G.R. No. 74236. November 27, 1987
SEVERO M. PUCAN, ROBERT A. JEREZ, JR. AND ALFREDO C. ANTONIO, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. EDUARDO R. BENGZON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL…
FERNAN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the
jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court over an action for damages and
prohibition arising from alleged questionable acts of officials of the Ministry
of Labor and Employment in the execution of a decision of the Minister of
Labor.
The record shows that on April 1, 1981, the then Minister of
Labor and Employment, Blas F. Ople, issued a resolution in a case entitled
“Drivers, Conductors and Mechanics of Saulog Transit, represented by
their leader, Robert Arevalo, complainants vs. Saulog Transit, Inc.,
respondents”. Upon motion for
reconsideration filed by Saulog Transit, Inc., Minister Ople rendered a
decision on January 20, 1982 modifying his previous resolution. Its dispositive portion reads:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution dated 1 April 1981
is hereby modified and the following are hereby ordered:
1. For the respondent to pay the 13th month pay
of the mechanics and other employees who are not paid on purely commission
basis if they have served for at least one [1] month within the calendar year
and their monthly salary does not exceed P1,000.00;
2. For the respondent to pay the drivers and
conductors paid on purely commission basis the allowances under P.D. 525, 1123,
1678 and 1713, if their total monthly earnings do not exceed the salary ceiling
set by the respective decrees and whose right thereto has not yet
prescribed. Respondent, however, shall
pay all the mechanics and other employees who are not paid on purely commission
basis all the allowances under all the decrees;
3. For the drivers and conductors to share with
the respondent the responsibility of cleaning/washing the bus;
4. For management to faithfully comply with the
rates of wages as agreed upon and provided for in the Supplemental Collective
Bargaining Agreement executed on 15 January 1979, the pertinent portions of
which were quoted earlier in this decision; and
5. All strikers who refused to comply with the
return-to-work orders of 29 January 1981 and 19 February 1981 are hereby deemed
to have abandoned their work and those who reported for work but were refused
admission by management be immediately admitted back to work.
SO DECIDED.”[1]
On appeal, the Office of the President affirmed the decision of
Minister Ople. Elevated to this Court
on petition for certiorari, the questioned decisions of both Minister
Ople and Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs Manuel M. Lazaro, were
likewise affirmed.[2]
On December 18, 1984, Director Severo M. Pucan of the Ministry of
Labor and Employment, National Capital Region, issued an alias writ of
execution directing the sheriff of the Ministry to require Saulog Transit, Inc.
to pay the complaining drivers and conductors the amount of P3,702,672.00
representing their emergency cost of living allowance [ECOLA] under
Presidential Decree Nos. 525, 1123, 1678 and 1713.
According to private respondent herein, pursuant to said writ,
Acting Deputy Sheriff Alfredo C. Antonio, Jr., tried to garnish and levy Saulog
Transit, Inc.’s office equipment and properties to satisfy the judgment. Sheriff Antonio desisted from carrying out
the directive of the writ after Saulog Transit, Inc.’s personnel manager had
asked him to specify who were the complainants and how much each of them were
entitled to received under the judgment considering that it had already been
satisfied with respect to some complainants.
Thereafter, Saulog Transit, Inc. filed an urgent motion to quash
or recall the writ of execution on the grounds that the decision sought to be
enforced being conditional, the persons seeking its enforcement must show that
they had satisfactorily met the terms and conditions set therein; that the
writ was issued without notice and hearing; that the judgment debt sought to
be enforced had been paid; and that the decision being vague and indefinite, it
is incapable of execution and therefore, no valid writ could be issued to
execute it.
After the complaining employees had filed their opposition
thereto and Saulog Transit, Inc. had traversed it through a reply, the hearing
officer, Robert A. Jerez, Jr., set the motion to quash for hearing. However, said hearing was not conducted
because the complaining employees did not present evidence as to who among them
were still entitled to be paid, and the hearing room was turned into a virtual
market place by the presence of around fifty persons insisting that the writ be
immediately enforced.
