SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND DIRECTOR OF LANDS, RESPONDENTS.

In this petition for review on certiorari, San Miguel
Corporation seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals^[1]
denying its application for registration of a parcel of land in view of its
failure to show entitlement thereto.

On December 23, 1975, petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC for
brevity) purchased from Silverio Perez Lot 684, a
14.531-square-meter parcel of land located in Sta. Anastacia,
Sto. Tomas, Batangas, in
consideration of the sum of P133, 084.80.^[2]  On February 21, 1977, claiming ownership in
fee simple of the land, SMC filed before the then Court of First Instance, now
Regional Trial Court of Batangas an application for
its registration under the Land Registration Act.

The Solicitor General, appearing for the Republic of the
Philippines, opposed the application for registration contending that SMC’s
claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant could
no longer be availed of by the applicant as the six-month period from February
16, 1976 prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 892 had elapsed; that the parcel
of land in question is part of the public domain, and that SMC, being a private
corporation, is disqualified under Section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution
from holding alienable lands of the public domain.  The Solicitor General thereafter authorized
the Provincial Fiscal of Batangas to appear in said
case, subject to his supervision and control.

At the initial and only hearing held on October 12, 1977, the
Court, upon motion of SMC and there being no opposition to the application
except that of the Republic of the Philippines, issued an order of general
default.  SMC was allowed to mark
documentary evidence to establish jurisdictional facts
and to present additional evidence before the Clerk of Court who was appointed
Commissioner for that purpose.

On December 12, 1977, the lower court, presided by Judge Eduardo
C. Abaya, rendered a decision granting the
application for registration and adjudicating the property in favor of SMC.

The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals.  In its decision of March 23, 1981, said court
reversed the decision of the lower court and declared the parcel of land
involved as public land.  Hence, the
instant petition with SMC submitting the following alleged “grave
errors” of the Court of Appeals for this Court’s resolution:  (1) the Court of Appeals’ failure to hold
that “prescription is a mode
of acquiring title or ownership of land and that the title thus acquired is registrable“; (2) the Court of Appeals’ disregard of
SMC’s evidence “not on the basis of controverting
evidence but on the basis of unfounded suppositions and conjectures,” and (3)
the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the factual findings of the trial court which
had the opportunity of observing the demeanor and sincerity of the witnesses.^[3]

We need not dwell lengthily on the third “error”
assigned by petitioner.  Suffice it to
state that while trial courts may have the opportunity to observe the demeanor
of witnesses, their factual findings may
nonetheless be reversed by the Court of Appeals, the appellate court
vested by law to resolve both legal and factual issues, if, by the evidence on
record, it appears that the trial court
involved erred.  What is of
primary concern to us in this case is the issue of whether or not the evidence
presented by the petitioner is sufficient to warrant a ruling that SMC and/or
its predecessor-in-interest has a registrable right
over Lot 684.

Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public
land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the
land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso, jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.^[4]
Such open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of the disputed properties
for more than 30 years must, however,
be conclusively established.^[5]
This quantum of proof is necessary to avoid the erroneous validation of
actually fictitious claims of possession over the property in dispute.

 In this case, petitioner’s
claim that its predecessor-in­-interest had open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of Lot 684 for more than thirty years is anchored on certain
documentary and testimonial evidence. 
Its documentary evidence consist of tax declaration No. 923 wherein it
appears that in 1974, Silverio Perez declared as his
own for taxation purposes, a certain riceland with an
area of 1.5657 hectares located in Sta. Anastacia, Sto. Tomas, Batangas,^[6]
and a certification of the Office of the Treasurer of Sto.
Tomas to the effect that in 1977, Silverio
Perez paid realty taxes for the land subject of tax declaration no. 923.^[7]

Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or right of possession over a piece of land.^[8]
They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.^[9]
Tax declarations only become strong evidence of ownership of land acquired by
prescription, a mode of acquisition of ownership relied upon by petitioner in
this case, when accompanied by proof of actual possession.^[10]

Such proof of actual possession was sought to be provided by the
testimony of vendor Silverio Perez that he had been
in possession of the property since 1933 until he sold it to SMC in 1975; that
the property was given to him by his parents when he got married; that no
document evidenced that transfer; that it had been in the possession of his
parents since 1925; that he had declared the property in his name for taxation
purposes; that he had paid taxes therefor, and that
he was in peaceful, continuous and exclusive possession of the property until
its sale to SMC.^[11]

Petitioner did not present other witnesses to corroborate Perez’s
testimony.  Its other witness, Antonio M.
de las Alas, Jr., a lawyer of the petitioner, simply
testified that he handled the negotiations for the purchase of the property;
that SMC was authorized to own and acquire property as shown by its articles of
incorporation and by-laws; that since its acquisition in 1975, the property had
been used as a hatchery farm of SMC; that SMC’s possession in the concept of an
owner had been continuous, adverse and against the whole world, and that the
land was declared for taxation purposes still in the name of Silverio Perez.^[12]

We hold that there is paucity of evidence of actual, notorious
and exclusive possession of the property on the part of vendor Silverio Perez so as to attach to it the character of an
express grant from the government.^[13]
Indeed, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, Silverio
Perez’s testimony, being uncorroborated, is simply self-serving and hence,
undeserving of any weight.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.  Costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.

^[1]
In CA-G.R. No. 63737-R, penned by Justice Elias B. Asuncion and concurred in
Justices Porfirio V. Sison
and Mariano A. Zosa.

^[2]
Exhibit 1.

^[3]
p. 18, Rollo.

^[4]
Director of Lands vs. Bengzon, G.R. No. 54045,
July 28, 1987, 152 SCRA 369; Director of Lands vs. Manila Electric Co.,
G.R. No. 57461, September 11, 1987, 153 SCRA 686; Director of Lands vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood and Veneer Co., Inc., G.R. No.
73002, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 509.

^[5]
Municipality of Santiago, Isabela vs.
Court of Appeals, L-49903, February 21, 1983, 120 SCRA 734, 745.

^[6]
Exhibit H.

^[7]
Exhibit J.

^[8]
Ferrer-Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 50340, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 701.

^[9]
Municipality of Antipolo vs.
Zapanta, G.R. No. 65334, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA
820.

^[10]
Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, L-43105, August 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 532.

^[11]
TSN, October 12, 1977, pp. 5 to 12.

^[12]
Supra, pp. 13-18.

^[13]
See: Republic vs. De Porkan, G.R. No.
66866, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 88.