Interim Rules and Guidelines)
“20. Procedure
for taking appeal. – An appeal x x x from the regional trial courts to the Intermediate
Appellate Court in actions or proceedings originally filed in the former shall
be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment
or order appealed from.” (Interim Rules and Guidelines)
Since the appellate court based its outright dismissal of
petitioners’ appeal on the non-transmittal of the record on appeal pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised
Rules of Court, then clearly, said dismissal was erroneous.
This Court is puzzled as to how the appellate court could have
overlooked Such a major
innovation introduced in the 1980 Reorganization Act and in the Interim Rules
which did away with the requirement of a record on appeal, the notice of appeal
being sufficient for the purpose. Be
that as it may, the appeal by petitioners should have been disallowed for a different reason: petitioners’ gross inaction for a period
which exceeded one year.
Records show that the trial court had ordered the records of the
case forwarded to the appellate court as early as April 11, 1985 and since that date, up to the filing of private respondents’
motion to dismiss appeal dated June 3,
1986, “nothing appear(ed) to have been done about the said
appeal.”
We cannot subscribe to petitioners’ gratuitous statement that
“as the rule now exists, the appellant is justified if he merely ‘folds
his hands’ after the trial judge has ordered that the records of the case be
transmitted to the appellate court.”[12]
Conceding to the point that it is the clerk of court who
primarily responsible for seeing to it that the records of appealed cases are
properly sent to the appellate court without delay (and having failed to do so
subjects him to administrative liability), it behooves the litigants to be more
vigilant of their rights. They should
take it upon themselves to call the attention of the trial court as to any
delay in action over their cases.[13]
The rule that it is the duty of the appellant to prosecute his
appeal with reasonable diligence is still a sound rule. He cannot simply “fold his hands”
and say that it is the duty of the clerk of court to have his case promptly
submitted to the appellate court for the disposition of his appeal.
This absence of an awareness or regard on the part of the
defeated litigant to personally see to it that the needed records are forthwith
sent to the appellate court is one major cause of delays in litigation. Thus, in an effort to do away with the litigant’s complacency and to spur him
into taking the initiative, the Court of Appeals has placed on the appellant
and his counsel the prime responsibility of
seeing to it that the appealed case shall be ready for decision as soon as practicable. They must take appropriate and timely steps to ensure that the record of the case is complete and
seasonably transmitted to the Court of Appeals.[14]
Proceeding now to the controversial auction sale of the disputed
residential land by the City Treasurer
for delinquency in the payment of realty tax, petitioners maintain that
said sale was irregular because they were never personally notified of their
tax delinquency, the distraint made on the subject
property and the auction proceedings,
since all the notices were sent to Concepcion who was
no longer the registered owner as of May 4, 1970.
Such argument is unavailing.
Under the particular circumstances of the case, we hold that the
City Treasurer had done everything that was legally incumbent upon him. Not only did he send the pertinent notices to
the declared owner, he also caused the mandatory publication of the notice of
public auction in two (2) newspapers of general circulation pursuant to Section
65 of P.D. No. 464. The notices were
understandably mailed to Concepcion because as far as the City Treasurer was
concerned, she was still the “declared owner” since the assessment of the property in question was still in her name. It should be recalled that
while petitioners had promptly secured a new transfer certificate of
title in their name after the 1970 acquisition, they neglected to effect the necessary change in the tax declaration as then required by
Commonwealth Act No. 470 (Assessment Law) and later by P.D. No. 464. Under the Assessment Law then
in force on May 6, 1970 when the Sta. Cruz property changed hands,
petitioners were obliged to make a new declaration
thereof. Section 12 provides:
“Sec. 12. Declaration to be prepared by owner of real
property. – It shall be the duty of
every owner of real property within a municipality or municipal
district or his duly authorized representative, to prepare, or cause to be
prepared, and submit to the provincial assessor a declaration of said property stating the
value of each parcel thereof which he owns within the municipality or municipal
district. Such declaration shall contain
a description of the property sufficient in detail to enable the provincial
assessor to identify the same.
“It shall also be the duty of any person acquiring at any time
real property in any municipality or municipal district or making any
improvement on real property belonging to him,
to prepare and submit to the provincial assessor, within sixty days
after the acquisition of such property or the completion of the improvement, a
declaration containing the value of the real property so acquired or of the
improvement made. The property and
improvement must be so described
as to enable the provincial assessor to identify the same on examination. x x x.”
Not only were the petitioners remiss in securing a new tax
declaration over the Sta. Cruz
property but they did not also pay their realty taxes from 1970 to 1977. As the subsequent owners, they should have realized
that they were duty-bound to pay the realty taxes because such taxes constitute
a lien enforceable against the property itself, regardless of the change in
ownership. This is the reason why the
City Treasurer can go directly against the delinquent property in order to
enforce payment of the taxes due.
Had petitioners been more diligent in the annual payment of their real
estate taxes, Tax Declaration 2048, which was issued in Concepcion‘s name and which remained as the basis in the
assessment rolls, would have been effectively replaced. But this desired change came much too late on
October 9, 1980 when Tax Declaration A 038-00812 was issued in petitioners’
favor, a good ten (10) years after they had purchased the disputed property
from Concepcion.
All told, if it were really true that petitioners were never
given the opportunity to protect their rights, they had only themselves to blame for the catastrophe that befell
them. Not having been apprised by
petitioners of a change in ownership of the subject property, the government was never placed in
a position to give them that opportunity.[15]
Considering, however, that
petitioners finally settled their tax obligations with the City Treasurer on September 20, 1979 and October 11, 1979 for the years 1970
to 1978, the question is raised: Can the
payments made (admittedly within the redemption period) be considered as an
exercise of petitioners’ right of redemption pursuant to Section 78 of P.D. No.
464?
Under Section 78, the exercise of the right of redemption
consists in the payment of the following:
[1] total amount of taxes and penalties due up to the date of
redemption; [2] the costs of sale, and [3] the interest at the rate of twenty
(20) per centum of the purchase price.
Evidence shows that petitioners
paid only the taxes and penalties due up to 1978 but not the taxes
due up to the date of redemption, i.e. the taxes for 1979, the costs of the
sale and twenty (20) percent interest on the purchase price. Since not all of the prescribed amounts under
Section 78 were paid within the one-year reglementary
period, it cannot be said that there was an effective exercise of the right of
redemption.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
is hereby DENIED. Considering the branch
clerk of court’s apparent contributory role in the delay in the transmittal of
the records of Civil Case No. R-82-5992 to the Court of Appeals, Atty. (now Judge) Cesar P. Javier is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him for
such delay.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, p. 53.
[2]
Rollo, p. 48.
[3]
Rollo, p. 44.
[4]
Rollo, p. 51.
[5]
Civil Case No. R-82-5992; Rollo, p. 22.
[6]
Rollo, p.
62.
[7]
Rollo, p. 63.
[8]
Rollo, p. 65.
[9]
Rollo, p. 77.
[10]
Rollo, p. 88.
[11]
Rollo, p. 80.
[12]
Rollo, 110.
[13]
Jumalon v. Montes, Adm. Matter No. P-2694,
March 29, 1982, 113 SCRA 103; Advincula v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75310, January 16, 1987, 147 SCRA 262.
[14]
Article VII-C, Court of Appeals Resolution No. 2, dated August 6, 1986.
[15]
See: Paguio
v. Ruiz, 93 Phil. 306.