In his order of February 12, 1985, Director Pucan stated that
Saulog Transit, Inc. was not afforded procedural due process with respect to
the computation of the monetary award. Hence, he directed Saulog Transit, Inc. to produce documentary evidence
to contest the complainants-awardees’ claims.
Alleging that it had not been furnished with a copy of the
computations of the “judgment award”, Saulog Transit, Inc. filed a
motion for clarification with a prayer that it be granted a period of thirty
days from receipt of said computation within which to submit the required
documentary evidence.
Without acting on said motion, Director Pucan issued another writ
of execution on March 1, 1985.[3]
On the strength of said writ, Sheriff Antonio served upon Saulog Transit, Inc.
notices of garnishment of its deposits in the Bank of Philippine Islands in
Quirino Avenue, Parañaque, Metro Manila and in the Philippine Banking
Corporation in Pasay City. He also
publicly announced to the drivers and conductors barricading the premises of
the MOLE Building in Intramuros, Manila that he would take possession of the
buses of Saulog Transit, Inc. the following week.
Three days later, Saulog Transit, Inc. filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, a petition for damages and prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction against Director
Pucan, Robert A. Jerez, Jr., Deputy Sheriff Antonio and Robert Arevalo. It attributed abuse of discretion tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction to the respondent public officials for enforcing the
allegedly void writ of execution. It
prayed for the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages “as may be
proved” during the trial plus attorney’s fees of P50,000.[4]
Finding an “immediate need” to restrain the respondents
from implementing the alias writ of execution, the lower court set a date for
hearing whereby the respondents would appear and show cause why the injunction
prayed for should not be granted. It
ordered the respondents to answer the petition and, in the meantime, directed
Sheriff Antonio and all persons acting in his behalf to “refrain and
desist from implementing the alias writ of execution issued on March 1,
1985”.[5]
After the hearing and upon posting by Saulog Transit, Inc. of a
bond of P500,000, the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.[6]
Thereafter, the respondent public officials filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on three grounds. First, the lower court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the
action or suit. Under Section 21 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in conjunction with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, regional trial courts may issue a writ of prohibition only if said writ
is directed to an inferior court. Since
respondents whose acts were being questioned are not inferior courts, the
regional trial court cannot take cognizance of the petition. Moreover, under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, not even the Intermediate Appellate Court has jurisdiction over
decisions and orders issued pursuant to the provisions of the Labor Code. In actual practice, labor cases are reviewed
by this Court.
Second, the petition states no cause of action. If the Ministry officials’ acts were
improper or illegal, Saulog Transit, Inc.’s recourse should have been to
question said acts before the Minister of Labor who issued the decision being
enforced. Hence, Saulog Transit, Inc.
has no cause of action as it has not exhausted all administrative remedies.
Third, the proceeding is barred by Section 255 of the Labor Code
which states:
“ART. 255. Injunctions
prohibited. – No temporary or permanent
injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor
disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity.”
On November 11, 1985, the lower court denied the motion to
dismiss the petition.[7]
Hence, the respondent public officials a quo filed the
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order raising the same grounds averred in their
motion to dismiss the petition for damages and prohibition below.
The petition is impressed with merit.
A perusal of the petition for damages and prohibition filed by
Saulog Transit, Inc. in the lower court reveals that basically, what was being
questioned was the legality or propriety of the alias writ of execution dated
March 1, 1985, as well as the acts performed by the Ministry officials in
implementing the same. In other words,
the petition was actually in the nature of a motion to quash the writ; and with
respect to the acts of the Ministry officials, a case growing out of a labor
dispute, as the acts complained of, were perpetrated during the execution of a
decision of the then Minister of Labor and Employment. However characterized, jurisdiction over
the petition pertains to the Labor Ministry, now Department and not the regular
courts. This conclusion is evident, not
only from the provisions of Article 224 [b] of the Labor Code, but also of
Article 218, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 227 in connection with Article
255 of the same Code.
