RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION AND/OR RUFO MAURICIO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Illustre Cabiliza
was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the 5th Judicial Region, Branch
II, Le­gaspi City with homicide and damage to
property through reckless imprudence, in an information which reads –

“That on or about the 20th day of Septem­ber, 1979, in the
city of Legaspi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the
driver of an Izusu dump truck, bearing Plate No.
WD-224 T Philippines “79, belonging to and owned by RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTIONS,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, operate and
manage the said vehicle in a reckless and imprudent man­ner without taking the
necessary precaution to prevent and/or avoid accident to persons and/or damage
to property, and without regard to traffic rules and regulations, causing as a
result of his carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle that he was driving
to sides­wipe and hit a Colt Gallant with Plate No. AC-206 S Pilipinas “79, driven and owned by the late JUDGE ARSENIO
SOLIDUM, thereby inflic­ting injuries upon the said Judge Arsenio
Solidum which directly caused his untimely death, and
further causing damage to the said Colt Gallant in the amount of Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Cur­rency, to the damage and prejudice
of the late Judge Arsenio Solidum
and/or his family, and likewise causing damage to the house owned by PABLO
NAVARRA, to the damage and prejudice of the said Pablo Navarra.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.” (Rollo, pp.
74-75)

After arraignment and trial on the merits, Cabiliza
was convicted of the crime charged in a Decision dated October 12, 1983, the dispositive
portion of which reads –

“WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Illustre
Cabiliza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide and damage to property thru reckless imprudence and hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4)
months, as minimum to six (6) years, as maximum of prision correccional;
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Judge Arsenio
G. Solidum, the sum of P115,723.05, as actual and
compensa­tory damages; P1,447,200.00
for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased; P200,000.00 as moral damages; and P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and to pay the costs.” (Rollo, p. 75)

The aforesaid judgment was promulgated on November 9, 1983. 
On November 11, 1983,
Cabiliza filed a Notice of Appeal.  But he did not live to pursue his appeal as
he died on January 5, 1984.  A notice of death dated February 4, 1984 was filed by his counsel Atty. Eustaquio S. Beltran. 
In the same notice of death, Atty. Beltran manifested the intention of Rufo Mauricio, as employer of Cabiliza
to proceed with the case on appeal pursuant to his right as employer who is subsidiarily liable.

On March 5, 1984,
the lower court issued an Order requiring the heirs of Cabiliza
to appear and to substi­tute him as appellant with respect to the civil aspect
of the case.

On motion of the heirs of the victim, the lower court in its
order dated August 23, 1984
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution and accordingly on the same date,
the Branch Clerk of Court issued a writ.

The writ of execution was however returned unsatis­fied per
Sheriff’s return of service dated September
3, 1984, because Cabiliza was found
insolvent.  A certi­ficate of insolvency
was issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Cagayan
and by the Municipal Assessor of Claveria, Cagayan where Cabiliza appears to
be a permanent resident.

On September 3, 1984,
the victim’s widow, Mrs. Aurora Solidum, filed a
motion for the issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution to be enforced
against the employer of Cabiliza, Rufo
Mauricio and/or Rufo Mauricio Construction Co., which
was granted by the court in its order dated September 6, 1984. 
A subsidiary writ of execution was issued by the Clerk of Court also on September 6, 1984.

On September 12, 1984,
Rufo Mauricio thru his coun­sel Atty. Beltran filed a
motion to quash the subsidiary writ of execution.  Resolution of this motion was held in
abeyance.

Meanwhile, Rufo Mauricio, as the
employer of Cabi­liza pursued the latter’s appeal
before the Intermediate Appellate Court (AC-G.R. No. 01829).  He interposed the following assignment of
errors –

I

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS GROSSLY NEGLIGENT AND IMPRUDENT IN
TRYING TO OVERTAKE ANOTHER TRUCK WHEN THERE WAS AN ONCOMING CAR FROM THE
OPPOSITE DIREC­TION;

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE COLLISION RESULTING IN DEATH OF JUDGE ARSENIO SOLIDUM AND DAMAGE TO HIS
CAR, WAS DUE TO THE LATTER’S GROSS NEGLIGENCE AND IMPRUDENCE IN INVADING THE
PROPER LANE OF THE ISUZU DUMP TRUCK OWNED BY RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION;

