YUCO CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT THRU HONORABLE VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., DEPUTY MINISTER, GEORGE HALILI AND AMADO MAGNO, RESPONDENTS.

Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the order
dated April 8, 1986 of
Deputy Minister Leogardo, Jr. of the then Ministry of
Labor and Employment (MOLE) which reversed the order of the officer-in-charge
of the Tarlac provincial labor office and directed
petitioner “to reinstate complainants with backwages
fixed at two years without deduction or qualification.”^[1]

In 1978, private respondents (complainants) George Halili and Amado Magno were employed by petitioner company
which is engaged in the manufacture/assembly of ice boxes in Barangay Matatalaib, Tarlac, Tarlac.  They were
assigned to make aluminum handle for the ice boxes.

On August 12, 1981, after obtaining a favorable legal opinion
from the Tarlac provincial office of MOLE concerning
the legality of moving the production of aluminum handles from Tarlac to Manila, petitioner addressed a memorandum to
private respondents directing them to report for work within one week from
notice at their new place of work at Felix Huertas
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.  The
memorandum further stated that private respondents would be paid with a salary
of P27.00 and an additional allowance of P2.00 “to meet the higher cost of living in Manila.”^[2]

A day after or on August 13, 1981, instead of complying
with the memorandum, private respondents filed a complaint with the provincial
labor office for illegal dismissal, 13th month pay and service incentive leave
pay.^[3]

As a countermove, on August
21, 1981, petitioner filed an application for clearance to
terminate the two employees on the ground of abandonment.  On September
25, 1981, the OIC of the Tarlac labor
office issued an order directing petitioner to give private respondents their
separation pay within ten (10) days from receipt of notice.

Private respondents appealed to the Office of the Minister of
MOLE through Deputy Minister Leogardo, Jr. who
rendered the order in question with the following reasons cited:

1.  At the time of acceptance
of the employment relation between the parties, it was assumed that the place
of work was in Matatalaib, Tarlac,
Tarlac.  Thus, to transfer the place of work at such a
distant place as Manila without the consent of the employees concerned can no
longer be construed as a reasonable exercise of management prerogative in the
assignment of personnel dictated by business exigencies;

2.  If petitioner
company had indeed relocated its operations from Tarlac
to Manila, it is puzzling why out
of the 50 employees, it singled out the two (2) plain laborers to man the Manila
operations.  Such actuation tended to
support the allegation that private respondents were discriminated against
because of their union activities and their refusal to disaffiliate from the
union.

A motion for reconsideration subsequently filed by the petitioner
was denied.  Hence this present petition.

First, some general principles on transfer.  In a number of cases, the Court has
recognized and upheld the prerogative of management to transfer
an employee from one office to another within the business establishment
provided that there is no demotion in rank or a diminution of his salary,
benefits and other privileges.  This is a
privilege inherent in the employer’s right to control and manage its enterprise
effectively.  Even as the law is
solicitous of the employees’ welfare, it cannot ignore the right of the
employer to exercise what are clearly and obviously management
prerogatives.  The freedom of management
to conduct its business operations to achieve its purpose cannot be denied.^[4]

But like all other rights, there are limits.  The managerial prerogative to transfer
personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion and putting to
mind the basic elements of justice and fair play.^[5]
Having the right should not be confused with the manner in which that right
must be exercised.  Thus it cannot be
used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable
worker.  Nor when the real reason is to
penalize an employee for his union activities and thereby defeat his right to
self-organization.  But the transfer can
be upheld when there is no showing
that it is unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced employee.^[6]

The reassignment of Halili and Magno to Manila
is legally indefensible on several grounds. 
Firstly, it was grossly inconvenient to private respondents. 
They are working
students.  When they received the
transfer memorandum directing their relocation to Manila
within seven days from notice, classes had already started.  The move from Tarlac
to Manila at such time would mean a
disruption of their studies.  Secondly,
there appears to be no genuine business urgency that necessitated their
transfer.  As well pointed out by private
respondents’ counsel the fabrication of aluminum handles for ice boxes does not
require special dexterity.  Many workers
could be contracted right in Manila
to perform that particular line of work.

Altogether, there is a strong basis for public respondent’s
conclusion that the controversial transfer was not prompted by legitimate
reasons.  Petitioner company had indeed discriminated against Magno
and Halili when the
duo was selected for reassignment to Manila.  The transfer was timed at the height of union
concerted activities in the firm, deliberately calculated to demoralize the other union
members.  Under such questionable
circumstances, private respondents had a valid reason to refuse the Manila
reassignment.^[7]
Public respondent did not err or abuse his discretion in upholding the employees’ cause.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order dated April 8, 1986 of Deputy Minister Leogardo, Jr. is hereby AFFIRMED.  Assuming that the positions of private
respondents have been filled up, they should be reinstated to substantially
equivalent position without loss of seniority rights, privileges and benefits
due them.  Costs
against petitioner.

So ordered.

Gutierrez, Jr., and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 21, 23-24.

^[2]
Rollo, p.
18.

^[3]
Annex F, Rollo, p. 73.

^[4]
Dosch vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 51182, July 5, 1982,
123 SCRA 296; Petrophil vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
64048, August 29, 1986, 143 SCRA 700; Abbott Laboratories Inc. vs. NLRC,
G.R. No. 76959, October 12, 1987, 154 SCRA 713.

^[5]
International Harvester Macleod vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73287, May 18, 1987, 149 SCRA 641.

^[6]
Phil. Japan Active Carbon Corp., et al. vs. NLRC and Quinanola,
G.R. No. 83239, March 8, 1989.

^[7]
See Bataan Shipyard and
Engineering Co. Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R.
No. 78604, May 9, 1988, 161
SCRA 271.