As a petition to quash the writ, Saulog Transit, Inc. should have
been guided by the procedure it followed in filing its earlier motion to quash
the writ of execution dated December 18, 1984. Whatever irregularities that may have attended the issuance of the alias
writ of execution of March 1, 1985 should have been referred to the same
administrative official or tribunal which rendered the decision being executed,
pursuant to Article 244 [b] of the Labor Code, which provides that “the
Secretary of Labor, the Commission and the Director of Labor Relations may
appoint sheriffs and take any measure under existing
laws, decrees and general orders as may
be necessary to ensure compliance with
their decisions, orders or awards x x
x” [Underscoring supplied]. Indeed, Saulog Transit, Inc. should have realized that despite the
finality of the decision of the Minister of Labor, he retained control over its
execution and implementation, so that resort to the regular courts,
particularly one of co-equal rank, would be an untenable recourse.
Apparently, Saulog Transit, Inc. was misled by its own prayer for
actual, moral and exemplary damages. It
believed that such additional cause of action could clothe the petition with
the mantle of a regular action cognizable by the regular courts. It was, of course, mistaken for the fact
remains that the acts complained of are mere incidents of a labor dispute. Such prayer therefore did not alter the
complexion of the case as one arising from a labor dispute, but was subsumed by
the nature of the main case, over which the regular courts had no jurisdiction,
much less the power to issue a temporary or permanent injunction or restraining
order. Thus, Article 255 of the Labor
Code categorically provides:
“Art. 255. Injunction
prohibited. – No temporary or
permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out
of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity, except as
otherwise provided in Articles 218 and 264 of this Code.”
On the other hand, Article 218 of the same Code as amended, reads:
“Art. 218. Powers
of the Commission. – The Commission shall have the power and authority:
x x x x
x x x
x x
[e] To enjoin or restrain any actual
or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful
acts in any labor dispute, which if not
restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or
render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party x x x”
[Underscoring supplied].
The broad powers granted to the Labor Department and/or the
National Labor Relations Commission by Articles 224 and 218 can only be
interpreted as vesting in said agencies jurisdiction over incidents arising
from, in connection with or relating to labor disputes, as the controversy
under consideration, to the exclusion of the regular courts.
In the instant case, before assuming jurisdiction over the
petition for damages and prohibition, the lower court should have considered
the following criterion: “whether
the acts complained of arose out of, or are connected or interwoven with the
cases which fall within the exclusive jurisdiction” of the labor arbiter
or the National Labor Relations Commission.[8]
Had this been done, the instant petition would not have prospered.
The execution of the decision of the Minister, now Secretary of Labor
and Employment has been unduly delayed. To refer the petition of Saulog Transit, Inc. to the Labor Department
for adjudication would work more hardship to the employees of private
respondent. It is therefore imperative
that said procedure be dispensed with, without prejudice, however, to the
right of Saulog Transit, Inc. to file the proper administrative, civil or criminal
charges against the officials involved if so warranted, before the proper
forum. Meanwhile, the amount of
emergency cost of living allowance or whatever monetary awards are due the
employees under the decision should be recomputed immediately by the Department
of Labor & Employment with notice to the parties and/or their
representatives. The proceeding shall
be conducted in such manner as to entitle all parties to due process of
law. The Department officials concerned
shall see to the proper implementation of the writ of execution that, as a
matter of course, shall be issued after such recomputation.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is hereby granted and the lower court is permanently enjoined from
acting on the petition for damages and prohibition in Civil Case No. 85-29542.
The Department of Labor and Employment is hereby directed to
immediately recompute the monetary awards granted to the employees of Saulog
Transit, Inc. in the decision of its former Minister, as affirmed by the Office
of the President and this Court, and to execute said decision in accordance
with law.
This decision is without prejudice to the right of Saulog
Transit, Inc. to file such administrative, civil or criminal charges as may be
warranted under the circumstances against the alleged erring officials of the
Minister of Labor and Employment before the proper forum.
Costs against private respondent Saulog Transit, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr.,
Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, p. 30
[2]
Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Lazaro, G.R. No. 63284, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA
591, Gutierrez, Jr., J., ponente
[3]
Rollo, p. 95
[4]
Civil Case No. 85-29542
[5]
Rollo, pp. 47-48
[6]
Rollo, pp. 81-82
[7]
Rollo, p. 55
[8]
Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana vs. Sarmiento, L-47853,
November 16, 1984, 133 SCRA 220, 233