III

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN AWARDING THE TOTAL OF P1,782,923.05 DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF THE COMPLAINANTS;

IV

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATION AGAINST THE ACCUSED UPON PROOF OF HIS
DEATH AND IN NOT RELEASING THE EMPLOYER RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTIONS AND/OR RUFO
MAURI­CIO FROM LIABILITY;

V

THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN NOT GIVING APPELLANT RUFO MAURICIO AND/OR RUFO MAURICIO CON­STRUCTION
A DAY IN COURT TO RESIST THE DAMAGES BEING CLAIMED BY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM.

On April 8, 1986,
the Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated its now assailed Decision,^[1]
the pertinent portion of which reads –

“We find that the proper amount of damages for loss of
earnings based on life expectancy of the deceased is P1,082,223.84.  In this respect, the trial court’s finding is
modified.  The Judgment appealed from is
affirmed in all other aspects.

“WHEREFORE, with the afore-mentioned modifications, the
appealed Judgment is AF­FIRMED.” (Rollo, p. 86)

Rufo Mauricio filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution of the Intermediate
Appellate Court dated July 18, 1986.

The said Decision and
Resolution are the subject of the present petition.  Petitioner contends that –

“1.     The dismissal of
the criminal case against the accused employee wipes out not only the employee’s
primary civil liability, but also his employer’s subsidiary liability for such
criminal negligence, because:

‘a.   The criminal case is based on Article 100 of
the revised Penal Code wherein criminal liability and the exemption of criminal
liability implies exemption from civil liability arising from crime.

‘b.   The civil liability of the employer
petitioner is based, if any, on quasi delict, since
the accused was exempted from criminal liability.

“2.     Exemplary damages
cannot be imposed upon an employer who at the time of the alleged incident was
not present nor inside the vehicle involved in the accident.

“3.     The petitioner
employer cannot be condemned (to pay) an exhorbitant
amount of damages to the tune of P1,417,946.89, without giving him opportunity
to cross examine the witness supporting such claim and affording him
opportunity to adduce evidence to resist the claim, because that would be
deprivation of property without due process of law repug­nant to the Freedom
Constitution.

“4.     The Honorable
Intermediate Appellate Court misapplied the facts contrary to the physical
evidence and relied on conjectures and surmises that depicted a different
picture of the accident when the evidence shows that it was the victim who was
negligent at the time of the accident.” (Rollo,
pp. 18-19)

The first contention of petitioner that the death of the
accused-employee wipes out not only the employee’s primary civil liability but
also his employer’s subsi­diary liability is without merit.  The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction
(rendered against him by the lower court) became final and executory
entinguished his criminal liability (meaning his
obligation to serve the imprisonment imposed and his pecuniary liability for
fines, but not his civil liability
should the lia­bility or obligation arise (not from a crime, for here, no crime was committed, the accused
not having been convicted by final judgment, and therefore still regarded as
innocent) but from a quasi-delict (See Arts.
2176 and 2177, Civil Code), as in this case. 
The liability of the employer here would not be subsidiary but solidary with his driver (unless said employer can
prove there was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove due
diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver).  (See 8th par. of Art. 2180, Art. 2194, Civil
Code; also People vs. Navoa, 132 SCRA 412; People vs.
Tirol, 102 SCRA 558; People vs. Sandaydiego,
82 SCRA 120).

Inasmuch as the employer (petitioner herein) was not a party in
the criminal case, and to grant him his day in court for the purpose of
cross-examining the prosecution witnesses on their testimonies on the dri­ver’s
alleged negligence and the amount of damages to which the heirs of the victim
are entitled, as well as to introduce any evidence or witnesses he may care to
present in his defense, the hearing on the motion to quash the subsidiary writ
of execution must be re­opened precisely for the purpose adverted to
hereinabove.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the
appellate court is hereby SET ASIDE, and this case is REMANDED to the trial
court for the hearing adverted to in the next preceding paragraph.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera,
Padilla, and Sarmiento,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Penned by Justice Esteban M. Lising concurred in by Justices
Rodolfo A. Nocon and Federico B. Alfonso, Jr.